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2Abstract
This thesis addresses the German position in the negotiations on the British proposal for a Europe- 
wide free trade area, on the acceleration of the tariff schedule of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1960, the formation of EFTA, and the first British application for membership of the EEC. 
To do this it analyses the attitudes, interests and lobbying efforts of German industry, West 
Germany's European policy from 1957 to 1963 after the establishment of the EEC and industrial 
influence on the respective decisions by the Federal Government. The main focus is on the trade 
relations with Western European countries outside the EEC.
Previous historiography has stressed the overriding German economic interest in and 
corresponding industrial pressures for avoiding trade discrimination by the EEC vis-a-vis the other 
European members of the OEEC/OECD. It has however failed to address the problem that, despite 
an alleged political consensus in line with these economic interests, Chancellor Adenauer was able to 
deliver a policy precluding the Europe-wide solution demanded by parliament, German business, and 
Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of Economics. It seems to suggest that this policy outcome was mainly 
a function of Adenauer’s personal authority and his constitutional prerogatives as Chancellor.
In order to address this central problem, the thesis examines industrial interests at the 
sectoral level. These are analysed on the basis of a quantitative study of sectoral foreign trade in 
manufactured products with the countries of EEC and EFTA respectively in the 1950s and 1960s. 
From other sources it examines the influence which German industry exerted on government policy 
towards European economic integration. This reveals that industrial interest at the sectoral level in 
fact gave rise to lobbying pressures for the policy outcome sought by Adenauer, to prevent the large 
Europe-wide free trade area and to prevent British accession to the EEC. The quantitative analysis 
shows that for those sectors in favour of the proposed free trade area and British accession the 
opportunity costs of the failure of these two projects were practically invisible. For sectors in decline 
and in structural difficulties, on the other hand, both these projects constituted a major threat. The 
EEC of the Six, however, offered them not only protection against competition from outside, but at 
the same time considerable export opportunities, particularly in the French and Italian markets.
The intra-govemmental power struggle over these issues is analysed first with regard to 
industrial pressure and second to the international framework and the respective constraints and 
opportunities it provided for domestic policy makers in West Germany. The eventual policy outcome 
is explained in three dimensions: first in terms of the particular structure of industrial interest and 
respective pressures; second an alliance between protectionist interests and the specific political 
agenda of the head of the executive; third in terms of opportunities for the Federal Chancellor arising 
from the interplay of policy and power at the international level. It is argued that this is a more 
convincing interpretation and more securely based on the historical evidence.
3Table of Contents
ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................2




1 GERM AN INDUSTRIAL INTEREST AND THE FREE TRADE AREA
ISSUE
TH E THEORETICAL FRAM EW O RK............................................................................ 15
1.1 Customs union theory and the free trade area issu e .....................................17
Theoretical criteria for assessing the effects o f customs unions and free trade
areas..........................................................................................................................17
Empirical studies on the impact o f EEC and EFTA on trade...................................... 29
1.2 Interest groups and  collective action in the democratic state.............. 32
Interests and their chances for successful representation.......................................35
Interest groups and the state ................................................................................... 38
Neo-corporatism, meso-corporatism and policy networks.......................................44
1.3 International negotiations and domestic politics...........................................48
2 POLITICAL AND SOCIETAL CHOICES IN "ADENAUER'S
KANZLERDEMOKRATIE"
W EST GERM AN DEM OCRACY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
1957-1963 ..................................................................................................................................... 56
2.1 German Industry and  the Choice Against the
Free Trade Area Option........................................................................................................56
The essential questions.............................................................................................56
The role o f the BDI.................................................................................................. 61
2 .2  W ho Governs in A denauer's "Kanzlerdemokratie"?
A denauer , Erhard, de Gaulle and the Free Trade A rea Is s u e ........................65
Konrad Adenauer..................................................................................................... 67
Ludwig Erhard..........................................................................................................................72
European integration: Erhard vs. Adenauer.....................................................................75
Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle and the Berlin-crises...................................79
2 .3  Personal Power Politics or Societal Choice? .................................................... 84
2 .4  The Political Influence of German Ind ustr y .................................................... 86
2 .5  The A ims of the Present St u d y .................................................................................. 90
43 LINKING EEC AND OEEC - GERMANY AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON 
A EUROPE-WIDE FTA IN THE MAUDLING COMMITTEE.......................... 92
3.1 The German position on the essential questions of an F T A ........................94
3.2 German industrial interest in the F T A ..........................................................   107
Who gains, who loses?...........................................................................................109
• Metal industry......................................................................................................I l l
• timber and timber processing and paper industries........................................... 115
• Stones and earths, marble, cement etc................................................................ 116
• Textiles................................................................................................................ 117
• Leather and shoe industry...................................................................................118
• Glass and ceramics............................................................................................. 118
• Electrical and mechanical engineering, car industry.........................................119
• Chemicals............................................................................................................ 120
What type o f FTA for German industry?................................................................121
3.3 Germany as a mediator between France and Br it a in .................................. 123
Germany and the British position in the Maudling negotiations..........................126
Germany and the French position in the Maudling negotiations..........................134
3.4 Co nclusions..................................................................................................................... 143
4 THE FTA CONCEPT ABANDONED - THE FAILURE OF THE 
MAUDLING NEGOTIATIONS, THE FORMATION OF EFTA AND THE 
HALLSTEIN PLAN FOR THE ACCELERATION OF THE EEC................. 145
4.1 The aftermath of the failure: can the FTA concept be saved? ..............149
Trade Discrimination on 1 January 1959 ............................................................. 149
Conflict with the Commission: West Germany retains the FTA concept............. 151
4 .2  The formation of EFTA and its expected impact on German trade . . . .  155
The fear o f the small free trade area..................................................................... 155
Sectoral trade with the Seven................................................................................. 160
4.3 German industry, the federal Government and  the Hallstein-Plan . 164
The acceleration proposals at the international level........................................... 165
German industry and the Hallstein Plan............................................................. ..169
The intra-Govemmental struggle over the Hallstein Plan.....................................174
The official German position on acceleration........................................................176
4 .4  Co nclu sio n s......................................................................................................................180
5 "BRIDGE BUILDING" BETWEEN EEC AND EFTA 1959-1961
FROM THE FTA PLAN TOWARDS THE CONCEPT OF A EUROPE-WIDE 
CUSTOMS UNION..................................................................................................183
5.1 Early German proposals for "bridge building" at the international 
LEVEL............................................................................................................................................184
Restating the FTA formula..................................................................................... 184
Short term and long term solutions in the German perspective........................... 189
5 .2  German industry and  the German concepts for "bridge building" in 
Eu r o p e .........................................................................................................................................193
5Academic and bureaucratic expertise in the international debate............................194
Sectoral interest and the debate on bridge building..................................................... 199
The customs union plan o f the BDI...................................................................................202
5.3 Mismanagement: The Muller-Armack-Plan as the BMWi 's panacea . .207
Anglo-German bilateral expert talks................................................................................208
The Miiller-Armack Plan: inner-bureaucratic brain-storming or blueprint for a 
workable European solution ? ...........................................................................................214
5 .4  Conclusions..................................................................................................................... 217
6 EEC , EFTA AND THE SECTORAL INTEREST OF GERM AN INDUSTRY  
THE QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE................................................................................219
6.1 Likely winners from the FTA and British accession - Machinery, 
Chemicals and Electrical engineering  .....................................................................220
Electrical engineering and electrical products...............................................................222
Chemical products.................................................................................................................226
Machinery................................................................................................................................ 229
6 .2  The potential losers from the FTA and British accession - Textiles, 




Paper and paper products...................................................................................................249
6.3 Co nclu sio n s..................................................................................................................... 253
7 ADENAUER, GERM AN INDUSTRY AND DE GAULLE'S VETO AGAINST  
BRITISH ACCESSION TO THE EEC ........................................................................... 259
7.1 The British application, France, Germany, and the common 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY............................................................................................................. 259
7 .2  G erm an in d u str ia l in te r e s t  and th e  prospect o f  B ritish  a c c e ss io n  t o  
th e  EEC .......................................................................................................................................271





- Iron alloys............................................................................................................................. 291
• Wood pulp and newsprint.................................................................................................292
• Asbestos and asbestos processing industry..................................................................293
• Coal and Steel..................................................................................................................... 295
The German position on the main industrial issues o f the negotiations.................296
7.3 A denauer, German industry and de Gaulle's v e t o ..................................... 303
The political establishment united against Adenauer.................................................. 306
The BDI and British accession to the EEC .....................................................................311
The German delegation: liberal rhetoric and protectionist positions......................316
6Adenauer endorses de Gaulle's «Non!»: German coal, textiles and agriculture, the 
failure o f the accession negotiations and the ratification of the Ely see treaty.... 321 
1. 4 C o n c lu s io n s ..................................................................................................................... 328
8 CONCLUSIONS: GERMANY’S DECISION AGAINST THE 
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EEC...........................................................................331
8.1 T he P o l i t i c a l  D ecision  a g a in st th e  F ree T rade A rea  and  B ritish  
A ccess io n  t o  t h e  E E C .......................................................................................................... 333
8.2 G erm an I n d u s tr ia l I n te r e s t  in th e  FTA p ro jec t and  B ritish  a cce ss io n  
t o  THE EEC 1957-1963 ............................................................................................ 337
8.3 In d u s tr ia l I n te r e s t  R ep resen ta tion  and  th e  S ta te  o f  th e  
"K anzlerdem okratie"  in th e  F e d e r a l R epublic o f  G erm any in t h e  e a r ly  
1960s.............................................        341
9 B IB L IO G R A P H Y ...........................................................................................347
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 4 .......................................................................................374
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 6 .......................................................................................384
LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................ 507
LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................... 520
7Acknowledgments
There are numerous people to whom I am grateful for support in writing this thesis. 
Above all I want to thank my supervisor Professor Alan Milward for his continuous 
encouragement, support and advice without which this thesis would not have been 
written.
I also wish to thank members of staff of the Department of Economic 
History at the London School of Economics. In particular, I wish to thank the 
Convener Mr. Dudley Baines, Dr. Paul Johnson, Dr. Peter Howlett and Dr. Max 
Schulze for support and encouragement and for their comments on my work at an 
early stage. Dr. Max Schulze also provided valuable advice on the quantitative 
chapter. I am very grateful to Linda Sampson for her help and encouragement. I 
wish to thank my fellow students in the department, in particular, Martha Morris, 
Rajiv Ball, and Dr. Simon Niziol, who have corrected the most blatant errors in my 
English.
I am grateful to Professor Lothar Kettenacker and Professor Peter Wende of 
the German Historical Institute, London and to scholars and students there for 
giving me the opportunity to present my work and for their comments. I also wish 
to thank the staff of the various archives where I have worked, in particular at the 
Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, the Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes, Bonn and 
the EEC and OECD Archives, Florence.
I wish to acknowledge the financial support from the Deutscher 
Akademischer Austauschdienst, Bonn, the German Historical Institute, London, the 
Fondation Robert Schuman, Paris and the Erasmus Programme. I also wish to thank 
the Economic History Society and the London School of Economics for the Micheal 
Postan Award.
I am particularly grateful to my friend Stefan Gemer for his support. 
Without his great generosity work on this thesis would have come to a halt at 
several stages. I would also like to thank all my other friends for their help, 
company and friendship during these years in London.
Finally, I wish to thank my parents for their love and constant support and 
encouragement during these three years and the three decades of my life.
8Abbreviations
AA Auswartiges Amt
ABCC Association of British Chambers of Commerce
ACDP Archiv fur Christlich-Demokratische Politik
AHC - CCE Archives Historiques de la Commission - Commission de la
Communaute Europeenne
AN Assemblee nationale
AVI Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Eisen- und Metall Verarbeitenden Industrie
BA Bundesarchiv
BAC Bruxelles Archives Centrales
BAW Bundesamt fur Gewerbliche Wirtschaft
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie
BHDI Bibliothek Haus der Deutschen Industrie
BMELF Bundesministerium fur Emahrung Landwirtschaft und Forsten
BMFin Bundesministerium der Finanzen
BMW! Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft
CCP Common commercial policy
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union
CEMT Conference Europeenne des Ministres de Transport
CET Common external tariff
CM Common market
CNPF Conseil National du Patronat Frangais




DIHT Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag
EBM Eisen, Blech und Metall Verarbeitende Industrie
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FBI Federation of British Industry
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
FHZ Freihandelszone (free trade area)
FO Foreign Office
FTA Free trade area
HAGHH Historisches Archiv der Gutehoffhungshutte
HDI Haus der Deutschen Industrie
HZ Historische Zeitschrift
JOCE Journal Officiel des Communautes Europeennes
KCA Kessings' Contemporary Archives
MAC Mutual Aid Committee
MAE Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres
9MAE-AD Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres - Archives Diplomatiques
MEF Ministere des Affaires Economiques et de Finances
NZZ Neue Zurcher Zeitung
ORGALIME Organisme de Liaison des Industries Metalliques Europeennes
PA Politisches Archiv (Auswartiges Amt)
PEP Political and Economic Planning
PRO Public Record Office
PTOM Pays et Territoires d'Outre-mer
REI Rat der Europaischen Industrieverbande
RWW Rheinisch-Westfalisches Wirtschaftsarchiv
SEU Simple economic union
SITC Standard International Trade Classification
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
TOM Territoire d'outre-mer
VDMA Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten e.V.
VfZG Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte
VWD Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste
ZVEI Zentralverband der Elektroindustrie
10
introduction
In the early stages after the formation of the European Economic Community the 
fate and future relevance of that new organisation were far from clear. A great 
effort had indeed been made by the six countries which had signed the Treaties of 
Rome in working out this balanced compromise for the establishment of a customs 
union and a common market in the near future. Yet it was by no means certain that 
some of these six countries might not develop second thoughts about the desirability 
of the entire project in terms of political or economic costs and benefits. In West 
Germany many were eager to supplement the envisaged common market with a free 
trade area that was to encompass all other member countries of the OEEC. For 
German industry in particular, the EEC was not the most desired framework of 
activities. Many industrialists and their respective associations had accepted the EEC 
without resistance because they expected that the Paris negotiations on a Europe- 
wide free trade area were bound to succeed. On British initiative these negotiations 
had begun in the autumn of 1957.
Among the member countries of the EEC Germany was and remained the 
strongest advocate of the free trade area. When the negotiations broke down at the 
end of 1958, the Germans tried to keep the momentum for a Europe-wide solution 
with the principal aim of securing the British market for German industry. The 
German attempts at "building a bridge" between EEC and EFTA, and their stance 
in favour of British membership of the EEC in the negotiations after 1961 were 
clear signs of this. The apparent domestic support in favour of this policy was 
overwhelming. One could indeed suggest that public opinion, organised industrial 
and labour interests as well as all segments of the political system, parties, 
parliament and cabinet alike, all supported the free trade area and, later on, British 
accession to the EEC. Given this seemingly unanimous support for these options it 
remains hard to understand why and how the federal chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
could accept the failure of these plans on the international level without any visible 
resistance on his part, and without facing major problems at home as a result of the 
silent acceptance of this failure.
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The group most affected and most concerned with these matters of foreign 
economic policy was obviously the German business community. German industry 
in particular kept pushing strongly in order to obtain the free trade area in one form 
or another. Consequently, industrial associations brought strong pressure to bear in 
this respect on the leadership of the federal government. In the context of this 
analysis, which is concerned mainly with the relationship between industry and 
government in the decision making process on the "free trade area issue" (as the 
whole complex of negotiations, debates and concepts relating to Britain and the EEC 
1957 to 1963 is called here), the theory of interest groups will be an essential tool in 
order to assess the potential and actual industrial influence on government decision 
making. The nature and concrete forms of industrial interest in foreign economic 
policy as such are likely to reveal to a certain extent their chances of being 
successfully represented to the Federal Government when seen in the light of the 
theoretical assumptions about collective action. The thesis therefore continues a 
theoretical and empirical approach to the impact of economic integration, be it by 
customs unions and free trade areas, in order to identify the effects on German 
industry of having or not having the free trade area as a supplement to the EEC. 
The theoretical work on customs unions gives some tentative estimates as to the 
overall welfare effect of these different options on the West German economy, 
while the empirical studies do this for individual industrial sectors.
A second determining factor for the success of any attempt by pressure 
groups to influence government decision making, apart from the relative strength of 
the groups themselves, is the nature of the system of interest representation. The 
probable outcome of lobbying within an ideal type pluralist system of competitive 
pressure groups is bound to be very different from the outcome to be expected in a 
corporatist system with strong institutionalised ties between government agencies 
and interest associations. Thus the institutional structure of the interest groups 
themselves, of the political system and the system of interest representation in 
Germany at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s is delineated as a 
frame for the present study. Finally, the analysis put forward cannot disregard the 
fact that the main forum of government action concerned here was the international 
scene and more precisely a set of more or less continuous international negotiations.
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While there is no body of coherent theoretical literature which would make it 
possible to square the international aspects neatly with the domestic ones, more 
recent publications in international relations have made rather promising attempts at 
formulating models that allow us to integrate some important features from both 
sides of the coin. The focus of this literature has been the position of the chief 
executive and the constraints and opportunities with which the holder of this 
position is faced as a consequence of acting simultaneously on both levels.
The existing literature on Germany's position in the early stages of the EEC 
has ignored a very obvious inconsistency between two features of the free trade area 
debate in Germany. On the one hand, there is the fact that the free trade area option 
enjoyed unanimous domestic support from all sides in the Bundestag and was 
advocated with particular fervour by German industry as well as by the Minister of 
Economics. On the other hand there is the strong impression that the federal 
government pursued this option without throwing its full weight behind it, and 
indeed accepted its failure at the international level without resisting this outcome. 
Given the extremely strong domestic support for the free trade area option it has to 
be explained why the top political leadership, the federal chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer, did not pursue this line of policy with the required force. Moreover, it 
will have to be explained how it was possible for the chancellor to conduct a policy 
that seemed to be effectively in contradiction with the express wishes and 
resolutions of the Bundestag and clearly with the strong parallel pressures coming 
from the powerful West German industry federation.
The answer put forward by the existing historical and political science 
literature is anything but satisfactory. There it is said, or implied, that only political 
considerations mattered and that Adenauer commanded so much personal authority 
in the realm of foreign policy as to be able to impose his decisions practically at 
will. The literature hardly ever sets out to explore the actual importance of 
economic and commercial factors and the corresponding pressures from groups of 
producers on the government. Nor does it make the attempt to analyse the structural 
elements of power in the relationship of the top government level and the most 
influential interest groups in the question of the free trade area. Because a good part 
of the literature seems to implicitly assume that European integration was destined
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to come about in the form of the EEC, the free trade area problem has been widely 
regarded as a "non-issue" or at best as a futile attempt by the British and some of 
their allies in Germany to derail the train of integration from its "proper" track. In 
view of this line of thought, the neglect by the literature of the problem sketched out 
above is not so surprising. However, the underlying assumption, according to which 
European integration was already safely on its way to achieving the common market 
at the beginning of the 1960s, must be challenged. In this respect, it is the free trade 
area issue which must be seen as the crucial decision in the case of Germany.
Until at least 1963, the so-called small-European solution ("kleineuropaische 
Losung") of the EEC of the Six had not been accepted in Germany without the 
supplement of a wider multilateral European framework of free trade. German 
industry was the major factor in keeping the momentum of this debate throughout 
the period after the signing of the Treaties of Rome. The fact that the debate and the 
pressure from German industry seemed to die down in 1963 needs to be explained. 
Why was it that at this point German industrial interests ceased to pursue their view 
of how the EEC should look with as much vigour as before? Was it out of 
resignation in the face of the political realities established by de Gaulle and 
Adenauer? Or was it that by then German industry had made its peace with the EEC 
and started to enjoy the Community's advantages? The answer to these questions 
cannot be derived from the findings of the existing literature, which has tended to 
ignore the role of economic interests and failed to analyse its impact on Germany's 
European policy.
One assumption of this analysis is that within the existing climate of overall 
strong support for the free trade area and subsequently for British accession to the 
EEC, a united front of industrial interest would have been able to force the West 
German government into a tougher position on the international level and thereby to 
generate a more favourable outcome for German industry. That this did not come 
about cannot only be attributable to the supreme will of the most powerful 
individual political actor on the German scene, i. e. Adenauer, as is suggested by
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some of the literature1. Rather more detailed analyses will be necessary to answer 
this question.
Was German industry really united in its efforts? If there were diverging 
interests within industry, how powerful were their respective associations? How 
good were their connections to the executive, the bureacracy and the chancellor 
himself? Was the government bureaucracy divided or unified in these matters? To 
what extent was the chancellor able to offset competing domestic interests against 
each other and against real or pretended constraints on the international level? These 
are the questions that might eventually lead to a more profound assessment of the 
free trade area issue in Germany. It cannot be denied that this issue was ranking 
high on the political agenda of the Federal Republic for a good number of years. If 
anything, this can be taken as a clear indication of its importance and of the fact that 
an option different from the one which finally prevailed was being very seriously 
considered within the political system of the Federal Republic. The analysis of this 
decision making process is likely to yield more than an answer to the question 
concerning the inaction of the federal government on the matter of the free trade 
area issue. It should also yield an insight into the state of the system of interest 
representation, the power of interest groups and its determinants in the institutions 
of the German political system towards the close of the Adenauer era. In the end the 
analysis comes to the conclusion that the German acceptance of the European 
Economic Community was only sealed effectively once the defeat of the free trade 
area plan was irreversible, and once this defeat had been finally accepted by the 
advocates of that option in German industry and their allies and agents in politics.
See Groeben , Hans von der : Aufbaujahre der Europaischen Gemeinschaft. Das Ringen 
um den Gemeinsamen Markt und die Politische Union (1958-1966). Baden-Baden 1982, p. 
75; M arjolin , Robert: Le travail d'une vie. Memoires 1911-1986. Paris 1986, p. 307; 
Charles Wighton sees .Adenauer as an autocrat surrounded by subservient characters in the 
cabinet, party and in .parliament. See W ighton , Charles: Adenauer - Democratic 
Dictator. A Critical Biography. London 1963, pp. 13-15.
1 German industrial interest and the free trade area 
issue 
The theoretical framework
The answer to the historical questions which have been formulated in the 
introduction requires a careful analysis that takes account of the existing 
historiography on the subject as well as of the theoretical concepts relating to it. The 
following discussion of a number of theoretical concepts, paradigms and analytical 
tools aims at highlighting the many factors that are likely to have played a role in 
German industry's attempt to influence the federal government's positions on the 
free trade area issue. The theoretical considerations presented here are not intended 
to serve as a blueprint for the study as a whole. Nevertheless, a sensible historical 
analysis of domestic policy formulation in the context of international negotiations 
and relating to foreign economic policy could not possibly do without being 
informed by the more important debates in customs union theory, modem political 
economy and theories of international relations. Moreover, negotiation analysis and 
bargaining theory have produced "metaphors" that can help analyse complex 
negotiating situations as those dealt with here.
The present analysis is primarily concerned with the influence of industrial 
pressure groups on a process of governmental decision making. The subject matter 
is foreign economic policy relating more specifically to economic integration. We 
are thus looking at the attempts by domestic groups to influence a state executive 
which is not only acting in response to these domestic pressures, but also to the 
constraints set by actors on the international scene. This international scene takes the 
shape of formal multilateral negotiations and bilateral contacts of a more informal 
nature. The two formal negotiation processes are envisaged to lead to a binding 
agreement on lasting conditions for the elimination of barriers to trade with a 
number of countries outside the EEC. These are, firstly, the negotiations in the 
Maudling committee for the establishment of a free trade area encompassing the 
states which are not members of the EEC and the EEC as one unit, and secondly, 
the negotiations on British accession to the EEC. Throughout both sets of
16
negotiations the member states of the EEC agreed to form common positions among 
themselves. In both cases the removal of quantitative restrictions (QR) and tariffs 
among the participating countries were the main points of attention. From the 
arrangements envisaged on the international level flow the corresponding concerns 
and interests by the domestic pressure groups in each participating country, and 
hence their respective activity in influencing their governments.
The interest groups concerned crucially depend on the information and 
consultation opportunities provided to them by the government bureaucracy. On the 
other hand, the government bureaucracy has to rely on the information provided by 
the interest groups in order to properly assess the effects of arrangements to be 
made in the international negotiations on the domestic economy. We have thus to 
consider primarily two levels of analysis: firstly, the domestic level on which the 
government bureaucracy interacts with domestic pressure groups and other 
influences within the political system; secondly, the international level on which the 
government is involved in negotiations with other governments. Since the 
government or the state can hardly be seen as a wholly unitary actor either on the 
domestic or the international level, the government itself must be considered as a 
third level of analysis. In other terms, the system of domestic interest 
representation, the international environment and the role of the state within the 
domestic political as well as in the international system have to be defined in order 
to establish the framework of the analysis. The theoretical tools needed to do so are 
found mainly in the theory of collective action, the literature on interest groups and 
their relationship with the state, as well as in more recent international relations 
literature trying to develop a mode of analysis capable of integrating domestic and 
international influences at a time.
While the aforementioned theories and sets of categories of analysis focus on 
the institutional and procedural features of the decision making process, the theory 
of customs unions and free trade areas is able to specify the nature of the expected 
interests that industrial pressure groups are likely to develop for the essential 
questions that would certainly be treated in any negotiations on a free trade area or 
on the accession of a major industrial producer to a customs union. Customs union 
theory has thus put forward general indications under which circumstances a
17
customs union or a free trade area would be preferable to an individual country. 
Some empirical studies in this field have tried to show the specific impact of the 
formation of the EEC and the division that occurred between the Community and 
the EFTA not only on the German economy as a whole but also on individual 
sectors. Studies of this nature might on the one hand have been considered by the 
actors involved in the decision making process at the time. On the other hand their 
results might indicate economic sectors with particularly great problems where one 
hence would expect to find a high level of interest group activity.
1.1 Customs union theory and the free trade area issue
Theoretical criteria for assessing the effects of customs unions and free trade 
areas
As has just been said, one use of customs union theory in the context of this analysis 
is^to||clearly Refine) the nature of the interests that were going to be defended or 
promoted by the industrial pressure groups during the negotiations of the Maudling 
committee, the deliberations on how a bridge could be built between EEC and 
EFTA, and finally, during the negotiations on the accession of the United Kingdom 
to the EEC. The theory provides the definitions of customs unions and free trade 
areas and shows how both arrangements can have very different effects depending 
on how particular variables of their construction are worked out in practice. These 
considerations have to be seen in connection with the decisions that were to be taken 
in the two international negotiation processes. In the first case, the objective was to 
include a customs union that already existed as one unit into a free trade area with 
the other members of the OEEC. In the second case, with the United Kingdom, a 
major industrial producer and at the same time a major consumer of agricultural 
products was to be included into the existing customs union, with the understanding 
that the other members of EFTA would also in their majority be included. The 
scientific exchange about customs unions and free trade areas in the 1950s is also 
likely to have been the major point of reference for the contemporary political 
debate of these issues. Hence the estimates given by that literature as to the
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desirability of the different options considered since the beginning of the Maudling 
negotiations in 1957 have to be seen as the background of these discussions.
The pioneering study of customs union theory is the book written by Jacob 
V i n e r  in 19501. Viner was struck by the observation that free traders and 
protectionists seemed to agree in their favourable judgement of CUs as a tool for 
pursuing their contradicting motives and approaches towards the general rules 
governing international trade. He argued that a free trader could not reasonably be 
in favour of a CU, while the protectionist was right in regarding it as a tool to 
promote trade protection. Viner's view seems thus to have pre-shaped a good deal 
of the debate on free trade and economic integration that was conducted throughout 
the 1950s and during the free trade area negotiations in particular. In broad terms, 
Ludwig Erhard seems consistently to have been following this line of thought in the 
struggle about the free trade area issue within the German Cabinet, in associating 
the concept of a CU with protectionism and that of a free trade area with free trade 
in general.
Viner defines a CU by the complete (not just partial) elimination of tariffs 
between member states, the existence of a uniform outside tariff and the 
apportionment of customs revenue between the member countries2. He analyses the 
effect of a CU with two members for the individual member states, for both 
members together, for the outside world and the world as a whole. While the 
overall effect has been the main concern of CU theory, in the present case the focus 
is on the effects for one single country. With the terms "trade creation" and "trade 
diversion" Viner provided the key concepts for CU theory. Trade creation denotes a 
consequence of union formation leading to a shift in the locus of production from a 
high-cost to a lower cost source of supply. Trade diversion denotes the opposite 
shift of the locus of production. Viner also pointed to economies of scale as a 
possible factor, but did not think its impact to have any greater significance in the 
absence of the mobility of production factors (common market). A pure expansion 
of the sales market was thus not seen as sufficient for bringing about an increase in 
the scale of the national economy. However, these considerations matter mainly for
V in e r , Jacob : The Customs Union Issue, (London, New York 1950), pp. 41-81.
V in er , CU Issue, p. 5.
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smaller economies, whereas, as Viner implies, they do not really apply to larger 
economies where optimum scale can be reached in any industry3.
As far as he provides criteria for assessing the impact of a CU Viner's work 
seems to be quite relevant for our question, since it is most likely (and was certainly 
seen so at the time when the free trade area issue was discussed) that the inclusion 
of the EEC into a free trade area would have modified or "moderated” its character 
in a way as to make it more palatable to the "free-traders". Viner gives some 
criteria for a CU to be acceptable from a "free-trade position"4. According to Viner 
a "free-trader" would assess a customs union more favourably; 1) the larger the 
economic area and thus the potential scope for internal division of labour; 2) the 
lower the common external tariff (CET) of the CU in comparison with the average, 
level of tariffs before union, 3) the greater the degree of rivalry of high-cost 
products in different parts of the CU which were previously protected in both parts 
of the CU, 4) the greater the differences in unit-costs of production for protected 
industries of the same kind as between different parts of the CU, (i.e. the greater 
the economies to be derived from free trade within the CU), 5) the higher the tariff 
levels in potential export markets outside the union for commodities in which the 
CU would have a comparative advantage under free trade, and 6) the greater the 
range of protected industries for which an enlargement of the market would result in 
unit-costs lower than those at which the commodities could be imported from 
outside the CU. Viner is at pains to stress that there cannot be an a priori judgement 
of customs unions as such, but that the particular features of each existing union 
have to be weighed against each other.
His considerations of these factors and some analysis of the history of CUs 
in the 19th century bring him to the conclusion that if two countries A and B are to 
form a CU, and if country A is protectionist while B follows free trade principles, 
then B joins the CU only for political reasons. Viner emphasises the predominance 
of political reasons for joining a CU particularly for free-trade oriented large 
economies, while for small countries the economic factors are seen as the only
The question of economies of scale has been more profoundly analysed later. See Ow en , 
N icholas .Economies of Scale, Competitiveness and Trade Patterns within the European 
Community, Oxford 1983.
V in er , CU Issue, pp. 51-78.
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decisive ones. This argument also played a role in the debate over the EEC and the 
free trade area in Germany during the late 1950s and early 1960s. As has been 
mentioned above, almost everyone involved saw Germany's joining of the EEC as 
an economic sacrifice for political benefits. The establishment of the Europe-wide 
free trade area on the other hand was seen as diminishing that sacrifice or perhaps 
even as turning it also into an economic gain.
Free trade areas are barely mentioned in Viner's work, perhaps mainly 
because the term had only figured for the first time in the Havana Charter of the 
GATT in 1948 and an actual FTA had never existed. Viner holds that it would be 
much easier, to negotiate partial CUs or FTAs rather than a complete CU. His 
assessment of the prospects of customs unions is quite pessimistic. The reason for 
this might be the economic situation prevailing in Western Europe at the end of the 
1940s. A CU applying to all kinds of trade barriers between countries of 
comparative economic importance is completely unrealistic in Viner's view. He sees 
the only way forward in bilateral bargaining within a framework of multilateralism 
with the right of third countries to claim most favoured nation status. A CU, he 
says, would function only as a psychological barrier to the greater economic 
solution of a balanced mutual tariff reduction on a non discriminatory basis5. Given 
that the economic situation in Western Europe had changed considerably by the 
mid-1950s, it seems surprising that a good many of these points still made up the 
core arguments of the advocates of the free trade area and the opponents of the 
common market in Germany at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s.
While the essential contribution of Viner's study, the identification of trade 
creation and trade diversion as the main effects of regional economic integration, 
some features of the model he used have been criticised and altered in subsequent 
research by other authors like James E. M e a d e  writing in 19556 and Richard G. 
L i p s e y writing in 19707. Their main criticism was that Viner had overlooked the
Paul and Ronald Wonnacott show that membership of a customs union yields some welfare 
gains that cannot be obtained by unilateral non-preferential tariff reductions. See 
Wonnacott , Paul/W onnacott , Ro nald : "The Customs Union Issue Reopened. " In: 
Manchester School of Economic and Social Sciences 60 (1992), pp. 119-135.
Mea d e , James E.: The Theory of Customs Unions. Amsterdam 1955.
Lipsey , Richard  G.: The Theory o f Customs Unions: A General Equilibrium Analysis. 
(LSE Research Monographs, 7), London 1970.
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effect customs unions can have on consumption patterns and thereby on welfare. An 
additional criticism was that Viner, by assuming constant costs, had arrived at the 
conclusion that either trade creation or diversion would come about, while under the 
more realistic assumption of increasing costs both could be at work simultaneously8. 
Lipsey introduced welfare as determined by community indifference curves into the 
analysis. In his more complex general equilibrium model Lipsey differentiates inter­
country and inter-commodity substitution as additional welfare effects brought about 
by the introduction of a tariff. He points to the fact that changes in real prices make 
it extremely difficult to predict the impact that the establishment of a CU might 
have, while this can be done more easily where real prices are assumed to remain 
constant and changes in domestic market prices directly reflect the impact of tariffs. 
Some of his conclusions represent strong reservations about Viner1 s view that trade 
diversion has a consistently negative welfare effect. His analysis suggests that trade 
diversion, when taking into account the effects of inter-country an inter-commodity 
substitution, might in certain cases be associated with a shift from a higher to a 
lower real-cost source of supply for an individual country whose trade is being 
diverted, may lead to more trade even if it brings about a shift from a lower to a 
higher real cost source of supply, looking at the world as a whole it may result in 
more trade even though there might be less gain per unit of trade. Therefore, the 
assessment of negative effects on welfare from the establishment of a CU, according 
to Lipsey, is far less certain than assumed by Viner9. What seems the most 
important point apart from the refinement of the model is that Lipsey reinforces the 
findings of Viner and Meade that a priori judgements of customs unions are not 
possible.
While these authors tried to assess potential differentials of gains or losses 
between member countries, non- members and the world at large, Tibor 
S c i t o v s k y  has tried to come up with an estimate of the overall impact of the 
establishment of economic union within Western Europe in terms of a percentage
For a detailed discussion of the underlying assumptions in Viner's work see M ichaely ,
M ich a el : "The Assumptions of Jacob Viner's Theory of Customs Unions." In: Journal of 
International Economics 6 (1976), pp. 75-93.
Lepsey, Theory, p. 30.
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change in GNP10. One has to keep in mind that the object of his attention was not 
just a customs union or a free trade area, but a fully fledged economic union with 
complete factor mobility. The estimated gains of economic union in Western Europe 
that Scitovsky presents are so small as to suggest that the whole exercise of union 
formation is completely pointless from an economic perspective. In his view, the 
greatest gains to be expected would arise from increased competition which, he 
holds, could be achieved far more easily by other means than by establishing a 
complete economic union11.
It is clear that Scitovsky's basic assumptions about the role of economies of 
scale and the potential growth of intra-European trade through further integration 
soon proved to be entirely inappropriate for describing the reality of trade among 
highly industrialised countries12. It is certainly difficult to assess what influence 
works such as that of Scitovsky had on the political debate, but it is likely that they 
were considered by many to be state of the art scientific arguments in the debate 
about regional integration in Western Europe13.
It should not be surprising that the first more detailed theoretical analyses of 
free trade areas were not produced before the first such arrangement (EFTA) had 
been in operation for some time. The concepts of the precise nature of the 
arrangements were all but clear to most of those who debated the problem in the 
political arena of the late 1950s. It seems that the label "free trade" led people like 
Erhard and many others to the assumption that any free trade area was by definition 
going to be less discriminatory and more disposed to the development of world wide
Scitovsky , T ibor: Economic Theory and Western European Integration. London 1958, pp. 
67-70.
Scitovsky , Theory, p. 68.
For a discussion of the determinants of the growth of intra-trade within regions of highly 
industrialised countries and on the possible impact of regional integration see Ma izels , 
Alfr e d : Industrial Growth and World Trade. An Empirical Study of Trends in Production, 
Consumption and Trade in Manufactures from 1899-1959 with a Discussion of Probable 
Future Trends. (Economic and Social Studies, 21), Cambridge 1963, pp. 383-393, 415-417. 
See also Ow en , Nicholas: Economies of Scale, pp. 8-9; on the relevance of intra-industry 
trade in European integration see Jacquem in , Alexis/Sapir , An d re : "International Trade 
and Integration of the European Community. An Econometric Analysis. " In. European 
Economic Review 32 (1988), 1439-1449.
For a brief overview o f and a recent contribution to the core arguments o f the customs union 
debate since 1950 see WonnacottAVonnacott, Customs Union Issue, pp. 119-135.
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free trade than any customs union14. A clear general theoretical definition of a free 
trade area was lacking still long after EFT A had already been created. Hirofumi 
Shitaba seems to have provided the first such definition of a free trade area and its 
distinctions and similarities with a customs union in 196715.
Victoria C u r z o n reviewed CU theory and extended it to the study of the 
effects of an FTA16. On the basis of six varying models she compared the effects of 
a tariff averaging CU with those of an FTA under the same set of assumptions. Her 
general conclusion was that it is very difficult to imagine a situation where a tariff 
averaging CU is more trade creating and had a larger consumption effect than an 
FTA and that, even in such an extreme case, the negative effects of a CU in one 
member country would on the whole offset the benefits accruing to the other. 
Curzon therefore suggests that an FTA is either identical with or preferable to a 
tariff-averaging CU in terms of the static effects of integration17. A further 
advantage of an FTA is seen in the fact that the gains from integration are fairly 
well distributed since both partners (the analysis considers two countries only) gain. 
It has to be added however, that the static effects are expected to be very small, 
indeed almost negligible in any case. Thus, an advantage in terms of static gains as 
such is not a very convincing argument in favour of an FTA. The only real problem 
with the FTA would be the disadvantage of the distortions of production patterns 
due to tariff disparities on imports of raw materials and intermediate goods. Yet 
Curzon holds that the size of these distortions is in practice quite small and does not 
outweigh the positive political and economic aspects of the FTA solution. She 
suggests that a tariff averaging CU will only be chosen in preference to an FTA, if
It is interesting to note that already in the mid-1960s Murray Kemp suggested that there is a 
level of a common external tariff within a customs union that should render every member of 
the union better off while not impairing the welfare of the world at large. This proposition 
was taken up by other authors and presented again more rigorously by Kemp and Henry 
Wan in 1976. See Kem p , Murray C ./W a n , Henry Y.: "An Elementary Proposition 
Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions. " In: Journal of International Economics 6 
(1976), pp. 95-97.
Shitaba , H irofum i: The Theory of Economic Unions: A Comparative Analysis of Customs 
Unions Free Trade Areas, and Tax Unions. In: Shoup Carl S. [ed.]: Fiscal Harmonization in 
Common Markets. Vol. 1\ Theory. New York, London 1967, p. 145.
Cu rzo n , V ictoria: The Essentials of Economic Integration. Lessons of EFT A Experience, 
London 1974, pp. 253-285.
It should be borne in mind that the static effects are considered to be in all likelihood very 
small for both sorts of arrangements.
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the tariff disparities are of such size as to make the negative effects of production 
distortions outweigh the positive effects of an FTA18.
The principal difference between the effects of a CU and an FTA is seen in 
the "shifting effect" of the FTA which brings about more trade with the world's 
lowest cost producer after the formation of the FTA, while in the tariff averaging 
CU this trade is reduced after union. This "shifting effect" of the FTA, Curzon 
argues, makes an FTA equivalent to a CU which would take the lowest pre-union 
tariff as common external tariff. This effect is only possible because the assumed 
strict rules of origin in the FTA can only prevent direct re-exports while they cannot 
prevent indirect trade deflection via the "shifting effect" whereby insufficient FTA 
supply is made up for by imports from the lowest cost source from outside the FTA. 
The "shifting effect" is certain to be reduced by transport costs. Hence the FTA 
solution to economic integration is suggested only for non-regionally cohesive 
associations of countries, since only in the case of a certain geographical distance 
between the member states, they can actually retain effective sovereignty over their 
tariffs.
According to Curzon an FTA will inflict less damage on itself and third 
countries than a tariff averaging CU. The margin of superiority of the FTA will 
diminish if the CU adopts a CET lower than the average tariff before union. The 
FTA would lose this superiority at a point somewhere above a CET equal to the 
lowest tariffs before union, because of the distorting effect of tariff disparities on 
production. If agreement can only be reached on a CET equal to the higher tariffs 
before union then the CU would be highly trade-diverting an as undesirable as a 
highly production distorting FTA.
Shitaba1 s analyses of customs unions and free trade areas not only help the 
understanding of the economic implications of these arrangements, they also allow 
to relate the different forms of economic union to the pressures that are likely to 
occur from the side of producers and consumers and their interest groups within 
member countries if, in specific sets of circumstances, one or the other arrangement
18 See, C u rz o n , Essentials, p. 267.
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is chosen by political decision makers19. Shitaba focuses his analysis of free trade 
areas and customs unions on the operation of the specific rules governing the 
respective arrangements. He shows how strongly the character of these rules 
influences the general impact which a free trade area or a customs union will have 
on the welfare of consumers and producers. Since these considerations give 
attention to the range of options that exist within either arrangement and the effects 
that these options are likely to have, his study is particularly useful as a point of 
reference for the analysis of the negotiations on the free trade area that took place in 
1958 among the member countries of the OEEC. The questions addressed by 
Shitaba on a mainly theoretical level were most certainly discussed in a very 
practical way during these talks. It will be relevant to ask whether the players in 
these negotiations and in the talks on commercial arrangements between EEC and 
EFTA which followed later were aware of these sorts of concepts. The study is also 
relevant in that it helps identify arrangements and rules which are likely to lead to 
mechanisms which build up pressures forcing the lowering or the heightening of 
external tariffs of the type of economic union in question.
Shitaba sees the functional characteristics of any economic union as a "co­
ordinated reorientation of geographic discrimination" prescribed in the member 
states' tariff system20. He analyses four different types of economic unions: the 
simple economic union, the customs union, the free trade area and the tax union. In 
our context only the first three are relevant. Shitaba’s simple economic union is 
merely a theoretical construct, but is quite useful in highlighting certain 
misunderstandings prevailing during the discussions about the free trade area issue 
in the late 1950's. He defines the simple economic union (SEU) as an economic 
union formed with respect to tariffs on all trade between the member states, 
requiring the elimination of tariffs on trade between the members and the freedom 
of the latter to determine their tariffs with third countries21. The customs union is
Arye Hillmann provides a summary of models for political decisions on protective measures 
H illm an , A. L.: The Political Economy of Protection. New York 1989, on protection in 
representative democracies see especially pp. 43-53.
Shitaba , Hirofum i: The Theory of Economic Unions: A Comparative Analysis of Customs
Unions Free Trade Areas, and Tax Unions. In: Shoup Carl S. [ed.]: Fiscal Harmonization in 
Common Markets. Vol. T. Theory. New York, London 1967, p. 145.
Shitaba , Theory, p. 148.
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defined as an economic union with respect to tariffs on commodities traded among 
member states and on commodities traded between member states and third 
countries. The establishment of a common external tariff (CET) leads to an 
equalisation of the member states' discriminatory measures against third countries22. 
This is the main difference as compared to the free trade area. Shitaba defines it as 
an economic union formed with respect to tariffs on products originating in the 
territories of the participating countries. He points to the fact that most previous 
definitions of free trade areas, such as Balassa’s, denoted what Shitaba describes as 
SEU. Shitaba therefore stresses that a free trade area is more than an SEU23. The 
crucial difference is the handling of deflections of trade. Deflections of trade are 
defined as a "redirection of imports from third countries through the partner country 
with the lowest tariff with the sole aim of realising tax advantages by exploiting the 
rate differentials between member states within an economic union"24. While the 
danger of deflections of trade does not exist in a CU because of the CET, the fact 
that in a free trade area external tariffs of member countries can vary and can 
independently be changed, makes deflections of trade quite probable, if transport 
costs do not compensate for the differences in external tariffs on imports. In a free 
trade area, these risks of deflections of trade are countered by rules of origin which 
limit the free movement of goods to those originating from member countries or 
goods that are defined as being of area origin.
Therein lies the main difference between a CU and an FTA, in the measures 
taken in order to counter deflections of trade. In aiming at regional economic 
integration both arrangements discriminate against third countries. The SEU on the 
other hand would not do so. It could be described as a customs union with a CET at 
the level of the lowest pre-union tariff or as a free trade area without rules of origin. 
It is hence an approach to implement international economic integration on a global 
rather than a regional level. Deflections of trade will occur unhampered25.
In the discussions in the mid and late 1950's the concepts of free trade areas 
held by many actors on the international scene seem indeed to have been ones of
22 S h ita b a , Theory, p. 157.
23 S h ita b a , Theory, p. 172.
24 Shitaba , Theory, p. 151.
25 Shitaba , Theory, p. 174.
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simple economic unions as presented by Shitaba. Hence in the debate at that time 
the free trade area approach to regional integration was seen by some as a way of 
economic integration which would not cause discrimination and which served to 
promote the "free-traders'" views. In this understanding, a free trade area would not 
lead to a higher level of regional protection but eventually to the integration into the 
world market at lower protection levels than before the formation of such an 
arrangement. That this concept of free trade areas did not at all correspond to 
projects that could possibly be undertaken by governments with the support of 
domestic producers and their interest groups does not seem to have been commonly 
accepted by many at that time. Otherwise it would be hard to understand why 
Shitaba makes such a big thing of the point that both a CU and an FTA are 
acceptable to import-competing domestic manufacturers in the member countries 
because of the expectations to profit from the trade diversions caused by either 
arrangement giving them advantages over their competitors in third countries. It 
should be clear that in order to induce countries to join any kind of economic union, 
the direct losses of some manufacturers may have to be accompanied by direct gains 
of other manufacturers in each country so that the governments of the respective 
countries can obtain enough political support for their participation in the union26.
In the assessment of the rules governing a free trade area it is quite important 
to have some idea as to the effect that these rules will have on the development of 
the level of tariffs. It can be said that within an SEU, downward pressures on tariffs 
are likely to materialise while upward pressures are impossible. This does not 
necessarily hold true for free trade areas in the real world. Curzon's assertion that 
free trade areas will always be preferable over customs unions has to be seen with 
reservations. Curzon states herself that the importance of the shifting effect is at 
least partly offset by transport costs. This implies that a priori statements as to the 
welfare effects of free trade areas are impossible just as in the case of customs 
unions. The actual circumstances of any real world arrangement will have to be 
■v taken into account before. The geographical location of member countries in 
relation to each other is at least as important in this respect as the likely political
Shitaba , Theory, pp. 156, 176.
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pressures building up in response to changes in the competitive position of 
individual industries.
T ^ l i s ,  the free trade area does not necessarily have an advantage over a CU 
from the point of view of the world as a whole, as has been claimed. The argument 
has been that within a free trade area there are pressures to align tariffs with the 
lowest rates prevailing in other member states. Again, it is to be assumed that the 
problem with this argument is that it actually refers to a simple economic union 
which does not constitute a realistic form of a free trade area. With the three 
country model which Shitaba uses he shows convincingly that within a free trade 
area the tendency to lower tariffs in those member countries whose prices for a 
given product are higher than the new area price will run up against political 
pressures from producers' pressure groups once the level of an effective protective 
tariff has been reached. Further lowering of tariffs would be extremely unlikely. 
Shitaba concludes that a reduction toward the lowest tariff will not occur and that, if 
it were possible, measures of trade deflections would not be needed in the first 
place27.
For a CU or an FTA to be acceptable and to work fairly smoothly it is 
important whether the economies of the member countries are rather complementary 
or rather competitive in relation to each other. In the first case an FTA would be 
more appropriate, in the latter a CU. In the case of competitive economies there is a 
mutual interest of producers in the other member states external tariffs. If such an 
interest is given, it will usually lead to some joint control over tariffs or at least to 
some intervention in members' external tariff policies28. In the negotiations on the 
free trade area in 1958 one can see these mechanisms at work. The question to what 
extent the Council of the proposed free trade area should have a say in the decisions 
by individual member countries concerning their external tariffs constituted one of 
the major problems of the negotiations.
S h ita b a , Theory, p. 183.
S h i ta b a ,  Theory, p . 187.
29
Empirical studies on the impact of EEC and EFTA on trade
After the establishment of the EEC and the EFTA a number of authors have tried to 
apply customs union theory in order to assess trade creation and trade diversion that 
was caused through these arrangements of regional integration by analysing the 
actual changes in trade flows in Western Europe. Some of these authors also tried to 
come up with ex ante assessments of the likely impact of joining such a framework 
from the point of view of one country29. Other studies attempted to assess the 
impact of EEC and EFTA as a whole30. Four such studies had been done by the late 
1960s and early 1970s on the effects of the establishment of EFTA and EEC. One 
of them was done by the secretariat of GATT on changes in import trends in EEC 
and EFTA countries after the establishment of both organisations in order to 
measure the effect that economic integration had exerted on the economies of the 
member states31. Similar studies were conducted by Bela Balassa and by the EFTA 
secretariat32. Victoria Curzon has discussed these four analyses in the final chapter 
of her book on European integration33. Following the line of the studies by Balassa
Worswick, G. D. N. (ed.): The Free Trade Proposals. Oxford 1960; Th e  Economist 
Intelligence U n it : Britain and Europe. A Study of the Effects on British Manufacturing 
Industry of a Free Trade Area and a Common Market. London 1957.
Krein in , M ordechei.: "The 'Outer Seven' and European Integration." In: American 
Economic Review, June (1960), pp. 370-386; Kreinin , M ordechei: "Trade Creation and 
Diversion by the EEC and EFTA." In: Economia Intemazionale 22 (1969), pp. 273-280; 
Nev en , D. J./R oller , L. H .: "European Integration and Trade Flows." In: European 
Economic Review 35(1991), pp. 1295-1309; Robertson , Dav id : Effects of EFTA on 
Member Countries. In: Corbet, Hugh/R obertson , David [eds.]: Europe’s Free Trade 
Area Experiment. EFTA and Economic Integration. Oxford [et al.] 1970, pp. 79-111; 
Trum an , Edwin M .: The Effects of European Economic Integration on the Production and 
Trade of Manufactured Products. In: Balassa, Bela  [ed.]: European Economic 
Integration. (Contributions to Economic Analysis, 89), Amsterdam [et al.] 1975, pp. 3-40; 
Balassa , Bela : Trade Creation and Diversion in the European Common Market: An 
Appraisal of the Evidence. In: Balassa , Bela  [ed.]: European Economic Integration. 
(Contributions to Economic Analysis, 89), Amsterdam, [et al.] 1975, pp. 79-118.
GATT Secretariat (ed.): "Trends in Sources of European Imports. " In: International 
Trade (1966), pp. 15-36.
Balassa , Bela : "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market. " 
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and by EFTA, Torsten Tewes has analysed trade creation and diversion effects on 
Germany arising from the formation of EEC and EFTA34.
It is fairly obvious that all of these studies faced considerable practical 
problems in that they work on the basis of data comprising changes of trade flows 
only during a very short period of time and also in that it is difficult to isolate the 
factors trade creation and diversion due to regional economic integration from other 
effects that might have altered trade patterns in Western Europe at the beginning of 
the 1960s. In addition, the data available were often aggregate data which would not 
allow the assessment of different directions of effects on trade among different 
sectors of the economy. Furthermore, the quantitative results of these studies have 
to be seen in the light of the broader theoretical assumptions about the effects of 
customs unions and free trade areas.
As a general yardstick for a rough approximation toward the likely impact of 
a free trade area on trade patterns, the Economist Intelligence Unit study emphasises 
the importance of differences in the nature of the real barriers to trade as they exist 
before the formation of the free trade area. They differentiate between three sorts of 
trade barriers: First, those which are going to be abolished in a free trade area, such 
as tariffs, quotas, export restrictions and subsidies; secondly, barriers which would 
not be swept away by a free trade area, but many of which would tend to disappear 
under the pressure of competition of tariff free markets, i. .e non tariff barriers; and 
thirdly, those which free trade cannot eliminate, such as transport costs. Others 
writing on the future impact on a country's economy of joining a free trade area 
have emphasised that the immediate problems connected with entry into the area are 
only temporary and therefore secondary, while the focus should be on the long term 
effects that are to be expected35. Yet it is also made clear that it was very difficult 
for economic policy makers at the end of the 1950s to obtain some reliable estimates 
as to the size and nature of the potential effects on an individual country of the 
formation of a Europe-wide free trade area as opposed to the "economic division of
Tew es, Torsten : "Handelschaffende und handelumlenkende Wirkungen der EWG bei der 
deutschen Einfuhr unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der EFTA-Lander. " In: 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 106(1971), pp. 221-239.
Jo hnson , Harry G.: The Criteria of Economic Advantage. In: Worsw ick, G. D. N. (ed.): 
The Free Trade Proposals. Oxford 1960, pp. 31-36.
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Europe" which was the result of the establishment of two trading blocs 
discriminating against each other. The distinction between politically appealing 
pseudo-arguments and valid economic judgements which Harry G. Johnson is 
asking for was a difficult one to be made in the heated debate over the best way for 
economic integration in Western Europe that took place in West Germany at the end 
of the 1950s.
The four studies mentioned above on the effects of EEC and EFTA 
formation on Western European trade used roughly similar methods to arrive at 
their results. All of them used changes in income elasticity of demand as indicator 
for trade creation and trade diversion. By extrapolating the findings for a certain 
period prior to the formation of EEC and EFTA they obtained an import-elasticity 
function for the period following the formation of the two arrangements valid under 
the assumption that this function would have represented trade flows if regional 
integration had not occurred. This function was then compared with the one arising 
from the actual trade figures. The differences between them was used as a direct 
indicator of trade diversion and trade creation36.
Torsten T e w e s  set out to analysing the degree of trade diversion and 
creation occurring in the commercial relations between the Federal Republic and the 
rest of the EEC member countries on the one hand and third countries on the 
other37. His method was based roughly on that of the Balassa and EFTA Secretariat 
studies. Tewes applies this method to five different commodity groups, foodstuffs, 
raw materials, two different classes of semi-manufactures (Halbwaren, Fertigwaren- 
Vorerzeugnisse) and finished goods. The results of this study show that, for 
foodstuffs, the trade diverting effects of EEC were twice as high as the trade 
creating effects, while for semi-manufactures trade diverting effects were very small 
in relation to trade creating factors. In semi-manufactures trade creation increased 
considerably in the years during 1964-1968 while diverting effects did not change. 
For finished products trade creating and diverting factors were almost equal for the 
period as a whole. In this case, different from the other commodity groups, trade
The four studies did not all investigate exactly the same questions. For a detailed discussion
o f the methodology and the results o f the four studies see C u rz o n , Essentials, pp. 286-308. 
Tew es, Wirkungen, pp. 221-239.
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diverting effects became much more important 1964-1968 and even exceeded the 
trade creating effects.
These results suggest that in the period 1960-1963 trade diverting and trade 
creating effects were largely equal to each other. German imports from third 
countries during that time would have been 5% higher and those from EFTA 7% 
higher than they actually were, if there had been no trade diversion. Without trade 
creation and trade diversion German imports from EEC countries would have been 
20% lower than they actually were. In the period 1964-1968 trade creating effects 
of the EEC were about 50% stronger than diverting effects. Without trade diversion 
German imports from third countries would have been 10% and those from EFTA 
20% higher than they were. Without trade creating and diverting effects German 
imports from the EEC would have been roughly one third lower than they were. 
Tewes study gives thus a useful indication as to what extent and in what wider 
commodity groups German producers would profit from trade diversion in trade 
with third countries and suffer from trade creation within the EEC. In chapter six of 
this study a similar quantitative analysis of the effects of EEC and EFTA will be 
provided for individual sectors of German industry.
1.2 Interest groups and collective action in the democratic state
The present analysis is concerned with the attempt by German industry to influence 
government decision making in the field of foreign economic policy, more 
specifically trade policy. As has already been said, one pre-theoretical assumption in 
this context is that, within the overall favourable public climate for the free trade 
area issue, German industrial associations should have had a very good chance to 
push the West German government into pursuing this option much more forcefully 
on the international level than was actually done. This assumption rests mainly on 
the fact that there were manifold public statements by practically all camps of the 
political and industrial scene and the important institutions of the political system in 
favour of this solution. One would therefore assume that particularly forceful 
pressure from influential groups like the Federation of German Industry (BDI)
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should have been able to bring about the desired action by the federal government. 
It appears that the historical questions arising from this obvious contradiction cannot 
be answered without recourse to theories about the political decision making process 
in general and here particularly about the chances of individual interests of being 
represented successfully at government level, i. e. being heard and being made part 
of the public policy pursued.
The relationship between interest groups and agencies of the state has been 
the focus of attention of an ever increasing number of theoretical writings in 
political science. Contributions have been made by group theory, the theories of 
rational choice and collective action, by game theory and the theoretical 
deliberations connected with the paradigms of pluralism and corporatism. This 
literature has thus come up with a good number of different theoretical approaches 
towards the analysis of decision making processes in modem industrial states. Many 
of them suffered either from an overly high degree of abstraction, while others 
lacked in coherence and systematic rigour. Mancur Olson's "Logic of Collective 
Action" for example has thus introduced an original and intriguingly simple and 
systematic approach for the analysis of particular problems related to the 
organisation of interests38. It has on the other hand been criticised for limiting itself 
to the analysis of the inherent conditions of interest group formation, while not 
providing insights into the continuing process of the representation of interests39. 
Furthermore, the rhetorical battle between advocates of pluralism on the one side 
and of corporatism and neo-corporatism on the other has often blurred, rather than 
clarified the picture. Indeed, it seems that a good part of this battle was fought 
merely over differences in terminology rather than substance. While there have 
recently been more fruitful attempts at working towards a common ground between
Olson , Mancur : The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge/Massachusetts, London/England 1965.
Frans van Waarden criticises that Olson does not analyse the logic of influence of interest 
groups, that he neglects the dimension of time and the influence of institutionalisation of the 
associational structure. See van Waarden , Frans: Zur Empirie kollektiven Handelns: 
Geschichte und Struktur von Untemehmerverbanden. In: Schubert , Klaus (ed.): 
Leistungen und Grenzen politisch-okonomischer Theorie. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme 
zu Mancur Olson. Darmstadt 1992, pp. 156. See also Cza d a , R oland  M.: 
Interessengruppen, Eigennutz und Institutionenbildung: Zur politischen Logik kollektiven 
Handelns. In: Schubert, Klaus (ed.): Leistungen und Grenzen politisch-okonomischer 
Theorie. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme zu Mancur Olson. Darmstadt 1992, p. 67.
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pluralism and corporatism, neither can claim to have developed into a fully-fledged 
theory. As a consequence, little progress has been made in defining the role of the 
state in relationship to the representation of interests in democratic political systems.
The more promising conceptual developments seem to spring from the 
"rapprochement" between pluralist and neo-corporatist writings on the one hand, 
and an increased focus of analysis of individual levels (macro-meso-micro) and their 
peculiarities on the other. The acknowledgement that pluralism and corporatism are 
not mutually exclusive concepts but rather the poles (or ideal types) in a continuum 
of modes of public policy making has brought about a truce between the two sides 
which finally seems to allow the possibility of a common way forward. Thus the 
shift of attention to the sectoral level by the neo-corporatists and the proposition to 
use the metaphor of "policy networks" for the analysis of more closely specified 
areas of policy making seems to provide a useful and practical framework capable 
of accommodating pluralist and corporatist concepts without forcing their complete 
integration. This approach also offers new ways to achieve a more precise definition 
of the role of the state in its relationship with societal interests and the groups 
representing it.
In the context of the present analysis those theoretical concepts and analytical 
categories referring to the relationship between government bureaucracy and 
industrial interest groups will merit particular attention. This is also true for 
considerations concerning the internal structures of interest groups and their effects 
on the probability of individual interests to prevail over others. Given that interest 
representation in democratic political systems is effected by interest groups as well 
as by political parties through the parliamentary process, the theoretical assumptions 
about their relationships also have to be considered. Despite the continuing lack of 
any precise concept of the role of the state the present analysis will have to find at 
least some tentative working notion of that role. All of this has to be defined as far 
as possible in order to arrive at an understanding of the theoretical variables that 
might allow an evaluation of the power of industrial pressure groups to influence 
government decision making. In this respect the role of the state will have to be 
reconsidered when addressing the theoretical aspects of international bargaining 
situations in the final section of this chapter. A second aspect in this context is the
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relationship between interest groups and political parties constituting the 
parliamentary branch of the political system.
Interests and their chances for successful representation
This first subsection will look very briefly at the inherent logic of collective action 
as formulated by Mancur Olson and the assessments derived from these arguments 
for the conditions of interests to prevail in competition with others. It will also look 
very generally at the determinants of power of interest groups as given by their size 
and internal structures, the role of social and political institutions and by the nature 
of decision making as such. If we define the power of interest groups in very 
general terms as their capacity to procure future benefits40, a some determinants of 
this capacity can be seen in the nature of the interests pursued, and the internal 
structure as well as the economic resources of the respective interest group. One 
could suggest that these factors are, in the short term, largely independent of 
influences coming from outside the interest group. Other general factors 
determining the power of interest groups, such as the dominant ideology, the 
competition of other interest groups and the institutions of the political system, are 
of an external character41.
Olson's main arguments have been discussed so widely that it is unnecessary 
to repeat them here in great detail42. While some have refuted Olson's "Logic of 
Collective Action" as illogical and wrong43, others have criticised that elements of
Pizzo rn o , Alessandro: Interests and Parties in Pluralism. In: Berger , Suzanne  (ed.): 
Organizing Interests in Western Europe. Cambridge, New York 1981, p. 265.
W ilson , Graham  K.: Interest Groups. Oxford 1990, p. 15.
For the core of the argument see Olson , Logic (1965), pp. 1-3; for a summary of the 
argument see also Olson , Mancur : The Logic of Collective Action. In: Richardson , 
Jeremy  J. (ed.): Pressure Groups. (Oxford Readings in Politics and Government), Oxford 
1993, pp. 23-37; Olson restates his argument in connection with his analysis of the overall 
impact of the existence of numerous powerful interest groups on the welfare of a modem 
state. See Olson , Mancur : The Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, 
Stagflation and Social Rigidities. Hew Haven 1982, pp. 17-35. For a broad discussion of 
Olson's works see Schubert, Klaus (ed.): Leistungen und Grenzen politisch-okonomischer 
Theorie. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme zu Mancur Olson. Darmstadt 1992; see also 
M itch el , W illiam  C.: "Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions." In: 
Journal of Theoretical Politics 2 (1990), pp. 85-108.
Kimber, Richard: "Collective Action and the Fallacy of the Liberal Fallacy." In: World 
Politics 33/2 (1981), pp. 178-196.
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his argument, such as the by-product theory, could not be validated by the results of 
empirical research, and that while analysing the logic of membership of interest 
groups, he neglected the logic of their influence44. It is indeed an important question 
in the context of the present analysis whether one can draw inferences from the 
nature of an interest and from the relative size of the organised group supporting it 
as to the interest's chances of being successfully represented. One should assume 
that an interest that has a greater tendency to be organised is also going to have a 
better chance of being successfully represented, particularly if, as Olson suggests, a 
large proportion of the group membership is highly interested in the public good45. 
To be sure, these purely internal aspects of the group do give only a very limited 
picture, and Olson has been justly criticised for not including institutional and other 
external factors, and failing to specify the role and nature of the state46. Yet as one 
of the many influences determining associational power, the internal factors 
ofrelative group size and degree o f interest in the public good might be of similar 
importance for the chances of the respective interest to be successfully represented 
as some of the external institutional factors. Given that group coherence is likely to 
rise with both these factors according to Olson, one should assume that, ceteris 
paribus, the propensity to act and to act forcefully on behalf of this interest is also 
relatively higher in such a group than it is in larger groups with lower proportions 
of members with a high degree of interest in the public good. This point might be of 
extreme importance when looking at the associational representation of individual 
sectors of German industry throughout the negotiation processes on the free trade 
area and British EEC membership.
In the course of this analysis it might be possible to identify and define other 
internal factors of associational power. As far as industrial associations are 
concerned, e. g. the numbers of those employed in the corresponding industrial 
sector might be of relevance in interest representation, if the interest involves 
preventing the decline of employment in that industry that might effectively be
44 van Waarden , Frans: Tur Empirie kollektiven Handelns: Geschichte und Struktur von
Untemehmerverbanden. In: Schubert, Klaus (ed.): Leistungen und Grenzen politisch-
okonomischer Theorie. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme zu Mancur Olson. Darmstadt 1992, 
pp. 139-168.
45 O lso n , Logic (1993), p. 33.
46 M itch ell , Interest Groups, pp.88-89.
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brought about e. g. through free foreign competition. It is obvious that substantial 
losses in employment can be used as a leverage with a government in a democratic 
state. While unemployment was not a problem in Germany at that time, this 
example still shows that internal resources as factors of associational power cannot 
be properly evaluated when detached from their concrete situational and institutional 
context. This means that in a particular situation an industrial sector's economic 
weakness might be its strength when it comes to putting pressure on politicians. A 
booming sector with equally high figures of employment could hardly make the 
same use of them as the potentially shrinking sector would be able to do. The 
members of the association representing the booming sector would neither feel so 
pressed to act as would those in the shrinking sector who might stand to lose their 
fortunes. Thus the properties of the interest groups and their members are clearly 
important factors in determining the relative power with which their interest can be 
represented. In the example used here, the association of the sector in decline would 
most likely have a very high degree of interest in the collective good which would 
lead it to act forcefully and add to its capacity of successful interest representation 
as determined by the other internal factors group size and economic resources. Thus 
one important aspect of the power of interest groups has been identified on the basis 
of Olson's argument about the logic of collective action.
Factors determined by the environment of the interest groups are of equal, 
and perhaps sometimes of greater importance. These are the existence of other 
interest groups with competing interests, a particular institutional setting of the 
political system, a dominant ideology in the society and the peculiarities of the 
policy area in which the interest group is operating47. All these external factors have 
been interpreted by rational choice theory as constraints or opportunities to the 
interest group facilitating or inhibiting the use of the power given by internal factors 
and thus affecting the balance of cost and benefit of collective action. Yet it seems 
impractical to integrate the role of institutions in the equation of the political 
decision making process by simply reducing them to constraints and opportunities 
and to assume their role as a constant given. It is not argued here that institutions do
For a model of competition among pressure groups see Becker , Gary S.: "A Theory of 
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence. " In: The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 98 (1983), pp. 371-400.
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not change the balance of cost and benefit of collective action. They certainly do. 
The stress is rather on the point that this undoubted function of institutions for the 
interest groups as such does not capture the full importance of institutional factors in 
the political decision making process. Institutions can neither be seen as a constant 
given nor as neutral48. Adrienne Windhoff-Heritier thus argues that political 
institutions are not merely the arenas in which political processes occur. She sees 
them as factors in their own right, influencing available options and thereby the 
choices open within the decision making process49.
The result of these considerations is thus that the view of institutions as 
providing constraints and opportunities to individual interest groups is a valid and 
important point, but can serve only as an approximation as to the full understanding 
of the role institutions play within the political decision making process. Although 
the approach of "New Political Institutionalism" does not provide a systematic 
theoretical framework and therefore no alternative to the rational choice theory, it 
might be possible^fruitfully/combine them by focusing on the constraints set by 
political institutions, while not losing sight of the wider aspects of institutions in this 
context50. In this respect the different nature of decision making processes in 
different political institutions (e. g. parliament in comparison with a government 
ministry) will have to be taken into account when analysing constraints and 
opportunities for interest groups.
Interest groups and the state
In the previous subsection an assessment of some general conditions of interest 
group power has been given. Group size and degree of interest of the membership 
have been identified as important internal variables of relative power in competition 
with other interest groups. Factors of the environment of interest groups, mainly 
political institutions, have also been considered on a very general level in their
Richardson , Jeremy J. (eds.): Pressure Groups. (Oxford Readings in Politics and 
Government), Oxford 1993, p. 2.
W indhoff-Heritier , Adrienne: Institutions, Interest and Political Choice. In: Cza d a , 
Roland  M./W indhoff-Heritier , Adrienne (eds.): Political Choice. Institutions, Rules, 
and the Limits of Rationality. Boulder, Frankfurt 1991, p. 28.
W indhoff-Heritier , Institutions, p. 37-38.
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impact on the capacity of interest groups to procure future benefits for their 
members. The present subsection will reconsider the problem of interest group 
power and take a look at the internal structures of interest groups and the question 
of who is going to dominate interest group action. It will have to be seen whether 
and how the analysis of the internal structure of interest groups will require 
modifications of the suggestion made above concerning the role of group size and 
degree of interest in the collective good. Here we shall also roughly sketch out the 
main features of the paradigms of pluralism and corporatism as far as these 
frameworks are likely to prove helpful to the present study.
The question of interest group power is very problematic. The definition 
given earlier can hardly be operationalised and applied directly to an empirical 
study. The "capacity to secure future benefits" in a modern democratic political 
system is contingent upon so many more or less obvious factors that it seems 
impossible to come sufficiently close to a complete set of well-defined variables. 
The only way open to arrive at some approximation will be to compare interest 
groups according to their structures, styles, tactics and relationships with the state51. 
Other relevant categories to compare interest group power are: 1) the general 
attitude toward interest groups in the political culture; 2) the density of membership; 
3) the degree of unity or fragmentation; and 4) the tactics used by them in the 
context of the political framework52. Whether the size of the group as such is going 
to have the important impact attributed to it by Olson in terms of the potential 
influence of the interest group is doubtful when seen in connection with the 
requirements of campaigning in favour of a certain interest policy within a modem 
democratic system. The advantage of smaller groups over larger ones could easily 
be compensated by the need for a group to establish a bureaucracy of its own, to 
rely heavily on the economic resources of its members and to be able to muster 
votes as leverage in the bargaining process. Thus Roland Czada recognises positive
For a discussion of state and interest groups see Steinberg , Rudolf  [ed.]: Staat und 
Verbande. Zur Theorie der Interessenverbande in der Industriegesellschaft. (Wege der 
Forschung, 298), Darmstadt 1985, see in particular Weber , W erner : Der Staat und die 
Verbande. In: Steinberg, Rudolf [ed.]: Staat und Verbande. Zur Theorie der 
Interessenverbande in der Industriegesellschaft. (Wege der Forschung, 298), Darmstadt 
1985, pp. 64-76.
W ilson , Interest Groups, pp. 12, 18-21, 34-35.
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effects of scale for large interest groups in terms of the provision of information, of 
mobilisation capacity, public relations and the control of free riders53. A variable of 
greater importance for the likelihood of forceful interest group action remains the 
degree of interest among its members. Jeremy Richardson provides a formulation of 
this aspect by saying that interest group activity is most likely to develop in cases 
where costs and benefits are concentrated on a relatively small number of interest 
group members and when they are significant54. Rather than the small size of an 
interest group it might thus be the relative "smallness" in scope of the interest 
represented (as compared to a more general interest) which might provide the group 
with a higher chance of advancing its objective. In chapter six it will be argued that 
the visibility of potential costs and benefits as well as of the opportunity costs of 
sub-optimal solutions is another crucial factor in determining the nature of group 
interest.
Another important question in the context of this analysis is how group 
decisions are actually determined and to what extent the internal structures of 
interest groups favour some members over others in the pursuit of individual 
interests. The elements of the organisational structure of interest groups are fairly
uniform. The larger groups usually have the following eight different functional
units: 1) members' conference; 2) steering committee (HauptausschuB); 3) Special 
committees (Fachausschiisse); 4) Presidency; 5) advisory committees; 6) special 
circles (Fachkreise); 7) regional subsections; and 8) management
(Geschaftsfiihrung)55. Hubert Scherzinger gives a detailed account of the influences 
at work in the internal decision making processes of interest groups. He points out 
that the degree of affectedness (Betroffenheitsgrad), the availability and access to 
information as well as the capacity to digest them are of crucial importance to this 
internal process. Other elements for determining the intra-group power distribution 
are the frequency with which particular functional units convene and the
Cza d a , Interessengruppen, p. 65.
R ichardson , Pressure Groups, p. 11.
Scherzinger , Hubert: Theorie der Willensbildung in Untemehmerverbanden:
Zusammenstellung der wesentlichen okonomischen Einflufigrdfien und der strukturellen 
Bedingungen sowie deren Einarbeitung in ein System von Modellen. (Untersuchungen iiber 
Gruppen und Verbande, 14), Berlin 1978, p. 52.
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composition of the group's material wealth56. Scherzinger analyses the process of 
intra-group decision making and policy formulation by looking at different sets of 
situations and evaluating the corresponding power distributions.
The relationship between interest groups and the agencies of the state has 
been the core of a long debate concerned with the essential question of who actually 
governs in any particular political system57. The exchanges between "pluralists" and 
"corporatists" have been marked by the normative and prescriptive character of 
many of their respective arguments. The debate was thus not only one over the 
adequate description and theorisation about public policy making in the modern 
state, but also, if not mainly, about how things should and could be done in the best 
way given a number of political, functional or even moral imperatives that had to be 
observed. At the present stage of the debate which began in the 1960s there are 
some who suggest that the ideas put forward under the labels of "corporatism" or 
"neo-corporatism" are essentially a variant of pluralism and that the whole argument 
of corporatism was based on a profound misconception of the pluralist paradigm in 
the first place58. Others see both approaches as poles of a continuum of modes of 
public policy making which could also be regarded as ideal types in the Max Weber 
sense.
When one reads the more recent literature on pluralism and corporatism one 
starts wondering why there was ever any disagreement between the two sides in the 
first place apart from conceptual misunderstandings. Pluralist writers today see their 
paradigm as being continuously misinterpreted by the corporatists and hold that 
basically everything pluralism was ever criticised for lacking had actually been said 
or implied by earlier writings. Similarly, corporatist writers, initially keen on
Scherzinger , Theorie, pp. 55-76.
For a formulation of the essential aspects see Da h l , Robert A.: Who Governs? Democracy 
and Power in an American City. London, New Haven 1961; see also Jordan , Grant: The 
Pluralism of Pluralism. An Anti-Theory? In: R ichardson , Jeremy  J. (ed.): Pressure 
Groups. (Oxford Readings in Politics and Government), Oxford 1993, pp. 49-53.
Ross Martin goes so far as to suspect that "the corporatists" deliberately misunderstood 
pluralism in order to be able to reject it more easily, while Andrew Cox sees them 
reinventing the wheel. See Martin , Ross M.: "Pluralism and the New Corporatism. " In: 
Political Studies 31 (1983), p. 95; Cox, Andrew : "The Old and New Testaments of 
Corporatism: Is it a Political Form or a Method of Policy-Making?" In: Political Studies 
36/2 (1988), pp. 300-301; see also Jordan's critique of Schmitter: Jordan , Pluralism, p. 
63.
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marking the profound difference between pluralism and their own concept, now 
imply that both concepts are closer to each other than previously admitted. Thus the 
dividing-line between the two concepts has become blurred in recent years. Since 
this was accompanied by rather vague re-formulations of, and amendments to, neo­
corporatism, it would not seem very useful to engage in disentangling the two 
concepts. We shall rather present very briefly the essentials of the concepts and give 
the overall tendency with which both paradigms regard the role of the state, the role 
of interest groups and their interaction in policy making.
Pluralism assumes a large number of dissimilar pressure groups representing 
their dissimilar interests and influencing the public policy making of the state59. The 
relationship among interest groups is generally seen as one marked by competition 
and temporary alliances among each other. Yet in the context of this study account 
has to be taken of the fact that according to Jordan another tradition of pluralism 
also emphasises the closed-group departmental relationships and sectoral policy 
making. Cox calls such relationships "corporatist pluralism", and asserts that this 
tradition (which must have been overlooked not only by corporatists but also most 
other writers in the field) encompassed all that the neo-corporatists later claimed 
was new in their analysis60. In pluralism, the state is seen as a rather passive register 
of interests. A pluralist state would also preclude any systematic incorporation of 
functional interests and have little or no power to influence the structure and power 
of individual groups. The relationship between interest groups and state in pluralism 
are thus of an entirely voluntary nature.
Within the context of democratic theory pluralism legitimised the role of 
interest groups as one checking the potential domination of minorities by the 
majority. Another advantage of the pluralist system was seen in the provision of a 
flexible mechanism of government which, through the accommodation of the major 
societal interests, ensured govemability. Criticism of this descriptive as much as 
prescriptive concept began to be raised in the 1960s when competition between 
groups endowed with varying amounts of political and economic resources was
For this and the following see W ilson , Interest Groups, p. 109; Martin , Pluralism, pp.
91-95; Jordan , Pluralism, pp. 57-58; Cox, Testaments, pp. 300-301; P izzorno , Interests, 
p. 259.
Cox, Testaments, p. 299.
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increasingly seen as a contradiction of democratic principles. Despite having been 
the dominant doctrine of democratic theory for quite some time, pluralism did not 
become a coherent model. Jordan depicts it rather as a "simple idea about the nature 
of political life"61.
The latter statement would also hold true for the corporatist approach. It has 
not provided a systematic explanation for the relationship between institutional 
structures, economic policy making and economic development62. The definition of 
this concept has been provided by Philippe C. Schmitter:
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation 
in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number 
of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered 
and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed 
(if not created byjthe state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports63.
This definition shows clearly that the relationship between state and interest 
groups is reversed in comparison with the pluralist concept. Under corporatism the 
state is in the condition to dictate the terms under which political bargaining takes 
place. The state uses this power in order to facilitate government through the 
delegation of specific functions to interest groups. While there is clearly an 
exchange relationship in which the state grants public and legal status to private 
organisations, which in turn take over part of the burden of government, the state 
remains ultimately in control. One essential feature of the relationship between 
interest groups and state under corporatism is thus the immediate link between
Jordan , Pluralism, pp. 59-61.
Leh n er , Fr a n z: Interessenstrukturen und Wirtschaftspolitik: Leistungen und Defizite von 
Olsons Theorie. In: Schubert, Klaus (ed.): Leistungen und Grenzen politisch- 
okonomischer Theorie. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme zu Mancur Olson. Darmstadt 1992, 
p. 83.
Schm itter , Philippe C.: Still the Century of Corporatism? In: Lehm bruch ,, 
Gerhard /Schm itter , Philippe C. (eds.): Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation. 
Beverly Hills, London 1979, p. 13. The first print of the article is to be found in: Review of 
Politics 36 (1974), pp. 85-131.
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interest representation and policy implementation. The state determines the 
conditions of both and thus enjoys a very high degree of autonomy. Thus 
Schmitter's definition is not concerned with the process of policy making which 
became the focus of attention later on, but with the political form of the state64.
Neo-corporatism, meso-corporatism and policy networks
The definition of corporatism as introduced by Schmitter is hardly compatible with 
the notion of a liberal democratic political system. However, since corporatism was 
thought to be, or to become, a set of categories and hypotheses capable of 
delivering at least the adequate description of modem democratic states, adaptations 
of the original concept had to be made. Thus corporatist writers came up with the 
notion of "liberal corporatism" (which Winkler and Pahl contrasted with "state 
corporatism"65). The formulation of this concept by the corporatist "school" led to 
some confusion, in the sense that almost everybody presented a slightly different 
view of what this term (that should lead corporatism out of a dead end road) was to 
denote in practice66. Instead of providing a way out, the new approach initially 
seemed to cause confusion as to which road to take among the many paths that 
suddenly seemed to be available. Lehmbmch defined "liberal corporatism" as a 
corporatism that remained embedded in a system of liberal constitutional democracy 
with institutionalised rules such as freedom of association, and in which interest 
groups enter voluntarily into relationships with the government and are also free to 
terminate these relationships. This version of corporatism seems to be so far watered 
down from Schmitter's original concept that the clear differences in comparison
For the main features of the corporatist system of interest representation see Cox, 
Testaments, pp. 294-296; Atkinson , M ichael M ./C olem an , W illiam  D .: "Strong States 
and Weak States: sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies." In: British 
Journal of Political Science 19 (1979), p. 56; O ’Sullivan , Noel: The Political Theory of 
Neo-Corporatism. In: Cox, Andrew /O ’Sullivan , Noel (eds.j: The Corporate State. 
Corporatism and the State Tradition in Western Europe. Aldershot 1988, p. 9.
For the definition of "state pluralism" which basically replicates the original definition of 
corporatism in which the state is seen as directing and controlling the relationship with 
interest groups see O’Sullivan, Theory, p. 7. Cox refutes the whole neo-corporatist 
approach as useless in that it has not led to any significantly new insights. He welcomes 
Schmitter's original definition of corporatism as useful when taken as an ideal-typical form 
of the state. He rejects the variants state and liberal corporatism accordingly. See Cox, 
Testaments, p. 294.
For this and the following see Martin , Pluralism, p. 87-90.
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with pluralism are difficult to establish. More importantly, the now "neo"- 
corporatists ceased to claim that states as a whole were of a liberal corporatist type, 
but that this term would more appropriately refer to individual sectors which coexist 
with sectors of a pluralist nature within the same political system.
Cawson defined liberal corporatism as a method of economic administration 
entailing group assumption of responsibility for delegated enforcement of 
government policy. Thus Ross Martin states correctly that, apart from the context of 
a constitutional form of political system, the voluntary nature of group-government 
relationship and the claim to be still distinct from pluralism, "liberal corporatism" 
remained ill-defined and hardly coherent. This becomes particularly visible in the 
diverging opinions among the proponents of that "school" about the role and nature 
of the state. Martin suggests therefore, that "liberal corporatism" is simply a 
developed variant of pluralism and that the modes of policy making that it denotes 
could be seen as being somewhere in a "continuum centred on pluralist relationships 
with corporatism as one extreme"67. Martin's continuum is thus not one with 
corporatism and pluralism at the extreme ends. It is rather a continuum reflecting 
different degrees of group access to government agents. The corporatist pole would 
thus be the extreme where access is institutionalised while the opposing pole would 
have to be seen as one where access of organised interest to government is at best 
indirect, e. g. via parliamentary channels only. Martin thus concludes that, since 
both neo-corporatism and pluralism are essentially concerned with the power of 
interest groups, their affinity is greater than between liberal corporatism and state 
corporatism68.
In a further attempt to enhance and thereby rescue the notion of neo­
corporatism a shift was made in the level of analysis. The new focus of attention 
was to be the sectoral or meso-level where, it was argued, neo-corporatist patterns 
might be more easily detected, while they might be hidden at the macro level if the 
system on a whole was more pluralist in nature69. It was also argued that there
67 M a r t in ,  Pluralism, pp. 99-100.
68 Martin , Pluralism, pp. 102.
69 W ilso n , Interest Groups, p. I l l ;  see also C aw son, A la n : Varieties of Corporatism: The
Importance of the Meso-Level of Interest Intermediation. In: Caw son , Alan  [ed.]:
Organized Interests and the State. Studies in Meso-Coporatism. London [et al.] 1985, pp.
1- 2 1 .
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would be a particular type of group-govemment relationship at this level: "meso- 
corporatism"70 where attention would have to be paid to specific bureaucratic 
arrangements, the relationships maintained between officials and the key societal 
actors and the specific organisational properties of associational systems and 
individual firms. The key factor in group-govemment relations at sector-level is 
seen in the degree of mobilisation of business71.
At this stage it becomes clear that the seemingly fruitless debate over neo- 
corporatism and its variants was not as pointless as some suggested. After much 
meandering about the many attempts at saving the neo-corporatist concept did not 
necessarily achieve the objective they sought, but still pointed the way toward a new 
focus of attention that might indeed further the analysis of group-govemment 
relationships in the modem state. The focus on the sectoral level might provide the 
possibility to integrate Olson's "logic of membership" with a "logic of influence" 
capable of taking account of the institutionalisation of group-govemment 
relationships72. The new concept related to this approach is the metaphor of "policy 
networks"73. It sets out to define more precisely the determining factors in the 
autonomy of the bureaucratic agents in their relationship with societal interests 
groups. Depending on the critical variables of the degree of centralisation in society 
and state and of the degree of differentiation between them, the concept attempts to 
define the autonomy of the bureaucracy and flowing from that the nature of possible 
patterns of group-state relationships at this level. Atkinson and Coleman come up 
with six ideal typical policy networks reflecting rising degrees of bureaucratic 
autonomy: 1) pressure pluralism; 2) clientele pluralism; 3) parantela pluralism; 4) 
corporatism; 5) concertation; and finally 6) state direction. The detailed definitions 
of these networks are likely to be useful tools in order to arrive at approximations of 
associational power at sectoral level. Given that the focus of the analysis is 
narrowed to individual segments of the system of interest representation, their
Lehm bruch , Organization, p. 130.
Atkinson/Coleman, States, pp. 49-50; 53. 
van Waarden , Empirie, p. 167.
For this and the following see Atkinson/Colem an , States, pp. 50-51; 55-59. For a 
discussion of the terms policy community and policy network see Jordan , Grant : "Sub- 
Governments, Policy Communities and Networks. Refilling the Old Bottles? " In: Journal of
Theoretical Politics 2 (1990), pp. 319-338.
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elements can be more precisely defined and assessments of associational power 
integrating the factors used by Olson with institutional aspects might be possible.
While so far, attention has focussed on the relationship between interest 
groups and government bureaucracy, i. e. parts of the executive branch, their 
relationship with political parties within a democratic political system is also 
important and needs to be addressed. Any system of interest representation is of a 
dual nature. Interest groups as well as parties are organisations fulfilling the tasks of 
interest aggregation and representation within particular frameworks. While the 
activities of political parties are likely to be very clearly and often formally defined 
by constitutions, statutes, parliamentary procedures and the political practice, the 
definition of the respective realm of activity of interest groups is generally not 
specified in this manner. In the optimist pluralist view of interest groups their 
activities have been seen as countering potential negative effects of majority rule. 
Yet after strong concerns have been expressed over interest group domination of 
democratic systems it seems rather that interest group power has to be checked by 
democratic institutions. Because of their interest in winning votes political parties 
tend to pay more attention to some sort of aggregate interest rather than to the 
special interests of particular groups. This tendency is particularly strong with the 
modern "catch-all party". While this would tend to give political parties the capacity 
to muster ideological resistance against the domination of interest groups74, the 
general weakening of the role of political parties and their declining ideological 
differences in modem democratic systems on the other hand, has diminished this 
capacity75.
Yet in spite of this apparent weakening of party differences it seems that 
there are still "issue networks" in which the boundaries between government and 
interest groups are less important than those between individual political camps76. 
The notion of issue networks suggests that the relationships between governmental, 
parliamentary and societal actors will take particular forms in different areas of
74 Schm id, Jo sef: Parteien in der Interessenvermittlung: Widerlager oder Verstdrker von
Verteilungskoalitionen? In: Schubert, Klaus (ed.): Leistungen und Grenzen politisch- 
okonomischer Theorie. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme zu Mancur Olson. Darmstadt 1992, 
p. 170, 173.
75 P iz z o rn o , Interests, pp. 269-273.
76 W ilso n , Interest Groups, pp. 156-157.
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policy making. In addition, while interest groups are likely to have a greater chance 
to get their way in those areas where the mediation of different societal interests 
through negotiation is necessary, there are policy areas where negotiation is not the 
main feature and where the executive thus retains a very high degree of autonomy 
and control77. This is particularly true with foreign policy where, for a number of 
reasons, the executive enjoys a particularly high degree of autonomy in decision 
making. In parliamentary democracies some of this autonomy will also affect the 
position of the governing party or coalition. Governing parties in general will be 
subject to sometimes very narrow institutional and procedural restrictions78. Their 
responsiveness toward pressure from interest groups will thus be conditioned upon 
these institutional influences that might enhance or constrain a party's autonomy.
1.3 International negotiations and domestic politics
The last section of this chapter will give a very brief outline of theoretical 
approaches that might be able to take account simultaneously of international and 
domestic aspects of the questions treated here. One approach has been put forward 
by Robert Putnam and has been somewhat refined by Andrew Moravscik on the 
basis of a comprehensive analysis of existing theoretical literature and empirical 
work on the constraints and opportunities faced by statesmen when simultaneously 
facing linked bargaining situations at home and abroad79. Subsequently, Moravscik 
has formulated the theoretical concept of "Liberal Intergovemmentalism" designed 
especially, but not exclusively, to explain and predict policy outcomes in a 
framework of policy co-ordination as existing in the European Community, both on
77 P iz z o rn o , Interests, p. 273.
78 Schm id , Parteien, p. 173.
79 For a summary of the attempts at integrating theoretical approaches to international and
domestic political decision making see Evans, Peter  B.: Building an Integrative Approach
to International and Domestic Politics. Reflections and Projections. In: Evans, Peter  B. 
[et al.] [eds.]: Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. 
Berkeley [et al.] 1993, pp. 397-430. For the following see M oravscik, Andrew : 
Introduction. Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining. 
In: Evans , Peter B. [et al.] [eds./: Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining 
and Domestic Politics. Berkeley [et al.] 1993, pp. 3-42; Putnam , Robert: "Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." In: International Organization 42 
(1988), pp. 427-460.
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the domestic and the international level80.The metaphor of "two-level games", as 
Putnam's approach is labelled, draws on existing theories of international relations 
and domestic policy making for the purpose of analysing situations of international 
bargaining. Yet while previous approaches generally put priority on either the 
international, the domestic or even the personal character of the main influences 
shaping policy outcomes of international bargaining situations and neglected the 
others, the "two-level-game" approach tries (to) systematically J integrate both the 
domestic and international levels of analysis with equal weight and to highlight the 
mutual dynamic influences that both have on each other. Essential in the "two-level 
game" is the role of the chief negotiator. Moravscik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
on the other hand is an attempt to create a comprehensive theoretical instrument to 
deal with domestic, intergovernmental and supranational features. He does so by 
linking theories of national preference formation with those relating to 
intergovernmental negotiation. While for the sake of analytical clarity Moravscik 
begins with the national definition of policy preferences by governments and a 
subsequent stage of intergovernmental bargaining, both are evenly integrated into 
the theoretical concept. This approach seems indeed as a way forward in the 
analysis of processes of regional economic integration that can be seen as the 
management by nation states of their increasing interdependence.
Both realist theory and interdependence theory accounted for changes in 
policy outcomes mainly by reference to changes of external constraints on individual 
states. Domestic factors were barely taken into account and often simply assumed 
away by regarding nation-states as rational, unitary actors with given interests and 
preferences at any given moment and with a fixed ability to mobilise bargaining 
resources. More recent literature has included domestic politics within the analysis 
merely as a source of residual variance which could not be accounted for by 
international factors. A particular analytical approach used to explain the 
formulation of foreign economic policy saw the way in which distributional 
coalitions formed as corresponding to a country's relative economic position in 
world markets. David Lake thus "identifies the 'national trade interest' with the
80 M oravscik , A ndrew : "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovemmentalist Approach". In: Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (1993), pp. 
473-524.
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executive branch of government, while domestic interest groups were viewed as 
forces impeding the executive from pursuing the 'common good' "81. The "national 
interest" is here defined by the differential impact of international agreements on 
specific domestic actors. Other currents of recent theoretical writing in international 
relations take the opposite view and suggest that theories of domestic preference 
formation have to take precedence over international approaches. While Moravscik 
states that there are almost no empirical studies that have not included both sides of 
the coin, no equivalent on the theoretical level has yet been provided in any 
systematic manner. He then sets out to give a thorough critique of the existing 
approaches to the problem and tries to take Putnam's "two-level-game" approach 
beyond the status of a mere metaphor.
The "two-level-game" approach focuses on the particular role of the 
statesman as the chief negotiator in international bargaining82. While the statesman's 
role in theories giving precedence to domestic influences is reduced to one of a 
passive political register for societal demands, theories focusing mainly on 
international factors see him subjected to dictates flowing from the international 
system as such. Putnam on the other hand points to the fact that statesmen are not 
only subject to constraints, be they domestic or international in nature, but that they 
also enjoy opportunities arising from a realm of autonomy which they might be able 
to create in their function as chief negotiators which is, as Moravscik stresses, to 
reconcile the distinct logic of both levels83. Moravscik identifies three specifically 
new features brought to the fore by the "two-level-game" approach. One is the 
affirmation that complex patterns of interdependence do not simply constrain 
statesmen, as had been argued by interdependence theory, but also give them new 
possibilities. The second is the emphasis on the statesman as the central strategic 
actor and his choice as a crucial element in international bargaining. In combination 
with the theory of rational choice the "two-level-game" approach thus gives clear 
indications as to where to look for the domestic influences which are the most
Quoted from M oravscik, Introduction, p. 12. See Lake , David  A.: "The State and 
American Trade Strategy in the Pre-Hegemonic Era." In: International Organization 42 
(1988), pp. 33-58.
For this and the following see Putnam , Diplomacy, pp. 456-460.
Moravscik , Introduction, p. 15.
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crucial in the determination of foreign policy. Moravscik also relates the approach 
to the "principal-agent" relationship. The third, and in Moravscik's view most 
decisive new element of Putnam's approach is the consideration that the statesman 
includes domestic and international factors simultaneously into his calculus. The 
strategies employed by the statesmen might thus utilise domestic factors for 
achieving aims at the international level or vice versa.
The main contribution of the "two-level-game" approach consists of 
including the ratification process into the analytical framework suggesting that 
ratification plays a role all throughout the whole process of international bargaining. 
Starting from the fact that the ultimate condition for a statesman achieving a 
particular objective in international negotiations is the successful ratification of the 
outcome at home, Putnam introduced the concept of a "win-set", denoting a "set of 
potential agreements that would be ratified by domestic constituencies in a straight 
up-or-down vote against the status quo of no agreement"84. This win-set (of 
ratifiable agreements) constitutes the only constraint on the statesman. In order to 
generate empirical hypotheses about state behaviour Putnam specifies more closely 
the concrete features of the three main analytical points of reference: domestic 
politics, the international negotiating environment and the statesman's preferences. 
For each of them a number of variables can be named which will lead to the more 
precise definition of the constraints and opportunities of the statesman. Thus the size 
of the win-set is the most important domestic constraint on the statesman. The size 
of the win-set itself depends not on total national costs and benefits, but their 
incidence, relative to existing coalitions and proto-coalitions. The influence of these 
coalitions has to be defined ultimately by their power in the ratification process 
whose structure therefore also enters into the equation. Yet apart from the constraint 
of the win-set as such the statesman enjoys the exclusive power to negotiate 
internationally and thus effectively holds a tacit veto over any agreement which he 
can use by not negotiating in earnest or by refusing to submit an agreement for 
ratification. Apart from this possibility the individual situation might grant the 
opportunity to the statesman of altering the domestic win-set itself, by linking the 
issue in question with other issues and by playing on preference differentials
Pu tn am , Diplomacy, pp. 435-452.
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between several interest groups. Thus, Moravscik stresses, the statesman's capacity 
to change the nature of institutions, to control crucial information and to affect the 
patterns of group mobilisation might leave him with considerable influence over the 
outcome of the ratification process. Furthermore, even the ratification procedure 
itself might be influenced in important ways by the head of the executive, be it 
through formal institutional or informal means. The more control the statesman 
enjoys over these means, the more greater his ability to shape the outcome of the 
ratification process85.
There is no need to describe Moravscik's line of thought in great detail for 
the international influences and the statesmen's own preferences. It should suffice to 
say that he is able to show how the fairly large influence over agenda-setting and 
information at the international level might at times give them the chance to mould 
domestic coalitions. Collusion of heads of government in order to accommodate 
their respective strategic needs on the domestic scene might be used to further their 
individual preferences if these are sufficiently compatible. Yet the potential of 
statesmen to take things into their own hands is clearly limited by the negative 
effects of the agreement expected by relatively concentrated domestic groups. 
According to Olson's collective action analysis, such groups are likely to build up 
strong resistance to these features of an agreement, thereby diminishing the size of 
the statesman's win-set. If, on the other hand, costs and benefits are very diffuse, 
the statesman will enjoy more possibilities to win the support of individual groups at 
a relatively low cost.
As for the preferences of the individual statesman, they lie mainly in 
enhancing the position at home, the effort to achieve an optimal response to 
international imperatives largely regardless of domestic factors, and thirdly, and the 
individual policy preferences about the issues in question, be it own experience, a 
certain idealism or other factors. Moravscik calls the statesman's personal 
preferences his "acceptability set" and draws a number of very interesting inferences 
about the general position of the statesman from the relationship between his 
acceptability set and the win set of the domestic polity. If, for example, the 
statesman's acceptability set reflects the mainstream interests of domestic groups,
M o ra v sc ik , Introduction, pp. 24-25.
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and is fully part of the domestic win-set, then the statesman’s position can be 
described as one of being the agent of his polity. If, however, the acceptability set 
lies outside the win-set and closer to the win-set of the opposite side in the 
negotiations, the statesman can be seen as a "dove", while in the opposite case (with 
the acceptability set lying partly outside the domestic yet farther away from the 
opposite win-set) he could be labelled as a "hawk". From these classifications of the 
statesman's position Moravscik draws further inferences as to the strategies which 
the statesman would be likely to adopt to influence the domestic win-set, how they 
are likely to deal with the partners at the negotiation table and to what extent the 
degree of credibility for their personal positions in the negotiation process. Thus 
statesmen are more likely to expand the domestic win-set when they can be 
classified as "doves" or "hawks", than when they are classified as "agents"; 
collusion among chief negotiators is more likely when both sides are classified as 
"doves" and the arguments, threats and offers made by the statesman who is a 
"dove" or an "agent" will be taken more seriously than those expressed by "hawks". 
Since in the latter case, the domestic win-set of the "hawk" is closer to the opposing 
win-set than his own "acceptability-set", the opposing statesman might be able to 
dismiss threats from the "hawk" and bring the "hawk's" own domestic groups into 
opposition to their chief negotiator with targeting them by measures that would 
affect these groups negatively86.
Moravscik's concept of Liberal Intergovemmentalism adds to the theoretical 
approach described above in that it is firmly grounded in theories of domestic and 
international political economy and in that it stringently integrates domestic 
preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining and the interest calculation of 
national and transnational groups. The concept thus allows the combination in a 
systematic manner of the analytical tools which have been presented in previous 
sections (concerning economic interest, pressure group influence, state and societal 
actors), and the theoretical concepts needed for the analysis of the intergovernmental 
negotiations. In the framework of this study the aspects of "distributional 
consequences of policy co-ordination" and the role of "policy areas and national 
preferences" are of great significance for the analysis. The same is true for the
M o ra v sc ik , Introduction, pp. 30-31
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predictions made by Liberal Intergovemmentalism for the "issue area" of 
commercial liberalisation which is at the core of the negotiations about the free trade 
area and British entry.
As far as the role of European institutions is concerned, the fact that their 
precise role and significance was by no means well-defined beyond the letters of the 
Treaty of Rome, as well as the fact that this role was still evolving will have to be 
taken into account. Moravscik's suggestions as to the effect and the role performed 
by supranational institutions for the efficiency of decision making and within the 
considerations of the "two-level game" of national leaders will still provide a 
valuable point of reference87.
This very brief summary of the main features of Putnam's approach and 
Moravscik's concept seems to be an adequate frame for an analysis which looks not 
only at domestic preference formation and interest group power in government 
decision making but also at a complex sequence of negotiations and talks on the 
international level in which the position of several statesmen must also be entered 
into the equation.
Table 1.1: Economic Interdependence and National Preferences
Issue area Sources of Societal Interest Determinants of State action
Commercial liberalisation 
(e.g. tariffs and quotas, 
agricultural price policy)
overt pressure, mostly from 
producers, whose net expected gains 
and losses reflect competitive 
position in international markets, 
levels of intra-industry trade, and the 
certainty of policy outcomes
where producer interests, strong 
unified and certain, governments will 
conform to the^ fc otherwise they are 
more likely to risk liberalisation 
when faced with overt and intractable 
policy failure, signalled by low 
investment and growth, unsustainable 
external disequilibria, and/or 
intolerable fiscal compensation
x
Source: Moravscik. Preferences, p. 495. extract from figure 2
The "two-level-game" approach seems to make this possible without having to 
resort to the sheer metaphysics of personal factors and the leadership qualities of 
individuals. An approach embracing: a) customs union theory in order to identify 
the nature of the interests at stake; b) Olson's analysis of collective action and the 
analysis of the nature of the system of interest representation at sectoral level in
M o ra v sc ik , Preferences, pp. 507-517.
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order to assess the potential power of those interest groups most affected; and c) the 
"two-level-game" approach to square domestic and international influences with the 
power exerted under certain conditions by the chief executive, should yield a 
sufficiently well-defined framework for the analysis of the historical problem which 
shall be described more closely in the following chapter.
2 Political and Societal Choices in 
"Adenauer's Kanzlerdemokratie"
west German Democracy and European integration
1957-1963
2.1 German Industry and the Choice Against the 
Free Trade Area Option 
The essential questions
Throughout all the debates and negotiations on the free trade area issue until 1963, 
German industry, the federal ministry of economics, its Minister Ludwig Erhard 
and the large majority of political parties in the Bundestag all saw themselves as 
Britain's natural allies in the pursuit of a large European and even an Atlantic free 
trade area1. The British saw the Federal Republic of Germany as the only power 
within the Six that could moderate or break resistance to these plans from a 
traditionally protectionist France. West Germany's business community also shared 
Britain's interest in world wide free trade and was wary of becoming locked up in a 
small European market. Given the strong and ever increasing public political 
support for Erhard on this matter, one has to ask why in the end West Germany 
sided with France and effectively endorsed de Gaulle's decision to shut Great 
Britain out of the common market in 1963, and why it did not instead insist on a 
European or indeed an Atlantic free trade area.
According to the literature, West Germany was firm and united in its support 
for the free trade area concept with the sole exception of Konrad Adenauer and
For a contemporary study of the British position see H eiser , Joachim ; British Policy with 
Regard to the Unification Efforts on the European Continent. Leyden 1959. See also Sm ith , 
Robert: "England und die Freihandelszone." In: Die Politische Meinung 3(1958), pp. 35- 
43; George , Steph en : Britain and European Integration since 1945. Cambridge 1991; 
Barker , Elizabeth : Britain in a Divided Europe 1945-1970. London 1971, pp. 145-164, 
168-185; Wallace , W illiam : Walter Hallstein aus britischer Sicht. In: Lo t h , W infried  
[eds.] [et al.]: Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europaer? Bonn 1995, pp. 225-246; W att , 
Donald  Cam eron : "GroBbritannien und Europa 1951-1959. Die Jahre konservativer 
Regierung." In: VfZG 28(1980), pp. 389-409. A detailed summary of the respective debate 
in France was written by Pierre Uri. Ur i, Pierre: La crise de la zone de libre-echange. 
(Tribune Libre, 43), Paris 1959.
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some of his aides. Acceptance of these views requires an acknowledgement that 
Germany's essential decisions on the free trade area, on British accession and in 
short on the shape of economic integration in Europe after 1957 were solely 
determined by the federal chancellor against the express will of Parliament, the 
Cabinet, his own political party and of the powerful Federation of German Industry 
and the business community at large. The implications of this view of the free trade 
area issue in Germany would be grave. It would suggest that Adenauer's role had 
been that of a "democratic dictator" and that German democracy towards the end of 
his tenure was unable to translate essential social and economic interests into 
political decisions which would reflect those interest to a certain degree2.
A superficial view of the free trade area issue could indeed support such a 
conclusion. It would imply that the wisdom or folly of one powerful politician could 
block a whole country's perceived political and economic interests from being duly 
represented in political decisions. One will, however, have to address and analyse 
the nature, strength and structure of the essential societal pressures in order to arrive 
at a valid assessment of the decision making process in the Federal Republic on 
European policy between 1957 and 1963. To simply accept the implicit assumption 
in much of the literature that Adenauer could dictate Germany's foreign and 
European policy practically at will and to explain the policy outcome in that way, 
would certainly prevent the analysis away from looking at the complexities of the 
Federal Republic's democratic system in the late 1950s and early 1960s and produce 
misleading results, as indeed a good part of the respective literature has done, as 
will be discussed in this chapter.
The essential shortcomings of the literature on the free trade area issue in 
West Germany consist in the failure to take account of the fact that an apparently 
unanimous expression of political will and economic interest in the Federal Republic 
was not matched by corresponding political action. The failure to appreciate this 
problem is partly due to the widespread conception that considerations of foreign 
policy and political issues in general were of paramount importance, that factors of
Charles Wighton sees Adenauer as an autocrat surrounded by a subservient cabinet, party 
and parliament who did serious damage to the "tender plant of German democracy". See 
W ighton , Charles: Adenauer - Democratic Dictator. A Critical Biography. London 1963, 
pp. 13-15, 266-267.
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economic interest did not matter much if at all in the West German decision making 
process, and that in these fields the federal chancellor of the time imposed his will 
based on his constitutional prerogatives and personal authority. The predominance 
of political factors has been explicitly formulated for the origins of European 
integration by Werner Weidenfeld3. Weidenfeld also displays unwillingness to deal 
with economic influences. A similar attitude seems to prevail in much of the 
historical literature on the free trade area issue. While Weidenfeld expresses the 
highly debatable view that economic factors dominated the evolution of the EEC 
after 1958 for two decades, he leaves the nature of these factors completely 
unspecified. He also seems to identify them with the mere technicalities of 
implementing the provisions of the EEC-treaty4. An attempt to relate these 
economic factors to the realm of political decision making,and to substantiate 
corresponding interests and groups representing them is not made. Thus in this view 
"economic factors" remain an abstract concept without any clearly defined political 
relevance. At the same time,the economic and political realms are kept strangely 
separated from each other with the political realm being the only one that actually 
matters. Given that this still seems to be the implicit assumption of writing on 
Germany's European policy and European integration at large, it is no wonder that 
these studies did not bother to look into the nature and the influence of economic 
interests in relation to the free trade area issue5.
Weidenfeld's analysis of the role of economic factors fails to actually describe any economic 
factor that might have played a role apart from a general wish for welfare, growth and full 
employment. His implicit assumption is that the economic and political spheres are worlds 
apart from each other. See Weidenfeld , W erner : "Economic Factors in the Origins of 
European Integration After the Second World War: A Political Scientist's View." In: 
Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 137(1981), pp. 434-449.
Weiden feld , Factors, p. 434-435.
This is true for most of the literature describing Adenauer's battle with Erhard over 
European policy essentially as a conflict between two political heavyweights without 
reference to the societal forces which they represented or claimed to represent. This reduces 
the conflict over West Germany's European policy to one between Adenauer's shrewdness 
and constitutional power and Erhard's popularity and dogmatic zeal. Koerfer's otherwise 
excellent book on this conflict and Schwarz' biography of Adenauer do not capture this 
dimension of the political choice made in West Germany at the time. See Schw arz , Hans- 
Peter : Adenauer. Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967. Stuttgart 1991; Koerfer , Da n iel : Kampf 
urns Kanzleraml. Erhard und Adenauer. Stuttgart 1987. The same is true for numerous other 
publications on West Germany's European policy. Kusters, Hanns Ju rgen : "Adenauers 
Europapolitik in der Griindungsphase der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft." In: VfZG 
31(1983), pp. 646-673; Groeben , Hans von d er : Aufbaujahre der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaft. Das Ringen urn den Gemeinsamen Markt und die Politische Union (1958- 
1966). Baden-Baden 1982.
59
This wide-spread view underlying much of the literature has been challenged 
by Alan Milward, who argues that national economic interests were actually 
predominant already in the early stages of European integration6. In the last decade 
or so,numerous studies on economic interests and their role in the political decisions 
on European integration have been undertaken7. Their findings make it impossible 
<sr seriously] contend that economic interests were not of extreme political 
importance in the decisions on European integration taken at the national and 
international level. Naturally, these interests will have different weights depending 
on their nature and size, the power of the groups by which they are represented and 
the importance of competing issues on the political agenda at any given point in 
time. This has already been addressed theoretically at some length in the previous 
chapter.
For the Benelux countries, Jan Arend Boekestijn has shown how closely the 
economic interest and its chance of success in competition with other societal 
interests is interwoven with the crucial political questions and choices to be made by 
a society. With regard to industrial interest in European integration, Werner 
Buhrer's study on the German steel industry and the ECSC and Thomas Rhenisch's 
thesis on German industry and the EEC have provided detailed analyses of 
economic interests and interest group activity relating to complex international
M ilw ard , Alan  S.: "Nationale Wirtschaftsinteressen im Vordergund. Neue historische 
Erkenntnisse statt iiberholter Schulweisheiten." In: Integration 10(1987), pp. 100-115. 
M ilw ard , Alan  S.: The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951. London 1984; 
M ilw ard , Alan  S.: The European Rescue of the Nation State. London 1992; Griffith s , 
Richard  T. [ed.]: The Netherlands and the Integration of Europe 1945-1957. Amsterdam 
1990; Buhrer , W erner/Schroder , Hans-Jurgen : Germany’s Economic Revival in the 
1950s. The Foreign Policy Perspective. In: No lfo , Ennio DI [ed.]: Power in Europe. Vol. 
2: Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC 1952-1957. Berlin, 
New York 1992, pp. 174-196; Ambrosius, Gerold : Europaische Integration und 
wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den funjziger Jahren. In: 
Berding , Helmut [ed.]: Wirtschaftliche undpolitische Integration in Europa im 19. Und 
20. Jahrhundert. (Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Zeitschrift fur Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft, Sonderheft 10), Gottingen 1984, pp. 271-294.; Boekestun , Arend  
Ja n : Economic Integration and the Preservation of Post-war Consensus in the Benelux 
Countries. In: Economic and Social History in the Netherlands, Vol. V, Amsterdam, 1993, 
pp. 179-212; Buhrer , W erner [et al.] [eds.]: Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die 
Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt. (Quellen und 
Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 30), Miinchen 1990; Berghahn , Volker  R. [et al.]: 
German Big Business and Europe in the Twentieth Century. (Occasional Paper, 17), Oxford
1993; Milward and others have put forward a synthesis of the historical evidence and its 
implications for a historical theory of European integration. See M ilw ard , Alan  S. [et al.] 
[eds.7: The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and Theory 1945-1992. London, New 
York 1993.
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negotiating processes on economic integration8. The literature on the free trade area 
negotiations, on British accession and in particular on the German position in these 
negotiations is however sparse9. Systematic studies on the industrial interest and its 
relevance for the German position in these negotiations have not been done at all. 
While a good number of historical studies on Britain and the Six are forthcoming 
with the opening of the respective archival material, there seems to have been little 
interest in the analysis of the position of German industry and its influence on 
Germany's European policy. Volker Berghahn noted that there is strikingly little 
information about the role of German business in the larger European context in this
Buhrer , Werner: Ruhrstahl und Europa. Die Wirtschaftsvereinigung der Eisen- und 
Stahlindustrie und die Anfange der europaischen Integration 1945-1952. (Schriftenreihe der 
VfZG, 53), Miinchen 1986; Rhenisch , Thom as: Die deutsche Industrie und die Grundung 
der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Florenz 1994.
Werner Buhrer's latest article on German industry and European integration reveals some 
important aspects of the free trade area issue. See Buhrer, Werner: German Industry in 
European Integration in the 1950s. In: Wurm , Clemens [ed.]: Western Europe and 
Germany. The Beginnings of European Integration 1945-1960. (German Historical 
Perspectives, IX), Oxford, Washington 1995, pp. 87-114. Most of the existing literature 
directly relating to these negotiating processes is based on the analysis of newspaper articles 
and interviews with participants and without access to government documents. Industrial 
interest and influence has not been analysed. Kiisters' account of the establishment of the 
EEC touches only very briefly on the free trade area negotiations: Kusters, Hanns 
Jurgen : Die Grundung der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Baden-Baden 1982, pp. 
280-294; Kusters puts the FTA problem into its wider context in a later publication: 
Kusters. Hanns Jurgen: Zollunion oder Freihandelszone? Zur Kontroverse iiber die 
Handelspolitik Westeuropas in den funfziger Jahren. In: Berding , Helm ut [ed.]: 
Wirtschaftliche und politische Integration in Europa im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert. 
(Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Zeitschrift fur Historische Sozialwissenschaft, Sonderheft 10), 
Gottingen 1984, pp. 295-308; Miiller-Roschach's book on Germany's European policy is 
the only comprehensive account of the German position. Muller-Ro schach , H erbert: 
Die deutsche Europapolitik 1949-1977. Eine politische Chronik. (Europaische Schriften des 
Instituts fur Europaische Politik, 55), Bonn 1980. The most comprehensive study has so far 
been Cam ps, M iriam : Britain and the European Community 1955-1963. London 1964. On 
the free trade area negotiations see Kaiser , Karl: EWG und Freihandelszone. England und 
der Kontinent in der Europaischen Integration. (Europaische Apsekte. Reihe C: Politik, 15), 
Leyden 1963; Hesberg, Wa lter : Die Freihandelszone als Mittel der Integrationspolitik. 
Frankfurt 1960; Keiser , Gunther : "Die Verhandlungen iiber die Errichtung einer 
europaischen Freihandelszone. Eine Zwischenbilanz zur Jahreswende 1957/58." In: Europa- 
Archiv 13(1958), pp. 10423-10430; Cornides, W ilh elm : "Die Freihandelszone als 
Krisenherd der europaischen Integrationspolitik. I: Politische Aspekte der gegenwartigen 
Integrationsbehmiihungen." In: Europa-Archiv 13(1958), pp. 10707-10711; Kohlhase , 
Nortbert/W ellmann, Joachim : "Die Freihandelszone als Krisenherd der europaischen 
Integrationspolitik. II: Wirtschaftliche Probleme der Verhandlungen iiber die
Freihandelszone." In: Europa-Archiv 13(1958), pp. 10711-10718; Lojew ski, W erner  v o n : 
"Am "crucial point". Die Freihandelszone in deutscher Sicht." In: Die Politische Meinung 
3(1958), pp. 44-48; "Die Verhandlungen der OEEC iiber eine europaische 
Freihandelszone." In: Europa-Archiv 12(1957), pp. 9651-9652.
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century10. Hence the present study seeks not only to address the particular historical 
question of why and how Adenauer's view prevailed against massive opposition 
from all political and social comers, but it also addresses the attitude and interests of 
German industry in a wider historical context and tries to answer the question why 
German industry finally endorsed the EEC and relinquished its hopes for the large 
European free trade area. As will be shown, both issues are two sides of the same 
coin.
The role of the BDI
The reasons for West Germany's decision to side with the French, to opt for the 
"small European" solution of the common market of the Six and to keep Britain out 
for the time being cannot simply be found in Adenauer's constitutional power and 
personal authority in matters of foreign policy. As will be shown in the following 
chapters of this analysis, the federal chancellor could also capitalise on the internal 
divisions of German industrial interest and on the fact that German industry came to 
appreciate the blessings of the EEC both in terms of increased protection against 
other European competitors and in terms of increased export opportunities to France 
and Italy. While the BDI's position remained practically unchanged all throughout, 
sectoral industrial interests, which were far from being uniform in any case, shifted 
in a way as to weaken support for the free trade area solution and toj considerably 
strengthen[ tbe^hSnatFon to firmly hold on to the EEC of the Six and of the Six 
only. That this change of heart within a number of sectors of German industry is not 
visible in the statements made by the BDI can be explained partly by the fact that 
the BDI did not systematically gather and aggregate particular industrial interests, 
but rather had to establish and represent what it saw as the general interest of 
German industry, and particularly the strong and expanding sectors.
Relatively little has been written on the role of German industry in the 
European policy of West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s11. As far as the
10 Berghahn , Volker A. [et al.] (ed.): German Big Business and Europe in the Twentieth 
Century. (Oxford, Providence 1993).
11 Buhrer , Ruhrstahl und Europa; Mahant, Edelgard E.: French and German Attitudes to 
the Negotiations about the European Economic Community, 1955-1957. London 1969; 
Deubner , Christian: Die Atompolitik der westdeutschen Industrie und die Grundung von 
Euratom. Frankfurt, New York 1977; Rhenisch , Industrie; Bra u n , Gerald : DieRolle der
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negotiations on the EEC treaty are concerned, only Thomas Rhenisch has put 
forward a detailed account of industrial interest. As stated before, the free trade area 
issue has not been analysed systematically with regard to the interests of German 
industry. It is however clear from the existing literature that German industry was 
very dissatisfied with the level of consultation on the treaties of Rome provided by 
the federal government and that it accepted the EEC so willingly mainly in view of 
the expected success of the FTA negotiations under way in Paris12. Edelgard E. 
Mahant suggests that German industry was incurring some opportunity cost from 
Germany's accession to the EEC13. In addition to the prospect for the FTA, the 
leadership of the BDI also supported the political agenda behind Adenauer's 
European policy and therefore accepted that political necessity took precedence over 
purely economic rationality in the case of the EEC. Yet, in the view of the peak 
associations of German industry and the ministry of economics, the EEC was only a 
stepping stone towards at least a Europe-wide trade arrangement, if not one that 
included all of what came to be called the "Atlantic Community".
Table 2,1: German exports to  EEC and e f ta  in million us 
Dollars 1955-1963





















Table 2.2: German imports from EEC and e f ta  in million us 
Dollars 1955-1963





















source: UN Yearbook of international Trade Statistics.
German foreign trade figures showed that trade with the OEEC-member countries 
outside the EEC was more important than that with the Six, and that the balance of 
trade with the seven most important trading partners outside the Community was
Wirtschaftsverbande im agrarischen Entscheidungsprozefi der EWG. Eine Analyse der 
Marla-Regional- und Agrarstrukturpolitik. (Schriften zu Regional- und Verkehrsproblemen 
in Industrie- und Entwicklungslandem, 13), Berlin 1972; Neunreither , Ka rlhein z: 
Wirtschaftsverbande im Prozeft der europaischen Integration. In: F riedrich , Carl 
Joachim  [ed.]: Die Politische Dimension der europaischen Gemeinschaftsbildung. Koln, 
Opladen 1968, pp. 358-445.
Rhen isch , Industrie, pp. 172-185, 294; Braunthal, Gerard: The Federation of German 
Industry in Politics. Ithaca, New York 1965, pp. 320-322.
Maha nt , Attitudes, pp. 285-286.
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constantly much more favourable than with those within. It was these economic 
realities that kept the BDI's interest in a Europe-wide solution alive and that helped 
Erhard to keep the FTA issue very high on the agenda of West Germany's European 
policy. However, these aggregate figures disguised the reality of industrial interest 
at the sectoral level.
__________ Figure 2.1:__________
German balance of trade with EEC and efta
i n c o r ^ o o c n O T - C M r oi n i n m m i n i o t D i o t D
0 0 ) 0) 0) 0 1 0 ) 0) 0 1 0 )
year
Source: UN Yearbook of International Trade statistics.
As will be shown in chapter 6, both the export interests and the protective interests 
of numerous sectors of German industry were served much better by the EEC than 
by the FTA or British accession. Hence, while capturing the overall interest of the 
German economy, the aggregate figures failed to take account of the fact that the 
pressures exerted by individual industrial interest groups could run counter to the 
overall picture and could be sufficiently strong to carry the day in a political 
showdown with the "guardians of the common good" at the BDI's headquarters in 
Cologne.
Werner Buhrer has analysed the aspirations of German industry with regards 
to European developments in the 1950s. According to him German industrialists felt 
that they had made a crucial contribution to West Germany's recovery and 
demanded to be heard by foreign policy makers. Thus, Buhrer argues, the BDI, 
German industry's peak organisation, claimed and actually had an influence on West
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Germany's foreign policy in that period pursuing a "Machtpolitik" of a new style14. 
The objectives of that policy were quite clear. If German industry was to continue 
and to further expand its success Germany needed "Gleichberechtigung" on the 
political level and the predominance of the principles of market economy in 
international economic relations. To the BDI the OEEC seemed to be a very apt tool 
to achieve these goals within Europe. It was the absence of a supranational body 
within the OEEC which was particularly welcomed by the BDI. The organisation 
clearly favoured a wide range of manoeuvre for the individual states. They also 
particularly welcomed the Europe-wide membership of the OEEC, while they were 
not at all fond of the ECSC for its supranational features and its limited 
membership. They saw the best chances for German industry in the establishment of 
a liberal economic system throughout the world, while they acknowledged that a 
quick and successful comeback of Germany depended also greatly on participation 
in Western European integration no matter what exact shape it would take.
After the conclusion of the treaties of Rome, the BDI was an ardent advocate 
of the FTA proposal and was even considering to act as a mediator between the 
French and the British15. The German business community had enthusiastically 
welcomed the British proposal in 1956 and spoke out unequivocally in favour of it 
ever since16. However, there was disagreement among the members of the BDI as to 
whether the common market should or should not be rejected unless it was 
accompanied by the FTA and whether the CM had to be regarded as a 
crystallisation point which had to be established before the FTA could be installed17.
Buhrer , Werner : "Der BDI und die Aullenpolitik der Bundesrepublik in den funfziger 
Jahren." In: VJZG 40 (1992), pp. 241-261.
Buhrer , BDI, p. 260; Buhrer, Industrie, pp. 99, 101, 107.
For the documents relating to the British proposals see HMSO [ed.]: A European Free Trade 
Area. United Kingdom Memorandum to the Organisation for European Economic Co­
operation. Presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of 
Trade to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. (Cmnd. 72), London 1957; HMSO [ed.]: 
Negotiations for European Free Trade Area. Documents Relating to the Negotiations from 
July 1956, to December 1958. (Cmnd. 641), London 1959; [OEEC-Council] : "Bericht 
iiber die Sitzung vom 17. Bis 19. Juli 1956 in Paris." In: Europa-Archiv 11(1956), pp. 
9113-9116; "Erklarung des Britischen Schatzkanzlers, Harold Macmillan, vom 3. Oktober 
1956 iiber die Plane fur eine partielle Freihandelszone zwischen dem Commonwealth und 
Westeuropa." In: Europa-Archiv 11(1956), pp. 9295-9296; OEEC [ed.]: Report on the 
Possibilities of Creating a Free Trade Area in Europe. Prepared for the Council of the 
OEEC by a Special Working Party. Paris 1957; "Die Verhandlungen der OEEC iiber eine 
europaische Freihandelszone." In: Europa-Archiv 12(1957), pp. 9651-9652.
Ma ha nt , Attitudes, p. 280.
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The fact that this option was considered shows the strength of the reservation against 
the EEC in some comers of German industry. Yet the feeling was also widespread 
(and not only in Germany) that German trade would benefit anyway, whether there 
was going to be a CM only or whether the CM was to be accompanied by the 
FTA18. Werner Buhrer states that the BDI wanted something even bigger than a 
Europe-wide FTA, including all of the OEEC members. According to that, German 
industry was actually looking for free trade within the Atlantic community. Buhrer 
observes the development to the point where "Kleineuropa" was felt to be too small 
for the "economic giant" which was the Federal Republic. The inclusion in 
supranational and international organisations had been accepted at the beginning of 
the 1950s. Now, at the end of the 1950s, they were increasingly seen as impeding 
further expansion. The BDI made itself the speaker for these views within German 
industry on the FTA, the attempts at bridge building between EEC and EFTA and 
the British application for membership in the EEC in 1961. Yet the peculiar 
closeness to the governing Christian Democrats made it impossible for the BDI to 
put itself into a position of outright conflict with the federal government19.
2 .2  Who Governs in Adenauer's "Kanz/erdemokratie"?
Adenauer, Erhard, de Gaulle and the Free Trade Area Issue
The British proposals for the establishment of an OEEC-wide free trade area were
welcomed enthusiastically in Germany. The Federal Cabinet pledged its support for
20these proposals already in spring 1957 . Two months later The federal council 
(West Germany's upper house) demanded that the government accelerate the steps 
towardss the formation of the FTA. When the Federal Parliament ratified the treaty 
establishing the EEC and Euratom in July 1957, it passed a resolution demanding 
the establishment of a Europe-wide FTA21. Toward the end of the FTA negotiations
The  Economist Intelligence Un it : Britain and Europe: A Study of the Effects on British 
Manufacturing Industry of a Free Trade Area and a Common Market,. London 1957, p. 61. 
Buhrer , BDI, p. 260.
Koerfer , Kampf, p. 145.
Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 2. Wahlperiode, Stenographische Berichte, 
Band 38, 224. Sitzung, Bonn, Freitag, den 5. Juli 1957. Zweite und dritte Beratung des 
Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zu den Vertragen vom 25. Marz 1957 zur Grundung der
Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europaischen Atomgemeinschaft nebst
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and after their failure the Federal Parliament re-emphasised its demands for the 
FTA with unanimous votes in October and December 195822. The FTA issue was 
the object of Parliamentary questions in 1959 and I96023, and after the failure of the 
negotiations on British accession the Federal Cabinet pledged to see to it that the 
negotiations would be resumed as soon as possible. The Bundestag expressed yet 
again its continued interest in a Europe larger than that of the Six in the preamble 
which it attached to the highly disputed German-French treaty of January 196324. 
All of these mostly unanimous expressions of Parliamentary will do not suggest that 
there were major disputes over European policy in Germany once the EEC had been 
established.
Erganzung (Drucksachen 3440, Nachtrag zu 3440, 3615), pp. 13315-13377, for report on 
the FTA see pp. 13427-13429.
Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 3. Wahlperiode, Stenographische Berichte Band 
41, 42. Sitzung, Berlin, den 2. Oktober 1958. Grofle Anffage der Fraktion der FDP betr. 
Erfullung des EWG-Vertrags (Drucksache 371), pp. 2429-2453; Koerfer , Kampf, pp. 218- 
219.
GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion der FDP, 22. Oktober 1959, betr.: Freihandelszone. 
(Drucksache 1305). In: Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 3. Wahlperiode. 
Anlagen zu den stenographischen Berichten, Vol. 64: Drucksachen 1301 bis 1400. Bonn 
1959; GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion der SPD, 29. Januar 1960, betr.: Europaische 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und Freihandelszone (Drucksache 1464 neu). In: Verhandlungen 
des Deutschen Bundestages. 3. Wahlperiode. Anlagen zu den stenographischen Berichten. 
Vol. 65: Drucksachen 1401-1580. Bonn 1959/60.
Adenauer read out the respective cabinet statement in his "Regierungserklarung" (statement 
on behalf of the government) on 6 February 1963. See Verhandlungen des Deutschen 
Bundestages. 4. Wahlperiode. Stenographische Berichte. Vol. 52. Bonn 1963, p. 2575. For 
the parliamentary debate on the German-French treaty see Verhandlungen des Deutschen 
Bundestages. 4. Wahlperiode. Stenographische Berichte. Vol. 53. Bonn 1963, pp. 3742- 
3754. For the proposed ratification bill and the text of the preamble see Der Bundeskanzler 
an den Herm Prasidenten des Deutschen Bundestages, 26. Marz 1963, (Drucksache 
IV/1157) und Anlagen. In: Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 4. Wahlperiode. 
Anlagen zu den stenographischen Jahresberichten. Vol. 84, Drucksachen IV/1081 bis 
IV/1280. Bonn 1963; Schriftlicher Bericht des Ausschusses fur auswartige Angelegenheiten 
(3. AusschuB) iiber den von der Bundesregierung eingebrachten Entwurf eines Gesetzes zu 
der Gemeinsamen Erklarung und zu dem Vertrag vom 22. Januar 1963 zwischen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Franzosischen Republik iiber die deutsch-franzosische 
Zusammenarbeit. (Drucksache IV/1252) In: Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 4. 
Wahlperiode. Anlagen zu den stenographischen Jahresberichten. Vol. 84, Drucksachen 
IV/1081 bis IV/1280. Bonn 1963, see in particular p. 10. On the French-German Treaty see 
Holscher , Wolfgang : Krisenmanagement in Sachen EWG. Das Scheitem des Beitritts 
Grofibritanniens und die deutsch-franzdsischen Beziehungen. In: Blasius, Rainer  A. [ed.]: 
Von Adenauer zu Erhard. Studien zur Auswartigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1963. (Schriftenreihe der VfZG, 68), Munchen 1994, pp. 9-44; Jan sen , Thom as: Die 
Entstehung des deutsch-franzdsischen Vertrages vom 22. Januar 1963. In: Blu m en w itz , 
D ieter  [et al.] [eds.]: Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit. Politik und Personlichkeit der ersten 
Bundeskanzler s. Vol. II: Beitrage der Wissenschaft. Stuttgart 1976, pp. 249-271; Schw arz , 
Hans-Peter : Prasident de Gaulle, Bundeskanzler Adenauer und die Entstehung des Elysee-
67
There was, however, the ongoing battle over European integration between 
the federal chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his Minister of Economics Ludwig 
Erhard and their respective followers. In this battle Erhard represented the view of 
the vast majority of Germany's political elites as expressed in the Parliamentary 
resolutions that have been cited. Adenauer on the other hand sought to dampen the 
Erhard camp’s zeal to supplement the EEC with a free trade area. Over the years it 
became clear that Adenauer was in outright opposition to those in Germany who 
wanted to see the FTA established and the EEC enlarged. On Adenauer's foreign 
policy agenda the relationship with France and its leading figure de Gaulle ranked 
very high. In his view the commercial issues with which Erhard busied himself were 
of minor importance and should certainly not impede his understanding with de 
Gaulle and Germany's good relations with France on which, in Adenauer's view, 
the Federal Republic's security crucially depended.
Konrad Adenauer
The power of the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany has been the 
object of numerous studies, essays and articles. The term "Kanzlerdemokratie" 
captures not only the constitutional design endowing the chancellorship with the 
prerogative to set the guidelines for government policy (Richtlinienkompetenz)25 but 
refers mainly to the actual performance of exercising power by Konrad Adenauer 
while being in office . The fact that until 1955 the Federal Republic was in a state
Vertrages. In: Loth , W ilfried/P ich t , Robert [eds.]: De Gaulle, Deutschland und 
Europa. Opladen 1991, pp. 69-179.
Buchheim , Ha n s: Die Richtlinienkompetenz unter der Kanzlerschaft Adenauers. In: 
Blum enw itz, Dieter  [et al.] [eds.]: Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit. Politik und 
Persdnlichkeit des ersten deutschen Bundeskanzlers. Vol. II: Beitrdge der Wissenschaft. 
Stuttgart 1976, pp. 339- 351; Junker , Ernst Ulrich : Die Richtlinienkompetenz des 
Bundeskanzlers. (Tiibinger Studien zur Geschichte und Politik,20), Tubingen 1965. On the 
office of the federal chancellor see articles 63 to 69 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Essential for the powerful position of the federal chancellor are articles 65 
(Richtlinienkompetenz) and 67 (konstruktives Mihtrauensvotum), which provides that a 
chancellor can be forced to resign, only if parliament elects a successor in his place. Seifert 
and Homig stress that despite his constitutional prerogative to set the policy guidelines the 
chancellor will always have to rely on support from the majority faction in parliament. See 
Hom ig , D ieter/Seifert , Karl-H einz [eds.]: Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. Taschenkommentar. Baden-Baden 41991, pp. 298-314, in particular pp. 302- 
305.
Bracher , Karl D ietrich : Die Kanzlerdemokratie. In: Loew enthal, Richard/Schw arz , 
Hans-Peter  [eds.]: Die Zweite Republik. 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland - eine
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of distinctly diminished sovereignty and that until then Adenauer performed the 
functions of both foreign secretary and chancellor contributed considerably to the 
evolution of his powerful position. However, the most important resource of actual 
political power was the loyalty and support of and Adenauer's control over the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)27. There has been a lot written on the CDU 
being a mere "Kanzlerwahlverein" (society for the election of the chancellor) and 
without much political life of its own. While this might be true to a certain extent
for the early years of the Federal Republic, it certainly changed by the beginning of
28the 1960s . At that time Adenauer gradually lost much of his power grip on the 
CDU with his party desperately hoping to arrange his replacement by Ludwig
29Erhard quickly and smoothly . In view of this it would be wrong to assume that
30Adenauer's power was equally strong throughout all of his tenure . Well before he 
agreed on a date to leave office his position had been seriously undermined.
In contradiction to this a number of writers suggest that Adenauer's 
command over the federal government in foreign and European policy was so strong 
that he could easily brush aside whatever opposition from within the Cabinet and 
any other comer of the German government there might have been31. The most far-
Bilanz. Stuttgart 1974, pp. 179-202; Baring , Arn u lf : Aufienpolitik in Adenauers 
Kanzlerdemokratie. Bonns Beitrag zur Europaischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft. (Schriften 
des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, 28), Munchen, 
Wien 1969; Kupper , Jost : Die Kanzlerdemokratie. Voraussetzungen, Strukturen und 
Anderungen des Regierungsstiles in der Ara Adenauer. (Europaische Hochschulschriften, 
Reihe XXXI, Politikwissenschaft, 79), Frankfurt [et al.] 1985.
For Adenauer's position within the CDU see Paterson , W illiam  E.: The Chancellor and 
His Party: Political Leadership in the Federal Republic. In: Paterson , W illiam  E./Sm ith , 
Gordon  [eds.]: The West German Model. Perspectives on a Stable State. London 1981, pp. 
3-17, and in particular p. 3 for the predominance of party allegiance over constitutional 
powers for the political strength of the chancellor. See also H eidenheim er , Arnold  J.: 
Adenauer und die CDU. The Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party. The Hague
1960, in particular pp. 178-229; Domes, Ju rgen : Mehrheitsfrakxion und Bundesregierung. 
Aspekte des Verhaltnisses der Fraktion der CDU/CSV im zweiten und dritten Deutschen 
Bundestag zum Kabinett Adenauer. (Politische Forschungen, 5), Koln, Opladen 1964. 
Paterson , Chancellor, p. 14; Kupper , Kanzlerdemokratie, pp. 347-364, 405-414. 
Dedring , Klaus-Heinrich : Adenauer - Erhard - Kiesinger. Die CDU als Regierungspartei 
1961-1969. Pfaffenweiler 1989, pp. 109- 194; Osterheld , Horst: "Ich gehe nicht leichten 
Herzens...". Adenauers letzte Kanzlerjahre - ein dokumentarischer Bericht. Mainz 1986, pp. 
67-80, 146-149, 163-168, 194-213.
Adenauer's rather ridiculous temporary quest for the federal presidency undermined his 
effective power for some time in 1959. See Wagner , W olfgang : Die 
Bundesprasidentenwahl 1959. (Adenauer-Studien, 2) Mainz 1972, see in particular pp. 67- 
72.
Robert Marjolin stresses that Adenauer was always able to accommodate French interests, if 
they did not run directly counter to fundamental German interests. He also points out that
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reaching statement of that sort is the assertion by the former European
commissioner Hans von der Groeben that all the opposition did not matter, since it
was anyway Adenauer who decided in the end:
Mochten auch Bundeswirtschaftsminister Erhard, sein Staatssekretar 
Muller-Armack und die Anhanger der Freihandelszone in Wissenschaft 
und Wirtschaft ihre Bemiihungen fortsetzen, die Entscheidungen wurden 
von Bundeskanzler Adenauer getroffen, der sich dabei auf die groBe 
Mehrheit der CDU stiitzen konnte32.
Groeben's statement might hold some truth for the very early stages of the 
negotiations on the treaties of Rome when a clear political decision by the Federal 
Republic was needed and Adenauer formally forced one against an unruly Erhard at 
the beginning of 1956 by explicitly invoking his constitutional prerogatives to 
determine the policy guidelines33. Yet von der Groeben1 s assessment does not refer 
to that basic decision at the very outset of a debate that continued almost until 
Adenauer left office. He refers to the time after the failure of the FTA negotiations 
when Erhard and many others in Germany tried to maintain the momentum of the 
FTA debate and at a time when Adenauer's authority was about to falter for the first 
time over his embarrassing quest for the presidency.
Von der Groeben wrongly alleges that Adenauer’s position had the support 
of the vast majority of his own party. He forgets that there were not only Erhard, 
Muller-Armack, a number of industrialists and academics who fiercely demanded 
the FTA solution, but also the unanimous resolutions passed by the Federal 
Parliament - obviously including all Christian Democratic MPs - taking exactly the 
same view on a number of occasions. It remains true that in matters of foreign
Adenauer was the only one in Germany who was in the position to do so given that there 
was considerable opposition to some of that. See Marjolin , Robert: Le travail d'une vie. 
Memoires 1911-1986. Paris 1986, pp. 307, 317. Charles Wighton sees Adenauer's power 
not only based on what he depicts as the chancellor's personal autocratic inclinations but also 
on the subservient attitudes of those who surround him in government and parliament. See 
W ighton , Adenauer, pp. 13-15.
"Whatever the Minister of Economics Erhard, his state secretary Muller-Armack and the 
advocates of the free trade area in academia and business did to continue their efforts, it was 
Adenauer after all who made the decisions and who could rely on the vast majority of the 
CDU". Groeben , Aufbaujahre, p. 75.
Kusters, Hanns Jurgen : Europapolitik, pp. 646-673; Kusters, Hanns Jurgen : Der 
Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionen deutscher Europapolitik 1949-1958. In: Buh rer , 
Werner  [et al.] [eds.]: Vom Marshallplan zurEWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland in die westliche Welt. (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 30), 
Miinchen 1990, pp. 335-370; Koerfer , Kampf, pp. 137-138
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policy the executive tends to dominate while Parliament is less influential in this 
field than in other areas. This is certainly a very important reality of German 
foreign policy for most of the 1950s34. Yet the unanimous Parliamentary resolutions 
demonstrate clearly that in these matters Adenauer could not always rely on a 
majority, even within his own party.
Yet in the existing literature on the FTA issue the constitutional powers and 
personal authority of the first federal chancellor were explicitly or implicitly 
regarded as the essential variables explaining the outcome of Germany's European 
policy in the years from 1957 to 1963. With foreign and European policy being 
Adenauer's special personal domain, the need to take industrial interest into account 
in order to understand West Germany's choice for the common market of the Six 
and the Six only despite apparent overwhelming support for a different policy option 
was not felt in the literature. Because of his power and authority Adenauer prevailed 
with his decision not to put pressure on de Gaulle, to endorse his veto. In the words 
of Hans von der Groeben it was Adenauer who decided and that was that.
It is argued here that the term "Kanzlerdemokratie" is a gross simplification 
of the nature of West German democracy in that period, if it is to suggest that the 
incumbent of the time was able to simply impose his will in questions of this 
dimension in the face of overwhelming opposition from all sides of the political and 
social spectrum. One has to question whether that sort of "Kanzlerdemokratie" 
really existed in the period analysed here and indeed if it ever existed at all. The 
term "Kanzlerdemokratie" as discussed by Karl Dietrich Bracher is certainly not as
Baring , Arn u lf: Aufienpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie ; Besson , Waldem ar : 
Die Aufienpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Erfahrungen und Mafistabe. Munchen 
1970; Besson , Waldem ar: "Prinzipienffagen der deutschen Aufienpolitik." In: Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift 9(1968), pp. 28-44; Baring , Arnulf: "Westdeutsche Aufienpolitik in 
der Ara Adenauer." In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 9(1968), pp. 45-55; Schw arz , Hans- 
Peter : "Die Politik der Westbindung oder die Staatsrason der Bundesrepublik." In: 
Zeitschrift fur Politik (Neue Folge), 22(1975), pp. 307-337; Schw arz , Hans-Peter : The 
Roles of the Federal Republikc in the Community of States. In: Kaiser , Karl/M organ , 
Roger (eds.): Britain and West Germany. Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign 
Policy. London [et al.] 1971, pp. 219-259; Noack , Pa u l : Die Aufienpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Stuttgart 21981; Schw arz, Hans-Peter  [ed.]: Handbuch der 
deutschen Aufienpolitik. Munchen, Zurich 1975, on the institutional framework of foreign 
policy making see in particular pp. 31-174; Becker , W infried : Views of the Foreign Policy 
Situation Among the CDU Leadership, 1945-1957. In: Nolfo , Ennio  di [ed.]: Power in 
Europe. Vol. 2: Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC 1952-
1957. Berlin, New York 1992, pp. 351-371..
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simplistic and one-dimensional as it might sometimes have been interpreted. Yet it 
seems that the suggestive power of this concept has distracted the attention of many 
historians and political scientists,preventing them from taking a closer look at the 
economic and societal interests and pressures underlying the great choices made in 
West Germany's European policy after 1957. Adenauer was at no point between 
1957 and 1963 in the position to close the FTA debate that he would have liked to 
have seen closed after 1958, nor was he able to openly speak out against his 
Minister of Economics in this matter. On the contrary, he was forced to pay lip 
service to the FTA and even to British accession and had to face a humiliating 
dressing down from his own Parliamentary party when he deviated from that line35.
Adenauer's conception of European policy differed considerably from that 
held by his main opponent Ludwig Erhard . For the federal chancellor it was 
essentially a means to secure the tremendous achievements in terms of international 
standing and regaining of sovereignty which the Federal Republic had accomplished 
ten years after the end of the Second World War. For Adenauer West Germany's 
security and the long-term objective of German unification could be safeguarded37, 
only if the West remained firmly united against any Communist threat. 
Reconciliation and subsequently co-operation between France and Germany were 
absolutely crucial in his view in order to dissuade France or any other Western 
power that gains could be made from concessions and detente vis-a-vis the Soviet
38Union which would almost certainly be at the expense of vital German interests .
DIE WELT, 23 VIII 1962, "England mull beitreten", von Georg Schroder, Bonn, 
"Adenauers Niederlage", "Nicht mehr Herr im Ring?".
Werner Weidenfeld has analysed the foundations of Adenauer's policy on Europe. See 
W eidenfeld , Werner: Konrad Adenauer und Europa. Die geistigen Grundlagen der 
westeuropaischen Integrationspolitik des ersten Bonner Bundeskanzlers. (Europaische 
Studien des Instituts fur Europaische Politik, 7), Bonn 1976; Schw arz , Hans-Peter : Das 
aufienpolitische Konzept Konrad Adenauers. In: Morsey , Rudo lf/R epgen , Konrad  
[eds.]: Adenauer-Studien Vol. 1 (Veroffentlichungen der Kommission fur Zeitgeschichte. 
Reihe B: Forschungen 10), Mainz 1971, pp. 71-108; Ba n d u let , Bruno : Adenauer 
zwischen Ost und West. Altemativen der Westdeutschen Aufienpolitik. Munchen 1970; 
Pottering , Ha ns: Adenauers Sicherheitspolitik 1955-1963. Ein Beitrag zum deutsch- 
amerikanischen Verhaltnis. (Bonner Schriften zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 10), 
Dusseldorf 1975; Besson, Waldemar: "Zum Verhaltnis von Zielen und Mitteln in 
Adenauers Aufienpolitik." In: Historische Zeitschrift 214 (1972), pp. 363-377; Kusters, 
"Europapolitik", pp. 646-673
Foschepoth , Josef [ed.]: Adenauer und die deutsche Frage. Gottingen 1988.
For Adenauer's policy vis-k-vis France see Schw arz, Hans-Peter  [ed.]: Adenauer und 
Frankreich. Die deutsch-franzdsischen Beziehungen 1958-1969. (Rhondorfer Gesprache, 7), 
Bonn 1985.
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Thus for Adenauer economic integration in Western Europe was a means to an end. 
The dogmatic zeal with which Erhard regarded the choices to be made on the 
precise nature of European integration was completely foreign to Adenauer's way of 
thinking. He might well have been happy with a free trade area, if it promised to 
further his foreign policy objectives. Erhard's concerns however seemed to be of 
rather inferior importance to Germany's interests in Adenauer's view.
Ludwig Erhard
For Ludwig Erhard the FTA issue and the questions of how a national economy, 
foreign trade and the international economy should be run were matters of principle 
and thus not to be subject to any other considerations, especially those of political 
pragmatism and opportunism that Erhard sometimes thought to discern in 
Adenauer's handling of such matters as the pension reform in 195739. In Erhard's 
universe of values and priorities economic considerations came clearly first. He was 
a disciple of neo-liberal or ordo-liberal teachings and stuck to these principles even 
when the German business community at times was not at all pleased with freer 
trade through the unilateral removal of tariffs and the anti-cartel legislation40. 
Erhard's general assessment of the economic and monetary preconditions of freer 
trade in Western Europe were those of the school of Ordo-Liberals of which 
Wilhelm Ropke was one of the most prominent representatives. Ropke's evaluation 
of the first steps that had been made after the treaties of Rome had entered into 
effect at the beginning of 1959 clearly indicates that the Ordo-Liberals and Erhard 
with them actually favoured the insertion of the German economy and the Western 
European economies in the world economy without establishing a preferential 
trading area in Europe41. That was one of the reasons why Erhard had been the most
39 Ko erfer , Kampf, p. 135.
40 The latest publication on Erhard's economic and political background is Anthony James
Nicholls' book on the formulation and establishment of a Social Market Economy in
Germany. N icholls, Anthony  Jam es: Freedom with Responsibility. The Social Market
Economy in Germany, 1918-1963. Oxford 1994. See also Cu rzon , Gerard : International 
Economic Order: Contribution of Ordo-liberals. In: Peacock , Alan/W illgerodt, H ans 
(ed.): German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy. London 1989. Herbert 
Ehrenberg delivers a fierce attack on the politician Erhard and argues that his economic 
policy successes were rather legend than reality. See Ehrenberg , Herbert: Die Erhard 
Saga. Analyse einer Wirtschaftspolitik die keine war. Stuttgart [n. y.].
41 Erhard's conviction that the return to the world market was the proper way forward for the 
German economy was spelled out already in 1953. Erhard argued at the time that the OEEC 
liberalisation program and the gradual establishment of convertibility through the
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fervent advocate of an early re-establishment of convertibility. Convertibility was 
seen as the end of a regional monetary system that was inherently discriminatory. 
Once this system was overcome, there would be a payments system that would 
transcend all regional entities and not only the EEC, but also the free trade area 
which was seen as the desirable common roof for all member countries of the
OEEC, whether they were members of the EEC or not. Thus Ropke saw the re­
establishment of convertibility at the end of 1958 as a chance that could help bring 
to an end the 'tragic state in which Europe had been put by the establishment of the 
EEC'42.
mechanisms of the EPU should open Europe toward the world market and prevent a 
European seclusion. See Erhard , Ludwig [ed.]: Deutschlands Riickkehr zum Weltmarkt. 
Diisseldorf 1953, p. 145. Reinhard Neebe shows that Erhard had the full support of the BDI 
in these matters already at the very beginning of the 1950s and that the BDI did by no means 
back the integration of the Federal Republic in the Atlantic Community from the outset. See 
Neebe , Reinhard : Optionen westdeutscher Aufienwirtschaftspolitik 1949-1953. In: 
Buhrer , W erner  [et al.] [eds.]: Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt. (Quellen und Darstellungen zur
Zeitgeschichte, 30), Munchen 1990, pp. 162-202. In his study on the re-establishment of
West Germany's foreign trade until 1958 Christoph Buchheim holds that West Germany’s 
return to the world market and the establishment of that world market was achieved by
1958. The liberalisation within the OEEC and the arrangements of the EPU are seen as a 
necessary preparatory step for that, whereas Buchheim judges the creation of a 
“kleineuropaische Integration” as disturbing to these developments. See Bu chheim , 
Christoph : Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958. 
(Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 31), Munchen 1990; Buch h eim , 
Christoph: Die Bundesrepublik und die Uberwindung der Dollar-Lucke. In: Buhrer , 
W erner  [et al.] [eds.]: Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland in die westliche Welt. (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 30), 
Munchen 1990, pp. 81-98, especially p. 97. With respect to the same question see also 
Neebe , Reinhard : German Big Busines and the Return to the World Market after World 
War II. In: Berghahn , Volker R. [et al.]: German Big Business and Europe in the 
Twentieth Century. Oxford, Providence 1993, pp, 39-70; Buhrer , W erner: Erzwungene 
oder freiwillige Liberalisierung? Die USA, die OEEC und die westdeutsche 
Aufienhandelspolitik 1949-1952. In: Buhrer , W erner [et al.] [eds.]: Vom Marshallplan 
zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt. 
(Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 30), Munchen 1990, pp. 139-162; 
Abelshauser, W erner: Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1945- 
1980. Frankfurt 1983, pp. 151-154; Kram er , Alan : The West German Economy, 1945- 
1955. New York, Oxford 1991, pp. 156-163. Rolf Dunke attributes Germany’s economic 
miracle mainly to factors related to reconstruction. Dunke , Rolf H .: Reassessing the 
Wirtschaftswunder: Reconstruction and Postwar Growth in West Germany in an 
International Context. In: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 52(1990), pp. 451- 
491; Braun , Hans-Joachim : The German Economy in the Twentieth Century. London, 
New York 1990, pp. 237-254; Berghahn , Big Business, pp. 117-118 tables 1.5 and 1.6; 
Giersch , Herbert [et al.]: Openness, Wage Restraint and Macroeconomic Stability: West 
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Economic Reconstruction and Lessons for the East Today. Cambridge, London 1993, pp. 1- 
27, especially pp. 14-20.
42 Ropke , W ilhelm : "Zwischenbilanz der europaischen Wirtschaftsintegration. Kritische 
Nachlese." In: Ordo (Jahrbuch fur die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Geselschaft) 11 (1959),
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People like Ropke and Erhard kept fighting against what they saw as 
misconceptions of European integration. In their view the essential choice that 
needed to be made in order to achieve integration was not one between the 
limitation of national sovereignty in favour of an international order on the one hand 
and the retaining of that sovereignty on the other. This choice, Ropke argued, did 
not exist, since national sovereignty could not remain complete anyway. The choice 
was thus rather between the limitation of national sovereignty in favour of an 
international agency or in favour of a market economy and the discipline of a free 
international payments system. Ropke saw the different ways towards international 
integration as the opposed principles of collectivism, which he saw at work in the 
EEC, and of a market economy, which was immanent in the move towards 
international convertibility of December 195843. The main danger that Ropke saw in 
the establishment of the EEC was that it would split up the free Europe. 
Additionally he feared that, because of the protectionist tendencies that prevailed in 
France and Italy, the CET of the EEC would be pushed upward rather than 
downward and that there would therefore be a high protective wall between the EEC 
and the rest of Europe as well as the rest of the world. In this context the free trade 
area was seen as the only means possible to overcome this division. In 1959 Ropke 
saw his predictions of a split within Western Europe fulfilled, the most significant 
sign of this being the paralysing uncertainty concerning the further development, 
especially the question whether the gap could be bridged within a reasonable time- 
span. Ropke branded it as a 'terrifying mental aberration' to label this 'piling up of 
barricades within Europe' with terms like "European unification"44.
pp. 69-94, see in particular p. 76; Ropke had already delivered a very critical verdict on the 
EEC a year before. See Ropke, W ilhelm : "Gemeinsamer Markt und Freihandelszone. 28 
Thesen als Richtpunkte." In Ordo (Jahrbuch fur die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft) 10(1958), pp. 31-62; also Ropke, W ilhelm : Integration und Disintegration 
der intemationalen Wirtschaft. In: Beckerath, E. von [et al.] [eds.]: Wirtschaftsfragen der 
freien Welt. Zum sechzigsten Geburtstag von Bundeswirtschaftsminister Ludwig Erhard. 
Frankfurt 1957, pp. 493-501; Stohler , Jacques: "Neoliberalismus und europaische 
Integration." In: Europa-Archiv 17(1962), 99-118; Kohlhase, N orbert: "Zum politischen 
Charakter der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft." In: Europa-Archiv 16(1961), pp. 
339-344.
Ropke , Zwischenbilanz, pp. 77-78.
Ropke , Zwischenbilanz, pp. 87-89. On the impact of the division between EEC and EFTA 
see Ben o it , Em ile: Europe at Sixes and Sevens. The Common Market, the Free Trade 
Association and the United States. New York 1961; Wa lter , Ingo : The European 
Common Market. Growth and Patterns of Trade and Production. New York [et al.] 1967;
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Despite all of that and despite his preference for free trade on a Europe-wide 
or rather on a global basis, Erhard had accepted the EEC for political reasons, still 
hoping that it would be supplemented by the proposed FTA. Thus, despite his fierce 
criticism of the treaties of Rome, especially of Euratom, Erhard endorsed the 
common market at least verbally45.Yet he did not stop to criticise the path of 
integration represented by the EEC favouring instead the FTA and world 
integration. The establishment of convertibility at the end of 1958 was in his view 
the best solution to all of that which would end regional discrimination and in the 
end render the common market harmless46. The conflict with Adenauer on the 
question of the FTA and the British application for entry into the EEC persisted 
however as long as Adenauer stayed in office.
European integration: Erhard vs. Adenauer
The conflict between Adenauer and Erhard over the best form of economic 
integration in Europe was the most fierce and enduring one of several rows over 
individual questions. Matters of economic policy in general had contributed to the 
worsening of the relationship between the two leading political figures in Germany 
and led to a climate of complete distrust between them. One of the factors in this 
conflict might have been that the actual power of the Minister of Economics and the 
importance of the policies conducted by this ministry had declined as compared to
Geneva  Graduate Institute of International Studies [ed.]: The European Free Trade 
Association and the Crisis of European Integration. An Aspect of the Atlantic Crisis? 
London 1968.
Groeben , Aufbaujahre, p. 46.
In a speech at a Council meeting of the OEEC on 12 February 1957, Erhard calls the FTA 
project the decisive political and economic measure towards European integration and 
stresses that EEC and FTA should be regarded as one whole, with the FTA mitigating the 
flaws of the customs union. See Erhard , Ludw ig : Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik. Der Weg 
der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Diisseldorf [et al.] 1962, p. 333. In November 1958 Erhard 
wrote a letter to Adenauer stating that none of the parliaments of the five EEC partners of 
France would have ratified the EEC treaty without the commitment to create the FTA. See 
Laitenberger , Volkhard: Ludwig Erhard. Der Nationaldkonom als Politiker. 
(Personlichkeit und Geschichte, 126-128), Gottingen, Zurich 1986, p. 144. In a speech on 
28 December 1958 transmitted on radio Erhard suggests that with convertibility a return to 
global free trade should be made thereby leaving behind the quarrels over common market 
and FTA. See Erhard , Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. 417-418. He continued his campaign for a 
Europe larger than that of the Six in a speech in October 1959 and stressed in a newspaper 
article at the end of 1960 that the entire German business community was behind him on this 
matter. See Erhard , Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. 450-455, 530-537.
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the very first years of the Federal Republic. In May 1956 the relationship between 
Adenauer and Erhard suffered greatly as a result of the fact that Adenauer had not 
been informed of the intention to lower the interest rates. Erhard and the Minister of 
Finance Schaeffer had been present when the Bundesbank in Frankfurt announced 
the raising of the discount rate by one percentage point. Vocke, the president of the 
Bundesbank, had convinced the two politicians that the economy had to be slowed 
down and inflation had to be fought. This should be done by the lowering of import 
tariffs which should be initiated by Erhard and Schaeffer and by the raising of the 
interest rate. Adenauer had not been informed of this. Since 1957 was an election 
year and since Adenauer feared a negative impact of this measures on the economy, 
he believed in a conspiracy and overreacted at the annual conference of the 
Federation of German Industry (BDI) in the "Gurzenich" in Cologne. Finally, 
Erhard and Schaeffer won Cabinet approval for their assessment of the situation and 
their support of the measures by the Bundesbank as well as for those they still 
intended to implement. In his speech at the BDI-conference Adenauer had revealed 
a profound ignorance of essential economic matters. Thus the whole affair was quite 
embarrassing to him and constituted a complete victory for Erhard and Schaeffer. 
Similar conflicts concerned the formulation of a cartel law in 1957 and the 
revaluation of the DM in 1961. In both cases Erhard was not as successful as in the 
first one47.
Yet the "Gurzenich"-incident over the heightening of the discount rate in 
1956 left the relationship between Adenauer and Erhard shaken. It never recovered 
and remained characterised by profound distrust. While Adenauer was never 
sufficiently powerful to dismiss his Minister of Economics, he did everything to 
frustrate his policies. Yet the "Gurzenich Affare" showed as well that Adenauer 
could not dominate the Cabinet just as he wished. Similarly, Erhard's views had 
prevailed at the end of 1956 in the session of the Federal Cabinet on the line to be 
taken on common market and Euratom and had prevented Adenauer from making
Koerfer , Da n iel: Wirtschaftspolitische Kontroversen zwischen Konrad Adenauer und 
Ludwig Erhard (1956-1963). In: Po h l , Hans (ed.): Adenauers Verhaltnis zu Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft. (Rhondorfer Gesprache. 12), Bonn 1992, pp. 38-42.
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substantial concessions to France, which Erhard and the Cabinet deemed unbearable 
for the Federal Republic48.
Erhard's arguments for the FTA were founded in his economic philosophy. 
He continuously pointed to the fact that Germany, as a very export-oriented 
country, should not lock itself up in a narrow and most likely quite protectionist 
common market with a limited membership. Some have argued that Erhard with his 
somewhat dogmatic approach to economic and political matters did not only take the 
principle of free or freer trade much more seriously than the business community 
itself, he is seen by some also as the only really important advocate of the FTA on 
the European continent at least in the early stages49. Yet, as has already been stated, 
the question gained momentum in Germany to such an extent that Adenauer could 
not dare to trigger a showdown with his adversary within the Cabinet. This means 
that Erhard managed to help aggregate and concentrate the efforts of German 
industry and politics in favour of the FTA. He most actively campaigned for this 
goal utilising his great personal authority with the Germans on all matters of 
economics, using comparatively unconventional ways of conveying his message via 
a costly media campaign and permanently dramatising the consequences which 
Germany had to face if the FTA project should fail, thus risking the escalation of 
the conflict with Adenauer. The ups and downs of this continuous struggle are 
described in great detail by Daniel Koerfer and Hanns Jurgen Kiisters. It was as 
much a conflict over political and economic concepts as about power.
Despite Adenauer's very strong position that he had built up during the first 
years after 1949, the fight over the distribution of authority in questions of 
European integration that was very intense in 1955 and the following year did not 
come a conclusion. In sum Erhard and the ministry of trade and commerce won the 
struggle and ended up with more authority than before, including those for German 
relations with all international multilateral organisations as far as economic 
questions were concerned. The Bundeswirtschaftsministerium (BMWi) also acquired 
the competence for the inter ministerial co-ordination and preparation of Cabinet 
decisions in European policy and retained the competence for tariffs and commercial
Kusters, Streit, pp. 360-361.
Ko erfer , Kampf, p. 143.
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policy50. Erhard’s struggle over competencies had primarily been with the 
Auswartiges Amt (AA) and the Foreign Minister von Brentano. The details of the 
arrangement that was finally reached are important in that it was according to these 
rules that the German representation in the Maudling committee, the EEC council of 
ministers and interim committee of the EEC was organised. Yet the decision making 
process concerning the distribution of competencies within the Federal government 
is revealing in itself in that it gives insight into the potential power that people like 
Erhard and Adenauer commanded within the Federal Cabinet. It was by no means 
the case that Adenauer could just do what he wanted and do so unchallenged. On a 
good number of occasions he had to yield to the majority of Cabinet members 
standing against him. Thus Erhard proved to be a figure whose opinion had to be 
heard and who could not easily be ignored in the political decision making process.
The record of success that Erhard was able to score in terms of public 
statements in favour of the FTA and later on of British accession to the EEC by all 
political parties, social groups, by Parliament and also by the Cabinet itself was 
impressive indeed: In July 1957, when the Bundestag ratified the treaties of Rome 
the German Parliament, even with the votes of the FDP which had rejected the 
treaties themselves, voted for a resolution supporting the idea of an FTA and for a 
liberal trade policy to be followed by the EEC. These and other resolution have 
already been cited. In 1960 Erhard reached a modification of the "Hallstein-Plan" 
for acceleration of the tariff reduction schedule of the EEC. This was yet again a 
success for Erhard within the German Cabinet. Erhard hoped thereby to gain some 
time for further negotiations with the EFTA countries before the EEC could acquire 
more cohesiveness51. The failure of the French plan for political co-operation 
associated with the name of Christian Fouchet and the reasons given by people like 
Luns and Spaak for their veto on that had certainly heightened Erhard's hopes for 
eventual success as well. Even when de Gaulle had held his infamous press 
conference in January 1963 and Adenauer had still signed the French-German 
treaty, the Bundestag inserted a clear reservation against a French-German
Kusters, Streit, pp. 368-370.
Koerfer , Kampf, pp. 412-430.
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"Sonderweg" in the very preamble of that treaty, asking among other things for the 
inclusion of Great Britain and other states into the EEC52.
Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle and the Berlin-crises
The importance of Germany's relations with France ranked very high on Adenauer's
foreign policy agenda53. France's political and economic instability in 1958 and its 
possible repercussions constituted a threat to almost everything that had been 
accomplished by the federal chancellor in terms of European integration. The return 
to power of Charles de Gaulle was seen with great wariness by the German 
chancellor. Given de Gaulle's previous record in European matters and on Germany 
there was not much hope that the EEC would continue unhampered nor that 
Adenauer's desire for reconciliation with France would be matched by similar 
efforts on the other side of the Rhine54. For Adenauer's attitude towards the FTA 
his meetings with de Gaulle therefore seem to have been of crucial importance.
If one follows de Gaulle's account of his first meeting with the German 
chancellor, he obtained quite a clear promise from Adenauer for support in the 
question of agriculture and concerning the British FTA proposal to which de Gaulle 
clearly expressed his objections55. Adenauer's view is clearly different from de 
Gaulle's version56. Hans-Peter Schwarz' description of the conversation rests on a 
protocol written by the interpreter. According to this source Adenauer, while 
criticising the US and the UK for some of their policies, was quite careful to avoid 
any clear statements concerning the FTA issue. Schwarz states that at that time,
Groeben , Aujbaujahre, pp. 214-215.
On de Gaulle’s influence on West Germany’s foreign policy Sta d en , Bernd v o n : Charles 
de Gaulle und die Aufienpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In: Lo th ,
W ilfried/P ich t , Robert [eds.]: De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa. Opladen 1991, pp. 
121-133.
Peter Schunck describes the great skepticism of the German delegation before Adenauer's 
first meeting with de Gaulle in September 1958. See Schunck , Peter: De Gaulle und seine 
deutschen Nachbam bis zur Begegnung mit Adenauer. In: Lo th , W ilfried /P ic h t , Robert 
[eds.]: De  Gaulle , Deutschland und Europa. Opladen 1991, pp. 21; on de Gaulle see also 
Lo th , W ilfried : De Gaulle und die europaische Einigung. In: Lo t h , W ilfried/P ic h t , 
Robert [eds.]: De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa. Opladen 1991, pp. 45-60.M aillard , 
P ierre: De Gaulle et VEurope entre la Nation et Maastricht. Paris 1995.
De  Ga u lle , Charles: Memoirs d'espoir. Le Renouveau 1958-1962, Paris 1970, pp. 188- 
189.
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September 1958, Adenauer was still in favour of the FTA proposal57. At their 
meeting in Bad Kreuznach on November 26, 1958 de Gaulle is even more 
straightforward in writing that Adenauer and he reached agreement to bring the 
negotiations in the Maudling committee to an end, since they tended to dilute the 
EEC from the very beginning by the establishment of a vast FTA that would include 
first Britain and later all of the West. As in the case of the first meeting in 
Colombey, de Gaulle points to the problem of Berlin as Adenauer's motive to yield 
to the French president's wishes in the FTA matter58. Schwarz interprets the meeting 
in Bad Kreuznach as quite decisive in the way de Gaulle described it. In 
ostentatiously declaring a common policy on the EEC Adenauer and de Gaulle did 
in fact declare their opposition to Macmillan's plans for the FTA even though this 
was never publicly and explicitly stated by Adenauer. Another indication for this 
might be the fact that before the Bad Kreuznach meeting Erhard and Adenauer had 
particularly tough fights over the FTA issue. Schwarz clearly sees Khrushchev's 
Berlin-ultimatum behind Adenauer's decision for France and de Gaulle and against 
the British59.
While there might have been a commitment by Adenauer on the FTA at the 
end of 1958, the question did not lose political momentum in Germany. In fact 
Erhard and his followers were able to muster more and more support over time. 
Hence Adenauer was not able to openly speak up against the British proposals at any 
stage. He could not dare to openly address the issue. In 1962 Erhard was simply
Schw arz , Adenauer, pp. 454-456.
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too popular to be attacked on the FTA issue60. Adenauer was even forced to pay 
continuous lip-service to the cause of the FTA and later on to the British application 
for membership of the EEC. Yet he does not change his mind in the matter, or 
rather he is not forced to do so by the pressures that build up in Germany in favour 
of the FTA and later on in favour of British accession to the EEC. Adenauer's 
decision is likely to have come about in Bad Kreuznach and might subsequently 
have been strengthened by his growing distrust vis-a-vis Macmillan and the 
American administration under Eisenhower and then under Kennedy61.
It might well be true that there even was an agreement between Adenauer 
and de Gaulle from the very beginning that they would wreck the FTA and any 
attempt the British might undertake of joining and, as de Gaulle said, of diluting the 
EEC. The mere fact that Adenauer might have struck such a deal does not imply 
that he would not have forgotten about it, if the political situation in Germany had 
forced him to do so. This view is taken by Jacques Bariety. He claims that the 
personal relationship between Adenauer and De Gaulle was of crucial importance 
for the German-French relations between 1958 and 1963. His thesis is that de 
Gaulle and Adenauer had indeed concluded some sort of moral and political 
agreement since their first meeting in Colombey, an agreement to which they were 
faithful throughout all the political changes that followed. While this sounds like 
"great men making history", Bariety clearly acknowledges that this agreement 
between Adenauer and de Gaulle did not mean that after Colombey all things in
Schw arz , Adenauer, p. 720.
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German-French relations were predetermined and were only the execution of a set 
programme. Bari&y acknowledges that such an assumption would be entirely 
unrealistic. What he stresses is that both statesmen made some basic decisions, the 
most important of which was to regard and treat each other as their preferred 
partners62. Bariety points to the psychological and historical background of the 
meeting in Colombey, the fact that Adenauer actually feared that de Gaulle might be 
an insurmountable obstacle to the pursuance of those foreign policy goals which 
were most important to him. This fear proved unjustified at that moment.
More importantly, Bariety states that de Gaulle proved to be a faithful 
supporter throughout all of the Berlin crisis, while Macmillan and Eisenhower were 
regarded by Adenauer as unreliable as far as the protection of vital German interests 
were concerned. The picture of the essential and profound understanding between 
Adenauer and de Gaulle would certainly not match the realities. De Gaulle's plans 
for a NATO directorate were not at all welcome by Adenauer. De Gaulle's proposal 
for the directorate was put to the British and the Americans only a few days after 
the meeting with Adenauer in Colombey. Adenauer had not been informed of this. 
Yet when the Soviets opened the Berlin crisis with their note at the end of 
November 1958, de Gaulle instantly assured Adenauer of his firm support, and this 
support remained firm all throughout. Given that Adenauer started to develop and 
then cultivated his distrust of Eisenhower and Macmillan, it seems plausible that 
there should be a reward for the general. Bariety suggests that it was in response to 
de Gaulle's strong support in the question of Berlin that Adenauer supported the 
General's policy on Europe when he did not make objections to the break-up of the 
Maudling negotiations at the end of 1958 and did not do it either when de Gaulle
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Adenauer und General de Gaulle fur die deutsch-franzdsische Politik zwischen 1958 und 
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brutally ended the negotiations on British accession to the EEC at the beginning of 
196363. In both cases Adenauer had to face extreme difficulties at home.
It is with a certain bitterness that Paul-Henri Spaak describes the events of 
early 1963 when de Gaulle said «Non!» to British accession and Adenauer still 
signed the German-French treaty a week later. Spaak describes Adenauer as blind 
and as seduced by the impressive ceremonies that de Gaulle had arranged for his 
state visit in 1962. Spaak attributes these events to the fact that Adenauer's 
judgement had been troubled by the ceremonies and that his lucidity had diminished 
because of his age64. Yet in Spaak's view there was still a chance to do something 
after de Gaulle's press conference of 14 January 1963. He holds that the anger 
among the other member states of the EEC was so great after this French veto that 
the British could have utilised this in their favour, if they had only wanted. Spaak 
claims that the other five would have been ready to stage an "eclat au sein du 
Marche commun"65. It would have been for those on the continent with particularly 
good relations with the British to have let them know that this was still possible. If 
it really was. Ludwig Erhard could have done so. Yet Erhard's role on the 
international scene is a bit ambiguous. It seems that he and his state secretary 
Muller-Armack profoundly overestimated their own influence and the general 
readiness in Germany to back up the FTA-project or British membership by decisive 
action. All throughout they were publicly very optimistic about the prospects of the 
FTA and British accession especially when talking to their British counterparts. It 
seems that a more sober and realistic approach by the German Minister of 
Economics could have made an important difference to British negotiating tactics 
and perhaps to the overall outcome66. It will be part of this study to evaluate to what
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extent Erhard and the BMWi were out of touch with German industry whose 
interests they claimed to represent in the FTA issue.
2 .3  Personal Power Politics or Societal Choice?
As is clear from all that went before, West Germany’s decision to side with the 
French and to stick to the common market of the Six and of the Six only in 1963 
has been described by the literature largely in terms of the political battle between 
the leading figures of the CDU. While the role and even the style of the main 
political actors is certainly important for the policy outcomes produced within a 
political system, one cannot simply take it for granted that these personal factors 
constituted the determining elements of debates relating to strong societal interest 
groups.
The purely political question of who would be Heuss’ and Adenauer’s 
successors in 1959 or the fact that the independent-minded Schroder succeeded 
Adenauer’s close disciple Brentano as Foreign Minister have certainly had their 
impact on policy style and perhaps also on the way certain decisions were shaped. 
Yet no question of a simply personal or party political category of that sort will in 
itself have made any significant difference to a decision in which societal actors like 
trade unions and employers took only the faintest amount of interest. Koerfer’s and 
Schwarz’ brilliantly presented historical narratives do not therefore do justice to the 
FTA issue, (which was probably not their objective in the first place)67. Yet those 
writings which explicitly dealt with the conflict over Germany’s European policy or 
Germany’s European policy in general have also failed to look beyond the level of 
personal politics and high politics to the societal forces driving the political ones, 
and in this case the criticism is more substantial . While all of these writings make 
important contributions to the completion of the picture of Germany’s European 
policy, the painting in the end will always only show the portraits of the politicians 
and leave the decisive social and political bargaining processes in the shadow.
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It is argued here that the FTA issue was not just a matter of high politics, but 
that it was an essential societal and political choice made in the Federal Republic in 
the years after 1957. To study this decision making process in more than its high 
politics dimension will therefore reveal much of the actual nature of German 
democracy at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, much of which 
has been left in the shadow of sometimes contradictory but catchy words and 
phrases like “Kanzlerdemokratie”, “Gefalligkeitsdemokratie” or Eschenburg’s 
question “Herrschaft der Verbande?” often misinterpreted as an assertion69. This 
will require looking at the sometimes very nitty gritty exchanges between sectoral 
industrial interest groups and the sectoral departments of the BMWi, to try and 
identify sectoral interests by analysing their trade performance within the EEC and 
outside over all of the period under investigation, and to match these expressions 
and indicators of industrial interest with the lobbying action and its impact on
70government policy by the peak orgamsations like the BDI and the DIHT .
Surely, the importance of high politics and personal influences will not 
vanish from the overall picture by adopting this approach. On the contrary, it will at 
last appear in its proper light and perspective. As this thesis will show, the fact that 
Adenauer was able to get away with the silent acceptance of the failure of the 
Maudling negotiations and his endorsement of de Gaulle’s veto against British entry 
to the EEC, the fact that Erhard - despite all his popularity and political clout - 
could not make a real difference in Germany’s European policy, all of this will only 
make sense once the underlying currents of actual industrial interest in the FTA 
issue will be analysed and understood. For reasons that can be explained in terms of 
Olson’s theory of collective action and understood by looking at the precise 
mechanisms governing industrial interest representation at the level of the BDI and 
at sectoral level, the actual industrial interests were grossly misrepresented by the
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unequivocal stand the BDI took in its public statements on the FTA issue all 
throughout and in particular on British accession to the EEC. Thus the position 
taken by the BDI, the numerous resolutions adopted by the Federal Parliament as 
well as the campaigns conducted by Ludwig Erhard were less and less in touch with 
the changing position of German industry at sectoral level. Hence what must have 
seemed to be an almost unanimous political position of the CDU and indeed the 
whole Bundestag, i. e. to carry through the FTA project, was not based on a 
similarly strong coalition of industrial interest. Why the actual situation in German 
industry was not reflected at the level of Parliament and parties, but clearly in the 
position of Germany’s delegation in the Maudling negotiations and the negotiations 
on British accession will be explained in this thesis.
2 .4  The Political Influence of German Industry
The existing historical and political science literature on the political influence of 
West German industry has not taken up the suggestion in much of the theoretical 
literature to focus on the sectoral level of interest representation in order to exploit 
the scope for investigation offered by Olson’s theoretical suggestions on the power 
of smaller, more clearly defined interests. The numerous studies analysing the 
political power of German industry have focused on the internal structures and 
resources of industrial associations, their relationship with leading politicians, 
political parties, Parliament and the government bureaucracies as well as on the 
different fields of policy making in which they operate71. The main thrust of
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attention has been given to the Federation of German Industry (BDI). The 
distribution of functions between the BDI, BDA and DIHT makes the BDI the 
dominant political force of industrial interest representation in Germany in the more 
general questions in all fields apart from wage bargaining, which is the domain of 
the BDA72. The BDI commands considerable resources and has privileged access to 
the leadership of the government bureaucracies, i. e. federal ministers and the 
federal chancellor. Its president Fritz Berg also profited from a close relationship 
with Adenauer. The BDI contributed considerable funding to the chancellor's CDU 
and had some influence in appointments to Parliamentary committees and posts in 
the government bureaucracy73. Yet while all of this suggests that the BDI wielded a 
very large amount of political power particularly in the Adenauer era, Gerard 
Braunthal dismisses Terence Prittie's claim that the leading circles of the BDI were 
the 'true rulers of Germany' at that time74.
In his analysis of the BDI's attempts at influencing German economic policy 
at home and abroad as well as its foreign policy, Braunthal concludes that there is a 
very mixed record of success in all these fields75. This suggests that there were 
considerable countervailing powers exerted by the trade unions, pressures stemming 
from international economic agreements and the executive's attention to electoral 
rather than industrial pressure. For our context the relationship of industrial pressure
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groups with the respective departments of the government bureaucracy and their 
role within the wider government, executive, Parliament and the federal system will 
be of particular importance. Most of these issues are being touched upon by many 
of the studies that have already been mentioned. William E. Paterson and others 
have provided a detailed comparative study of the relationship between government
Hf.
and the chemical industries in Britain and Germany . They start by identifying the 
characteristics of "policy communities" and base their analysis on a number of sets 
of criteria and classifications by which they systematically capture cross-country 
differences and similarities. Paterson and others find that the main address of 
industrial demands and the main point of exchange of information between 
government and industry is the chemicals department of the BMWi, which is 
described as an advocate for the industry within the government and at times as an 
apologist for government policy vis-a-vis the industry77.
The influence of industrial pressure groups depends obviously also on the 
nature of the overall political system and the structure of and balance between its 
different elements. Numerous studies have been produced on the federal government 
bureaucracy, Parliament, political parties and their relationships with each other and
78with different societal groups in the political system of the Federal Republic . It
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Wissenschaft, 5), Berlin 1968; Prior , Harm : Die interministeriellen Ausschiisse der 
Bundesministerien. Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Koordinierung heutiger 
Regierungsarbeit. (Sozialwissenschaftliche Studien. Schriftenreihe des Seminars fiir 
Sozialwissenschaften der Universitat Hamburg, 10), Stuttgart 1968; Katzenstein , Peter : 
Politics and Policy in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State. Philadelphia 
1987, see in particular pp. 15-35; Men y , Yves: Government and Politics in Western 
Europe: Britain, France, Italy, West Germany. Oxford 1990, pp. 100-123, 238-295; Of f e , 
Cla us: The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups: Observations on the West
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would go beyond the scope of this study to summarise the discussion of corporatism 
and pluralism with regards to the Federal Republic in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet the 
literature seems to suggest that the labelling of the overall system will be of no 
analytical help and that the structures in an individual field of policy making might 
vary considerably from those in others.
Throughout the 1950s the BDI had fought many a battle on the field of 
economic policy against Ludwig Erhard whom it judged to be an "ideologist" in the
79worst sense of the word . Durmg that period the BDI had rather consistently 
supported the chancellor who was a pragmatist in economic matters and paid more
attention to votes and the financial well-being of his party than to the observance of
80economic principles dear to his Minister of Economics . On the free trade area 
issue however, the coalitions were inversed. Erhard had and retained the BDI's full 
support on the free trade area, on the attempts at "bridge building" between EEC 
and EFTA and especially on British accession to the EEC81. At the same time 
Adenauer was beginning to lose considerably in authority and control over his party. 
All of these findings of the literature make it rather difficult to understand how 
Adenauer was able to sustain his policy in the face of strong opposition from almost 
every possible comer within the political system of the Federal Republic. While the 
literature states that the end of the "Kanzlerdemokratie" had already begun in 1959, 
it does not address the question of why German industry did not obtain what it had 
sought from Adenauer. This was so despite the allegations in the 1950s that the very 
close relationship between chancellor and BDI threatened to turn the Federal
German Case. In: Berger , Suzanne [ed.]: Organizing Interests in Western Europe. 
Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics. (Cambridge Studies in Modem 
Political Economies), Cambridge [et al.] 1981, pp. 123-158.
Braunthal , Wirtschaft, p. 373. Erhard had a rather difficult relationship to interest roups 
in general. See Duren , Albrecht: Ludwig Erhards Verhaltnis zu den organisierten 
wirtschaftlichen Interessen. In: Muller-Arm ack , Alfred /SchrOd e r , Gerhard  [eds.]: 
Ludwig Erhard. Beitrage zu einer politischen Biographie. Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag. 
Berlin 1972.
For Adenauer's relationship with industrial pressure groups and his conception of economic 
policy see Hellw ig , Fritz : Adenauers Verhaltnis zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik. In: 
Po h l , Hans [edj: Adenauers Verhaltnis zu Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. (Rhondorfer 
Gesprache, 12), Bonn 1992, pp. 88-111; M uller-Arm ack , Alfr ed : Adenauer, die 
Wirtschaftspolitik und die Wirtschaftspolitiker. In: Blu m enw itz , D ieter  [et al.]. Konrad 
Adenauer und seine Zeit. Politik und Personlichkeit der ersten Bundeskanzlers. Vol. I: 
Beitrage von Weg und Zeitgenossen. Stuttgart 1976, pp. 204-228.
Braunthal , Federation, p. 325-326; Rhen isch , Industrie, p. 294; Buh rer , BDI, pp. 260- 
261; Erhard , Wirtschaftspolitik, p. 533.
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Republic into a "Gefalligkeitsdemokratie" (a democracy characterised by the 
services rendered by the political leadership to the most powerful interests)82.
2 .5  The A im s o f  the Present S tudy
The present study sets out to tackle a question that has been neglected in the existing 
literature for reasons that have been amply described. The aim of the study is to 
provide an analysis of the position and the lobbying actions of German industry in 
relation to the FTA issue primarily vis-a-vis the German federal bureaucracy and in 
particular vis-h-vis the BMWi. This analysis will go beyond noting the positions and 
actions of the BDI and will take into account the sectoral interests as presented to 
the BMWi and as reflected in the sectoral foreign trade performance. The 
differences and divergence of the interests of German industry at the level of the 
BDI and at sectoral level will be of great importance in explaining why and how the 
change of heart in German industry concerning the EEC, the prospect of a Europe- 
wide FTA or British accession to the common market and towards the threat posed 
through EFT A was effectively concealed from the public eye.
This study will thus provide the first systematic analysis of German industrial 
interest and the position of German industry on the British FTA proposal, the 
attempts to mediate between the Six and the other OEEC members and since 1960 
between the Six and the Seven, as well as on the first British application for 
membership of the EEC. One important finding is that German industry was 
nowhere near as favourable to the FTA, to British accession and the idea of an 
Atlantic FTA as is commonly suggested by the literature and in most of the BDI’s 
own public statements on these questions. The balance of sectoral interests and the 
potential of these interests for being successfully represented at the political level 
shifted very markedly over the period considered here and made the EEC of the Six 
and o f the Six only the clear preference of a number of sectors, while in others this 
option came to be seen as much more acceptable than it had been regarded at the 
beginning.
Theodor Eschenburg notes examples for Adenauer's willingness to yield to the BDI's wishes 
in view of the important financial support for the Christian Democrats coming from the 
BDI. See Eschenburg , Jahrhundert der Verbande, pp. 114-117.
91
More importantly, the present study will reinterpret the political battle over 
the FTA issue in West Germany in the light of the analysis of industrial interest and 
industrial influence on the German position in the corresponding negotiation 
processes. It offers an important additional explanation as to why and how Adenauer 
was able to get away with his collusion with de Gaulle against the express will of 
the Federal Parliament, his Cabinet and the majority of his own Parliamentary party 
and why the turmoil over de Gaulle’s final veto and Adenauer’s endorsement of it 
died down relatively quickly. It will be shown that Germany’s decision to opt for 
the common market of the Six and of the Six only (at least for the time being) was 
not just due to Adenauer’s resolve to go along with de Gaulle, but in fact 
represented very important societal forces. At the time when de Gaulle spoke his 
infamous «Non!», a sigh of relief must have gone through some sectors of German 
industry for whom British accession and possibly the association of other EFTA 
members would have caused an extremely difficult situation. Adenauer could 
capitalise on the internal divisions of German industry and on the fact that the 
inducement of those in favour of British accession to mount a large campaign was 
very small given that by 1963 the strongest export sectors of German industry had 
realised that the expansion of their EEC markets had more than offset the losses that 
they had feared outside. On the other hand the Erhard camp, which had always 
expressed the importance of the markets outside of the EEC in terms of aggregate 
figures and aggregate interests, had to realise that aggregate interests are impossible 
to translate into actual political force.
3 Linking EEC and OEEC 
Germany and the negotiations on a Europe-wide 
fta in the Maudling committee
With the negotiations in the Maudling committee the 17 member states of the OEEC 
tried to reach an agreement on the formation of a Europe-wide free trade area 
(FTA). As a country whose trade with the OEEC member states made up for 60% 
of its exports, Germany had a strong interest in the establishment of an OEEC-wide 
abolition of barriers to trade. This was expressed in unanimous political support for 
the FTA from all political parties, the Government, Parliament and the Cabinet. 
The following chapter sets out to trace the German position during the Maudling 
negotiations. It will analyse its formulation within the Government and give an 
account of the role German industrial interest played for the formation and 
development of the official German position. It will address the expectations of 
German industry and its general perceptions of the effects that an FTA would have 
on specific industrial sectors. On the basis of the archival evidence, this chapter will 
make an attempt at identifying industrial sectors that were likely to gain and those 
likely to lose from the establishment of a multilateral trade association between the 
EEC and the other member states of the OEEC. The chapter will try to assess the 
extent to which a lowest common denominator for a German position on the 
essentials of an FTA could have been or actually was derived from the industrial 
interest as indicated by the studies gathered in the German BMWi.
The main conflict that persisted throughout all of the negotiations concerned 
the question of deflections of trade and the appropriate measures to counter their 
effects. Differences of opinion did not only arise over the rules of origin or 
alternative measures, but on the more basic question of the importance of and the 
effects that would result from deflections of trade as such. Since the operation of 
counter measures would have to correspond closely to the institutional arrangements 
of the FTA, disagreement in this point prevented an early settlement on the question 
of institutions and their voting procedures. A second essential point of conflict was 
the scope of the proposed FTA. Should it include agriculture? How should the
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problem of imperial preference for the Commonwealth be solved? Finally, there 
was disagreement on whether or not co-ordination of certain national policies was 
needed to make the FTA run smoothly. Some seemed to favour some sort of 
replicate of the Treaty of Rome, while others wanted a framework in which a 
downward pressure on external tariffs would foster integration into the world 
economy.
The Maudling negotiations began on October 18, 1957 in Paris. Preparatory 
negotiations had taken place under the chairmanship of the Chancellor of the 
exchequer Peter Thomeycroft since March 1957. Since then three working parties 
of the OEEC (No 21, 22 and 23) had worked on the general technical problems of 
the creation of an FTA, on the question of agriculture and the specific problems 
arising for the less developed countries in the OEEC1. Since June 1957 a group of 
trade experts started working on questions related to the problem of deflections of 
trade and rules of origin. In September and October 1957 Paymaster General 
Reginald Maudling who had been appointed Special Minister of the British 
Government for questions relating to the establishment of an FTA toured the 
member states of the OEEC, before the actual negotiations began2 on the ministerial 
level. The EEC council decided early in 1958 that the negotiations in the Maudling 
committee should be conducted by its member states themselves and that the 
commission should not yet represent the community, while it should be present at 
the negotiating table. The president of the EEC commission began attending the 
Maudling negotiations in February 19583. The role of the commission and the fact 
that it began regarding the FTA plan as a threat to the integrity and undisturbed 
development of the EEC gained importance toward the end of the negotiations. The 
proposal for a preliminary agreement made by the president of the commission 
Walter Hallstein became the focus of a increasingly heated debate between the EEC 
and the other eleven. It finally became obvious that the conception of an FTA held 
by France and Italy on the one hand and by Britain, the Scandinavian countries and
Cam ps , M iriam : Britain and the European Community 1955-1963. London 1964, p. 117-
118.
Kaiser , Ka rl : EWG und Freihandelszone. England und der Kontinent in der Europaischen 
Integration. (Europaische Aspekte. Reihe C: Politik. 15.), Leiden 1963, p. 140.
Camps, Britain, p. 47.
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Switzerland on the other were by far too different to be compatible. This chapter 
will therefore also try to assess to what extent Germany fulfilled the role of a 
mediator between the main opponents during the negotiations. It will mainly ask 
what room for manoeuvre the German political leadership actually had to fulfil this 
role in view of the constraints given by domestic industrial pressures.
3.1 The German position on the essential questions o f an FTA
Since early May 1957 an inter ministerial committee formed of representatives of 
several German federal ministries was responsible for formulating the guidelines for 
the German delegation in the preliminary negotiations on the FTA. The committee 
was chaired by Freiherr von Mahs of the BMWi and continued to perform its 
function after the actual Maudling negotiations began4. The Auswartige Amt (AA), 
the BMWi (BMWi), the ministries of finance (BMFin) and of agriculture (BML) as 
well as the ministry of labour (BMA) were represented in the committee. The 
Bundesbank was consulted on a case by case basis. By September 1957 the inter 
ministerial working party had been able to draw up a very general line to follow in 
the negotiations. The different ministries reached agreement that the main purpose 
of the FTA was to guarantee the free movement of goods by a lowering of tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions. Since 60% of all German exports went to the 
economies of the OEEC, the establishment of the FTA was of crucial importance to 
Germany. According to the inter ministerial working party the FTA should also 
serve to prevent the fading of co-operation within the OEEC. Between the A A and 
the BMWi the whole question of the FTA was mingled with a battle over 
competencies in foreign economic policy and diplomacy. Adenauer was entirely 
behind the A A in these matters. The Foreign Minister von Brentano had his 
confidence5. Apart from distrust, both ministries pursued largely contradicting
4 As ever the chairmanship remained disputed between AA and BMWi. See PA - AA, Ref. 
200, vol. 456: Bonn, 3 V 1957: van Scherpenberg an den Herm Staatssekretar [Hallstein], 
betr.: Vertretung der Bundesregierung in der Arbeitsgruppe 21 (FHZ in Paris).
5 Adenauer personally imposed a preliminary distribution of competencies at the outset and 
reserve his right to make changes to that. See PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol 456: Cadenabbia, 16 
III 1957, Adenauer an Bundeswirtschaftsminister, Bundesminister fur wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit, nachrichtlich an AA.
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policies as far as their preferences for the EEC and the French or the FTA and the 
British were concerned. The A A seriously suspected that Erhard was willing to 
wreck the EEC, if necessary, in order to bring about the FTA6.
In summer 1957 it was by no means clear which precise form of association 
between the member countries of the EEC and the other eleven member states of the 
OEEC should be chosen. The two main working hypotheses contemplated in the 
inter ministerial committee were that of an FTA of which all 17 member states of 
the OEEC would be members constructed as a copy of the EEC with co-ordinated 
commercial and economic policies and strong institutions on the one hand and an 
association aiming only at the removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions and not 
providing for co-ordinated policies, except on a very limited scale, in which the 
EEC would be regarded as one unit7. Concerning the essential questions of 
deflections of trade and of economic activities as well as on the lowering of tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions the inter ministerial committee had set out guidelines 
already in May 1957. Concerning tariffs the committee advocated the same system 
of linear and selective lowering as applied in the EEC. It spoke out in favour of a 
liberal definition of area origin. As for the scope of the projected FTA, the 
committee was in favour of the inclusion of agriculture in the same form as it was in 
the EEC and against the inclusion of services and the free movement of capital and 
labour. Nor should the right of establishment be part of a convention on an FTA8.
In December 1957 a department for European affairs was established in the 
federal BMWi9. Before, the competence for these issues had mostly been with the 
department VA2 responsible for foreign trade10. Apart from an ongoing and never- 
ending struggle over competencies in questions of European integration between the 
Auswartiges Amt and the BMWi, the latter1 s right of heading the German
According to Hartlieb, Erhard told his staff that the FTA was something like a question of
life and death and that therefore the EEC had to be sacrificed, if necessary. See PA - AA, 
Ref. 200, vol. 149: Bonn, 22 III 1958, Hartlieb an Carstens, betr. FHZ.
BA, B102 - 11156,2: Bonn, 10. VII 1957: Protokoll einer Sitzung im Auswartigen Amt 
betreffend die Freihandelszone.
BA, B102 - 56373: 18 V 1957: Bericht von Herm Hiinke uber die erste Sitzung des 
interministeriellen Ausschusses zur Freihandelszone in Paris.
BA, B102 - 11161,1: Bonn, 02 XII 1957: Vermerk zur Schaffung einer Europa-Abtei-lung. 
BA, B102 - 56373: Bonn, 04 IV 1957: Personalentscheidungen zur Koordination 
europaischer Angelegenheuiten innerhalb des BMWi.
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delegations in the OEEC and also in the EEC council later on was never challenged. 
Yet it seems to be worth noting that the BMWi regarded the FTA mainly and 
essentially as an economic and commercial matter, while the Auswartiges Amt 
tended to stress the political importance of that project11. The ministry of finance 
became involved only in questions concerning the abolishment of fiscal tariffs and 
financial contributions to a fund to support the less developed countries in Europe12. 
The Minister of Agriculture, Heinrich Liibke, aired very early on his general 
reservations and his conditions for an inclusion of agriculture in the FTA . In 
January 1957 he pointed to the problems that would arise from the tariff autonomy 
within an FTA. Under such conditions the system of protection envisaged within the 
EEC would not be able to perform its functions properly. He would not agree to the 
inclusion unless it was ensured that the same conditions applied to the agriculture of 
all member states13. The ministry of labour was concerned mainly when the 
question of the free movement of labour was addressed.
Preparatory working parties on the FTA were established following the 
OEEC council meeting on July 17 to 19, 1956. The Working party No 17 had been 
concerned with methods for the association of the EEC and the eleven other 
countries of the OEEC. In February 1957 this working party delivered a report to 
the OEEC council stating that it was technically possible to associate the EEC with 
an FTA. In March 1957 three new working parties were established of which 
working party No 21 was concerned with the main economic problems of setting up 
such an arrangement, namely the lowering of tariffs and the question of origin. In 
the Federal BMWi the German representatives for these working parties and co­
ordinators within the ministry were appointed a few weeks later. Von Mahs and 
Kiesswetter were responsible for the co-ordination within the ministry, while
BA, B102 - 11159,1: Bonn, 10 VII 1958: Vermerk zur Abteilungsbesprechung iiber 
juristische Aspekte einer FHZ-Konvention am 9. Juli 1958.
BA, B102 - 12235b, 1: Bonn, 19 VI 1958: Stellungnahme des Finanzministeriums (Herr 
Zepf) als Antwort auf den Entwurf des BMWi fur ein provisorisches Abkommen fiber eine 
FHZ; B102 - 11159,2: Bonn, 20 X 1958: Abteilungsbesprechung betr. finanzielle Hilfe fur 
Entwicklungslander.
BA, B102 - 56373: Bonn, 15 I 1957: Der Minister fur Landwirtschaft unf Forsten (Herr 
Liibke) zur Freihandelszone.
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Gehrels and Horn represented Germany in the working party No 2114. Horn later 
joined the group of trade experts that had been given a mandate by working party 
No 21 and started its work on the specifics of the definition and control of origin in 
June 1957. The working groups had explored the potential of the solutions that 
could be found for the central problems of an FTA.
Deflections of trade and rules of origin were at the centre of the negotiations 
in the working party No 21 of the OEEC and remained on the top of the agenda of 
the Maudling committee until the failure of the negotiations. These questions were 
decisive as to the commercial relations with countries outside the projected FTA and 
would determine the general character of the multilateral trade association. Other 
important problems that were discussed in the Maudling committee like the role of 
the Commonwealth, imperial preference were largely seen in connection with the 
question of deflections of trade and rules of origin. The question of agriculture was 
of particular importance to agricultural exporters like France, the Netherlands and 
Denmark, but also for the Federal Republic, which hoped that the inclusion of 
agriculture would divert agricultural import pressures to the UK.
For Germany the main issue was clearly the overall character of the FTA 
and hence mainly the definition and rules of origin and the precise way in which 
they were to be operated. Most of the other questions that gained a lot of attention 
throughout the negotiations like agriculture, imperial preference and the question of 
how to achieve a provisional agreement when the simultaneous entering into force 
of the EEC and the FTA became impossible, were important for the Germans 
mainly in that the complication that they caused for progress of the talks threatened 
the overall success of the negotiations. The main positions on deflections of trade 
and rules of origin had already been spelled out before the Maudling committee 
assumed its work in October 1957. Representing an economy that performed 
generally very well on foreign markets and therefore could be regarded as quite 
competitive, it was obvious for the German negotiators that it would be in the best 
interest of the German economy as a whole to achieve the most liberal conditions 
for trade possible. The German delegation in the working parties and later on in the
BA, B102 - 56373: Bonn, 04 IV 1957: Personalentscheidungen zur Koordination 
europaischer Angelegenheuiten innerhalb des BMWi.
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Maudling committee therefore aimed at measures against deflections of trade that 
would allow the largest number of goods possible to be traded without customs duty 
within the FTA. Administrative procedures for the control of the origin of goods 
should also be kept as simple as possible.
It was the German position that counter measures against deflections of trade 
should only apply to those deflections that were due to differences in the member 
states' external tariffs. Together with a number of other countries in the OEEC 
Germany assumed that the deflections arising from the lowering of internal tariffs 
during the first stage of the transitional period would be negligible anyway, since 
substantial tariff protection was likely to remain in place during this initial phase. 
This fact would, the Germans argued, allow the industries in countries with higher 
external tariffs to adjust to the new situation. The recommendation was therefore to 
wait and see what happened and then to respond flexibly, if deflections really 
occurred. Flexibility should therefore be the characteristics of the respective 
provisions in a convention for an FTA. The German representative in the group of 
trade experts argued that the usual rules of origin would be sufficient to counter any 
deflections of trade that might occur15.
These conventional rules of origin include the percentage rule, a list of raw 
materials and a list of processes. The percentage rule prescribes a certain maximum 
percentage content of non-area material as part of the value of the good in question. 
If the percentage of non-area ingredients in a given good represent less than the 
maximum percentage possible according to the rule, then the good in question will 
be defined as of area origin and hence move freely within the FTA. The usual 
maximum percentage for non-area content as percentage of the value of a good is 
50%. All substances on the list of raw materials are regarded as of area origin no 
matter from where they actually originate. The list of processes defines all those 
goods as of area origin which have undergone or resulted from one of the processes 
mentioned on the list. While these are the general definitions of the conventional 
rules of origin, the subtleties of their actual ways of operation leave room for a 
good number of variations as to the effect of the measures. It is obviously crucial at
15 BA, B102 - 11157: Vermerk zur Vorbereitung fur die Situng des Maudling-Ausschusses 
vom 11. bis 13. Marz 1958. [Reference made to the report by the trade experts: CIG(58)12 
and the German position taken in this working group.]
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what level the maximum percentage is fixed for a certain good and in which way the 
origin control is being administered between the member states. Thus the British 
initially insisted on declarations concerning the area origin to be submitted by the 
producer and the exporter of a good, while the Swiss and the Dutch felt that a 
declaration by the exporter should be sufficient, since otherwise industrial secrets 
and special know how might be leaked to competitors abroad. The Germans 
suggested their own model as a compromise. It required the producer to submit the 
declaration of origin to the chamber of commerce in the exporting country. 
Together with all other delegations in the group of trade experts the German 
representatives supported the British proposal for a raw material list consisting of all 
those raw materials that were imported by the European states. Again, there was 
agreement in principle from the German side with this liberal and relatively simple 
solution, while later on certain reservations had to be made after the industrial 
associations had been contacted.
One of the main points of disagreement between the more liberal and the 
more protectionist camps in the working parties and the Maudling committee was 
the proposal to levy a compensatory charge in cases where deflections of trade arose 
and especially when these deflections threatened to affect an industry of a member 
country. This proposal had been put forward and discussed in the group of trade 
experts already in their session from September 17 to 20, 195716. The Italians put it 
on the table again in March 1958 in the Maudling committee as "Carli-Plan". It 
envisaged to levy the compensatory charge when there were differences in price 
levels so that prices for a given product were higher in the importing than in the 
exporting country. The condition was that the differences in price levels had to be 
due to differences in external tariffs. These differences should set the limit for the 
level of the charge to be levied. The crucial point of the proposal was that the 
charge should be levied also in the case of products that originated entirely in the 
FTA.
A proposal for compensatory charges figured already in several French notes responding to 
Maudling’s questionnaire of October 1957. See MAE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, 
Vol. 38: Projet d’intervention au comite intergouvememental sur la zone de libre-echange 
[undated draft of the first statement by the French delegation in the Maudling committee, 
most likely beginning of November 1957].
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The views on this proposal were initially split within the federal BMWi. The 
department of foreign trade (department V) saw the Italian proposal, which was 
backed by the French as a means of preserving uncompetitive industries. The 
department argued that, while it was not feasible in the negotiations to reject 
protection in general and to support a concept of an FTA which would result in a 
harmonisation of external tariffs at the lowest level, it would neither be tenable to 
make products of area origin subject to measures countering trade deflections. Nor 
could there be a harmonisation of external tariffs on the highest level. Hence the 
department concluded that, if a member country was to protect uncompetitive 
industries, this should be done either by subsidies or by resorting to an escape 
clause. Otherwise the concept of an FTA would be destroyed. Department I of the 
BMWi supported that view. The Department IV A1 which was in charge of the 
industrial sector of non-ferrous metals on the other hand, thought the compensatory 
charge to be useful in order to ensure the protection of an industry that was at a 
disadvantage as a consequence of adverse conditions of production17. A week before 
the Maudling negotiations began in October 1957, the federal BMWi had not yet 
come to an undivided position on this important question. Department V kept 
warning that such a charge, aiming at achieving equal starting conditions could 
theoretically be levied on an extremely high number of goods. Thus it could mean 
that free trade would in fact be prevented in a number of sectors. The system of 
compensatory charges would also have to face extreme difficulties in its practical 
operation, since price differences and their causes vary between countries. Thus the 
system of compensatory charges would lead to a levelling of prices and to a 
lowering of incentives to raise productivity, lower costs, to rationalise and to get rid 
of cartels and other arrangements of that sort. This system would hence prevent the 
pressures for a harmonisation of tariffs at lower levels to come into effect and thus 
also prevent, what many supporters of the FTA idea in Germany were hoping for, 
the build-up of pressures to lower the common external tariff of the EEC. 
Additionally, the system would be dependent on changing price differentials and 
thus establish a high level of uncertainty for trade mainly for deals on the forward 
market.
BA, B102 - 56373: Bonn, 07 X 1957: Vermerk zur deutschen Position zum Carli-Plan.
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At a meeting in the department V on October 12, 1957 it was agreed to be 
the German position for the negotiations that protection for individual industrial 
sectors should be given via the mechanism of an escape clause and that questions 
concerning the system of origin should not be mixed with questions relating to 
internal competition. While this was the line that the German delegation to the 
Maudling committee took in the beginning, and while the rejection of a 
compensatory charge was complete in the departments I and V of the BMWi 
because of the general negative effects it would exert on the nature of the FTA, 
even these departments acknowledged that "shifting effects" or "substitution", as 
they called it, could not be prevented by the usual rules of origin. The 
compensatory charge on the other hand could deal with this problem18.
At the outset of the Maudling negotiations the German delegation had' 
specified the more general ideas laid down before. For the percentage rule the 
Germans agreed to a maximum level fixed for non-area material at 50% of the value 
of the good in general. Yet they wanted to have the possibility to have other levels 
set for certain products where it seemed appropriate. They were in favour of a list 
of raw materials that should contain mainly those materials on which there were no 
tariffs levied anyway by the OEEC member states. The German delegation put 
strong emphasis on a list encompassing a wide range of processes that should be 
applied in addition to the percentage rule. The Germans argued in favour of rules of 
origin that should not try to tackle in advance every case that was theoretically 
possible. They rather wanted to see a flexible arrangement and wait and see whether 
deflections did actually occur. They saw flexible arrangements as well as a certain 
co-ordination of the commercial policies of the future member states of the FTA 
especially toward low price countries and state trading countries as preconditions for 
such a flexible method of operation. They also put forward their view in the session 
early March 1958 that rules of origin must not be used as measures of protection
The "shifting effect", as described by Victoria Curzon, occurs when a member country of a 
free trade area with low tariffs exports all its production of a certain good to another member 
of the area, while the demand for that product in the home market is satisfied by import 
from third countries only. The actual importance of this effect will largely depend on the 
question whether the producer of the product in question is at the same time the main 
distributor of imports of that product into the domestic market. See Cu rzo n , V ictoria : The 
Essentials of Economic Integration. Lessons ofEFTA Experience. London 1974, p. 272-274.
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against competition from goods that are entirely of area origin19. This was a 
rejection of the proposal for compensatory charges as put forward in the group of 
trade experts.
When the Italians came up with the Carli-Plan proposals on 20 March 1958, 
the first German reactions to that in the internal considerations of the BMWi were 
slightly more favourable than one would have expected from the line that had been 
taken before in the group of trade experts and in working party No 21. The Carli- 
Plan, as it was now called, envisaged the levying of compensatory charges from the 
second stage of the transitional period onward and only in cases where a certain 
harmonisation of external tariffs could not be reached among the member countries. 
The German delegates Horn and Pfeiffer remained sceptical as far as the operation 
of such a system was concerned, which would be some sort of modified tariff 
system. They also rejected the idea that products of area origin should be subject to 
a compensatory charge. Under such conditions, they argued, one could not talk of 
free trade any more. Yet the German delegates were able to find some positive 
aspects in the Italian proposal. Under the condition that, for most products traded 
within the area, a normative tariff level with wide margins around it could be found 
and that all member countries were able to fit their individual tariffs somewhere 
within this margin, the German experts saw the Carli-Plan as a useful basis for 
further discussions. But the preconditions which would ensure freedom from tariffs 
for most of European trade through some sort of tariff harmonisation were very 
unlikely to be realised.
The summary of their assessment was the following: While the Carli-Plan 
was essentially in contradiction to the initial German concept of an FTA, it was 
regarded as a positive move, in that it meant a departure of the Italian delegation 
away from its previous merely negative attitude in the work of the trade experts. 
The basic idea behind the plan, i.e. a far reaching harmonisation of tariffs within 
the area, was also to be welcome, since it promised to avoid trade deflections and 
therefore to simplify the operation and limit the necessity of counter measures. The
BA, B102 - 11157: Vermerk zur Vorbereitung fur die Situng des Maudling-Ausschusses 
vom 11. bis 13. Marz 1958.; B102 - 18399: Undatierter Vermerk [most probably 
February/March 1958] von Herm Horn: Vorschlag fur eine deutsche Position als Antwort 
zum Bericht der Gruppe der Handelsexperten.
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decisive question was, to what extent it was possible to harmonise tariffs within a 
wide margin for most goods traded in Europe and thereby ensure free trade for all 
of them. Finally, the German trade experts laid down a number of conditions for an 
introduction of compensatory charges. Firstly, goods of area origin must not be 
subject to the charge. Secondly, the levying of the charge should be limited to 
exceptional cases. Thirdly, there should be an incentive to lower those tariffs that 
are higher than the upper level of the margin, so that they enter the margin and 
finally, there had to be a gradual removal of the compensatory charges after the end 
of the transitional period with a fixed date for their complete removal20. It seems 
though that the German delegation had to depart from this fairly strict line in the 
course of the negotiations. This was partly due to the necessity to form a common 
position on the FTA among the six members of the EEC. At some point during the 
summer of 1958 the German delegation in the Ockrent committee of the EEC 
agreed that measures of the Carli-Plan should be taken complementary to the 
general application of a list of processes. This amounts to a substantial change of 
position on the German side which seems to have been linked to the French demand 
for sectoral studies, strongly advocated in their memorandum of March 1958 and 
with the influence of some sectors of German industry on the BMWi.
By July 1958 the German experts were contemplating three different options 
concerning this question. One was the general line taken within the Ockrent 
committee, another one was a proposal put forward by Reginald Maudling21 and the 
third one was a document prepared by the Steering Board of Trade of the OEEC22. 
Of these three options the proposals by Maudling came closest to the initial German 
position. Yet even Maudling's document did not exclude in principle the application 
of measures according to the Carli-Plan for some sectors and conceded to the 
French that there was a necessity to conduct sectoral studies in order to determine 
specific solutions on a sector by sector basis. The German delegation in the Ockrent 
group had made substantial concessions in the question of compensatory charges
BA, B102 - 11161, 2: Bonn, 22 III 1958: Gedanken von Horn und Pfeiffer beziiglich einer
von der deutschen Delegation einzunehmenden Position hinsichtlich des Carli-Plans.
OEEC, CIG(58)45.
OEEC, CIG(58)44, Report by the Steering Committee for Trade on questions of origin and
deflections of trade, 10 VII 1958.
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which went much further than those made by Maudling in his document. After 
Maudling had put forward his position, the Germans wanted to abandon the view 
their delegation had taken in the Ockrent committee. It is obvious from the archival 
evidence that the German delegations in Brussels and Paris were not pursuing 
coherent positions at all times. This put them at a disadvantage with the French who 
sent the same delegation to the EEC and the OEEC talks.
Toward the end of the Maudling negotiations the draft interim report by the 
Steering Board of Trade had laid down detailed proposals for a solution of the 
problems of deflections of trade and of rules of origin23. The general considerations 
of this report stated that there would be a very low risk of deflections of trade 
during the first stage of the transitional period, so that the specific rules governing 
the definition and control of origin could be established during that phase, while the 
convention on the FTA should not include detailed provisions on these questions. 
The report went on to suggest that there should be a certain harmonisation of 
external tariffs on primary materials in order to diminish the risk of deflections of 
trade in the first place. Measures against deflections of trade should be applied 
where the differences of external tariffs were such that the risk of deflection was 
evident. In such cases either rules of origin or compensatory charges should be 
applied. The report demanded that the action taken against deflections of trade must 
not exceed what was absolutely necessary. A code of good conduct should help 
avoid problems arising from the autonomy of member states to set and change their 
external tariffs as they wished. The draft interim report asked for a complaints 
procedure and for escape clauses in cases of unforeseeable difficulties. Finally, it 
stated the need for satisfactory reciprocity between the member states. In the section 
on the specific problems of deflections and on possible solutions for them the 
Steering Board essentially argued that there was no universally applicable solution 
and that sectoral studies and special rules for individual sectors were needed24. The 
third and final section of the report by the Steering Board of Trade concerned 
procedures and safeguard clauses in connection with deflections of trade. It included
OEEC, CIG(58)57, Report by the Steering Committee for Trade on questions of origin and 
deflections of trade, 15 X 1958.
For the sectoral studies conducted in the OEEC see OEEC-Archives, FTA-file 216, see in 
particular Paris, 2 X 1958, Chapellier au Secretaire general, Sergent.
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provisions on a code of good conduct which would require member states to give 
notification prior to a lowering of external tariffs and to consult the issue with any 
other member state that so wished. It also proposed procedures that would enable 
the members to change the rules of origin as experience was gained concerning their 
operation during the first stages of the transitional period.
The Germans generally agreed to the suggestions of the Steering Board of 
Trade and put forward very detailed views on the procedures and the decision 
making within the future FTA institutions. They now departed from their initial 
position that there should be autonomy of the member states as far as the setting of 
external tariff levels vis-a-vis third countries was concerned. While the German 
delegation had previously been supporting the British view that there should be 
autonomy of the member states in this field, they now demanded that the decision 
on changes in external tariffs and the possibility to take measures against that should 
be taken by the council of the would-be FTA. The procedures envisaged by the 
Germans would not give the council the power to prohibit the tariff changes, but, if 
there was no two thirds majority of the member states stating that the change would 
not result in deflections of trade, then other members would have the right to take 
counter measures against them. If there was no two third majority in the council on 
precise counter measures that should be allowed, then it was left to the member 
states to take actions as they wished. This was a clear departure from the principle 
of tariff autonomy.
The shift in the German position on two of the essential questions related to 
the handling of deflections of trade might partly be explicable with the outcome of 
the sectoral studies that had been undertaken after the French had demanded that in 
the spring of 1958. Such studies were presented by the Steering Board of Trade for 
the chemical industry, the textile industry, for the mechanical engineering sector 
and the sectors of non-ferrous metals as well as of timber and timber products in the 
Steering Board's draft interim report25. These sectors had been identified as those 
where the problems of deflections of trade were likely to be most serious. They 
were also the sectors where internal competition was expected to have a great
OEEC, CIG(58)57, Report by the Steering Committee for Trade on questions of origin and
deflections of trade, 15 X 1958.
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impact. The six member countries of the EEC had begun sectoral studies among 
themselves in Brussels in order to arrive at a common position in matters concerning 
deflections of trade. This proved impossible for timber and timber products with 
France demanding the complete exclusion of this sector from the FTA26. In the 
textile sector the German delegation had taken the view that a co-ordination of 
commercial policies among the member countries was necessary not only for the 
sake of achieving a compromise among the six, but also in order to respond to the 
interests of the German textile industry27. Different views from other departments 
within the ministry were rejected. The Germans also acknowledged the immense 
problems of internal competition in the sector of non-ferrous metals. The general 
line taken by the German delegation in the Brussels talks on sectoral problems still 
aimed at the most liberal principles possible wherever the tariff differences were 
little. Yet in cases of larger differences between external tariffs the Germans 
decided to support the French in their demand for harmonisation, which meant to 
apply measures of the Carli-Plan where harmonisation did not go far enough. The 
Germans rejected Carli's compensatory charge as inappropriate and saw a better 
solution in the application of preferential tariffs corresponding to the actual cost 
advantages between the member countries concerned. Yet this was just a slight 
modification of the original Carli-Plan, not any less cumbersome in its operation 
and hardly possible in terms of GATT rules.
It should be obvious from what has been described so far that the German 
position on the key questions that were discussed in the Maudling committee shifted 
from a determined liberal position to one that accepted potentially protectionist 
mechanisms at the very centre of the FTA. It is important in this respect to identify 
the links between certain industrial sectors that were particularly affected positively 
or negatively by the project of a Europe-wide FTA and the way in which
26 AHC, CCE, BAC 61/1982, No. 9: Brussels, 10 X1958: Commission, Direction Generale I, 
Direction B (association des pays tiers), Division 2 1235/58-F, Compte-rendu de la reunion 
des experts des industries de bois, pates et papier tenue les 8 et 9 octobre 1958.
27 BA, B102 - 11159,2: Bonn, 10 XI 1958: Vermerk von Herm Friedrich zu den in Brussel 
vorgenommenen Sektorstudien. For the German position on textiles among the Six see also 
AHC, CCE, BAC 61/1982 No 6: Bruxelles, 15 XI 1958, Direction Generale des relations 
exterieures, Direction B (associations avec les pays tiers), Division 2: Compte-rendu de la 
reunion des experts des industries textiles, tenue le 5 novembre 1958 k Bruxelles; Bruxelles,
28 XI 1958, Compte-rendu, groupe de travail du secteur textiles; reunion 25 novembre 
1958.
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Government decisions were made and positions within the framework of the 
international negotiations were adapted. The main modification in the German 
position during the Maudling negotiations concerned the acceptance of a modified 
version of the Carli-Plan to be applied in cases where tariff harmonisation did not 
work out. Another important change in position concerned the tariff autonomy of 
the member countries.
3.2  German industrial interest in the FTA
Industrial interest and the German position in the negotiations
In the Federal BMWi the department IV was in charge of relations with German 
business. Its three main sub-sections dealt with iron and steel (section A), chemical 
industry, mineral oil, timber, cellulose and paper (section B) and all other industries 
(section C). The sub-department IV2 had the responsibility of co-ordinating 
questions of foreign trade arising within the department IV. These were the 
departmental units where the reactions of German business toward the international 
trade negotiations were gathered, analysed and transmitted into the decision making 
process concerning the line to be taken by the German delegation in the 
negotiations, as it had been agreed among the ministries that industrial interest 
groups should not be directly participating in any sections of the negotiations28. At 
the end of May 1957 Krautwig, the man in charge of co-ordinating the position of 
the department IV, asked the heads of the subunits A, B and C whether the EEC 
and the projected FTA would endanger the existence of certain industrial sectors in 
Germany and whether there were reasons to take measures in order to protect and 
preserve these industries. In early June he specified what information he was 
looking for. Since for the FTA a precise definition of what it was going to look like 
could not yet be given, he asked the sub-sections to try and formulate solutions for 
the relevant questions that would be best for German business29. For the talks
PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 457: Bonn, 5 IV 1957, von Rhamm an Hartlieb, Aufzeichung zur 
FHZ, hier: Ressortbesprechung am 4. April 1957.
BA, B102 - 18373,1: Bonn, 27 V 1957: Krautwig an die Leiter der Unterabteilungen IV A, 
B und C.
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among the trade experts on the raw material list the respective sections of the 
department IV reacted with reservations wherever the sectoral interests of German 
industry were not yet clear30. In summer 1957 German industry had already been 
fairly well informed about the general importance of the international negotiations 
that were going on among the member states of the OEEC by the Federation of 
German Industry (BDI)31.
It was common practice in the BMWi to inform the industrial associations 
centrally via the BDI. Thus the BDI had already been contacted about the FTA in 
August 1956 and been asked by the BMWi to provide a picture of the sectoral 
interest of German industry by mid-January 1957 as far as rules of origin and 
questions of distortions of competition were concerned32. In September 1956, the 
Federal ministry of finance (BMFin) had provided the industrial associations with 
information on the plans for an FTA and the legal basis for the rules of origin as 
they were operated at that time in Germany33. The first inquiry by the BMWi 
concerning the potential impact of the EEC and the FTA on German industry led to 
a large number of statements by the different industrial sectors. The responses by 
German industry varied greatly as to the availability of statistical data. Most studies,
BA, B102 - 18398,1: Kurzer Bericht iiber die Sitzung der Handelsexperten am 4. und 5. Mai
1957.
From August 1956 the BDI’s foreign trade section provided the member associations with 
information about the work on a European free trade area conducted within the OEEC and 
advised them to contact the respective section of the BMWi whenever the ministry was 
preparing the German position during the work of the preparatory working parties on 
questions relating to the definition of origin, the precise rules of origin and the lists of raw 
materials and processes related to these questions. HDI - NB254: Koln, 12 VIII 1956, BDI 
AuBenhandelsabteilung, Hipp, Gocksch an die Mitgliedsverbande, betr.: Europaische 
Freihandelszone - Stellungnahme zu den Arbeiten der OEEC; Koln, 13 XII 1956, BDI 
AuBenhandelsabteilung, Hipp, Gocksch an die Mitgliedsverbande, betr.: Europaische 
Freihandelszone - Stellungnahme zu den Arbeiten der OEEC; Koln, 2 I 1957, BDI 
AuBenhandelsabteilung, Hipp, Gocksch an die Mitgliedsverbande, betr.: Freihandelszone; 
Koln, 13 II 1957, BDI AuBenhandelsabteilung, Hipp, Gocksch an die Mitgliedsverbande, 
betr.: zollpolitische Fragen; Koln, 19 II 1957, BDI AuBenhandelsabteilung, Hipp, Gocksch 
an die Mitgliedsverbande, betr.: Freihandelszone, Bericht der Sonderarbeitsgruppe 17 der 
OEEC; Koln, 16 IV 1957, BDI AuBenhandelsabteilung, Hipp, Gocksch an die 
Mitgliedsverbande, betr.: Freihandelszone, Stand der Pariser Verhandlungen; Koln, 18 VI 
1957, BDI AuBenhandelsabteilung, Hipp, Gocksch an die Mitgliedsverbande, betr.: 
Freihandelszone, Ergebnis der Aussprache in Koln am 6. Juni 1957.
HDI - NB254: Koln, 12 VIII 1956, BDI AuBenhandelsabteilung, Hipp, Gocksch an die 
Mitgliedsverbande, betr.: Europaische Freihandelszone - Stellungnahme zu den Arbeiten der 
OEEC.
BA, B102 - 56373: Bonn, 29 IX 1956: Finanzministerium an Industrieverbande.
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that were hurriedly put together, struggled with the fact that the respective data were 
not at hand and that the form and character of the proposed FTA was barely visible. 
While German industry was therefore rather slow in putting forward the material 
needed in the BMWi to arrive at a coherent German position, the talks among the 
trade experts in Paris proceeded quite rapidly. At the beginning of 1958 the sub­
sections A, B and C of the BMWi were informed that, if they wanted to submit 
additional material concerning the question of origin, they had to do so quickly, 
since the experts’ talks in Paris had already reached a very advanced point and were 
approaching a conclusion34. Nearly all the potentially important questions had been 
addressed by the trade experts by spring 1958. At the end of January 1958 the 
representatives of the BMWi present in the negotiations on the FTA and in the 
expert talks that were continuing met with the leading associations of German 
industry, the BDI, the German Chambers of Commerce (DIHT) and also with the 
umbrella organisation of the German trade unions (DGB) in Paris35. The files of the 
BMWi show that the main thrust of industrial response to the questions connected 
with the FTA was handed in to the BMWi between summer 1957 and spring 1958. 
not much was contributed from the industrial side after that.
Who gains, who loses?
It soon became apparent that the survey given as a response the BMWi's request for 
information could merely have a preliminary character. Assessments of the FTA 
were difficult to obtain, since the precise rules that would govern this arrangement 
were not yet clear, while they were clear in the case of the EEC. Minor problems 
for reliable estimates for the effects of the FTA - apart from the lack of specific data 
for some sectors - arose from the fact that the common external tariff (CET) of the 
EEC had not yet been fixed for a number of important raw materials on the List
BA, B102 - 18398,3: Abteilung IV C7 an Unterabteilungen. Department IV C 7 of the 
ministry of trade and commerce informs its sub-departments at the beginning of 1958 of the 
stage of the talks. Concerns that the Germans might be too slow to come up with a clear 
position because of the lack of appropriate analyses by German industry had been aired some 
time earlier: 16 IX 1957: Abteilung IV C7 zur Erstellung einer Liste von Rohstoffen.
BA, B102 - 56373: 24-25 I 1958: Sitzung von Beamten des BMWi mit fiihrenden 
Industrieverbanden und Gewerkschaften in Paris.
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G36. Yet the uncertainty over the CET that would finally be set by the six members 
of the EEC for the materials on List G remained and impeded clarification on rules 
of origin within the international negotiations. Hence statements on deflections of 
trade and desirable rules of origin were particularly difficult to make for industrial 
sectors whose production involved these materials. These difficulties prevented the 
German delegation in the group of trade experts to come up with proposals of then- 
own at an early stage. Industrial reactions to the British proposal of a raw material 
list had been too sketchy. The sub-department IVC7 stressed in mid-September 
1957 with regards to the overwhelming German interest in exports that, if the 
Germans wanted to influence the definition of origin in their interest, it would be 
crucial to come up with constructive proposals very soon. Concerning the list of raw 
materials the Germans came closer to having a coherent position.
On September 17, 1957 the department IV addressed a letter to the inter 
ministerial working group for the FTA criticising the first report of this working 
group for not acknowledging legitimate interests of German industry in certain 
questions. It referred explicitly to the sector of non-ferrous metals. In this letter 
department IV demanded a change in the text of that first report, since otherwise 
German industry would have the impression that their very legitimate concerns were 
not being taken seriously by the Federal Government. This impression had to be 
avoided, since one needed the close co-operation of German industry in order to 
conduct the very tricky negotiations on the simplification of the definition and 
control of origin37.
Despite these difficulties in the process of formulating a coherent and precise 
German position on the essentials of the future FTA, the response to the first 
request by the head of department IV of the BMWi for studies on the effects of the 
EEC and the FTA gave a relatively clear impression of the expectations of the
36 List G in the annex I to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community relating 
to article 20 of the treaty comprised those products for which the arithmetical average was 
not deemed feasible for the CET and where the Six had not been able to agree on a common 
tariff initially. The member states agreed on the common tariff for the products on List G on 
2 March 1960 with the exceptions of manufactured tobacco and petroleum products. See 
Cam pbell , Ala n : Common Market Law. Volume II. London, Harlow 1969, p. 17, § 2028. 
For the agreement reached in 1960 see Journal CJfficiel des Communautes Europeennes, 20 
Decembre 1960, 3C Annee N° 80 C, pp. 1825/60-1871/60.
37 BA, B102 - 18398,3: Bonn, 17 IX 1957: Abteilung IV an von Mahs, betr. den ersten 
Bericht der interministeriellen Arbeitsgruppe.
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industrial sectors, even if precise estimates were rare, list Major concerns were 
aired by the sector of non-ferrous metals that feared the competition to which it 
would be exposed in an FTA encompassing all members of the OEEC. Serious 
concerns were also stated by the timber and the timber processing industries. In 
other sectors the expectations were mixed. The leather and shoe industry had 
positive expectations concerning the EEC, while the FTA seemed to hold less 
comfortable prospects for this sector. While the cement and brick industry did not 
expect any changes in the general situation, the survival of other industries 
belonging to the same sector seemed to be either endangered or expecting large 
gains from the EEC and the FTA. Thus the German marble industry feared serious 
problems within the EEC and the FTA, while the industry of fireproof materials 
expected a considerable improvement of its export situation. The German textile 
industry did not fear major negative effects, but had not been able by August 1957 
to gather sufficient statistical material to back up that statement with reliable 
estimates. The glass and ceramics industry did not expect any changes in the overall 
situation, but stressed that this assessment was conditional on a few very important 
points that would need to be met by the results of the international negotiations on 
the FTA. Other sectors, like the construction industry, mineral oil and the aviation 
and ship-building industries did not feel touched at all by the new developments. 
The sectors with entirely positive expectations were the car industry, electrical 
engineering and the mechanical engineering sector38.
• Metal industry
The metal industry was able to provide a very detailed assessment in response to the 
requests made by the head of department IV at the end of May and the beginning of 
June 1957. The picture concerning the effects of the EEC and the FTA on the metal 
industry in general was indeed very mixed and the analysis of the factors at work 
potentially in favour or to the disadvantage of the industry quite complicated. The 
general position taken on the EEC was more favourable than that on the FTA,
BA, B102 - 18373,1: Bonn, 08 VIII 1957: Abteilung IV A2 an IV c7: Auswirkungen der 
FHZ auf die deutsche Automobilindustrie und den Maschinenbausektor; 20 VIII 1957: 
Abteilung IV A 4: Auswirkungen der FHZ auf die deutsche Maschinenbauindustrie.
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agreement to which was made dependent on a number of crucial conditions 
concerning the nature and the operation of the rules of origin that would be applied. 
The question of tariff differentials for imports of raw materials were at the heart of 
the concerns expressed by all processing industries. In this respect the uncertainty 
that prevailed for certain materials on List G brought the sector to insist on a 
number of important reservations concerning the operation of rules of origin in the 
FTA and in their industry in particular39. The arguments were the following: As the 
largest producer and the second largest consumer of metals the Federal Republic 
was more than any other country of the 17 OEEC member states dependent on 
imports of cheap ores, raw metals and scrap. This dependency was aggravated by 
the relative disadvantage of not having associated territories with ore deposits and 
production of raw metals on which Belgium, France and Britain could rely for their 
imports. Special problems arose for the German founding industry whose capacity 
by far exceeded German demand and which had been protected by tariffs on 
imports. EEC and FTA would expose this industry which had begun but not yet 
concluded a process of rationalisation to the competition of the industry of the 
Benelux countries, but much more importantly to the competition of Britain's metal 
industry.
Despite a lot of problems the metal industry as a whole expected an 
improvement of their sales possibilities through the establishment of both the EEC 
and the FTA. The dependency on the imports of raw materials and raw metals and 
the particular importance of exports for the non-ferrous metal industry and the 
precious metal processing industry were seen as the main problems. The metal 
industry expected no improvement in the acquisition of raw materials, but tougher 
competition. The essential problems from the establishment of the FTA for the 
metal industry arose from the fact that the fixing of a CET among the six member 
states of the EEC would result in a heightening of certain German tariffs because of 
the high tariffs existing in France and Italy. This would mean higher costs for raw 
materials for the German metal processing industries and would be a serious
List G contains among other things iron alloys as well as the raw metals and scraps of 
aluminium, magnesium, lead, zinc and a number of more rare metals. See Journal Officiel 
des Communautes Europeennes, 20 Decembre 1960, 3e Annee N° 80 C, pp. 1839/60- 
1842/60.
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obstacle for their exports within the FTA. The metal industries therefore demanded 
that the German Government should aim at fixing the CET in the negotiations with 
its EEC partners at the level that would not change the German tariffs valid on 
January 1, 1957. The Government should agree to the levying of tariffs on raw 
metals only under the condition that there could be tariff free quotas or a temporary 
lifting of tariffs on these materials. They demanded that import and export of scrap 
should be unrestricted in the FTA and that certain special tariffs for raw and 
auxiliary materials should remain in place. In addition to that they wanted approval 
for "benign" cartels40.
As far as the FTA itself was concerned, the German metal industry pointed 
to the fact that Britain had considerable advantages because of the Commonwealth 
and because of the fact that the British Government had restricted exports of scrap 
to Germany. Additionally, Sweden, Norway and Austria had better conditions for 
the production of aluminium, magnesium and silicon because of their cheap 
hydroelectric energy. Inspite of these drawbacks the German metal industry 
expected a generally positive influence on their sales conditions from the 
establishment of the FTA as well. They demanded though a minimisation of the 
differences in the starting conditions among the member countries of the OEEC. 
Unjust disadvantages for individual industrial sectors had to be avoided, they 
argued. This referred mainly to the question of access to cheap raw materials and 
scrap. Because of that the metal sector argued in favour of a list of raw materials 
that should, among a range of other materials, encompass all sorts of scrap and 
waste. A list of processes should be used in addition to that in order to simplify the 
rules of origin as much as possible. The metal sector agreed to the British proposal 
for a list of raw materials that had been put forward in June 1957, but reserved its 
right to make some modifications, once further studies of the German situation in 
the metal industry would have been undertaken. In cases where the CET was not yet 
decided, respective materials should not be included in the list. Non-ferrous metals 
should have a special status and would probably need protection, the associations 
argued, since their starting conditions were much less favourable than those of the
BA, B102 - 18373,1: Bonn, 27 VIII 1957: Abteilung IV A 1 [metal industry] an den Leiter 
der Abteilung IV betreffend die generelle Einschatzung der Auswirkungen der FHZ auf die 
deutsche Metallindsutrie.
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Scandinavian countries and of Austria mainly because of their access to cheap 
hydroelectric energy41. The industrial associations made their willingness to take 
risks with the formation of the FTA and the acceptance of the measures required for 
its efficient operation dependent on the condition that there would be escape clauses 
which would allow the temporary exclusion of certain products until a common 
agreement would be found.
In mid-September 1957 the departmental section IV A1 in charge of non- 
ferrous metals made detailed statements concerning the British proposal for a list of 
processes. This list, they argued, should contain those products for which the 
calculation of the maximum percentage of non-area content would be too 
cumbersome. The list should state the process as well as the product obtained from 
it. The department had no problem to include all those raw materials and 
intermediary products as well as finished goods in cases where the raw metal and 
the intermediary products were free of tariffs in all member states of the FTA or 
where the differences in external tariffs were negligible. Where, on the other hand, 
the CET of the EEC countries for such raw metals and intermediary products were 
not yet fixed (aluminium, zinc and lead which were on list G), they should not be 
included in the list until the CET had been agreed on. Department IV section A1 
came to the conclusion that, instead of a list of processes and a list of raw materials, 
there should only be a "list of area products" which should include all those 
products that were agreed by all member countries. This would be much simpler 
than the application of the list of processes. It would make sure that the export 
conditions of the German non ferrous metal industry were not impaired by the fact 
that certain raw materials would not be included in the list of raw materials
Despite the fact that Germany imported 21% of the aluminium which it consumed in 1957, 
it still levied a 7% protective duty on these imports. On lead and zinc, whose imports stood 
at 10 and 20% respectively in 1957, Germany had neither quantitative restrictions nor 
tariffs. See AHC, CCE, BAC 62/1982 No. 10: Bonn 13 XII 1958: Delegation de la 
Republique federale d'Allemagne, Etude par secteur au sein de la Commission europeenne 
en vue de la constitution d'une Association economique europeenne , secteur special des 
m£taux non-ferreux. Proposition de la delegation allemande concemant les possibilites de 
resoudre le probleme de l'origine pour le plomb et le zinc; Bonnl5 XII 1958: Delegation de 
la Republique federale d'Allemagne, Etude par secteur au sein de la Commission europeenne 
en vue de la constitution d’une Association economique europeenne. Rapport par la 
delegation allemande sur la situation de 1'aluminium.
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qualifying them as of area origin42. This was the position with which the BMWi had 
entered the talks among the trade experts. Because of the potential difficulties of the 
non-ferrous metal sector, it seems to have been relatively easy for the German 
delegation in the Maudling committee to agree with the French and the Italians who 
demanded to apply the compensatory charge of the Carli-Plan in cases where 
external tariffs differed considerably43.
* timber and timber processing and paper industries
Another problematic sector was the timber and timber processing as well as
the paper industry. In its response to the request by the head of department IV 
section B4 said that there were no major dangers to be feared for the industry in 
general from the establishment of the EEC, while the inclusion of the Scandinavian 
countries and of Austria in the FTA would make competitive pressures on all 
products made from timber as raw material much harder. The expected level of the 
CET for raw materials was also of major concern, since the German industry 
largely depended on imports and the French had completely contradictory 
interests44. Competition in the FTA would become the harder the lower the degree 
of refinement of the products would be. This would result in particular difficulties 
in the young German chipboard industry, which was the first of its kind in Europe 
and feared that the timber producing countries would establish industries of their 
own. Similar pressures would have to be faced by the cellulose, paper and paper
BA, B102 - 18398,2: Bonn, 10 IX 1957: Abteilung IV A1 an den Leiter der Abteilung IV 
betreffend den Britischen Vorschlag einer Rohstoffliste.
BA, B102 - 11159,2: Bonn, 17 X 1958: Horn an die Unterabteilungen EA 2 und El. Horn 
argues here that the Germans must give in to French demands if they do not want to risk the 
break-up of the negotiations. BA, B102 - 11160,1: Bonn, 21 X 1958: Vermerk von Herm 
Friedrich zu den Gesprachen der Mitgliedslander der EWG zum Ursprungsproblem. 
Friedrich states that in the sectors of non-ferrous metals and chemicals the Germans were 
ready to achieve a compromise. It seems that the initial hesitation within the BMWi 
concerning the acceptance of the Carli-tax in some fields (aluminium, lead, zinc) was not at 
all reflected in the German position among the Six. See AHC, CCE, BAC 62/1982 No. 10: 
Brussels, 19 XI 1958, Commission, DG I, Direction B, Division 2, 2078/58-F: Compte- 
rendu, groupe de travail du secteur metaux non-ferreux, reunion du 17 XI 1958.
After lengthy discussions and the initial French insistence to exclude the whole sector from 
the FTA, the German proposal for an escape clause seemed to lead toward a compromise 
toward the end of the negotiations. The whole debate among the Six on timber and timber 
products is documented in the file AHC, CCE, BAC 62/1982 No. 9, see especially Brussels, 
25 XI 1958, Commission, DG I, Direction B, Division 2: Compte-rendu, groupe de travail 
du secteur des industries du bois, pates et papiers, reunions des 20 k 21 novembre 1958.
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processing industries. They had already embarked on the way to producing more 
refined products. This would be their only chance against Scandinavian an Austrian 
competition, once the lowering of tariffs would begin in the FTA. Card board and 
all types of wrapping material would be most hit45. Section B4 therefore asked the 
German negotiators to give full attention to the problems of the timber, timber 
processing and related industries. It made approval to the British list of raw 
materials dependent on absolutely equal levels of external tariffs for all materials on 
the list. This, it argued, would be required in order to obtain equal starting 
conditions46. Resistance by British and French associations against the inclusion of 
timber and timber processing industries in the FTA filtered through to the Maudling 
negotiations47. In November 1958, shortly before the failure of the negotiations, the 
French still demanded the exclusion of these industries while the Italians wanted a 
transitional period of at least thirty years, while the Germans were apparently 
contemplating some proposal for a compromise48.
* Stones and earths, marble, cement etc.
In the sector "Steine und Erden" including the marble industry, the industry of 
fireproof materials, the industry of construction materials and cement and brick 
industries, the picture was very mixed. While the marble industry feared to be 
almost wiped out mainly by Italian competition the industry or fireproof materials 
expected vast gains from EEC and FTA. The fireproof industry already performed 
quite well in exports to the other member countries of the OEEC despite fairly high 
tariff levels in the main markets France and the Benelux countries. The industry 
welcomed the British proposal for a list of raw materials and urged the German 
negotiators to do everything possible to abolish administrative hurdles for
45 BA, B102 - 18373,1: Bonn, 08 VIII 1957: Abteilung IV B 4 [timber industries] to the head
of department IV: the effects of the EEC and the free trade area on the German timber and 
timber processing industries.
46 BA, B102 - 18398,1: undatiertes Dokument von Abteilung IV B4 [probably
August/September 1957] zum britischen Vorschlag einer Rohstoffliste.
47 Very surprisingly, the German cellulose industry had spoken out in favour of the free trade 
area at an international conference in May 1958 reuniting the associations of Britain and the 
Six. See BA, B102 - 11158: Bonn, 07 VIII 1958: Abteilung IV B 4 an Herm Keyserling 
(MdB).
48 BA, B102 - 11159,2: Bonn, 10 XI 1958: Vermerk von Herm Friedrich (Abteilung IV) zum
Stand der Sektorenbesprechungen der sechs EWG Mitgliedslander in Brussel.
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exporters. The industry of construction materials feared some dangers because of 
more costly standards that had to be met in Germany, because of lower freight 
tariffs abroad and restrictive business practices at work in a number of other 
countries. Additionally, the international diamond syndicate in London still strictly 
excluded Germany with the result that the Germans had to buy their diamonds at a 
price 80% above that of the syndicate. The cement industry did not expect any 
changes in its overall situation.
• Textiles
The textile industry was self-confident in their assessment of the effects that EEC 
and FTA were going to have for them. Without having done any research and 
without having provided any statistical material they simply assumed that the 
German\hfiving for quality would be sufficient to deal with existing inequalities in 
conditions of production. They were apparently concerned though with the 
commercial policy vis-a-vis the Commonwealth and other low-price countries like 
the planning economies of Central and Eastern Europe49, but felt that the other 
Western European countries would share their protective interests in that respect50. 
Corresponding to the demands by the industry the German delegation insisted 
throughout the negotiations that there should be a common commercial policy by all 
members providing protection51.
BA, B102 - 18373,1: Bonn, 09 VIII 1957: Abteilung IV Cl an den Leiter der Abteilung IV: 
zu den Auswirkungen der EWG und der FHZ auf die deutsche Textilindustrie. For the 
concerns of the textile industry vis-k-vis imports from "low price countries" see BA, B102 - 
11159,2: Bonn, 10 XI 1958: Vermerk von Herm Friedrich (Abteilung IV) zum Stand der 
Sektorenbesprechungen der sechs EWG Mitgliedslander in Brussel.
That the assumption of broadly similar conditions of the textile industries in Europe was 
right is made clear in a report by the working party N 21 looking at the textile sector at the 
beginning of 1958. See AHC, BAC 61/1982 No 6: Paris, 27 I 1958, OEEC, 
FTA/WP4(58)6, Suppleants du groupe de travail no. 21 du conseil, groupe d'experts 
commerciaux definition de l'origine: matieres textile et ouvrages en ce matieres.
AHC, CCE, BAC 61/1982 No 6: Bruxelles, 15 XI 1958, Direction Generale des relations 
exterieures, Direction B (associations avec les pays tiers), Division 2: Compte-rendu de la 
reunion des experts des industries textiles, tenue le 5 novembre 1958 a Bruxelles; Bruxelles, 
28 XI 1958, Compte-rendu, groupe de travail du secteur textiles; reunion 25 novembre
1958.
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* Leather and shoe industry
The leather and shoe industry made its assessment under the supposition that there 
be equal starting conditions as far as access to raw materials, tariff policies and 
export policies were concerned. They demanded a co-ordinated commercial policy 
with respect to the Commonwealth. They expected a slightly less favourable 
situation in the FTA than in the EEC and were confident to remain competitive and 
to expand their exports under the new conditions52. There general confidence seems 
to have stemmed from the expectation that all other European countries would agree 
on protective measures against imports from developing countries like India.
* Glass and ceramics
For the glass and ceramics industry the desirability of the FTA crucially depended 
on whether the percentage rule could be modified in their case and whether certain 
important products for the production of glass fibres would be included in the list of 
materials. The German glass fibre industry depended for their competitiveness on 
imports of a number of products from the United States. If they were not included 
in the list of materials, it would mean that the products of the German glass fibre 
could not be regarded as of area origin. This would be unacceptable. The Federal 
Association of the Glass industry (Bundesverband Glasindustrie) and the ceramics 
industry (AG Keramische Industrie) both demanded that for their products the 
percentage rule should prescribe not 50% but 20% as the maximum percentage of 
value of non-area ingredients. The reason for this demand was that the percentage of 
value of unrefined material as compared to that of a refined product was relatively 
low. A very simple decoration could bring about an increase in value which was 
several times the value of the raw product. A maximum percentage of 20% would 
prevent that such raw products from "lower price countries" could obtain area origin 
through very simple processes. While the industry did not expect any major changes
BA, B102 - 18373,2: Bonn, 28 VIII 1957: Abteilung IV C 2 an den Leiter der Abteilung 
IV: Die Auswirkungen der EWG und der Freihandelszone auf die deutsche Lederindustrie;
10 VIII 1957: Abteilung IV C 2 an den Leiter der Abteilung IV: Die Auswirkungen der 
EWG und der Freihandelszone auf die deutsche Schuhindustrie.
119
in the situation, it was concerned that a certain co-ordination of the commercial 
policies toward lower price countries should be reached53.
* Electrical and mechanical engineering, car industry
Among the industries that expected large gains from the EEC and the FTA and that 
were not daunted by any problems the German car industry, electrical engineering 
and mechanical engineering were the sectors with the greatest expectations. In the 
mechanical engineering sector the FTA was seen as much more advantageous than 
the EEC. Section A2 of department IV argued that France and Italy with their 
protectionist traditions and particularly France with its unbalanced economic system 
would have considerable weight within the EEC and would, in this context, be able 
to avoid major restructuring, while it would be forced to do so within an FTA if it 
did not want to lose its competitiveness. It is obvious that these rather general 
concerns were far apart from the serious problems faced by other industrial sectors. 
As far as the electrical engineering sector was concerned, the lowering of tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions was predicted to have only positive effects on the German 
sales. Since the German electrical engineering industry was already operating in 
most markets of the would-be member states of the EEC and the FTA, they had an 
efficient marketing structure at hand, while their foreign competitors did not have 
similar structures abroad. The electrical engineering sector demanded that a equal 
access to raw materials be ensured by including the materials concerned in the list of 
raw materials54. The German delegation in the Maudling negotiations argued in 
favour of a careful assessment of the impact of preferences the UK enjoyed in the 
Commonwealth markets. They even considered to agree to the French suggestion to 
temporarily exclude certain British products from the FTA because of these 
preferences55.
53 BA, B102 - 19398,1: Bonn, 27 VIII 1957: Abteilung IV C 3 an den Leiter der Abteilung
IV: Stellungnahme beziiglich den britischen Vorschlag fur eine Grundstoffliste; B102 - 
18373,2: Abteilung IV C 3: Vermerk zu den Auswirkungen der EWG und der 
Freihandelszone auf die deutsche Glass- und Keramikindustrie.
54 BA, B102 - 18373,1: Bonn, 20 VIII 1957: Abteilung IV A 4 an den Leiter der Abteilung
IV: Auswirkungen der EWG und der Freihandelszone auf die deutsche Elektroindustrie.
55 AHC, CCE, BAC 61/1982 No. 7: Brussels, 18 XII 1958: Commission, DG I, Direction B,
Division 2, I/976/59-F: Compte-rendu, groupe du secteur des industries mecanique et
electrique, reunion du 17 decembre 1958.
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* Chemicals
Expectations in the chemical industry were also very good. The chemical industry 
had understandably a strong interest in the list of raw materials. The section B4 of 
the department IV agreed to the British proposal for this list in June 1957 only with 
the reservation that these materials should either be subject to the same external 
tariff in all member states or that there was no tariff at all levied on them. Since the 
chemical industry had not been able to assemble statistical data sufficient to come to 
a clear view and to precise recommendations for the German negotiators they also 
reserved the right to add other products to the list that had been proposed by the 
British. While the chemical industry in general expected positive effects from the 
establishment of the EEC and the FTA, they predicted fierce competition for certain 
standardised products, particularly in the rubber industry56. In the negotiations of 
the Maudling committee the German delegation demanded the handling of the proof 
of origin mainly through the list of processes. In cases where the tariff differences 
for raw materials were too large they intended to opt for a harmonisation of tariffs. 
Since France demanded the strict application of the Carli-Plan for all of the 
chemical industry, while the British had many preferential tariffs equal to zero this 
would have led to the practical exclusion of the chemical industry from the FTA. In 
November 1958 agreement on this point seemed impossible to the German 
negotiators57. The differences among the Six themselves in this sector were just as 
important as the differences that existed among all members of the OEEC58.
BA, B102 - 18373,1: Bonn, 01 VIII 1957: Abteilung IV B 1 an den Leiter der Abteilung 
IV: Auswirkungen der EWG und der Freihandelszone auf die deutsche Chemieindustrie; 
B102 - 18398,1: Bonn, 18 VI 1957: Abteilung IV B 4 an den Leiter der Abteilung IV: 
Stellungnahme der Abteilung IV B 4 zum britischen Vorschlag einer Grundstoffliste.
BA, B102 - 11159,2: Bonn, 10 XI 1958: Vermerk zur deutschen Position, die in den 
Sektorengesprachen beziiglich der Ursprungsprobleme eingenommen werden soil. (Anhang 
zum Vermekr von Herm Friedrich (Abteilung IV) zum Stand der Sektorenbesprechunge 
unter den sechs Mitgliedslandem der EWG in Brussel.).
This became clear once more in the sectoral studies which the Six conducted among 
themselves from September 1958. For all their talks on chemicals see AHC, CCE, BAC 
62/1982 No. 11.
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What type of FTA for German industry?
The question that arises from this summary of the positions of German industry at 
the beginning of the negotiations on the FTA is, whether the variety of the views 
taken, the problems faced and the successes predicted should have brought the 
German negotiators to a clear general position which they could have kept 
throughout the course of the negotiations. Was there thus one mix of arrangements 
that would have satisfied most sectors of German industry. The general concerns of 
most industrial associations was access to cheap raw materials and to cheap imports 
of semi-products. Could that have been ensured, most of the industrial sectors 
mentioned would have had no substantial reservations against the FTA. There were 
obviously certain industries that expected to suffer from the EEC just as much or 
nearly as much as from the establishment of an FTA. For some of them the 
prospects would have looked gloomy in any case, if they were not able to rationalise 
and to specialise in certain fields of production where they would be competitive 
afterwards. Since the negotiations did not really come to a point where their 
successful conclusion had to be feared by these sectors, it is difficult to assess how 
powerful their reaction would have been. The potential winners of the FTA on the 
other hand, those who had nothing to fear but only to gain from EEC and FTA 
alike, were clearly not exerting any very substantial pressure in favour of the FTA. 
For them gains were certain with or without the FTA. And while they felt that their 
gains with the FTA would be somewhat larger, the difference that the FTA would 
actually make to them was not in any way as concrete as the fears of the metal- 
producing and processing, timber-processing, paper, glass and ceramics industries.
Even a good number of those sectors which welcomed the FTA (e. g. the 
chemical industry, textiles), did so only under certain very clear conditions. The 
discussion about the British list of raw materials reveals the pressures in favour of 
an arrangement with equal or "harmonised" external tariffs. As Shitaba pointed out 
in his theoretical study, it is very unlikely that competitive industries in different 
countries member countries of an economic union could simply accept tariff 
autonomy of the other members, since it would immediately affect their competitive
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position within the area59. The pressures exerted by the producers of competitive 
economies therefore tend to favour customs unions. For many German producers 
the establishment of an FTA might have been quite acceptable, if - and that is the 
crucial point - if Germany herself had retained tariff autonomy and could thus have 
catered for the specific import interests of German maufacturers. By entering the 
EEC (at this point mainly concerned with the establishment of the customs union 
provisions of the treaty) this had become a competence of the Community and was 
subject to bargaining among member states. Thus the List G remained one big 
unknown factor. Unless agreement was reached among the Six on the tariffs on the 
materials and products listed there, tariff differentials and resulting effects on the 
competitiveness of German industries could not be assessed. As things stood by 
mid-1958, the type of FTA for which German industry was asking resembled 
therefore more a customs union than anything else.
While the German delegation wanted to see itself as a mediator - with a 
position a bit closer to Britain than to France -, the direction in which German 
industrial interest pointed, did not suggest that there was much scope for impartial 
brokerage. Large parts of German industry in actual fact favoured the FTA under 
liberal conditions. But the number of sectors which made their acceptance of the 
arrangement subject to specific conditions was large as well. As has been shown, 
some sectors saw the FTA as a substantial threat to their existence. They were 
certain to make great efforts to either prevent it altogether or to mould it according 
to their needs. And moulding it according to their needs would have meant to accept 
the Carli-Plan at least for some sectors, to try and achieve tariff harmonisation for 
as many products as possible and to limit tariff autonomy of the member states and 
thereby watering down the crucial principle of any FTA. In the end, the German 
delegation agreed to all of these measures.
Shitaba, Theory, pp. 156, 176. The problem had been addressed by the trade experts in 
September 1957. See OEEC Archive, Florence: Paris, 30 IX 1957, G. Keiser to Cahan [and 
others] Report on the limits to the realisation of independent tariff policies vis-k-vis third 
countries within a free trade area.
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3 .3  Germany as a mediator between France and Britain
In June 1957, when the beginning of the Maudling negotiations was still more than 
half a year away, Ludwig Erhard, his state secretary Alfred Muller-Armack and 
then vice Chancellor and Minister for Economic Co-operation Franz Bliicher had a 
talk on the tactics concerning the FTA plans under discussion in the working groups 
of the OEEC. Bliicher argued that the greatest danger for the FTA was the 
possibility that there would be a uniform and common proceeding by the Six. He 
was convinced that, among the 16 member countries of the OEEC, France would 
hardly be able to succeed in opposing a solution that would be generally accepted by 
the others. Within the EEC on the other hand it would be much more difficult to 
deal with an intransigent France, and if France managed to bring the EEC member 
countries in line behind her, the FTA would be dead. State secretary Muller- 
Armack seemed to be little impressed with the logic of this forecast. He argued that 
it would be easier to deal with the French within the EEC first in order to tie them 
in to a common position which they then could not challenge any more60.
It is hard to tell whose argument was logically correct. Bliicher's did not 
prove wrong in any case, since the EEC member states proceeded on the basis of 
common positions and since the negotiations failed because of an intransigent 
France. Yet it is not at all clear whether an alternative proceeding of decision 
making at the international level would have been possible at all and if so, whether 
the outcome would have been different. There was hardly the possibility for the 
EEC member countries not to establish a common position first, each time before 
they entered the council meetings of the OEEC. Otherwise the danger of not even 
attaining a certain level of cohesiveness within the EEC at the very beginning was 
evident and could have rendered the previous efforts to achieve the compromise 
represented by the treaties of Rome useless.
For the Federal Government it was clear from the very beginning what the 
negotiations would look like. There would be Britain trying to achieve an FTA 
excluding agriculture, while leaving its relationship with the Commonwealth 
untouched and thus remaining in a privileged position belonging to two preferential
See, BA, B102 - 11155,1: Bonn, 14 VI 1957: Treffen von Ludwig Erhard, Alfred Muller- 
Armack und Franz Bliicher (Minister fur wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit).
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systems61. On the other side there would be France with an industry used to a high 
level of tariff and quota protection arguing that there had to be harmonisation of the 
conditions of production in a very broad sense, before there could be free trade in 
Europe and asking for all kinds of safeguards for the future operation of the 
arrangement and asking above all for accommodating her agricultural interests62. 
France and Britain being the poles of the negotiations, the other players would 
group around them depending on the particular problems in question. These 
problems would make it rather difficult for the German delegation to perform the 
role that the BMWi-leadership would have liked them to perform, i. e. that of a 
broker, slightly but consistently biased in favour of the British position. The internal 
divisions of the Federal Government and the French awareness of that made this 
task even more difficult63.
Thus the main point of conflict was going to be the general nature of the 
FTA. The French were in fact asking for not much less than a replication of the 
treaty of Rome. They aimed at a common external tariff for the FTA as a general 
rule and at the least at a substantial harmonisation of tariffs and trade policies. 
Otherwise, they feared, competitive conditions would be distorted for reasons not 
relating to the relative productivity of firms. A supporting argument was that the 
French National Assembly had indicated at the occasion of the ratification of the 
treaty of Rome that the FTA would have to include similar guarantees as the treaty 
of Rome in order to be acceptable64, the FTA would thus have had to be very close 
to a customs union, and the member states would therefore have lost their tariff 
autonomy for which the British and the low tariff countries cherished the idea of an 
FTA. This related directly to the nature of the rules of origin and the question of
61 PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 149: PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 149: Bonn, 18 I 1958, Vermerk von 
Hartlieb, betr.: FHZ/Ministerrat.
62 For the French position at the outset of the Maudling negotiations see Cam ps, Britain, pp. 
131-132. For the French position on the details of the British proposals for the FTA and the
indstructions for their delegation see MAE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 38-
39, see especially: Vol. 39, Paris, 9 V 1957, Projet de memorandum sur la zone de libre- 
echange a remettre a nos cinq partenaires du traite de Rome et sous reserve de leurs 
reactions, aux pays-membres de l’OECE. The French made it clear already in this memo that 
they would make any final agreement to the FTA dependent on a just settlement on 
agricultural products.
63 The French were well aware of the differences between BMWi and AA from the very
beginning. See MAE - AD DE - CE: A-30-7, 757: Paris 15 II 1957, MAE, Wormser.
64 Camps, Britain, pp. 136-138.
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compensatory charges that had been brought up by the French in the first session of 
the Maudling committee as well and figured prominently in the Italian Carli-Plan 
some months later. A second major problem stemming from the concerns about 
unequal competitive conditions was the Commonwealth and British imperial 
preferences. In this case not only the French had major reservations. They wanted 
either the abolition of the UK’s preferences on Commonwealth markets or their 
extension to all members of the EEC65. A third and complicated problem related to 
the second was the question of agriculture which the British wanted to have 
excluded from the FTA. This was clearly unacceptable to countries like Denmark 
and the Netherlands, but also to the Federal Republic which wanted to ensure that 
the pressure of agricultural exports from France and the Netherlands could be 
shared with the British66. The fourth point, institutional problems, was no less 
controversial, especially when it came to the question of how the decision on the 
proceeding from one to the next phase of the transitional period and on the definite 
end of the transitional period should be made. France demanded that there be 
unanimity which would give member countries veto power in this point.
All of these four issues were compounded when the necessity arose in 1958 
to come up with some sort of interim agreement in order to make the FTA 
operational at the same time when the EEC made its first tariff adjustments and thus 
to prevent discrimination between the Six and the other OEEC members. Since the 
negotiations dragged on without a quick solution being in sight, an interim 
agreement was aimed at in order to secure approval by the GATT for the FTA. 
Such an interim agreement would necessarily prejudice the form of the final 
convention on the FTA. Since the French had the strongest reservations to sign 
anything before the final arrangements were known, the negotiations came close to a 
halt. Britain and the other non-member countries of the EEC rejected any proposal
AHC, CCE, BAC 61/1982 No. 7: Brussels, 18 XII 1958: Commission, DG I, Direction B, 
Division 2, I/976/59-F: Compte-rendu, groupe du secteur des industries mecanique et 
electrique, reunion du 17 decembre 1958.
When Walter Hallstein was still secretary of state in the AA, he made this very clear to 
Maudling. See PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 149: Bonn, 4 I 1958, Leiter der Abteilung IV and 
Hallstein, betr.: Britischen Vorschlag zur Agrarregelung in der Freihandelszone; in der 
Anlage: Personliche Botschaft von Staatssekretar Hallstein an Minister Maudling; Bonn, 30 
V 1958, Emmel an Referat 200, betr.: Stand der Europaischen Integration, hier: Stand der 
FHZ Verhandlungen.
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which would lead to the slightest differences in treatment between the EEC and the 
rest of the OEEC at the beginning of 195967. On this matter Germany tried hard to 
serve as an honest broker and to bring about a solution that could be borne by both 
sides.
Germany and the British position in the Maudling negotiations
Beginning with their earliest plans for closer economic co-operation with the 
European continent in spring 1956, the British hoped that their project of a partial 
FTA would exert considerable attraction on other European countries but 
particularly on Germany68. The fact that, for economic reasons, Germany would be 
in favour of the British plans was an important factor in the way Plan G was drafted 
and presented to the Germans by the British Government in 1956. The feedback that 
the British got from Ludwig Erhard was very favourable indeed. Having this 
important figure of German politics as an ally for their initiative, the British were 
quite confident that the chances to succeed were fairly high. Macmillan's visit to 
Bonn in early May 1957 strengthened the impression that the Germans would be a 
reliable supporter of British views on the FTA, since the Federal Government had 
laid down elements of a German position around that time which came very close to 
the British concepts69.
At the outset of the Maudling negotiations the officials of the Federal BMWi 
seemed to be very confident as far as Germany’s influence with the other members
Already in March 1958, the US State Department had predicted a breakdown of the 
negotiations for the end of 1958, if the British retained their rigid position on the timing 
problem. See FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. VII, Part 1, Western European Integration and 
Security; Canada, pp. 20-23: Washington, 20 III 1958: John Foster Dulles, Circular 
instmction from the Department of State to certain diplomatic missions. The State 
Department continued to disagree with the British position on the question of the timing. See 
FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. VII, Part 1, Western European Integration and Security; Canada, pp. 
56-58: Washington, 25 VII 1958, Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs (Dillon) to the Permanent Representative at the NATO (Burgess). The 
Germans did not believe by then that an agreement on the FTA could possibly take effect at 
the same time as the first round of internal tariff reductions among the Six. See PA - AA, 
Ref. 200, vol. 149: Bonn, 3 III 1958, Vermerk von Harkort iiber Gesprach mit dem 
britischen Wirtschaftsgesandten Marjoribanks.
PRO, T234 - 195: 20 IV 1956: Report of a working group of officials on a UK initiative in 
Europe.
BA, B102 - 11155,2: Bonn, 13 V 1957: Vermerk von Herm Gocht zur Errichtung einer 
europaischen Freihandelszone und ihrer Assoziation mit der EWG; Koerfer, Kampf, p. 146.
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of the EEC was concerned. When Reginald Maudling toured the capitals of the 
OEEC member countries in September and October 1957, the assessment he 
received when he stopped in Bonn should have delighted him. The state secretary of 
the BMWi, Alfred Muller-Armack, told the chairman-to-be of the 
intergovernmental committee on the FTA that the questions of agriculture and the 
associated territories would not constitute a real problem among the member 
countries of the EEC. The real questions would be the lowering of tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions. Muller-Armack was confident though that on a number of 
important points agreement could be reached among the Six. Thus he assumed that 
the treaty on the establishment of the FTA would be reached quickly, that a definite 
end for the transitional period after 15 years could be agreed and that potential 
delays in the proceeding from phase two to phase three of the EEC should be valid 
for the FTA as well. He also thought that the lowering of quantitative restrictions 
could proceed from the very beginning of the operation of the FTA, while the 
regulations on agriculture should only be finalised once the lowering of tariffs 
began, since otherwise the countries that were agricultural exporters would be at a 
disadvantage. While the state secretary of the Federal ministry of agriculture, 
Sonnemann, asked that Britain should provide outlets for the surpluses of the other 
agricultural exporters since otherwise they would exert pressures in the German 
market, the overall message that Maudling took with him from Germany was a very 
positive one: The Germans did not see any serious problems for the FTA70.
The picture looked slightly less bright when Maudling met with Erhard at the 
end of February 1958 in Paris. By then the first rumours about the content of the 
French memorandum had been leaked to the press71. Still, Maudling hoped that the 
Germans would be able to help bring round the French to follow a more 
constructive line72, as Muller-Armack seemed to have managed a year before in 
talks with Maurice Faure. Therefore the British had high expectations concerning
BA, B102 - 11156,1: Bonn, X 1957: Protokoll des Treffens mit Reginald Maudling am 4. 
Oktober 1957.
Le  Mo n d e , 28 II 1958. See also OEEC Archives, Florence, FTA 206: Paris, 3 III 1958, 
OECE: Propositions fran?aises sur la zone de libre-echange.
BA, B102 - 11157: Bonn, 28 II 1958: Treffen Ludwig Erhards mit Reginald Maudling in 
Paris.
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Adenauer's state visit later that month73. Concerns arose when Adenauer intended to 
bring along Walter Hallstein, his former close aide and now president of the 
Commission of the EEC, whom the British regarded essentially as an agent of the 
French. Since the British Government intended to turn Adenauer round to being 
firm with the French, this seemed particularly unfortunate74. Hallstein did not come 
to London in the end, but Adenauer praised him by saying that there was no more 
convinced supporter of the idea of the FTA in order to promote closer co-operation 
with the UK than Hallstein. Statements like that should have deepened British 
awareness that Adenauer did perhaps not mean what the British wanted to 
understand when he assured them of his support for the FTA. Yet these kinds of 
doubts were quickly allayed by the typically optimist and reassuring statements 
made by Ludwig Erhard who had accompanied the Federal Chancellor to London. 
Erhard told the Prime Minister and other leading figures of the British Government 
that the negotiations had nearly reached their conclusion and that French objections 
should not be overestimated. If the Gaillard Government had not fallen, he argued, 
agreement would have been reached before the end of April. This could be 
retrieved, Erhard thought. Adenauer added that Anglo-German co-operation was of 
outstanding political importance to the Federal Republic75. Erhard’s assumption that 
the French could be turned around was completely unfounded. While Erhard's 
meeting with Gaillard had apparently gone very well, the only positive consequence 
that could have, the AA argued, was to help induce Erhard and the BMWi to 
accommodate "legitimate" protectionist concerns of the French and certainly not the 
other way round76.
Adenauer's visit had apparently been interpreted by the British Government 
as an important success. The impression seems to have been, that the Germans were 
still firmly on their side. In early May 1958 the German representative at the OEEC 
in Paris, Werkmeister, warned Erhard that Britain might have overly optimist
73 PRO, F0371 - 137386/ WG 1054-41: 14 IV 1958: Talk between Hoyer Millar and the
German ambassador in London von Herwarth.
74 PRO, F0371 - 137384/ WG 1054-13: 25 III 1958: Letter by Reginald Maudling to the
Prime minister.
75 PRO, F0371 - 137388/ WG 1054-62: Record of talks between Adenauer, Erhard and the
British Prime Minister Macmillan and others on the free trade area plans.
76 PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 149: Bonn, 13 III 1958, Hartlieb an Carstens, betr.:
FHZ/Maudling Auschuh.
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expectations concerning the German potential to bring the six member countries of 
the EEC in line with the position that had been reached between Britain and 
Germany during Adenauer's visit in London. High expectations could lead the 
British to the impression later on that the Germans had not been honest with them. 
The British would have to understand, Werkmeister argued, that the Germans first 
had to come to a compromise with the EEC partners, if the FTA was to succeed at 
all. The German Government should make it clear to the British that there was a 
certain border line that could not be transgressed. It would be necessary to let them 
know the precise nature and the limits of a possible compromise77.
While there tended to be a much closer and a bit more realistic exchange of 
information on substantive matters subsequently, Erhard did not allow his optimism 
to be damped by facts. Thus at a press conference with Maudling on 26 June 1958, 
the German Minister of Economics proclaimed that, despite some minor technical 
questions, there was not only complete agreement between the British and the 
German Governments, but also that the FTA would be certain to start operating on 
January 1, 1959. Maudling added that the proposals needed for this to be achieved 
were actually not yet on the table and that the problem concerning the 
Commonwealth had not yet been resolved78. It was only one week later that the 
British ambassador to Germany, Sir Christopher Steel, told Adenauer that the 
negotiations on the FTA had practically failed in his view because of a lack of 
French co-operation79. The British and German perceptions of the reality of the 
Maudling negotiations could not easily be reconciled at that time, even though 
Maudling recognised that the Germans had successfully pushed the French to 
abandon their demand for a 'decalage', which would have a delay of several years 
in the operation of the FTA. Hence the picture in summer 1958 was quite mixed.
While on the level of ministers the German pledges and statements tended to 
be overly optimistic and continued to be so, there was serious work being done 
between the two Governments at the level of experts. At the end of May 1958 Sir 
John Coulson had come to Bonn accompanied by Figgures, Bretherton and others to
BA, B102 - 11159,1: Bonn, 07 V 1958: Werkmeister an Erhard.
BA, B102 - 11159,1: Bonn, 26 VI 1958: Presse Konferenz im Bundeshaus in Bonn.
BA, B136 - 1597: Bonn, 07 VII 1958: Treffen Adeanauers mit dem britischen Botschafter 
Sir Christopher Steel.
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discuss the essential problems of agriculture, the role of the Commonwealth and the 
possibility of an interim agreement. On this occasion, the Germans came up with 
some precise concepts as to which solutions could realistically be obtained in the 
negotiations among the Six and among the Seventeen. Thus in the case of the 
Commonwealth the Germans suggested that there should be escape clauses similar 
to those in article 226 of the treaty of Rome, if an advantage in competition for the 
UK resulting from preferential trade with the Commonwealth could be proven. 
Coulson was extremely reluctant to make any concessions on this point. He only 
came up with the, by then already well-known, British position that imperial 
preferences had never been held incompatible with British membership in the OEEC 
and that it could not be understood why they should then be incompatible with the 
FTA. Muller-Armack insisted that some solution was needed, even if it merely had 
a psychological effect on the French. He could, for example, imagine to have the 
right of establishment in the UK for those industries that might feel damaged by the 
existence of imperial preferences. Coulson replied that it would not be possible for 
Britain to relinquish the preferences on their exports to the Commonwealth for 
which they paid in so many ways. Without mentioning France explicitly, he 
indicated that Britain would be ready to consider special arrangements for countries 
that might be too weak to fulfil all multilateral obligations, but that this would be a 
matter of special concession to one country by all the rest. A special handicap for 
Britain alone would be a very different matter and hardly acceptable. While the 
British were not ready to move in that question, they were certainly prepared to 
discuss the matter of equal access to raw materials. Coulson made it clear that 
putting pressure on Britain to make a choice between imperial preference and free 
trade in Europe would not bring about anything desirable. Coulson had similarly 
strong reservations on the question of an interim agreement, nor was there anything 
new from the British side on this occasion as far as agriculture was concerned. 
Coulson repeated the previous British position that the UK could not agree to any 
lowering of tariffs in this field80.
For this and the following paragraph see BA, B102 - 11159,1: Bonn, 23 VI 1958: Meyer- 
Cording an Muller-Armack und Erhard: Vorbereitungen fur den Besuch Reginald Maudlings 
am 25. und 26. Juni 1958. [References are made to the latest talks with the British at the end 
of May].
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One month later, toward the end of June 1958, an Anglo-German working 
group that had been formed to work out a common position between the two 
Governments studied solutions for rules of origin. The Germans presented their 
British counterparts with a paper arguing that the examinations of questions of 
origin should be undertaken sector by sector in order to determine the most useful 
procedures that should be applied. Four anti-deflections measures should be possible 
in general: a) the percentage rule, b) lists of processes, c) a certain harmonisation of 
external tariffs within a set margin and d) compensatory charges. External tariffs for 
raw materials and intermediary products should be made uniform. A systematic 
comparison of these tariffs should be undertaken for that purpose. There should be 
two principles for the sectoral examinations of the rules of origin: First, if, despite 
differences in external tariffs, deflections of trade do not occur, rules of origin 
should not be applied. Secondly, questions of origin must never be mingled with 
protective measures against goods of area origin. Finally, the German paper 
proposed to use the first four years of the transitional period to undertake the 
sectoral studies necessary. The British generally agreed to the German proposal with 
a few exceptions. They stressed that compensatory charges and a harmonisation of 
tariffs should only be applied exceptionally, while the percentage rule and lists of 
processes should be generally used. More importantly, they argued that the 
systematic comparison of tariffs should not aim at their harmonisation, but at 
keeping them low or reducing them to zero. If a country wished to have a high 
tariff, it would have to do so entirely at its own risk. No country should have a 
claim vis-a-vis the other member states as far as the consequences of having a high 
tariff are concerned. The UK would not be ready to levy any tariffs on raw 
materials imported from the Commonwealth.
When Maudling came to Bonn the next time on 25 June 1958 these issues 
were discussed again. On the Commonwealth the British position had not changed. 
Maudling offered that Britain would agree to a special protocol accommodating 
France’s special needs, if that was what was needed. Beyond that British 
concessions concerning the Commonwealth seemed to be impossible. In agriculture 
Maudling was content to acknowledge that the Ockrent paper No 461 that had been 
worked out among the six members countries of the EEC came close to the British
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position. The problems that remained were of minor importance and concerned 
British horticultural products that were protected by very high tariffs. The British 
had moved in the question of an interim agreement. Had they previously been 
intractable on this question, they were now ready to negotiate. While they still saw 
the danger that such an agreement might lead away from the FTA, they 
acknowledged its necessity in order to obtain the agreement from the GATT for the 
regional preferences that should be granted the member countries of the OEEC. The 
question of GATT compatibility would prove to be a complicated issue for the rest 
of the negotiations in the Maudling committee, leading to a heightening of tensions 
between Britain and France. Muller-Armack stressed that it would be difficult to 
come to a compromise with the French on an interim agreement, if it was to entail 
certain matters of principle with regards to the final arrangements for the FTA. If 
these matters were to be included in the interim agreement, then the discussion 
would be as difficult and as lengthy as it was predicted to be for the final 
agreement. Hence these issues should be cut out and not be addressed in the interim 
agreement81.
It seems that the little progress made between Germany and Britain by the 
late summer 1958 was all that could be achieved. It corresponded to some successes 
of Germany's mediating efforts with the French as well, as will be seen in the 
following. The crisis of the negotiations that started with the French memorandum 
of March 1958 therefore seemed to have finally been overcome. The fact that the 
French actually abandoned the memorandum in late July seemed to a succes^of 
German diplomacy. Yet it is likely that it was actually simply another stage in 
French delaying tactics. When negotiations resumed again in fall, the direct 
confrontation between the French and the British at the negotiating table proved to 
be a fatal environment for progress. Thus the French and the British representatives 
in the Steering Board of Trade of the OEEC hardened their positions. Responding to 
the French representative Clappier in a matter concerning the rules of origin that 
should apply in the chemical industry the British delegate Bretherton took a position 
that fell clearly short of concessions that had already been made by the British
BA, B102 - 11159,1: Bonn, [26] VI 1958: Vermerk Gochts zum Besuch Maudlings in Bonn 
am 25. und 26. Juni 1958.
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before. While the British had previously made some concessions concerning the 
application of compensatory charges, they now demanded that the percentage rule 
should generally be applied. Bretherton then also rejected a compromise by the 
chairman Baron Snoy82. The sessions of the Maudling committee in the last week of 
October 1958 proved to be particularly unfruitful. On 24 October 1958 the French 
representative in the Maudling committee, Olivier Wormser, replied to a speech 
made by Sir David Eccles in Geneva at the GATT conference on 16 October 1958 
where Eccles had argued in favour of global trade liberalisation. Wormser called in 
doubt that there would be mutual and binding tariff preferences among the 17 
member countries of the OEEC if, as the British apparently wished, there should be 
complete tariff autonomy.
Reginald Maudling replied to Wormser's statement a couple of days later. 
He summed up the British position on the issues that were still unresolved and tried 
to counter the French accusations that Britain would intend to undermine the mutual 
and binding tariff preferences that had been reached among the six member 
countries of the EEC. Yet despite the general agreement with the objectives and 
procedures laid down in the EEC memorandum that had been provided for this 
session, Maudling did not deny that there were still considerable differences as far 
as the operation of escape clauses was concerned. He also reaffirmed the British 
position that tariff autonomy had to be guaranteed and that tariff changes must not 
depend on the approval of other member states, since otherwise multilateral tariff 
negotiations would be impossible and hence the lowering of tariffs would become 
even more difficult than it was anyway. The abandoning of tariff autonomy might in 
the end even lead to pressures for the heightening of tariffs. The Germans were 
appalled by the seeming hardening of the positions of the French and the British at 
this stage. They were convinced that Reginald Maudling had exaggerated when 
demanding a complete tariff autonomy and they hoped that he would contribute to 
allay the unease and help prevent further conflicts that his statements could cause
BA, B102 - 11159,2: Bonn, 13 XI 1958: Bericht von Herm Axenfeld uber ein Treffen des 
“Steering Board of Trade”.
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with the French83. It is not entirely clear why Maudling put the British case so 
strongly at this particular point. It is probable that, after Wormser's visit in London 
in mid-October and the visit by Couve de Murville later, the British perceived the 
imminent failure of the negotiations more clearly than the Germans and might have 
intended to provoke the French to finally come true, thereby leaving them with the 
moral and diplomatic burden for that failure84. The British were however 
dissatisfied with the with a lack of decisiveness on German side and Adenauer was 
at pains to convince Macmillan that the Federal Republic was still committed to the 
multilateral association, as had been stated so clearly by Bundestag and the Federal 
Cabinet85.
Germany and the French position in the Maudling negotiations
The analysis of the French position in the Maudling negotiations and the general 
attitude toward the FTA is complicated by the fact that, in the middle of these 
negotiations, the French were about to abolish the political system of the Fourth 
Republic and to enter into a very different constitution that would end the powerful 
position of the National Assembly and force the country into political stability by 
the creation of a monarchy-like presidency. The fact that France faced a tense 
situation on the internal as well as on the foreign policy level should have convinced 
its negotiating partners that dealing with the French in the Maudling committee 
should not be easier than it usually tended to be. The French Government was faced 
with fierce industrial opposition against any FTA plan. Thus in the substantive 
discussions on the form of the FTA, the French mainly stressed the need to achieve 
equal conditions of competition for all partners before an FTA could actually start
BA, B102 - 11159,2: Bonn, 12-13 XI 1958: Handschriftlicher Vermerk von Hiinke zur 
Frage der Zollautonomie; 28 X 1958: Erklarung Reginald Maudlingszu Fragen der 
Handelspolitiken.
MAE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, vol. 40: Londres, 12 XI 1958, Francis Hure 
(ambassade frangais) au Directeur Olivier Wormser.
PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 150: Bonn, 12 XII 1958, Adenauer an Macmillan. Dissatisfaction 
came also from the Dutch press already before the failure, accusing the Chancellor for 
having made a deal with de Gaulle at Colombey. Den Haag, 27 X 1958, Lons an 
Diplogerma London.
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operating. This was and remained the essential French theme. Variations of it were 
displayed in all individual questions concerning the FTA.
Having started the negotiations with a very clear concept of what an FTA 
had to look like in order not to potentially harm French interests and with a very 
rigid behaviour when compromises needed to be made, the French managed to 
extract a number of important concessions, first from their partners within the EEC 
and then from all member countries of the OEEC. It would sound a little crude to 
say that the French political leadership simply did not want the FTA86. Yet it might 
altogether be not only the shortest but also the most precise and correct analysis of 
the French position in the Maudling committee. Given that there was strong 
pressure from the French industrial umbrella association, the Patronat, in general 
and also from individual industrial sectors against such an arrangement87 and given 
that an FTA did not exert any attraction to the French on the political level either, 
the political leadership would have followed France's "best interest", if they 
pursued a strategy leading to the demise of the whole project, preferably with much 
less scandal on the international level than the one that arose around the European 
Defence Community. The Maudling negotiations could thus serve as a useful 
exercise for the French in order to find out how far they would be able to go with
Vis-^-vis the Americans the French were quite franc about this. Thus Francois Val6ry told 
the Director of the Office of Economic Affairs at the American mission to the European 
regional organisations in Paris that France simply did not want the FTA at this time, while 
she could not afford to be charged for the breakdown of the negotiations. See FRUS, 1958- 
60, Vol. VII, Part 1, Western European Integration and Security; Canada, pp. 51-52: Paris, 
18 VII 1958: Telegram from the mission at the NATO and European regional organizations 
to the Department of State. That the French did not actually agree to any of the important 
principles of an FTA is already clear from their internal discussions on the preparation of 
their memorandum of March 1958. Wormser admits that "... si l ’on remet en cause une de 
ces hypotheses de base, mieux vaudrait reconnaitre que Ton ne veut ni negocier ni aboutir." 
See MAE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 39: Paris, 5 II 1958: Note par Olivier 
Wormser pour Monsieur Joxe, a. s. zone de libre-echange et rapports de la France avec le 
Royaume-Uni. At the end of October, Wormser summed up the instructions under which the 
French delegation had been conducting the negotiations as avoiding their breakdown or a 
crisis, avoiding any committments and as avoiding their quick progress: "La delegation 
franpaise avait pour instruction, dans le cadre des 17, de ne pas provoquer de rupture, de ne 
pas provoquer de crise, de ne pas prendre d'engagement et de ralentir revolution des 
negotiations." See MAE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, vol. 40: Paris 31 X 1958, 
Note par Olivier Wormser.
Cornides, W ilhelm : "Die Freihandelszone als Krisenherd der europaischen
Integrationspolitik. I. Politische Aspekte der gegenwartigen Integrationsbemuhungen." In: 
Europa-Archiv 13 (1958), pp. 10708-09.
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their new partners in the EEC and particularly with Germany, without risking major 
damage in their foreign policy.
Some assessments by German Government officials as to the influence they 
thought they commanded with the French Government have already been 
mentioned. Ludwig Erhard was generally quite optimistic that the French resistance 
against the FTA could be overcome easily. His general attitude toward France was 
one of barely disguised contempt for a, what he thought, inferior social and 
economic system and a protectionist attitude. Erhard had little problems with 
lecturing French officials about how to run an economy properly. But it is not 
evident how Erhard himself should have exerted serious pressure on the French 
during the course of the Maudling negotiations. It should generally be very difficult 
if not impossible in modem diplomacy among essentially similarly powerful states 
for a member of a Government to have any influence on the other side, if there is 
not something that he could trade off in order to obtain something in exchange. The 
probability of this is even smaller, if, as was the case with Erhard, the person in 
question did not have any popularity or personal relationship with officials in the 
other country. Erhard seems to have been underestimating the resolve of the French 
negotiators and probably expected that the political pressures building up in 
Germany in favour of the FTA would bring Adenauer to exert the influence that 
would be needed at the top political level. Whether or not Adenauer could have 
hoped to do that without running important risks for other foreign policy objectives 
is an important question, especially after de Gaulle came to power in France. At 
least some of the German officials were aware of the limitations of their capacity to 
exert influence on the French, as was shown in Werkmeister's letter to Erhard 
shortly after Adenauer's visit to London in April 195888.
The first major crisis of the Maudling negotiations arose when the French 
announced in January 1958 that they would come up with a plan of their own and 
then put forward their memorandum in March. When the French made this 
announcement in the session of the Maudling committee on 15 January 1958, 
Ludwig Erhard instantly replied that there could not be such a thing as a distinct
88 BA, B102 - 11159,1: Bonn, 07 V 1958: Werkmeister an Erhard; The AA was very sceptical
whether any pressure could be exerted on France given its very difficult internal situation.
See PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 149: Bonn, 19 IV 1958, von Rhamm an Carstens, betr. FHZ.
137
"French plan" after the treaty of Rome had been ratified. There could only be a 
common plan by the Six. Erhard was right, but his objection was easily handled by 
the French who replied that the French plan would certainly first be considered with 
the other partners within the EEC before it was to be discussed in the Maudling 
committee89. Thus the French had made it plain that all their views had to be heard 
first before any progress could be made. The French memorandum was essentially a 
compilation of all previous reservations and objections against the FTA that the 
French had mentioned. It aimed at having a number of very detailed sectoral 
agreements, a much more complete degree of economic integration, the 
establishment of a CET and a common commercial policy as well as at measures to 
counter deflections that would bring the FTA in fact very close to a customs 
union90. The memorandum demanded that the FTA should start operating only three 
years after the EEC had entered into force. According to the French plan conditions 
of production should be harmonised and economic as well as financial policies 
should be co-ordinated. The member countries should retain the right to veto the 
progress toward the last stage of the transitional period. This was clearly 
unacceptable to any of the OEEC member states that did not belong to the EEC91.
While the Chancellor’s office was already drawing up plans to deal with the 
failure of the negotiations, bilateral talks between the French and the Germans had 
begun a few weeks later and promised some hope for the negotiations92. In talks 
with the French side in St. Germain at the beginning of April, Muller-Armack put 
forward a "personal proposal" that was to replace the French memorandum and 
should have served as a basis for an agreement in the Maudling committee93. It tried
BA, B136 - 2597: Bonn, 22 1 1958: Ehm an Haenlein betr.: Maudling AusschuB am 15. und 
16. Januar 1958; PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 149: Bonn, 18 I 1958, Vermerk von Hartlieb, 
betr. FHZ/Ministerrat.
The internal discussions on the drafts for the French memorandum show how little scope the 
French actually saw for ever seriously considering an FTA. See MAE, Papiers Directeurs 
Olivier Wormser, Vol. 39: Paris, 5 II 1958: Note par Olivier Wormser pour Monsieur Joxe, 
a. s. zone de libre-echange et rapports de la France avec le Royaume-Uni.
BA, B102 - 11161,2: Bonn, 05 III 1958: Vermerk von Gocht zum franzosischen 
Memorandum; B102 - 18399: Undatierte Zusammenfassung des franzosischen
Memorandums.
BA, B136 - 2597: Bonn, 06 III 1958: Notiz von Haenlein fur Adenauer zum franzosischen 
Memorandum und die Moglichkeit des Scheitems der Maudling Verhandlungen.
BA, B102 - 11161,2: Bonn, 09 IV 1958: Bericht iiber die deutsch-franzosischen 
Besprechungen betreffend die FHZ am 2. und 3. April 1958 in St. Germain. See also MAE, 
Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, Vol. 39: Paris, 2 IV 1958, Note de la Direction des
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to come to a compromise that might still be acceptable to the British while at the 
same time aiming at allaying as many of the French fears as possible. It also 
accommodated most of the concerns of German industry and allowed Muller- 
Armack to do so, while retaining the aura of the honest broker between Britain and 
France. Thus special arrangements for the treatment of problems relating to the 
Commonwealth were suggested. While the Germans criticised the concept of 
sectoral agreements as dividing the FTA treaty into a number of individual 
agreements, they still accepted the sectoral approach as a "heuristic working 
method"94. They rejected the plan for complete harmonisation of economic and 
social policies but accepted the French demand for tariff harmonisation and 
compensatory charges in sectors like the chemical industry where the operation of 
rules of origin would be difficult. Concerning agriculture the Germans came up with 
a proposal aiming at guaranteed levels of sales in export markets that should be 
expanded in parallel with the general increase in demand. The German paper also 
made suggestions concerning arrangements to open the British market for 
continental agricultural products. This constituted one of the BMWi's but also the 
agricultural ministry's main objectives, i. e. diverting some French and Dutch 
agricultural exports to the UK.
The immediate French response was not very encouraging. While they 
signalled that they would, under certain conditions, be ready to abandon the 
'decalage' they did not see themselves in the position to sacrifice the demand for 
sectoral agreements. This was needed, the French argued, to satisfy their public 
opinion at home. They reiterated their preference for the Carli-Plan and their wish 
to apply it on the widest range of goods possible. They also remained firm in their 
demand that the markets of the Commonwealth should be opened to a certain degree 
for products from Western Europe. During Adenauer's visit to London, Ludwig
Affaires Economiques et Financieres, (Olivier Wormser) sur les conversations de Saint 
Germain le 2 avril 1958; Paris, 3 IV 1958, Note de la Direction des Affaires Economiques 
et Financieres, (Olivier Wormser) sur les conversations de Saint Germain le 3 avril 1958; 
MAE -AD, DE-CE, A-30-7, vol. 753: Paris, 11 IV 1958, Ambassade de la Republique 
Federale d'Allemagne: Aide memoire: proposition du professeur Muller-Armack (entretiens 
a St. Germain).
94 This had already been discussed at a meeting at Strasbourg on 18 and 19 March. See PA - 
AA, Ref. 200, vol. 149: Bonn, 22 III 1958, Vermerk von Carstens, betr. FHZ- 
Verhandlungen; bilaterale deutsch-franzosische Gesprache in Strafiburg am 18. und 19. 
Marz 1958.
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Erhard was apparently referring to these talks when he claimed that, if the French 
Government had not fallen, agreement would have been reached before the end of 
the month. This hypothetical reasoning was politically irrelevant. Nor was it backed 
by the records of the talks.
In May 1958 the French had asked for an interruption of the talks because of 
their internal political difficulties, while the Germans pressed for the continuation of 
the working parties of experts and of the Ockrent group95. The readiness to threaten 
the French with serious consequences, if they did not show some inclination for 
compromise, seems to have been somewhat greater on the German side during the 
summer after de Gaulle had resumed power. Yet the only evidence for that is a 
letter from a member of the European department of the Federal BMWi, 
Kiesswetter, to the head of this department Klein and the fact that, by the end of 
July, the French actually took a more positive attitude toward the FTA for the first 
time and abandoned some of the important demands they had made in the 
memorandum in March96. Kiesswetter suggested in early July to make it entirely 
clear to the French at the occasion of the EEC council meeting on 23 July 1958 that 
a failure of the FTA could lead to a failure of the EEC. While this could not be the 
case de iure, it could well be the case de facto, Kiesswetter pointed out. He 
recommended to let the French know that Germany would give equal treatment to 
the other member states of the OEEC as to the member countries of the EEC. One 
week later the commission of the EEC reported the marked change in attitude on the 
French side to which was referred already97.
The question is to what extent pressure from the German side contributed to 
that change and which concessions the Germans themselves offered to the French in
95 BA, B102 - 11158: Undatierter Vermerk [Ende Mai].
96 BA, B102 - 11159,1: Bonn, 14 VII 1958: Kiesswetter an den Leiter der Abteilung EA
betreffend die nachste Sitzung des Maudling Ausschusses am 24. und 25. Juli 1958.
97 BA, B102 - 11159,1: Bonn, 19 VII 1958: Bericht von Hiinke iiber den Besuch des
Kommissionsmitglieds der EWG Jean Rey am 18. July 1958. Similar reports were received 
at the US State Department. See FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. VII, Part 1, Western European 
Integration and Security; Canada, pp. 56-58: Washington, 25 VII 1958, Letter from the 
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon) to the Permanent 
Representative at the NATO (Burgess). For the French perception of the Council meeting on 
23 July 1958 see MAE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 40: Paris, 23 VII 1958, 
J. P. Brunet de la Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financieres, Cooperation et 
integration 6conomique aux embassades k Bonn, Vienne, Bruxelles, Copenhague [..., in all 
OEEC member states].
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July 1958 in order to obtain a more positive attitude from them. There is a 
statement by Muller-Armack from early November where he complains that the 
German delegation at the session of the Maudling committee at the end of October 
1958 was in trouble because they had made concessions to the French in July on the 
basis of very firm commitments on their part which had apparently not materialised 
later on98. There must have been some tacit agreement in July between the French 
and Germans. The attitude displayed by the French Foreign Minister Couve de 
Murville in connection with the committee meeting on 29 October 1958 must have 
greatly disappointed the German negotiators. The impression from the archival 
evidence from the BMWi is that the agreement that the Muller-Armack thought to 
have reached with the French in July and in the EEC Council meeting at Venice on 
their general acceptance of the FTA was not honoured by the French delegate 
Wormser. The Germans therefore contacted Couve de Murville in order to achieve 
a more lenient position from the French side, but without any success99. It is quite 
likely that this outcome had to do with Adenauer’s first meeting with de Gaulle in 
September 1958. Even before that Adenauer prevented Muller-Armack from putting 
forward his proposal to overcome the crisis in the negotiations100. While Adenauer 
does not seem to have conceded anything in particular on the FTA issue101, the 
French must have made it absolutely clear to Adenauer and von Brentano that the 
FTA was met with almost complete resistance in France and that, if the Federal 
Government wanted the FTA to go ahead, it would have to support the French 
conditions for it. They also left little doubt about the fact that the FTA might
BA, B136 - 2597: Bonn, 03 XI 1958: Muller-Armack an Adenauer iiber die Sitzung des 
Maudling Ausschusses in der letzten Oktoberwoche 1958.
BA, B102 - 11160,1: Paris, 29 X 1958: Muller-Armack an BMWi und Bundeskanzleramt 
iiber die Ergebnisse der Verhandlungen am 29. Oktober 1958; Muller-Armack suggests in 
his memoirs that after the Venice conference of the Six, the way was clear for the success of 
the FTA. See Muller-Armack, Alfr ed : Aufdem Wege nach Europa. Erinnerungen und 
Ausblicke. Tubingen 1971., pp. 209-215.
In a letter to Erhard Adenauer insists that no new proposals should be made by the German 
delegation in view of the wider political repercussions they might have also for the EEC. See 
ACDP, Bestand Muller-Armack, 1-236, 033/1: Bonn, 18 VII 1958, Adenauer an Erhard. 
Hans-Peter Schwarz points out that Adenauer did not give a clear answer to de Gaulle on the 
question of the free trade area. See Schw arz, Adenauer, p. 456; for the wider significance 
of the meeting see Maillard , Pierre: De Gaulle et I'Allemagne. Le reve inacheve. Paris
1990, pp. 145-168.
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compromise the success of the EEC102. The French were thus implicitly playing the 
same trump that Werkmeister had advised the German side to play, i. e. the threat 
with problems for the EEC. While Adenauer was in September personally still in 
favour of the FTA, de Gaulle's clear stance on the issue might have induced him to 
reconsider.
At the end of October, the disappointment in the Federal BMWi was 
overwhelming. It had become clear already in October that, if the French chose to 
block constructive solutions, there was no way to prevent them from doing so. Thus 
the French had obstructed the work of the Steering Board of Trade on its report by 
coming up with entirely new demands at a very late stage103. In his recommendation 
to the ministry the German delegate Horn wrote that the only choice was to follow 
France's wishes, since otherwise the negotiations would break down104. In an 
interview with the Swiss newspaper "Neue Zurcher Zeitung" on 5 November 1958, 
Muller-Armack stated that he could not imagine any fruitful development, if EEC 
and FTA would not start operating at the same time. When asked what would 
happen, if the FTA failed completely, Muller-Armack replied that the EEC was a 
firm reality that would not be questioned in any case. His statement still constituated 
a hidden threat105. After the negotiations had failed with the statements made by the 
French Minister Soustelle on 14 November 1958 and the British reaction to that, 
Adenauer and de Gaulle met in Bad Kreuznach two weeks later and published a 
communique that indicated the solution they recommended to the EEC member 
countries for keeping the differences of treatment vis-a-vis the other OEEC 
members as small as possible. They also asked the commission of the EEC to write
For this see the position paper worked out by Olivier Wormser MAE, Papiers Directeurs, 
vol. 40: Paris 12 IX 1958, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financieres, Olivier 
Wormser: Note pour le Ministre a. s. Marche commun, zone de libre-echange (entretiens 
franco-allemands).
MAE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, vol. 40: Paris, 14 X 1958, Projet d'une 
intervention frangaise au comite Maudling. Complaints on the French delaying tactics came 
from the international civil servants at the OEEC. OEEC-Archives, FTA-file 211: Paris, 2 
X 1958, G. Keiser to M. Ouin, co-operation with the European Commission on the matter 
of origin.
BA, B102 - 11160,1: Bonn, 17 X 1958: Vorschlag von Herm Horn (Europa-Abteilung des 
BMWi) fur eine deutsche Stellungnahme; by then the French had already decided to wreck 
the negotiations: MAE - AD, DECE, A-30-7, vol. 754: Paris, 6 X 1958, Wormser, Note 
a.s. zone de libre-echange.
Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 5 XI 1958; MAE - AD, DE-CE, A-30-7, vol. 757: Bonn, 5 XI 
1958, Ambassade frangais & MAE.
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a report concerning the possibility to establish an association between the EEC and 
the other member countries of the OEEC106. It is likely that, for de Gaulle, 
Khrouschtschow ’ s speech on 10 November indicated that now was a good 
opportunity to call off the negotiations, since it would allow him to offer Adenauer 
a firm stance vis-a-vis the Soviets on Berlin in return for the Federal Republic’s 
acceptance of the failure of the FTA. The seemingly shaky position of the US 
administration on this further enhanced de Gaulle’s chances to obtain agreement 
from Adenauer for whom commercial issues like the FTA negotiations were of very 
secondary importance107. It was also noted with great accuracy by the French chief 
negotiator, that there was a considerable difference between the political support for 
the FTA in Germany and the views of those representing the main economic forces. 
This was one consideration that brought Wormser to suggest that the risk of a strong 
German reaction against the French after the disruption of the negotiations was quite 
unlikely108.
Muller-Armack's interview and the communique by de Gaulle and Adenauer 
show clearly where the limits for German pressure on the French lay. The Germans 
were not ready to seriously call into question the EEC, even though some in the 
BMWi apparently harboured that hope. The problem was that, short of doing that, 
there was apparently nothing that could sufficiently impress the French to make 
them accept some sort of compromise on the FTA. At the stormy session of the 
OEEC Council on 15 December 1958, Couve de Murville declared that France 
regarded Eccles’ initial statements suggesting an FTA between Canada and the UK 
as a threat and was by no means prepared to further negotiate under such
BA, B102 - 12235b, 1: Bonn, 28 XI 1958: Deutsch-franzosische Gesprache in Bad 
Kreuznach.
The German ambassador to the USA, Wilhelm C. Grewe, expressed the concerns of the 
West German Government to the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. See FRUS, 1958- 
1960, Vol. VIII, Berlin Crisis 1958-1959, pp. 76-80: Memorandum of Conversation 
between Wilhelm C. Grewe, the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and ambassador 
David K. Bruce. The AA noted de Gaulle's firm stance on Berlin in the meeting with 
Adenauer on 26 November 1958: PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 1: Bonn, 27 XI 1958, van 
Scherpenberg and Erhard, betr.: Unterrichtung des britischen Botschafters iiber die 
Gesprache von Bad Kreuznach. See also Ga ulle , Charles d e : Memoirs d'espoir. Le 
Renouveau 1958-1962. Paris 1970., pp. 190-192
MAE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, vol. 40: Paris 20 X 1958, Direction des 
Affaires Economiques et Financieres, Olivier Wormser: Note a. s. zone de libre-echange.
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conditions109. Thus the French decision to call off the negotiations had already been 
reached in October. Part of the motivation was also the fear that within the GATT 
decisions would be taken concerning the EEC's common agricultural policy and the 
level of the CET at the request of the British and the USA that would further 
undermine French interests110. In citing all these reasons to end the Maudling 
negotiations in a letter to Adenauer and invoking their talks at Colombey, de Gaulle 
concludes:
Le moment me parait venu pour les Gouvemements frangais et 
allemand de faire front, de concert, a ces attaques de fafon a 
marquer un coup d1 arret et k decourager une fois pour toutes les 
adversaires du Traite [de Rome] qui cherchent a semer la discorde 
entre nous.111
3.4  Conclusions
The present analysis shows the extent to which the German position in the Maudling 
negotiations was shaped and constrained by German industrial interest as well as by 
the positions of the main opponents at the negotiating table, Britain and France. 
There is little doubt that the scope for success of the negotiations was very limited 
by the latter players from the very outset. The belief held by many political actors 
that France could be pressured into a solution was mistaken. The contrary was true. 
As the weakest member in the chain, France was able to take the negotiations 
hostage with the constantly lingering threat of vetoeing their progress and disrupting 
them altogether. The relative rigidity of the British negotiating position made this 
even easier for the French.
MAE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, vol. 41: Paris, 15 XII 1958, Conseil des 
Ministres, Stenogramme de la 423° stance tenue au Chateau de la Muette; MAE - AD, 
DECE, A-30-7, vol. 754: Paris, 6 X 1958, Wormser, Note a.s. zone de libre-echange; 
FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. VII, Part 1, Western European Integration and Security; Canada, pp. 
82-85: Telegram from the Mission at the NATO and European Regional Organizations to 
the Department of State.
The concerns about GATT and the CAP were reiterated in talks between Wormser and 
Hallstein in December. See PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 150: Bonn, 17 XII 1958, Carstens an 
Hallstein, Aufzeichnung iiber die Unterredung des Herm Staatssekretars mit Wormser iiber 
den Stand der FHZ-Verhandlungen vom 17. Dezember 1958.
MAE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, vol. 40: Paris, 6 XI 1958, Projet de lettre du 
General de Gaulle au Chancelier Adenauer; Aide-memoire du Gouvemement franfais sur la 
C.E.E. et la Zone de libre echange.
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At the sectoral level German industry did not receive the prospect of having 
the FTA in addition to the EEC with quite as much enthusiasm as it was greeted by 
the BDI and the ministry of economics. The reservations, wishes and conditions put 
forward by a large number of industries were all pointing to a solution that 
resembled much more a customs union with a common external tariff than a free 
trade area with member states enjoying autonomy in fixing external tariffs. Sectors 
like the metal and the chemical industry put forward very concrete conditions for 
their acceptance of the FTA and basically rejected the notion of complete tariff 
autonomy. The profound concerns of important industrial sectors had a clear impact 
on the German position in the negotiations. While starting out with a liberal 
conception of rules of origin, the German delegation abandoned its initial position 
on tariff autonomy and on the Carli-proposal, at the end rejecting the first and 
embracing the latter.
Partly as a consequence of these industrial pressures, the German delegation 
was not able to perform the function of a mediator in quite the way the BMWi 
would have liked it to do so. Constrained also by the institutional framework given 
in the EEC, the Germans had in fact not much at all to offer to the British in terms 
of influencing the French position. Erhard’s view on this was a complete 
misconception of Germany’s influence which contributed very much to the fact that 
the British remained rather inflexible at decisive moments during the negotiations. 
The situation was complicated by the continuing rivalry and ideological differences 
between the BMWi and the A A on European policy. While the BMWi was aware of 
the industrial problems in Germany and the fact that there was little scope for 
compromise for the French, its leadership displayed an unrealistic and counter­
productive optimism which deceived the German public and misinformed the British 
on the prospects of success.
4 The fta concept abandoned
The failure of the Maudling negotiations, the 
formation of efta and the Hallstein Plan for the 
acceleration of the EEC
The German position on the FTA issue and on the question of what should be done 
next after the failure of the Maudling negotiations remained quite ambiguous for 
some time. Understandably, Kroushchev's Berlin ultimatum of November 27, 1958 
had received all the attention of the Chancellor, the AA as well as the media and the 
general public. That Adenauer did not try to press de Gaulle on the FTA issue in the 
circumstances of increasing East-West tensions and his perceived unreliability of the 
British and the USA in these matters was probably to be expected. De Gaulle 
records in his memoirs that agreement was reached between him and the Federal 
Chancellor at their meeting in Bad Kreuznach that the plan for an FTA should not 
be pursued any further1. While in the midst of the political turmoil over the Berlin 
crisis the FTA seemed to die a silent death, Ludwig Erhard tried what he could to 
keep the patient alive or to prepare at least for prolonged mourning. At the French- 
German talks on 26 November, the Minister of Economics had however spoken, as 
if nothing major had happened. At that occasion he showed himself convinced that 
the other 11 would not make too much fuss about the magic date of 1st January 
1959. He also seemed entirely satisfied that serious work toward a "multilateral 
association" would continue2. What he had to say to the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer during his visit to London in early December sounded 
slightly differently, but still rather optimistic3. This optimist view was somewhat 
supported by the political resolve of the Bundestag. A few days later, on December 
9, it unanimously passed a resolution put forward by the Social Democrats binding 
the Federal Government to further pursue the creation of an FTA. German industry 
had been the first after the interruption of the negotiations on 14 November to urge
1 G a u l le ,  C h a r le s  de: Memoirs d'espoir. Le Renouveau 1958-1962. Paris 1970, pp. 190- 
192.
2 MAE,Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, vol. 41: Paris, 27 XI 1958, Note a. s. Entrevue 
franco-allemande du 26 novembre; PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 1: Bonn, 27 XI 1958, Carstens 
an Diplogerma Brussel, Den Haag, Luxemburg, Rom.
3 M u lle r -A rm a c k , A lf r e d :  Auf dem Wege nach Europa. Erinnerungen und Ausblicke. 
Tubingen 1971, pp. 221-222.
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the Chancellor to put pressure on France. In a letter to Adenauer the BDI's 
president also put forward a number of proposals that might be acceptable to all 
sides and help resume the talks. Despite Adenauer's obvious unwillingness to put 
pressures on de Gaulle, the BDI board kept its resolve to pursue its objectives in 
talks with the Chancellor and the president of the European commission4.
With the move toward convertibility, the devaluation of the French Franc 
and the resumption of the trade liberalisation by the end of December 1958 France 
had performed a masterpiece to restore its position in economic diplomacy as well 
as to initiate sound restructuring of the economy5. Without measures of this kind, 
the French situation would have become untenable within the OEEC, where France 
was in breach of its commitments under the liberalisation program. Without this 
important move France would not have been in the position to fulfil its obligations 
under the treaty of Rome either. But despite these obligations, it remains that the 
timing of the move was superb and its effects important, as it had not been expected 
by Britain or Germany. It eased international pressure on France and deprived 
people like Erhard of their most beloved enemy and target of their rhetorical raids: 
blatant French protectionism. In conjunction with Kroushchev's Berlin ultimatum it 
created a situation where de Gaulle did not have to fear difficulties from the German 
side over the French refusal to continue the Maudling negotiations. With the EEC 
coming into operation at the beginning of 1959 the chances for the resumption of 
any serious multilateral talks on any solutions to the commercial divisions within 
Europe were gone for the immediate future. The anger and frustration over the 
failure of the Maudling negotiations would have to cool off before new steps could 
be taken. Apart from that new talks would have to be based on concepts different 
from those which had failed before in the French view.
RWW, HAGHH - Nachlafl Reusch, 40010146/680: Koln, 9 XII 1958, BDI 
Hauptgeschaftsfuhrung an die Mitglieder des Presidiums, betr.: Prasidialsitzung vom 3. 
Dezember 1958 in Koln.
PA - AA, Ref. 200, vol. 150: Bonn, 22 XII 1958, Carstens an Brentano und Hallstein, 
betr.: Gipfelkonferenz iiber die FHZ. For the French financial measures at the end of 1958 
see [Rueff, Jacques:] "Zur Wirtschaftsreform in Frankreich: Bericht zur Finanzlage (Rapport 
sur la situation financiere) erstattet von einer Kommission unter dem Vorsitz von Jacques 
Rueff." In: Ordo 11(1959), pp. 3-68, or R u e f f ,  J A C Q U E S :  "Rapport sur la situation 
financiere." In: Statistiques et Etudes Financieres 11(1959), pp. 5-55.
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The fact that the EEC council of ministers had agreed on some measures to 
reduce the discriminatory effect of the EEC's coming into operation did not calm 
the BDI over the the potential damage to Germany's foreign trade interests from a 
split between the Six and the other members of the OEEC. The BDI warned even 
before the failure of the Maudling negotiations that the OEEC and the EPU and 
therefore the framework of Western European trade were in danger, should the FTA 
not come about6. The preparations for the formation of EFTA also led to increased 
activity of other German industrial associations with the intention to prevent any 
irreversible move that would effectively widen the gap between the Six and the 
Seven. For the same reasons German industry greeted the Hallstein-Plan for the 
acceleration of the transitional period of the EEC-treaty with anger and resistance. 
At the same time plans began to be put forward for pragmatic and long-term 
solutions to the intra-European trade problems. Throughout 1960 a plethora of 
schemes was produced by academics, industrial associations and politicians. On the 
international level attempts were made to resume the dialogue in the framework of 
the trade committee of 21 within the OEEC/OECD7. The German Government 
again took on its mediating function between the British and the French in late 1960 
when the first serious attempts were made to use the theoretical concepts for 
solutions which had been contemplated for more than a year as the basis for bilateral 
talks between the Germans and the British, the Germans and the French, and later 
on for direct talks between the British and the French Governments.
This chapter will address the role of West German industry in the policy 
formulation of the Federal Government after the failure of the Maudling 
negotiations and before the beginning of formal talks on British accession to the 
EEC in 1961. It will on the one hand focus on the question of who was acting on 
behalf of German industry when government agencies were contacted, informed and 
faced with demands of industrial interest. On the other hand the chapter deals with 
questions relating to the perception and formulation of industrial interest itself. 
There will have to be some consideration as to what extent the situation prevailing 
after the failure of the negotiations on the FTA would induce businesses and
6 BDI Jahresbericht 1957/58, pp. 33-36.
7 For the transition from OEEC to OECD see Robertson , Arthur  Henry : European
Institutions. Cooperation. Integration. Unification. London 1959, pp. 82-84.
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industrial associations to formulate specific demands. It is therefore important to 
observe which particular interests were formulated and expressed at which level of 
industrial associations, where these interests were aggregated and by whom they 
were transmitted to the Government. The chapter will go on to ask to what extent 
German industrial interest shaped the position of the Federal Government in the 
talks on the international level, in particular in the bilateral talks with Britain and 
France in late 1960 and early 1961.
For German industry the failure of the Maudling negotiations meant that the 
effects of the formation of the EEC on trade with the other OEEC member countries 
would for the time being not be eliminated by an FTA and that there would be 
possible retaliation against the EEC's trade discrimination8. Under the original 
provisions of the treaty establishing the EEC the internal tariff changes were to 
begin only rather slowly in 1959 and the setting up of a common external tariff 
should only begin in 19629. The move by Britain, three of the Scandinavian 
countries, Austria Switzerland and Portugal to form EFTA threatened to widen the 
discriminatory gap. In addition to that the Commission of the EEC proposed in 
February 1960 a more rapid reduction of internal tariffs and the establishment of the 
CET at an earlier point than stipulated in the treaty. Thus rather than seeing the 
preservation of these very important markets being ensured by the establishment of 
an FTA, German industry was faced with tariff discrimination in the EFTA markets 
and with higher tariffs on imports from the Seven through the CET. The foundation 
of EFTA posed yet another problem. Given that the US administration saw the 
EFTA as commercially discriminatory without the benefit of adding to European 
cohesion and security, its creation might have caused delays in the new American 
trade policy which was geared toward major tariff reductions within the GATT.
In its 1958 annual report, the BDI warned that the failure of the FTA negotiations would 
most likely lead to die collaps of the OEEC and the EPU and would also bring about 
retaliatory measures from the other OEEC member states against the EEC’s discrimination 
coming about by January 1959. BDI Jahresbericht 1957/58, pp. 33-36.
BA, B102 - 18555: 10 II 1960: Letter by Pfeiffer (department IV/2) to a number of sub­
sections of departments III and IV concerning the tariff burden of German business within 
the common market, also BA, B136 - 2557, pp. 52-55 in the files of the Federal 
Chancellor's Office. For the treaty provisions on the tariff schedule (articles 14 and 23) see 
Cam pbell , Ala n : Common Market Law. Volume 2. London 1969, pp. 13-15, 18-19.
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Those in Germany who, like Erhard and the BDI, hoped for the development of an 
Atlantic community of free trade would then have to wait longer10.
Apart from Berg’s letter to Adenauer and some statements of regret and 
general concern displayed by BDI and DIHT there was little response by German 
industry to the failure of the Maudling negotiations as such. The reason for this was 
perhaps that their interruption in November 1958 was not quite so visibly the failure 
of the whole concept of a multilateral economic association in the OEEC. It seems 
that at least the Bundestag as well as the Federal Government did not acknowledge 
that the end of the Maudling committee was effectively also the end of the FTA 
concept for Europe as a whole. The BDI looked at it in quite the same way and was 
not discouraged in the pursuit of its objective to seek an early resumption of the 
talks by Adenauer's fairly blatant refusal to facilitate this through clear words vis-a- 
vis de Gaulle.
4.1 The aftermath of the failure: can the FTA concept be saved?
Trade Discrimination on 1 January 1959
The changes in the German tariff schedule that would be required as a result of the 
operation of the EEC were tariff reductions vis-a-vis the other member states and a 
heightening of tariffs vis-a-vis third countries in the establishment of a common 
external tariff11. According to the treaty the internal tariff reductions would start
In talks with the Acting Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon in June 1959, Ludwig 
Erhard developed his views on European economic integration. While Dillon agreed to 
Erhard’s approach, he stressed that the USA would not accept any special arrangements 
between the Six and the UK which could damage American trade interests. Erhard then 
clarified that he intended to build a bridge between the Six and the Seven, while keeping the 
common market as it was. See FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. VII, Part 1, Western European 
Integration and Security; Canada, pp. 120-125: Washington, 4 VI 1959: Memorandum of 
Conversation. The French were also very aware of this potentially very important influence 
working in their favour. See MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 43: 
Paris, 17 IV 1959: Wormser k l’ambassade a Washington.
Elisabeth Muller provided a quantitative assessment of the rate of tariff discrimination 
prevailing between the member countries of the EEC and third countries for product groups 
of the SITC and individual products. See Mu ller , Elisabeth: "Atlantische oder 
Europaische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Eine Untersuchung fiber die Bedeutung der 
Zollpolitik der Europaischen Wirtschaftgemeinschaft fur die Lander der Freihandelszone, 
die USA und Canada." In: Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 117(1961), pp.
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with a reduction of 10% on 1 January 1959 thus inflicting some degree of 
discrimination on third countries. The process of the establishment of a CET would 
not start earlier than 1 January 196212. The decision of 3 December 1958 by the 
EEC Council on the measures to be taken on 1 January 1959 introduced some 
changes to the stipulations of the treaty in order to prevent some of the initial 
discriminatory measures from coming into effect by that date13. The proposal for 
this decision had been one outcome of Adenauer's and de Gaulle's meeting at Bad 
Kreuznach a few days earlier14. Since these proposals only related to the initial 
measures at the beginning of 1959 and given that all further steps would be 
automatic, the threat of discrimination was not reduced a great deal. It was in any 
case the main concern to allay the psychological effects and the anger among the 
other OEEC members about the failure of the FTA negotiations and the beginning 
of trade discrimination at the same time.
The decision did not only concern tariff reductions which were to be 
extended to all GATT member states but also import quotas whose first expansion 
by 20% was extended to OEEC member countries on the basis of reciprocity. An 
expansion of 10% was to be extended automatically for each quota, while a further 
10% could be negotiated by the member states with third countries in relation to 
their particular interests. For non-liberalised agricultural products a 10% tariff 
reduction was envisaged. The measures adopted by the EEC Council of Ministers 
came close to what had been proposed by the Commission and the German 
delegation in the Maudling negotiations for an interim agreement that should have 
preceded the operation of the FTA as such15. The one difference was that it had to 
be extended to all GATT member states as far as tariffs were concerned and could 
not be restricted to the OEEC member countries. These measures however fell well
494-520. On the EEC’s commercial policy see Frank , Isaiah : The European Common 
Market. An Analysis of Commerical Policy. London 1961.
See articles 14 and 23 of the treaty establishing the EEC.
BA, B102 - 11159,2: 4 XII 1958: Decision by the Council of Ministers of the EEC on 
measures to be taken on 1 January 1959.
BA, B102 - 12235a, 1: 28 XI 1958: Letter to the BMWi concerning Franco German talks in 
Bad Kreuznach on 26 November 1958. Annex: Summary of the results of the meeting in 
French.
BA, B102 - 11159,1: 18 VII 1958: Meyer-Cording to Erhard: note in preparation for the 
negotiations in the EEC Council of Ministers on 23 July 1958 and the Maudling Committee 
in Paris on 25/26 July 1958.
151
short of what the British expected by the end of 1958, particularly concerning small 
quotas. While the globalisation of the so-called 3% quotas and their extension to 
non-EEC member countries did not constitute a problem for Germany, the French 
were not ready to yield on this point. The British demands therefore stood no 
chance of being accepted by the EEC Council of ministers16.
By charging the Commission of the EEC with the task of preparing a report 
on the possibilities of creating a European economic association by March 1959, the 
Council of Ministers provided for a break in multilateral talks on the issue. Before 
the Commission would deliver its report, nothing further was going to happen 
within the OEEC. Bilateral talks between France and Britain however began on
their bilateral quotas17. The details of the proceedings at the international level need
18not be recounted here. They are set out in great detail in Miriam Camps’ report .
Conflict with the Commission: West Germany retains the FTA concept
On the international level the Federal Government kept its pledge for a European
economic association vis-a-vis the French and the Commission, both of which
wanted the FTA theme cancelled from the European agenda. Muller-Armack and
van Scherpenberg (AA) made it clear to the commissioners Jean Rey, Hans von der
Groeben and Robert Marjolin on their visit to Bonn at the end of January 1959 that
the German Government was bound by the decisions of the Bundestag. When the
commissioners confronted them with the option of an arrangement of a global
nature, the two German ministers replied that it was for political and objective
reasons that Bonn remained committed to the position stated at Bad Kreuznach and
to the decision of the Council of ministers and that a global solution was no solution
to this matter. The European aspect was the core of the issue in the German view.
The solution had to be a multilateral association within the OEEC. The second
BA, B102 - 12235a, 1: Bonn, 9 I 1959, EA3, Hiinke: Bericht iiber die Sitzung der 
Standigen Vertreter in Brussel am 8. Januar 1959; Bonn, 14 I 1959, EA3, Leyser: Bericht 
iiber die Ressortbesprechung am 13. Januar 1959 zur Vorbereitung der 18. Tagung des Rates 
der EWG am 14. Januar 1959; Bonn, 12 I 1959: EA3, Hiinke: Synopse der Vorschlage zur 
Kontingentsaufstockung im Rahmen einer Ubergangslosung (Stand vom 10. Januar 1959). 
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 43: Paris, 19 I 1959: Wormser a 
l'ambassade k Londres, a. s. conversations franco-britanniques; Paris, 7 IV 1959: Note a. s. 
negotiations commerciales franco-britanniques.
Camps, Britain, pp. 173-209.
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option presented by the three Commissioners contained further sectoral studies 
which should form the basis of any agreement. Muller-Armack and van 
Scherpenberg had some minor suggestions for the improvement of this option. At 
the end they reaffirmed once more that the Federal Republic regarded an FTA as a 
binding link between the customs union and liberal world trade the establishment of 
which, they claimed, was both necessary and possible19.
As the first and second memoranda of the Commission were to prove, the 
Germans cut no ice with the Commissioners. The Commission remained committed 
to an agenda that had repeatedly been rejected by the Federal Government. Muller- 
Armack and van Scherpenberg had told the Commissioners in January what they 
thought of their plans. They in turn had chosen to ignore the German view on that
occasion. The same was true for the German comments on the two Commission
20memoranda of 26 February and 17 September 1959 .
While the German position on the principle of having an FTA did not change 
at all before the late summer of 1959 and was aimed strongly at an overall 
solution21, it changed greatly in terms of the demands with which they would now 
be content, if the French agreed to have the FTA at all. In talks with Wormser in 
March, Muller-Armack presented very detailed proposals for an FTA solution 
generously accommodating all previous French reservations. His proposal sought to 
achieve a common French-German position among the Six and foresaw a 
“decalage” (a delay in the start of operation of the association) of four years, a 
percentage rule requiring 90% value added within the area, harmonised tariffs, the
BA, B102 - 11165: Bonn, 29 I 1959: Vermerk iiber den Besuch der Herren Rey, von der 
Groeben und Marjolin von der Kommission am 28. Januar 1959 im BMWi.
BA, B102 - 11165: Bonn, 14 IV 1959: Der Bundesminister fur Wirtschaft an den Herm 
Staatssekretar des Bundeskanzleramtes. Betrifft: Verhandlungen iiber die Freihandelszone. 
Hier Arbeiten im Sonderausschufl der EWG. Bonn, 7 X 1959: Deutsche Stellungnahme zur 
2. Denkschrift der Kommission.
Miiller-Armack argued for a “solution d’ensemble” in talks with the French in September 
1959, while the French firmly insisted that there could only be ad hoc measures for the 
moment until France was ready to adopt a “global” or a “European” approach. See MAE, 
DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 44: Bonn, 17 IX 1959: Compte-rendu de 
la reunion franco-allemande tenue le 16 septembre 1959 h Bonn. See also PA - AA, Ref. 
200, Bd. 459: Bonn, 17 IX 1959: Abteilung Dg 40, Aufzeichnung, Deutsch-franzosischer 
Meinungsaustausch iiber die multilaterale Assoziation.
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Carli-tax and social harmonisation22. There was nothing to indicate that the British 
or indeed any other OEEC member outside the EEC would have agreed to that set 
of arrangements. Hence Wormser did not even comment on the proposal and 
pointed to his scepticism concerning their attitude. Muller-Armack made a futile 
attempt to argue that the British position had evolved in the meantime, but thereby 
only revealed to what extent he and the BMWi was out of touch with reality. This 
was highlighted by the fact that Carstens felt the need to tell Wormser privately that 
what Muller-Armack had said reflected only his personal position and, while it was 
shared by van Scherpenberg, it did not reflect the opinion of the Federal 
Government. In a conversation with van Scherpenberg, Wormser later insisted that 
the Federal Government should handle these problems at least until October in a 
purely academic way. The impression the French must have got from van 
Scherpenberg’s approval to that and indeed from all the talks at Aachen and Bonn 
was one of a complete mess in the Federal Government and a complete victory for 
France’s strategic position for the rest of that year. Even the economic committee of 
the Bundestag seems to have had better information than Muller-Armack. His view 
that with the restoration of convertibility the EEC had lost its essential functions, 
and his optimism that the French could soon be persuaded to endorse the FTA 
approach was regarded as completely unrealistic at a committee meeting in June23.
Until July the Federal Government treated the whole question on the basis of 
the analyses which it had done during the course of the Maudling negotiations and 
in preparation for them. In its reaction to the first Commission memorandum24 the 
Federal Government made concrete proposals for a final arrangement of a 
multilateral association. The ultimate concept was still that of an FTA. In the
For this and the following see MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 43: 
Paris, 25 III 1959: Note par Olivier Wormser, a. s. conversations franco-allemandes d’Aix- 
la-Chapelle et de Bonn (24 mars 1959).
Bundestagsarchiv, 3. Bundestag, 16. Wirtschaftsausschufl, Protokolle 46. bis 80. Sitzung: 
Kurzprotokoll der 50. Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses am Mittwoch, den 24. Juni 1959 
in Bonn.
PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 289: Bonn, 3 III 1959: Aufzeichung: Erstes Memorandum der 
Kommission der EWG zur Frage der Europaischen Wirtschaftsassoziation vom 26. 2. 1959; 
see also BA, B102 - 122301: Bonn, 5 III 1959, EA3, Hiinke an Muller-Armack, Meyer- 
Cording, betr.: Stellungnahme zum Memorandum der Kommission der EWG iiber eine 
Europaische Wirtschaftsassoziation vom 26. Februar 1959; Bonn, 17 III 1959, EA3, Hiinke 
an Muller-Armack, Meyer-Cording, betr.: Skizze der Bemerkungen der Bundesregierung zur 
Denkschrift der Kommission.
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German view a long term solution of this kind could be best achieved, if tariff 
reductions were first implemented for goods that were mostly produced in the area, 
for other goods the tariffs of which were equal or close to equal in the EEC and the 
member countries of the association which were not members of the EEC, and 
finally for goods for which sectoral agreements had been reached regardless of 
whether they also qualified for the two other product groups. The proposal went on 
to suggest that, for these goods, tariff reductions could start practically immediately, 
while for all other goods a study group should be formed. The solution for goods 
not qualifying for immediate tariff reductions was seen in the application of 
compensatory charges as proposed by Carli or, alternatively, in a harmonisation of 
tariffs. Other elements of the German proposal were GATT conformity, the co­
ordination of commercial policies and a "decalage" in order to allay fears in France 
and the Commission that the EEC might be damaged by the project25.
The objective of forming an association was also still the core of the German 
response to the second memorandum. Yet the concept of an FTA was not mentioned 
explicitly any more, as had been the case in the response to the first memorandum. 
In essence the BMWi regarded the second memorandum as completely pointless, 
since, in the view of their European department, it did not contain any new idea. 
Hiinke criticised the fact that the European aspect was not given enough weight and 
that the Commission was only aiming to strengthen its own position rather than 
following its mandate to promote a European economic association . Yet inspite of 
this negative assessment by the BMWi, the Federal Cabinet welcomed the 
memorandum at least in principle, while the BMWi as well as the Bundesbank 
wanted to have the memorandum amended by a clear statement in favour of a 
European rather than a global solution27.
BA, B102 - 11165: Bonn, 14 IV 1959: Der Bundesminister fur Wirtschaft an den 
Staatssekretar des Bundeskanzleramtes [Globke]: Kabinettsvorlage. Betr.: Verhandlungen 
iiber die Freihandelszone; hier: Arbeiten im Sonderausschufl der EWG. Annex: 
Bemerkungen der Bundesregierung zu der Denkschrift der Kommission vom 26. Februar 
1959 und weitere Anregungen.
BA, B102 - 11165: Bonn, 19 IX 1959: EA3, Hiinke an Miiller-Armack: Erste 
Stellungnahme zur Denkschrift der Kommission vom 17. September 1959.
BA, B102 - 11165: Bonn, 22 XI 1959: EA3 Leyser: Ergebnisprotokoll der 
Ressortbesprechung am 16 Oktober 1959 iiber die Denkrschrift der Kommission der EWG 
vom 17. September 1959.
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The first slight change in the German position and the reluctant abandonment 
of the FTA concept had come about as a reaction to the talks between the Seven on 
forming an FTA among themselves. In the fourth meeting of the EEC's Special 
Committee on the FTA (Rey Committee) Muller-Armack made it clear that the 
Federal Republic continued to pursue a European economic association, but that the 
likely establishment of the small FTA would make the immediate creation of such
an association impossible. The building of a bridge between the two groups would
28instead be needed . Muller-Armack’s reasoning implied that the Seven, by forming 
EFTA, actually helped Adenauer, the AA and the Commission to get it their way, 
as far as the German position was concerned. The formation of EFTA, far from 
being a leverage for the Seven for pressure in favour of the association, thus 
actually precluded any immediate resumption of negotiations to that end29.
4.2 The formation of EFTA and Us expected impact on German trade 
The fear of the small free trade area
It has already been mentioned that German industry was slow to respond to the 
failure of the Maudling negotiations and that its associations did not contact the 
Government on developments at the European level before the EFTA project first
30took shape in the negotiations between the Seven which started in June 1959 . One 
might assume that individual businesses would not tend to alert their respective 
associations, unless they faced direct problems for their foreign trade. As concrete 
negotiations on important changes of international trade in Europe had ceased and 
the impact of the initial measures of the EEC had been lessened, it is unlikely that
BA, B102 - 11165: Bonn, 13 VII 1959: Kurzbericht iiber die 4. Sitzung des EWG 
Sonderausschusses "Freihandelszone" am 9. Juli 1959 in Brussel.
According to American reports, it seems that even in Whitehall it was eventually recognised 
that the formation of EFTA had had a solidifying effect on the Six and had enhanced the 
likelihood of acceptance of acceleration among them. FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. VII, Part 1, 
Western European Integration and Security; Canada, pp. 279-281: London, 8 IV 1960: 
Telegram from Embassy in the UK to the Department of State. The AA pursued a conscious 
policy of strengthening the position of the Commission. See PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 354: 
Bonn, 24 XI 1959: Obermann an Abteilung D2, betr.: Stellungnahme des Herm 
Bundeskanzlers gegeniiber General de Gaulle zur Frage der Beziehungen zwischen EWG und 
EFTA.
On the history of EFTA see most recently L ie , Biarne : A Gulliver among Lilliputians. A 
History of the European Free Trade Association 1960-1972. Oslo 1995. [Unpublished MA 
thesis].
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German enterprises should have expected a significant change in their foreign trade 
situation31. The fact that the formation of the CET was only to start in 1962 made 
the odds of this undertaking for the German economy more bearable. Some of the 
measures involved, like the reversal of the substantial unilateral German tariff 
reductions of 1957, might actually have been welcome by a good number of 
industrial sectors. For the economy as a whole the effects of this particular measure 
was seen as unwelcome by the ministry of economics because of potential 
inflationary effects32. In addition to that it seems highly unlikely that a major part of 
German industry was aware of what these things would mean to them in a few years 
time and whether they would have to be judged as beneficial or detrimental. Since 
1959 also saw a remarkable production growth and trade expansion, fears and 
complaints were even less likely to arise33.
Table 4,2,1: Output of w est German
manufacturing industries bv sectors 




semi products 4.62 11.24
mechanical engineering 0.84 3.35
vehicles 19.24 16.67
electrical engineering 14.78 10.18
iron-, sheets-, metal products 0.00 11.56
chemicals 7.27 13.98
glass 3.14 9.14
asbestos, kautschuk 3.47 15.79
timber processing -4.39 3.67
paper production 0.58 6.32
paper processing 0.53 9.04
textiles -5.99 3.82
finished textiles only -4.78 5.53
clothing -4.98 5.68
Source: W irtschaftskonjunktur. Berichte des ifo Instituts fur W irtschaftsforschung, 
4/1964, 2. Beilage: zahlen zur Branchenkonjunktur.
For the quantitative analysis of the impact of EEC and EFTA on German foreign trade see 
chapter 6.
Cam ps, Britain, p. 256.
After exports in manufactured goods had grown at 4% in 1957-8 they grew at 11 % in 1958- 
9. To the EEC exports grew at almost 17% and to the EFTA at 13.5% in 1959. Source: 
S ta t i s t i s c h e s  B u n d esam t (ed.): Der Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
Berlins (West). Teil 3. Der Spezialhandel nach Bezugs- und Absatzgebieten und nach 
Warengruppen und -untergruppen. 1957-1959. Stuttgart 1958-1960.
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That changed when the Seven convened their first negotiations on the formation of a 
"small FTA" at the beginning of June 1959. In a speech to the annual general 
meeting of the BDI, its managing director Wilhelm Beutler stated that the EEC 
could not be regarded as an end in itself and that solutions had to be found 
immediately to overcome the trade divisions in Europe34. Later that summer the 
BDI and the DIHT asked the European department of the BMWi for analyses of the 
importance of the EFTA for German foreign trade. A bit later the first letters from 
individual enterprises arrived at the BMWi to express their concerns and to report 
initial difficulties they had in trading with some of the prospective EFTA 
countries35. Throughout the fall of 1959 the German press echoed these concerns in 
frequent analyses of the consequences that the formation of EFTA was going to 
have particularly for the Federal Republic as the single largest trader with the Seven 
in the EEC. The Handelsblatt, a daily business-newspaper, published a series of 
articles featuring the impact of the small FTA on German exports as a whole and 
the exports of individual sectors like mechanical engineering, textiles, cars and the 
metal processing industry. The essence was that the Federal Republic had a greater 
commercial interest in doing trade with the Seven than it had in doing trade within 
the EEC36.
RWW, HAGHH - NachlaB Reusch, 40010146-680: Niederschrift iiber die 10. Ordentliche 
Mitgliederversammlung des BDI vom 23. Juni 1959 in Berlin.
BA, B102 - 12146,2: Bonn, 24 VIII 1959: EA3, Hiinke an Miiller-Armack. Betr.: Erste 
Auswirkungen der kleinen FHZ. In this letter Hiinke reports that the VDMA, the head 
organisation of the mechanical engineering industry, described a case of a German exporter 
of heavy machinery who was asked by his Swedish client to guarantee for any tariff changes 
that might occur between the signature of the contract and delivery and that would render 
British machinery possibly cheaper. The Swedish client made the order conditional on this 
guarantee. The Germans brought this case up even in talks with the French in order to stress 
the urgency of action avoiding further divisions. Muller-Armack also put it to the French 
that BDI, DIHT and BDA were all rather concerned about the plans for the little FTA. See 
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 44: Bonn, 17 IX 1959: Compte- 
rendu de la reunion franco-allemande tenue le 16 septembre 1959 & Bonn. For a similar 
complaint by a German exporter see BA, B102 - 12146,3: Miinchen, 12 XI 1959: Ziindapp- 
Werke an BMWi. In this letter the manufacturer of motorcycles asks about the necessity to 
establish branches in the EFTA countries in order to head off any potential trouble in the 
future.
HANDELSBLATT, 3 XI 1959: "Gefahren der kleinen Freihandelszone. Eine Untersuchung 
des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums - Bundesrepublik Deutschland am starksten betroffen." 
KOLNER STADTANZEIGER, 3 IX 1959: "Andere Sieben zerren am deutschen Export". 
HANDELSBLATT, 24 IX 1959: "Skandinavien darf nicht verlorengehen. Verlust dieses 
Marktes ware schwerer Schlag fur die Textilindustrie"; 2 X 1959: "Der Siebenerblock
158
In the ministry of economics in Bonn the results of some initial studies on 
the formation of a small FTA were available within days after news about the talks 
of the Seven had broken. The first draft study was presented by the head of the 
European department within the BMWi, Meyer-Cording, to the state secretary 
Muller-Armack and transmitted to the leading officials of the AA, Carstens and 
Harkort, to the BDI, the DIHT and the chairman of the economic committee of the 
German Bundestag, Fritz Hellwig and others37. Thus the BMWi provided all 
relevant groups and Government departments with initial information about the 
potential impact of the EFTA. The main concern was naturally the preservation of 
German export markets. The essential conclusion of the studies that had been done 
during the first half of June 1959 was that German exports of finished manufactured 
products might be severely hit once tariff reductions between the Seven would come
38into effect . As far as imports from the Seven were concerned, the only serious 
impact expected was an indirect one in the field of agriculture. In an undated draft 
of the study on the impact of EFTA the European department of the BMWi stated 
the expectation that if Denmark was granted special concessions on agricultural 
imports among the Seven at the expense of the Netherlands (as it was in the end), 
this would entail a higher import pressure by Dutch agriculture on the German 
market39.
Apart from these general statements on the impact of EFTA on German 
foreign trade, a more detailed assessment was provided by the BMWi of the trade 
relations with the EFTA as a whole and of particular areas of concern in trade with 
the individual member countries of the Seven. The importance of German trade with 
the Seven matched that of trade with the rest of the Six in 1957. The Seven then 
accounted for 27% of German total exports, the Six for 29%. In 1957 the trade
gefahrdet die EBM [Eisen, Blech, Metall] - Ausfuhr. Die EWG AuBenseiter sind wichtige 
Abnehmer der EBM - Industrie"; 14 X 1959: "Autoindustrie braucht GroBe 
Freihandelszone. Kleine FHZ wiirde der englischen Konkurrenz Vorteile bringen".
BA, B102 - 12146,1: Bonn, 8 VII 1959: Meyer-Cording an Muller-Armack: Entwurf einer 
Studie iiber die Bedeutung des Projekts einer kleinen Freihandelszone.
BA, B102 - 12146,1: Bonn, 9 VI 1959: EA3, Hiinke an Abteilungen EA5, IV/2, VA1, 
VC1,VC4,5 u. 7: Entwurf einer Aufzeichnung fur Bundeskanzleramt, Bundestagsausschiisse 
fur Wirtschaftspolitik und AuBenhandelsfragen, SonderausschuB des Bundesrates fur den 
Gemeinsamen Markt und die Freihandelszone, BDI usw.
BA, B102 - 64813: Bonn, [undated]: EA3: Betr.: Bedeutung des Projekts der kleinen 
Freihandelszone.
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balance with the EFTA had shown an export surplus of DM 900 million for the 
Federal Republic. These 1957 figures in the BMWi's study stated clearly that trade 
with the EFTA was of prime importance to the Federal Republic40.
While the actual figures remained undisputed in this case, the interpretation 
of the trade statistics did not. As was often the case and as shall be shown later, 
rows arose between the BMWi on the one side and the BMF, AA and the 
Chancellor's office on the other over how to provide reliable statistics and how to 
interpret them reliably and without bias in favour of one of the potential options of 
decision making. In this case it was the "Mitteilungsblatt Europaische 
Gemeinschaft" which made the allegation that the BMWi was making wrong 
statements on the basis of the right figures. The "Mitteilungsblatt" focused on the 
decline in German exports to the Seven in 1958 rather than their levels in 1957 and 
suggested that the BMWi was denying the fact that, in terms of overall value, the 
rest of the EEC was clearly Germany's largest trading partner. Hiinke rejected this 
in a letter to the BMWi department for public relations. The true importance of the 
Seven to German trade was not to be discovered by merely looking at the overall 
trade value, Hiinke argued, but mainly by looking at the trade balance, which in the 
case of the Seven was much more favourable to the Federal Republic than with the 
EEC41. At the aggregate level all these considerations mattered little to individual 
sectors, nor did they give any suggestions as to which questions would deserve 
government attention to be resolved on the international level, if necessary. The 
politically conditioned differences in emphasis by the BMWi as opposed to the AA 
in matters relating to the overall importance of trade with the Six and the Seven and 
the assessment of the potential damage done by not achieving this or that desired 
solution continued and surfaced every once in a while. The general line in such 
cases was that the BMWi would tend to highlight the extreme importance of trade 
relations with EFTA and to draw a gloomy picture if its favoured solutions to the 
problem were not achieved, while the AA, often supported by the BMF, would try 
hard to present the figures in a rather less dramatic light.
BA, B102 - 12146,1: Bonn, 4 VI 1959: Von EA3, Hiinke: Vermerk iiber die Auswirkungen 
der kleinen Freihandelszone auf den deutschen AuBenhandel.
BA, B102 - 12146: EA3, Hiinke an Referat LP. Betr.: Mitteilungsblatt "Europaische 
Gemeinschaft vom 130260".
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Sectoral trade with the Seven
When looking at the impact of the formation of EFTA on a country by country basis 
and with regards to individual industrial sectors, the prospects for German industry 
on the markets of the Seven were more palpable42. The factors determining the 
discrimination with which German exports would be faced after tariff reductions 
among the Seven would naturally depend on the previous level of tariffs and on the 
question of whether or not industries in another member country of EFTA would be 
capable of replacing the supply previously provided by German industry in terms of 
volume, quality and price. Average tariff levels were the highest in Portugal, 
Austria and Norway, hence German exports to these markets were likely to be most 
threatened, if one did not take transport costs into account which would compensate 
for part of the negative effects in the case of Austria. While the UK also had a 
relatively high average tariff level, the BMWi's study suggested that German 
exports were not in any great danger there, given that the other suppliers in the 
EFTA would hardly be able to entirely replace German exports to this single largest 
market among the Seven. Sweden was somewhere in between, while the negative 
effects of EFTA for German exports to the low tariff countries Denmark and 
Switzerland were expected to be quite small given their geographical proximity43. 
As far as quota discrimination was concerned, important losses could only have 
occurred in the Austrian market, given that West Germany's other main trading 
partners among the Seven, the UK, Sweden and Switzerland all had relatively few 
and small quantitative restrictions44.
While the overall negative impact of the formation of the small FTA might 
not have been seen as very detrimental to German foreign trade, a closer 
examination of the situation in individual markets of the Seven and in relation to 
individual industrial sectors showed that damage had to be expected in some sectors 
of German industry, namely in chemicals, capital goods and finished products at 
large. In these three groups exports to the Seven were significantly greater than
42 For the quantitative sectoral analysis done country by country see chapter 6.
43 BA, B102 - 12146: Bonn, 4 VI 1959: EA3, Hiinke: Vermerk: Die Auswirkungen der
kleinen Freihandelszone auf den deutschen Aullenhandel.
44 Lm, Gulliver, pp. 26-27.
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those to the other EEC member states. This was particularly striking in exports of 
cars, ships and electrical engines45. It was feared that, at a certain point, the tariff 
discrimination that would develop against the non-Seven would offset the transport 
cost advantages that Germany might have in some of these markets and that then 
competing industries within the Seven would then be at a clear advantage. The 
BMWi tried to clearly identify from where these competitive pressures were most 
likely to arise in individual sectors. To that end its study provided information on 
the importance of German imports into each of the Seven and on those sectors 
where imports from Germany represented the largest value of imports from 
individual countries.
In the British market Germany ranked as only the seventh most important 
exporter in the year 1958, but as the biggest European one, with the main items 
being chemicals, iron and steel, engines and electrical engines as well as 
photographic and optical material and precision tools for scientific purposes. The 
relatively high level of average tariffs (22.5%) was likely to lead to high levels of 
discrimination. Yet generally, it was expected that German exports would suffer 
only little from that, since the other member states of the EFTA would hardly be 
able to provide the volume of imports needed on the British market.
Table 4,2.2: imports into the  EFTA markets according to
1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958
UK DK N SWE AUT CH
FRC 3,06 3,60 19,28 19,83 17,09 20,17 22,06 23,31 36,17 38,93 24,39 25,96
UK - - 24,47 22,81 17,44 15,47 13,87 14,03 4,15 4,35 5,41 5,33
SWE 3,85 3,57 8,99 10,10 16,19 15,91 - - 1,28 1,16 1,58 1,57
DK 2,80 3,06 - - 3,16 4,43 4,00 4,00 0,54 0,69 0,95 0,82
CH 0,89 0,96 1,71 2,21 1,29 1,38 1,94 2,12 4,92 4,31 -
N 1,57 1,47 3,58 3,54 - - 3,69 3,31 0,66 0,50 0,37 0,43
AUT 0,23 0,22 0,54 0,56 0,46 0,42 0,66 0,72 - - 2,33 2,46
PORT 0,41 0,38 0,32 0,33 0,23 0,19 0,31 0,31 0,15 0,23 0,21 0,20
Source: BMWI. BA. B102-12146.1: Bonn. 4 V11959: EA3 . Vermerk betr.: Die Auswirkungen der 
“kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel; Anlage 2-7.
The predominance of imports from Germany was particularly marked in chemicals 
and engines, while in iron and steel as well as in precision tools and optical material
For the following see BA, B102 - 12146: Bonn, 4 VI 1959: EA3, Hiinke: Vermerk iiber die 
Auswirkungen der "kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel.
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Germany was only slightly ahead of Norway and Sweden in the first case and of 
Switzerland in the latter. Competition was mainly expected to come from Sweden in 
the engineering sector and from Switzerland in precision tools, watches and 
photographic and optical material. On the Scandinavian markets the main concerns 
were for German exports of textiles, engines and motorcars but also of chemicals, 
metals and ships. In all of these sectors, with the exception of ship exports to 
Norway, Germany was by far the single largest supplier to the Swedish, Danish and 
Norwegian markets, Britain in most cases being the second largest with the 
exception of base metals and ship imports to Norway where Sweden took the second 
largest and the largest share correspondingly. Concerning the value of overall 
exports, Germany was second to the United Kingdom in the Danish market while it 
provided more than all other EEC member countries together to all of the EFTA 
markets and was the largest supplier for Sweden and Norway. In the case of Austria 
Germany provided more than three times the total value of imports, in the case of 
Switzerland more than twice as much as the other member countries of the EFTA 
and in both cases more than the rest of the other EEC member states together46.
Table 4.2.5: imports into the  EFTA markets according to
origin as percentage of combined imports from th e  Six and 
th e  Seven
1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958
UK DK N SWE AUT CH
FRG 14,03 15,12 25,43 26,21 24,43 27,57 34,58 35,20 57,14 59,51 37,31 38,71
UK - - 32,27 30,16 24,93 21,15 21,75 21,19 6,56 6,64 8,27 7,94
SWE 17,66 14,99 11,86 13,35 23,14 21,75 - - 2,03 1,78 2,42 2,35
DK 12,85 12,87 - - 4,52 6,06 6,28 6,05 0,86 1,05 1,45 1,22
CH 4,10 4,03 2,26 2,92 1,84 1,89 3,03 3,20 7,77 6,59 -
N 7,19 6,20 4,73 4,68 - - 5,79 5,00 1,05 0,76 0,56 0,64
AUT 1,05 0,91 0,72 0,74 0,66 0,58 1,03 1,08 - - 3,56 3,67
PORT 1,86 1,59 0,42 0,44 0,33 0,26 0,48 0,46 0,24 0,36 0,32 0,30
Source: BMWI. BA. B102-12146.1: Bonn. 4 V11959: EA5 . Vermerk betr.: Die Auswirkungen der 
‘kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel: Anlagen 2-7.
As for the expectations of the BMWi concerning German exports to the 
markets of the Seven in future years, some indications have already been given. In 
Austria the high tariff levels, particularly for textiles, electrical tools, watches and
For the detailed presentation of these figures relating to Germany’s position in the export 
markets of the Seven compared to those of potential competitors see annex 4.2. mainly 
tables A 4.2.1 - A 4.2.6.
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motorcars made losses for German exporters likely. In addition to that a report by 
the German embassy in Vienna suggested that the Austrian economy would face a 
major crisis because of the disruptions of commercial relationships with the EEC 
member countries, which in turn would affect Austria's capability to import. 
Another grave problem was seen in the fact that Austria was only going to abolish 
quantitative restrictions vis-a-vis the other Seven which would give Germany's 
competitors a crucial advantage in the non-liberalised sector47. Concerning 
Switzerland the outlook for German exports seemed to be fairly good. Geographical 
proximity and a well-established network of agents, as well as other factors like the 
reliability of services were seen as overriding the immediate tariff changes that 
would come about with the operation of EFTA. The only real concern was that, if 
the hope for a Europe-wide solution vanished and retaliatory measures against the 
EEC were taken, German exporters might lose their advantageous position in the 
Swiss market48. In Denmark the Government was just in the process of revising the 
tariff schedule. The outcome of this revision was expected to be favourable for most 
German exports. A deterioration was only expected in the case of cars and engines 
where Britain was expected to make inroads into the German market position49. In 
the Norwegian market German imports had increased while Swedish imports 
decreased and those from Britain stagnated. The draft study of the European 
department expected that this favourable development of the last two and a half 
years would come to a halt and be reversed, once EFTA started operating. The 
main concern was that British and Swedish imports to Norway would replace a large 
portion of German supplies in ships and motorcars50. In Sweden imports from 
Germany had increased during 1958 at the expense of imports from Britain. 
Immediate dangers to German exports on the Swedish markets even after the first 
tariff reductions of 20% were therefore not expected. The only concerns were that
BA, B102 - 12146: Wien, 2 IX 1959: Deutsche Botschaft, Dr. Muller-Graf an AA, BMWi: 
Betrifft: Auswirkungen der kleinen Freihandelszone; Lie, Gulliver, pp. 26-27.
BA, B102 - 12146: Bern, 19 X 1959: Von. Deutsche Botschaft, Mohr an AA, BMWi.
BA, B102 - 12146: Bonn, 9 VI 1959: EA3, Hiinke an Abteilungen EA5, IV/2, VA1, VC1, 
4, 5, 7: Entwurf einer Aufzeichnung fur Bundeskanzleramt, Bundestagsausschiisse fur 
Wirtschaftspolitik und AuBenhandelsffagen, SonderausschuB des Bundesrates fur 
Gemeinsamen Markt und Freihandelszone, BDI usw.
BA, B102 - 12146: Oslo, 21 IX 1959: Deutsche Botschaft an AA, BMWi: Betrifft: 
sogenannte kleine Freihandelszone.
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German semi-manufactures might quickly lose competitiveness on the Swedish 
market quickly. What became more worrying than the formation of EFTA was the 
reaction with which the heightening of German tariffs would be met by the Swedish 
side once the CET would come into effect according to Hallstein's acceleration in 
early 1960. Under these circumstances the substantial Swedish exports of finished 
products to Germany might be severely hit, which in turn might have negative 
repercussions on German exports to Sweden51.
As far as the EEC as a whole was concerned, the formation of EFTA was of 
much greater importance to Germany and the Netherlands than to any other member 
state52. The Netherlands were running a balance of payments surplus with the Seven 
which was particularly important for Dutch agricultural exports. At the other 
extreme was Italy which, as the only member state of the EEC, had a negative trade 
balance with the Seven53.
4.3 German industry, the federal Government and the Hallstein-Plan
Proposals for the acceleration of the internal tariff reductions within the EEC and an
early beginning of the formation of a common external tariff were debated among
the Six by early February 1960 in the framework of the Rey Committee. Several
proposals by the Dutch, the French and by the Commission of the EEC were on the
table54. The West German Government had not made up its mind by then as to
which line to take in response to these proposals. It took the Federal Cabinet
roughly until April to come up with modification proposals55. In the meantime the
Commission had already published the Hallstein-Plan for the acceleration of the
tariff changes foreseen in the treaty on the EEC and the public debate about it had
begun. The BDI and individual industrial associations as well as the representatives
51 N eu e  Z u r c h e r  Z e itu n g , 21 V 1960.
52 BA, B102 - 12146: Den Haag, 27 VIII 1959: Deutscher Botschaft Betrifft: Niederlandische 
Haltung zur kleinen Freihandelszone.
53 B e r l in e r  B ank: Mitteilungen fur den AuBenhandel Nr. 6/59, 29 VI 1959.
54 For the commission’s proposal on acceleration see PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 277: Bonn, 17 
III 1960: EWG/Vorschlage der Kommission zur Beschleunigung des Vertrages vom 26. 
Februar 1960.
55 Muller-Armack briefed the Bundestag's economic committee on the acceleration plan in 
March 1960. See Bundestagsarchiv, 3. Bundestag, 16. WirtschaftsausschuB, Protokolle 46. 
bis 80. Sitzung: Kurzprotokoll der 74. Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses am Donnerstag, 
den 17. Marz 1960 in Bonn.
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of German agriculture flatly rejected the Hallstein plan or wanted to see at least 
some important modifications being made56.
Table 4,5,1: Acceleration proposal and trea ty  provisions—
Hallstein Plan Treaty of Rome Hallstein Plan Treaty of Rome
internal tari::f reductions vis-a-vis third countries (CET)
1st July 1960: 
lowering by 20%
1st July 1960: 2nd 
lowering by 10%
first step toward CET 
on 1st July 1960 (base 
CET minus 20%)
first step toward CET 
on 1st January 1962 
30%
31 December 1961: 
lowering by 20%
31 December 1961: 
3rd lowering by 10%
extension of internal 
reductions to third 
countries
2nd step toward CET 
on 1st January 1966, 
again 30%
end of 1st phase: of 
the transitional period 
lowering by 50% p
1962-66: 3 lowerings 
each by 10%
CET to be reached at 
end of transition 1970
They therefore pressed the Government at different levels to respond to their 
concerns and to demand changes at the international level before the final decision 
of the council of ministers of the EEC was due in early May 1960. In the following 
a brief account of the early international talks about the acceleration proposal and 
the initial German position will be given. It has to be analysed what the differences 
between the possible timetables were for the German external tariff. It will then be 
shown how German industry and agriculture reacted to the Commission's plans and 
how they sought to influence the Federal Government to amend these proposals.
The acceleration proposals at the international level
The first multilateral talks about the acceleration of the tariff adaptations envisaged 
in the treaty on the EEC took place in the Rey Committee on 8 February 1960. In 
that committee meeting Muller-Armack had to reserve the German position on 
acceleration, since the Cabinet had not managed to arrive at a united decision on the 
matter. The issue of acceleration had been mentioned in the second memorandum by 
the Commission in September 1959 as a means to strengthen the EEC. The BMWi
BDI Jahresbericht 1960, pp. 28-29; HDI - NB254, Koln, 22 XI 1960, BDI, 
AuBenhandelsabteilung: Ergebnisbericht iiber die Arbeitsbesprechung mit den
Mitgliedsverbanden iiber Auilenhandelsfragen.
All internal quotas except those for agriculture were abolished by the end of 1961. For the 
precise timing of the reductions of tariffs and quotas and the establishment of the CET under 
the treaty of Rome and the actual schedule followed according to the acceleration decisions 
see Walter , Ingo: The European Common Market. Growth and Patterns of Trade and 
Production. New York [et al.] 1967, pp. 6-15.
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c o
had regarded it from the very outset as detrimental to the German interest . 
Acceleration surfaced again on the international level only after France and the 
Commission had brought it on the agenda in spring I96059. It was a particularly 
difficult issue in West Germany for reasons relating to the precise arrangements 
envisaged for the creation of the CET of the EEC. It was also disputed between the 
AA, which was broadly in favour of it, and the BMWi. Erhard took a very strong 
stance on that issue60. The main problem was that the tariff levels of January 1957 
had been chosen in the treaty as the starting point for the adaptation process. To 
complicate matters, the BMWi had implemented a number of unilateral tariff 
reductions for "konjunktur - political" reasons in the mid 1950s, the last of which 
had taken place after January 1957 and had amounted to a reduction of 25% of 
previous tariff levels. These unilateral tariff reductions obviously had to be reversed 
once the process of convergence of the tariff levels toward the projected CET would 
begin. The Federal Republic would therefore have to raise the tariff levels that were 
applied at the moment when this process started, while in relation to 1957 the 
changes were considerably smaller61. With the proposal to accelerate this 
adjustment, the effect of these increases would be felt more and much earlier. The 
effect of the Commission's proposal was estimated by the BMWi to be that the 
customs duties levied on imports from third countries into Germany would rise by 
DM 125 million to 400 million on 1 July 1960. DM 91 million of the increase 
would be because of the reversal of the "konjunktur - political" tariff reduction of 
1957 and only DM 34 million on account the first adaptation to the CET62. The 
BMWi certainly feared that these tariff increases would cause inflationary pressures,
BA, B102 - 12218b: Bonn, 28 IX 1959, Von. EA3, Hiinke an Muller-Armack und Meyer- 
Cording, Betr.: Vorbereitung zur Ressortbesprechung am 29. September 1959 iiber die 
Denkschrift der Kommission vom 17. September 1959 (2. Ubergangslosung); Bonn, 26 XI 
1959: Von. EA3, Hiinke an Meyer-Cording Betr.: Vorzeitige Heranfuhrung an den 
Gemeinsamen Auflentarif der EWG.
At that point the French were sure that acceleration had American support and that Luns’ 
and Erhard’s attempts to avoid it were rejected by the US administration. See MAE, DE- 
CE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 45: Paris, 6 II 1960: Olivier Wormser a 
l’ambassade a Washington.
While Miiller-Armack and Meyer-Cording thought a slight rise in the German external tariff 
was acceptable, Erhard remained absolutely firm. See PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 277: Bonn, 
19 I 1960: Dr. Sachs, Vermerk betreffend die Vorschlage zur Beschleunigung der 
Integration des gemeinsamen Marktes.
See annex 4.3.
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while some manufacturers might have expected a negative impact on their price 
competitiveness particularly in the markets of the Seven, due to higher costs for 
primary materials and semi-manufactures. There might also have been the concern 
that a heightening in Germany’s tariffs would cause some sort of retaliation or at 
least a worsening in climate vis-a-vis the USA .
On 24 November 1959 the council of ministers of the EEC had decided on a 
number of measures to be taken throughout the following year and general lines of 
policies to be followed in the future. These were designed on the one hand to lessen 
once more the impact of discrimination towards third countries and to strengthen the 
cohesion of the EEC on the other. They comprised the extension of a number of 
quota and tariff concessions to third countries within the GATT, in particular the 
tariff reductions which were due to be made according to the EEC schedule by 1 
July 1960. The council decision proposed that this extension to take place on a 
temporary basis. The other main point of that decision was to create a European 
Contact Committee to conduct the dialogue with the Seven. Another point was to 
declare the determination to intensify the cohesion of the EEC, which was said to be 
the precondition for any liberal policy towards the outside world64.
The proposals by the Commission and by France, which were discussed in 
the Rey Committee in February 1960 seem to have followed this line of thought. 
The French proposed to link together the next step of internal tariff reductions and 
the first step towards the establishment of the CET on 1 July 1960 and to increase 
the internal tariff reduction from 10% according to the treaty to 20%. The 
Commission made a very similar proposal with the main modification that the first 
adaptation of national tariff levels towards the CET should be made, if it was to be 
a lowering towards the CET and, in the case where it was to be a heightening of the 
existing national tariff level, it should be made towards the CET reduced by 20%.
BA, B102 - 12205,1: Bonn, 7 IV 1960, EA3, Hiinke, an Muller-Armack, Betr.: Vorschlage 
zur Modifikation des Hallstein Plans.
US and Canadian officials had made it clear to Muller-Armack that any heightening of 
German tariffs was very badly received in North America. See PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 277: 
Bonn, 19 I 1960: Dr. Sachs, Vermerk betreffend die Vorschlage zur Beschleunigung der 
Integration des gemeinsamen Marktes.
BA, B102 - 12218b: Straflburg, 24 XI 1959, Von. EWG-Rat: Betr.: Beschlufl des Rates auf 
25. Tagung am 23-24 November 1959.
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This suggestions might have been made by the Commission to make the move a bit 
more palatable to the low tariff countries within the EEC.
Two days before the meeting of the Rey Committee the Federal Government 
had not come to a common position on acceleration. The BMWi flatly rejected the 
possibility of any heightening of German external tariff levels, while the A A 
thought it to be unrealistic to follow that line in international negotiations. The 
reasons the BMWi gave for its position were that such a move would be highly 
undesirable in terms of "Konjunkturpolitik", that it was likely to even increase the 
German balance of payments surplus, that it would be seen as an unfriendly act by 
EFTA and that the USA would not like it either65. In the meeting on 8 February, 
Muller-Armack and Wormser found themselves in clear confrontation. The 
Germans were not ready to approve of acceleration and rejected the French 
"package" aiming at the reduction of internal tariffs and the beginning of the 
creation of the CET at the same date on 1 July 1960. Muller-Armack said that 
Germany would certainly observe the treaty on the EEC, but would not accept the 
French proposal. Wormser in turn remained firm in his demand that internal 
reductions and the creation of the CET must not be separated from each other66. 
Proposals by the Dutch and the Germans in the committee meeting aimed at 
avoiding further discrimination between the Six and the Seven. The Dutch proposed 
that the EEC extend its tariff reductions on 1 July to all GATT member states and 
that EFTA do the same. In addition to that they suggested that the CET should be 
lowered by 20%. The German proposal was practically identical to the Dutch, but 
the Germans felt it was unrealistic to expect the Italians and the French to go along 
with the extension of the internal tariff cuts to all GATT members once more .
BA, B102 - 12204,2: Bonn, 6 II 1960, EA3: Sprechzettel zur Frage des Handelsausschusses 
der 20 [sic!].
BA, B102 - 12204,2: Bonn, 8 II 1960: Handschriftliche Aufzeichnung iiber die Sitzung des 
Comite Special.
BA, B102 - 12204,2: Bonn, 6 II 1960, EA3: Sprechzettel zur Frage des Handelsausschusses 
der 20 [sic!]; Bonn, 11 II 1960, EA3, Hiinke: Bericht iiber die Sitzung des 
Sonderausschusses der EWG am 8. Februar 1960.
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German industry and the Hallstein Plan
The potential problems faced by German industry and agriculture that could result 
from the acceleration as proposed by the Commission were very diverse in nature. 
The larger industrial associations aired the concern that acceleration of the creation 
of the CET would deepen the rift between EFTA and the EEC, and that this might 
have serious detrimental effects on German exports to the Seven. Certain industrial 
sectors as well as agriculture were more concerned about the internal reduction of 
tariffs and of quantitative restrictions. There were also important regional 
differences, with the Northern German regions’ links to the Scandinavian and 
British markets and the Southern and South Western proximity to the opening
/TO
markets of France and Italy . But given the fact that the whole issue was highly 
complicated and that the matters which were addressed were not likely to exert any 
effect on German exports before the end of the year or even later, the response by 
German industry was not very strong as far as the smaller industrial associations 
were concerned. This might be a function of the fact that the smaller associations 
did not command the resources to conduct major studies on this issue. The smaller 
associations did not have continuous access to the relevant Government agencies and 
the decisive political figures, nor were they so much concerned with or involved in 
the making of the medium and longer term commercial policy. It is therefore no 
surprise that the comments on acceleration reflected in the files of the BMWi came 
from the umbrella organisations, the BDI, the DIHT the farmers federation (DBV) 
as well as a few of the larger specialised industrial association like the VDMA 
(mechanical engineering industry) and the EBM (metal processing industry). It is 
worth mentioning though that at least the DIHT provided its sub-units, the local 
chambers of commerce, with fairly detailed information about the acceleration plans 
and their potential impact69.
68 Thus, the vice-president of the BDI and president of the Association of Bavarian Industry, 
Rodenstock, argued in favour of acceleration. The motivation behind this was clearly to 
secure the integration of the Six and preferential access to the French and the Italian market 
for Bavarian industry. See MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 46: 
Article du Professor Rodenstock, para dans le “Suddeutsche  Zeitu n g” , le 20 avril 
[I960].
69 The DIHT was in fact already thinking about more far-reaching solutions to the problem at 
this time. BA, B102 - 12204,2: Bonn, 17 II 1960, DIHT, Kuhn an Industrie- und 
Handelskammem und Mitglieder des Europa-Ausschusses, Betr.: Losungsmoglichkeiten der 
Europa-Frage.
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Of the interest groups mentioned only the DBV and the BDI contacted the 
Chancellor directly to make their views heard at the highest level, as their presidents 
Edmund Rehwinkel (DBV) and Fritz Berg (BDI) had direct access to Adenauer. 
Adenauer was also contacted on the issue of acceleration by the
70GemeinschaftsausschuB der Deutschen Gewerblichen Wirtschaft . This organisation 
comprised the largest associations of German business, including BDI, DIHT, 
BDA, commercial associations, bankers' associations and the representation of other 
services like insurances and transport as well as retail industry. In addition to the 
direct contacts with Adenauer the BDI was continuously in touch with the BMWi as 
was the DBV with the federal Ministry of Agriculture (BML). The fact that all 
German business threw its weight behind the plea that had been made by the BDI 
gave this viewpoint a very strong position in the Cabinet considerations. Against 
this seemingly united front of German business, the DBV and the BML were likely 
to lose out. Yet while the German agricultural interest was clearly expressed, the 
analysis of the industrial interests needs some differentiation.
The acceleration of the establishment of the CET meant that a good number 
of sectors of German industry were likely to face less competition than before, in 
cases where their main competitors were based outside the Six. These sectors were 
therefore highly unlikely to share the generally rather critical view adopted by the 
BDI. Other sectors might have found that the increased competition within the EEC 
after the accelerated reduction of internal tariffs would be unacceptable to them. 
Others again, whose main export markets were the Seven had to fear the possibility 
of retaliatory measures by the EFTA member countries, once the German external 
tariff had to be raised for their products, because of the complication related to the 
"konjunkturpolitische Zollsenkung" of July 1957. For yet other sectors the 
acceleration of internal tariff reductions will have been very desirable, since it was 
going to open up the highly protected Italian and French markets quicker than 
expected. Thus, even at a very general level, a good number of very different
BA, B136 - 2553: Koln, 11 III 1960, BDI, Fritz Berg an Adenauer; B136 - 2557: Bonn, 23 
III 1960, DBV an Kanzleramt: Entschlieflung des Presidiums des DBV vom 22 Marz 1960 
zu den Empfehlungen der Kommission zur Verkiirzung der Ubergangszeit; B136 - 2558: 
Bonn, 11 V 1960, DBV, Rehwinkel an Adenauer; B136 - 2558: Bonn, 29 IV 1960, 
GemeinschaftsausschuB der Deutschen Gewerblichen Wirtschaft, Paulsen an Adenauer.
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responses by German industry was to be expected. In view of this the fiercely 
critical reaction by the BDI was not necessarily to be expected, nor could one 
assume that it was strongly and unanimously backed by its member associations. 
The reason for the BDI’s negative attitude toward acceleration lay clearly in the 
overall assessment that the EFTA was such a very important export market and that 
the UK was Germany’s most important competitor there.
In a position paper relating to the acceleration proposals of the Commission 
the BDI delivered a devastating verdict on the Hallstein Plan71. It demanded that no 
measures be taken which would increase the commercial discrimination between the 
Six and the Seven. The internal tariff reductions in both trading blocs and the 
introduction of rules of origin in the EFTA would not only bring undesired 
psychological effects which would be detrimental to trade in Europe, but more 
seriously, the measures proposed by the Commission and their combined side- 
effects would impede investment decisions. In these circumstances the BDI deemed 
the Hallstein Plan as simply untenable.
While the proposed increase in the internal tariff reductions among the Six 
was already pretty bad in terms of increasing discrimination, the BDI regarded the 
early steps towards the establishment of the CET as even worse particularly for the 
Benelux countries and for the Federal Republic, where tariffs would have to rise. 
The reversal of the "konjunkturpolitische" tariff reduction in Germany on top of this 
was entirely unacceptable to the BDI. The leading German industrial association had 
no good words either for what the Commission regarded as an important 
concession, the reduction of the CET by 20%. The BDI complained that the 
Commission had proposed this reduction only as an anticipation of the potential 
outcome of tariff negotiations in the GATT and that corrections could still be made 
on that, if the results of the negotiations were not satisfactory. The BDI rightly 
argued that this made negotiations on the matter with the Seven practically 
impossible. In the view of the BDI, negotiations between the Six and the Seven had 
to be initiated as soon as possible within the framework of the Trade Committee of 
the 21. Consequently, the BDI made suggestions for talks on a unification of EFTA
71 BA, B136 - 2553: Koln, 11 III 1960, BDI, Stellungnahme zu den Empfehlungen der EWG- 
Kommission fur die beschleunigte Durchfiihrung der Romischen Vertrage, insbesondere zu 
den Auswirkungen auf das Verhaltnis EWG-EFTA.
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and EEC and on an interim solution as long as that union could not be achieved. 
This paper was sent to the Chancellor with a direct letter from the president of the 
BDI, Fritz Berg. He explicitly asked Adenauer not to grant German support to the 
recommendations by the Commission72.
When the “ GemeinschaftsausschuB der Deutschen Gewerblichen Wirtschaft” 
wrote to Adenauer at the end of April, the language was a bit softer on the Hallstein 
proposal. German business no longer rejected it in principle, but suggested it should 
only be implemented, if a deepening of differences between EEC and EFTA could 
be avoided and if a serious attempt would be made first to achieve an improvement 
of the relationship between the two trading blocs. But the “GemeinschaftsausschuB” 
was quite clear about what they wanted from their Government: "From this follows 
the expectation of the GemeinschaftsausschuB that the Federal Government throw 
their weight behind a liberal tariff and commercial policy of the EEC and that they 
oppose the overly far-reaching and dirigist Commission proposals in the field of 
agriculture"73. It seems that German business had changed its attitude toward 
acceleration.
While the overall assessment was still unfavourable as far as the effects on 
relations with EFTA were concerned, there might have been pressure from some 
sectors of German industry which looked forward to the opening of the French and 
Italian market. This change of attitude is also reflected in a letter from the second 
highest ranking official of the BDI, Wilhelm Beutler, to Ludwig Erhard just a day 
before the decisive meeting of the EEC Council in May. The stress by the BDI 
then, was on the efforts to initiate talks with the Seven rather than on the criticism 
of the Hallstein proposal. In any case, some concessions had been obtained by the 
BDI on acceleration from the Federal Government which it had pledged to push 
through at the international level. At a DIHT conference in Kassel on 5 April 1960 
the banker Hermann Josef Abs gave a speech in which he took a rather positive 
attitude towards the acceleration project as it stood then in the international talks. 
He stressed that the acceleration proposal provided the unique chance to lower the 
CET, which in turn would be rewarded by reciprocal concessions which EFTA
72 BA, B136 - 2553: Koln, 11 III 1960, BDI, Fritz Berg an Adenauer.
73 BA, B136 - 2558: Bonn, 29 IV 1960, GemeinschaftsausschuB der Deutschen Gewerblichen
Wirtschaft, Paulsen an Adenauer.
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might make. Abs impressed on the conference that there was no point in taking a 
negative view on acceleration as such, but that its weaknesses had to be removed. 
He argued in favour of a package deal including acceleration and the reduction of 
tariffs vis-a-vis third countries. The provisional reduction that was on the table so 
far would have to be made irreversible, Abs argued. The Federal Government 
should also make sure that the "konjunkturpolitische" tariff reduction of 1957 
should not be reversed in one go, but in at least two steps74. Muller-Armack had 
presented a very similar proposal for a phased reversal of the “konjunkturpolitische 
Zollsenkung” to the French in March I96075.
The only unequivocal rejection of the acceleration plan that remained, before 
the EEC council gathered on May 11, seemed to come from agriculture, which 
feared the faster elimination of quantitative restrictions among the Six envisaged in 
the Hallstein Plan76. The impression that the president of the DBV might have made 
on Adenauer with his last-minute telegraph just before the EEC council was to 
begin, might have been countered by the position taken by Mr. PraB, a high ranking 
official in the Chancellor's office, who briefed Adenauer on the same day on the 
position of German agriculture. The impression he gave to Adenauer was not quite 
in line with what Rehwinkel had said in his telegraph. PraB took the view that 
German agriculture had not really provided a clear position and that German 
farmers would have to make a few concessions anyway, if the acceleration plan was 
to be pushed through in a favourable way for German industry. In his view German 
industry was actually rather much in favour of acceleration77. In the circumstances it 
was highly unlikely that Adenauer would have done anything to support the position 
of German agriculture on this particular point.
BA, B102 - 12205,1: Kassel, 5 IV 1960, Rede von Herman Josef Abs bei der Tagung des 
DIHT in Kassel am 5. April 1960.
Muller-Armack’s proposal to the French suggested that the reversal should take place in two 
steps, the first due on 1 July 1960 and the second on 1 January 1962. MAE, DE-CE, 
Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 45: Paris, 10 III 1960: Systeme de M. Miiller- 
Armack.
BA, B136 - 2557: Bonn, 23 III 1960, DBV an Bundeskanzleramt, EntschlieBung des 
Presidiums des DBV iiber die Empfehlung der Kommission zur Beschleunigung der 
Ubergangszeit; Bonn, 11 V 1960, DBV, Rehwinkel an Adenauer.
BA, B136 - 2558: Bonn, 11 V 1960, PraB an Adenauer, Betr.: Beschleunigte 
Verwirklichung der EWG.
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The intra-Governmental struggle oyer the Hallstein Plan
At the level of the Federal Cabinet the Hallstein Plan opened yet another round in
the long series of fights between the BMWi and the AA. Ludwig Erhard did not 
miss any opportunity to make his views known to the public and to show to the AA, 
to the Chancellor's office and the BMF, who was the master of economics and 
statistics, which in his view was and had to be the BMWi and the Minister himself. 
The fight over the Hallstein Plan was also yet another episode in the continuing 
battle between Erhard and Adenauer. Erhard made use of the fact that Adenauer had 
left Bonn for a state visit to the USA. The Minister of Economics obviously enjoyed 
the apparent unity of opinion of German industry behind him. He also felt the 
support from the Bundesbank against the acceleration plan and he seems to have 
been once more in a mood where he felt he was morally obliged to step in against 
Adenauer making statements on an economic issue for which he was ill-prepared 
anyway, in Erhard's view, and in this case particularly so, since he had been briefed 
by AA officials who, Erhard believed, were just as incompetent in these matters as 
the Chancellor himself.
Adenauer had met Eisenhower on 15 March 1960. In the communiqu6 that 
they issued that day they endorsed the Hallstein-Plan. Erhard felt he could not 
remain silent on this matter. He called a press conference and aired his concern over 
the acceleration proposal and the damage it was likely to do to the relationship 
between the EFTA and the EEC and to the West German economy. The media 
echoed Erhard's view in the following days. The Chancellor's office felt that Erhard 
had dramatised the situation greatly by using the statistics in a misleading manner. 
What was particularly upsetting for the Chancellor's office was the fact that Erhard 
had called the press conference against the explicit request by the office not to do 
so. PraB reported to state secretary Globke that Erhard had told the Minister of 
Finance Franz Etzel that his comments were not directed against the BMF but rather 
against Adenauer's statement in Washington where the Chancellor, in Erhard’s 
opinion, had obviously relied on advice from the AA without having a clear view of 
the subtleties of the issue.
Erhard's action risked causing a crisis within the Cabinet. Ministers were 
openly disagreeing on the line of policy to be followed by the Government on this
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important issue, while the Chancellor was away and nobody at home seemed to be 
able to contain the dispute. Etzel and the state secretary van Scherpenberg of the 
A A suggested that Adenauer should send a telegraph in order to discipline Erhard. 
Copies of the telegraph should be sent to Krone and Hocherl, the chairmen of the 
parliamentary faction of the CDU/CSU. It should bind all Cabinet members to 
refrain from public statements until the Cabinet had convened and decided on the
78matter . On 22 March 1960 Adenauer sent the requested telegraph to Erhard and 
the others involved. Adenauer made it absolutely clear that he would not allow 
Erhard and his ministry any further statements that would cast doubt on the 
homogeneity of the Cabinet in the question of European integration79. State 
secretary Globke co-ordinated the counterattack from the Chancellor's office. He 
distributed Adenauer's telegraphs from San Francisco to the ministers Erhard, Etzel
and Schaffer. He was also in charge of organising a Cabinet meeting immediately
80after Adenauer's return from his lengthy trip to the USA and Japan . Adenauer was 
quite right in judging that the affair had put Germany's position in foreign policy in 
some danger. Yet the Chancellor's telegraph had obviously served its purpose well. 
A day later PraB reported to Globke that at a meeting between several Government 
departments there had been complete harmony between the officials from the BMWi 
and the AA. Apparently, Muller-Armack was quite happy to support acceleration in 
principle and gave the impression to be relieved that Adenauer had taken a clear 
position on the matter in this sense81.
Although the excitement had soon cooled off, Erhard continued to insist that 
the substance of what he had said was perfectly right and that he had done so only 
because von Brentano and Etzel had publicly declared that the acceleration plan had 
been approved by the Cabinet, while the Cabinet had not even discussed the matter. 
He had simply intended to put this right. Erhard made it clear now that he was in 
favour of acceleration in principle as well, but that he would insist that important 
modifications to that plan had to be made and that it would anyway have
BA, B136 - 2557: Bonn, 21 III 1960, PraB an Staatssekretar Globke zur Vorlage, Betr.: 
Kontroverse BMWi, BMF, AA.
BA, B102 - 12218a: San Francisco, 22 III 1960, Adenauer an Erhard.
BA, B136 - 2557: San Francisco, 22 III 1960, Adenauer an Globke.
BA, B136 - 2557: Bonn, 23 III 1960, PraB an Globke, Betr.: Beschleunigung des EWG- 
Vertrags.
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considerable effects on a number of sectors of the economy. Globke reported all this 
to Adenauer, who was still in Tokyo. The state secretary did not fail to mention that 
many others, including a large part of the CDU/CSU faction, shared Erhard's view 
that modifications to the plan were needed and that negotiations with EFT A were of 
crucial importance. The president of the Bundesbank, Blessing, had warned that the 
Hallstein Plan might lead to some price rises which could not be countered any 
more before the next federal election. While Globke pledged that he and Krone 
would see to it that differences of opinion would be kept from the public, he advised
the Chancellor to proceed carefully, to wait for a clear analysis of the potential
82effects and to seek certain modifications in the international negotiations .
The official German position on acceleration
When the turmoil was over, the combatants returned to the analysis of the statistics 
on the effects of the proposed tariff changes interpretation of which had been at the 
heart of the whole conflict. It was not only the fact that Erhard had addressed the 
public with his concerns over acceleration which had upset the other ministers. The 
point of contention were the figures he had provided or rather the way in which he 
had done so. Erhard had stated that the increase in tariff levied on imports from 
third countries would amount to roughly 45%. The Chancellor's office apparently 
took offence in the publication of such a high figure in case it might be mistaken 
and therefore shock the public. The Chancellor's office would have preferred to 
compare the absolute tariff levels as percentage of the value of goods (which would 
rise from 2.59% to 3.76%) rather than talk about percentages of percentage levels, 
which the BMWi did. The main point though was that changes of that order of 
magnitude, the Chancellor's office held, would occur already as a consequence of 
"normal fluctuations in trade flows" and should therefore not disquiet anybody. The 
Chancellor’s office also criticised the fact that the BMWi's study had only focused 
on some sections of total imports, while the analysis of all imports would lead to far
83more comforting figures . The EEC Commission supported the chancellery m the
BA, B136 - 2557: Bonn, 28 III 1960, Globke an Adenauer in Tokyo.
BA, B136 - 2558: Bonn, 2 IV 1960, PraB, Kurzvermerk fur Kabinettssitzung, Betr.: 
Aussprache uber die Verkiirzung der Fristen des EWG-Vertrags.
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view that talking about percentage changes in percentage levels was confusing the 
public and tried to calm the tensions in the German discussion by putting forward its 
own statistics84.
As stated earlier, fights over figures were a normal business between the 
BMWi and the BMF. The BMF had presented a study of the impact of the Wormser 
Plan, i. e. the French proposal for acceleration that preceded the Hallstein Plan,
85already by the end of November 1959 . The results were of a kind as to not arouse 
any worries, as far as additional burdens on the German economy were concerned. 
In December 1959 the BMF sent this study to the Chancellor's office in response to 
press reports that had been made on the basis of information by the BMWi. These 
reports had talked of an increase in tariff burdens on German imports of around 
30% through the introduction of the CET. The BMF had checked this and had come 
to the conclusion that the BMWi's figures were wrong and that the first step of the 
adaptation towards the CET would not cause more than a 5 % increase in the overall 
tariff burden on German imports . The BMF study had analysed the main 300 tariff 
positions for imports in 1958 and had extrapolated these figures taking into account 
the additional reduction of internal tariffs and the first step toward the introduction 
of the CET as proposed by the French87. In the BMWi's press conference in March 
1960 the figures presented had sounded even more dramatic. Erhard had talked of a 
45% increase in the tariff burden on German imports from third countries. The 
BMF disagreed with the BMWi over the methods used in the study and the 
presentation of the figures of the percentage increase that was expected. The main 
objection was that Erhard's presentation had been sensationalist and that the likely
PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 277: Brussel, 24 III 1960: EWG, Kommission, Informationsdienst: 
Mitteilung an die Presse. For the details of the figures see Annex 4.3.
The Wormser-Plan envisaged for the 1 July 1960 a further lowering of internal tariffs by 
20% and a first step toward the CET diminishing the difference between national tariffs and 
the CET by 30%. See PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 277: Bonn, 27 XI 1959: Bundesministerium 
der Finanzen, General-Referat Zolltarif: Untersuchung der Auswirkungen des Wormser- 
Plans.
BA, B136 - 1299: Bonn, 10 XII 1959, BMF an Bundeskanzleramt, Vialon, Betr.: Wormser 
Plan, hier: Zusatzliche Belastung der deutschen Wirtschaft.
BA, B136 - 1299: Bonn, 27 XI 1959, BMF, Generalreferat Zolltarif, Betr.: Untersuchung 
der Auswirkungen des Worser Plans.
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changes in German tariffs would not have effects exceeding those that might occur
88under normal fluctuations of trade .
While the Federal Government was still struggling to return to a somewhat 
more united position and to begin work towards a compromise, the talks at the 
international level proceeded. On 24 March the Rey Committee convened, and a 
few days later discussions continued in the Trade Committee of the 21. Surprisingly 
enough, the German delegations in these talks continued their work with a high 
degree of normality. Their preparations for the international meetings were 
unaffected by the intra-Governmental uproar, which seemed to have vastly 
overstated the actual differences that existed between the federal ministries on the 
substance of the matter. The main concern for the Germans was still the reversal of 
the "konjunkturpolitische" tariff reduction of 1957, which they did not want to 
implement in full on 1 July I96089.
At its meeting on 5 April 1960 the Cabinet charged the ministers of 
economics, foreign affairs, finance and agriculture, Erhard, von Brentano, Etzel and 
Schwarz, to co-operate in providing a draft for a position paper to be decided on by 
the Cabinet at its next meeting. Acceleration was welcomed by the Cabinet in 
principle, while it stressed that every chance for satisfactory relations with the 
EFT A had to be exploited. The Cabinet statement provided a clear reminder of the 
remaining divisions in that it stressed at the end that "individual statements of
90different content had nothing to do with the actual facts" . The four ministries 
came very close to drafting a common position paper. In fact the officials charged 
with that work managed to provide a statement in which the four ministers agreed 
on all but one point. Erhard remained inflexible as to the point of time at which the 
Council of Ministers of the EEC should take its decision on acceleration. He 
insisted that negotiations with the Seven had to take place before the EEC would 
proceed with its decision. On all other points agreement was reached91. At its next
88 BA, B136 - 2557: Bonn, 21 III 1960, PraB an Herra Staatssekretar zur Vorlage, Betr.:
Kontroverse BMWi, BMF, AA.
89 BA, B102 - 12204,2: Bonn, 19 III 1960, EA3, Hunke: Sprechzettel fur Herm Staatssekretar
Professor Dr. Muller-Armack zur Ressortbesprechung am 23 Marz 1960.
90 BA, B102 - 12205a: Bonn, 5 IV 1960, KabinettsbetschluB.
91 BA, B136 - 2558: Bonn, 19 IV 1960, Staatssekretar Globke an die Herren Bundesminsiter
Betr.: Vorschlage der Kommission zur Beschleunigung des EWG-Vertrags, hier: 
Vorbereitung der Kabinettssitzung vom 22 April 1960; Bonn, 20 IV 1960,
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meeting on 22 April the Cabinet unanimously supported the view that acceleration 
should go ahead and that the CET should be lowered by 20%. While the Federal 
Cabinet was in favour of a definitive decision by the EEC Council of Ministers on 
that point at its next meeting, it demanded that there should be negotiations with the 
Seven immediately after the decision would have been taken. For technical reasons 
related to the ratification process in some member countries of the Six, there would 
be a delay until the decisions could come into effect. This time-span should be used
92for negotiations .
The EEC Council of Ministers came to a hard-fought compromise on an 
acceleration package by 12 May 1960. In the early hours of May 11 it had been 
agreed that acceleration should go through for industrial goods, if a solution for 
agriculture could be found the following day. While the Dutch were generally in 
favour of acceleration, they insisted that agriculture should be included in full. The 
AA had feared that Erhard’s planned visit to Luns, who was chairman of the trade 
committee of the 21 might stir up stiffer opposition against acceleration among the 
Six, as Luns was shortly going to tour European capitals. They thus tried to delay 
Erhard’s visit in The Hague93. After the negotiations among the Six had come close 
to a breakdown, a compromise was finally reached, which envisaged an additional 
5% internal tariff reduction for non-liberalised agricultural products. Concerning 
external tariffs, agriculture was not included in the early adaptations towards the 
CET, while it was agreed that negotiations on a reduction of external tariffs by 20% 
should be initiated on the basis of complete reciprocity. Import quotas for 
agricultural products were to be raised slightly until the end of the first four-year 
period. By mid-1961 considerations on additional expansions of quotas should 
begin94.
The outcome of the EEC Council meeting had led to the fulfilment of some 
but not all of the major German objectives for modifying the acceleration scheme.
Bundeskanzleramt, Vialon, Vermerk fur Kabinettssitzung Betr.: Komissionsvorschlage fiir 
die Beschleunigung des EWG-Vertrags.
92 BA, B102 - 12218a: Bonn, 5 V 1960, Adenauer an von Brentano, Betr.: Bundestagssitzung
am 4 V 1960.
93 PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 489: Bonn, 7 IV 1960: van Scherpenberg an Brentano,
Aufzeichung zu EWG und EFTA.
94 BA, B136 - 2558: Bonn, 13 V 1960, PraB an Adenauer zur Vorlage, Betr.: Beschleunigte
Verwirklichung der EWG.
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While the wishes for a phasing out of the 1 konjunkturpolitische" tariff reduction had 
been achieved, direct negotiations with the Seven were not likely to come about 
soon. On the other hand talks in the Trade Committee of 21 continued. In a note to 
several sections of the European department in the BMWi and to the BMF, Hiinke 
set out in detail the practical implications for German external tariffs resulting from 
the Council decision. According to this the Federal Republic was allowed to reverse 
50% of the unilateral tariff cuts made in 1957 by the end of 1960. Only in a few 
cases had the reductions to be reversed in full. But any reversal of these measures 
was to take place only in cases where the actually applied tariff level was lower than 
the CET minus 20%95.
4.4 Conclusions
The failure of the Maudling negotiations did not lead to any change of strategy by 
industry or by Government. Neither seemed to have felt the necessity for a complete 
reappraisal of the situation. The proposals put forward by the Federal Government 
at the international level in the aftermath of the failure continued to follow the great 
lines of the concepts of an FTA with minor modifications only. The impression that 
the FTA could still be achieved remained the official view of the leading industrial 
associations at least until spring 1960. Given that the Federal Republic's official 
position on the matter had not changed at all at the end of 1958, but had rather been 
reinforced by parliamentary resolutions and continuing support for the FTA from 
the federal council (Bundesrat), this lack of a reappraisal should not be too 
surprising.
While it is quite probable that Adenauer privately abandoned the FTA 
concept at Bad Kreuznach (or perhaps already at Colombey), this was not reflected 
in any explicit way in official German policy. The fact that the Bundestag renewed 
its unanimous support for the FTA concept only two weeks later would suggest that 
the Chancellor's probable pledge to de Gaulle against the FTA then was exculpable. 
In terms of Germany's foreign policy interest it was perhaps even desirable at that
BA, B102 - 12218a: Bonn, 19 V 1960, Von. EA3, Hiinke: Vermerk zur Auslegung der 
Bestimmungen des Beschleunigungsbeschlusses iiber Mafinahmen zur Angleichung an den 
Gemeinsamen Auflentarif der EWG.
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point. It would be ridiculous to accuse the Chancellor of cheating in this matter. At 
least it was by no means clear that he “betrayed” German industrial interest at Bad 
Kreuznach. One might rather argue that, in view of the explicit restatement of the 
FTA concept by the German Government throughout the spring and summer of 
1959, de Gaulle might have been the one who felt betrayed by the pledge that 
Adenauer had allegedly made in November 1958, given that the Chancellor was not 
able to deliver this in terms of Government statements along the same lines. The 
French foreign ministry actually perceived a weakening of Adenauer’s position vis- 
a-vis Erhard at the beginning of 195996. All of this is to suggest that, while 
Adenauer was an extremely important player in the Cabinet, he was still only one 
player among others, all of whom had to carefully observe and respond to the 
manifestations of political pressure from interest groups and their agents within the 
political system. That Adenauer was no exception and even he could not escape 
these pressures, is clear from the evidence relating to the struggle over the Hallstein 
Plan. Globke warned Adenauer that the creation of “faits accomplis” in the question 
of acceleration would be dangerous and that it was far more advisable to let things 
proceed slowly and not to instigate objections from the vast parliamentary majority 
opposing that move as it stood. It is very probable that Adenauer had to be given 
this kind of advice fairly often, but that these occasions rarely made it into the files 
of the Chancellor's office. In this case they did, since the Chancellor was in Japan 
and the situation at home was volatile.
Industrial opinion on the Hallstein Plan was transmitted mainly through the 
larger associations in particular through the umbrella organisations, BDI, DIHT and 
the GemeinschaftsausschuB der Deutschen Gewerblichen Wirtschaft. The 
explanation for this is the lack of appropriate resources in the smaller associations to 
conduct the respective studies and the fact that the effects to be expected from these 
measures, while potentially harmful to some, were very diverse, difficult to 
perceive and not to be expected very soon. As will be seen in the following chapter 
on the attempts at bridge building between the Six and the Seven, the formulation 
and expression of industrial interest on possible arrangements for a Europe-wide
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 42: Paris, 19 III 1959: Note par 
Olivier Wormser pour le Ministre, a. s. conversation franco-allemande d’ Aix-la-Chapelle.
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association were entirely the domain of BDI and DIHT, since these considerations 
were too far removed from anyone involved in day-to-day business affairs. It will 
be observed in the following chapters to what extent the involvement of smaller 
specialised associations in the formulation and expression of industrial interest can 
be validly seen as an indicator for the effective impact on a certain question of 
international commercial policy. The absence of such involvement of smaller 
associations should then be an indication of a lack of immediate urgency in the 
matter to particular sectors or to industry at large.
The struggle between the BMWi and the AA is a somewhat puzzling factor. 
The conflict over acceleration was not entirely a matter of differences over 
economic policy issues. This conflict entailed some psychological ingredients even 
beyond the usual fight over competencies. Erhard's behaviour in particular is very 
difficult to assess. It will therefore be necessary to further analyse his position and 
his relationship with German industry. It is not at all clear to what extent Erhard 
responded to industrial interest, to his ''own" economic doctrine or to the attraction 
exerted by the power of the Chancellorship for which he might already have been 
longing for in 1960. This question is important in the wider context of the thesis in 
that the somewhat "independent" set of interests that seems to have been followed 
by Erhard might be more difficult to be accounted for by pressures exerted on him 
from other forces. For the BDI the options were however limited by the fact that 
Erhard and the BMWi were their only reliable contacts with some say at the Cabinet 
table. Outside the bureaucracy the only channels of influence open to them were the 
CDU and to a lesser extent the FDP. Yet the transmission of interests via party and 
parliamentary channels seems to have been much less effective in the short term 
than the well-established contacts with the BMWi.
5 "Bridge Building" between EEC and efta 1959-1961 
From the fta Plan towards the Concept of a 
Europe-wide Customs union
In 1960 the German position towards the solution of the commercial problems 
between the Six and the Seven underwent a remarkable change. Under the influence 
of BDI and DIHT and inspired by the BDI’s work on a European customs union, 
the Federal Government reconsidered its position and finally abandoned the FTA 
concept. The result of this shift in the German position was the so-called Miiller- 
Armack Plan, an eclectic synthesis of the plethora of proposals that had been on the 
table since talks on a Europe-wide trade arrangement started in 1957. This plan had 
strong similarities with the customs union proposal by the BDI, while it also 
included the results of expert talks between the British and the German 
Governments at the end of 1960. The bilateral talks which the German Government 
initiated with the British and the French independently were seen as leading to 
proper negotiations on "bridge-building" within a multilateral framework. By early 
1961 the chances for that had considerably increased. The objective of the Miiller- 
Armack Plan had been to produce an arrangement that would be acceptable to 
everybody as a starting point. The BMWi hoped that it had the capacity to develop 
into a Europe-wide customs union in the longer run.
The plan would have given Britain and the other members of EFTA more 
time to adapt and some say in substantive matters as well. This more subtle 
approach towards the creation of a Europe-wide trade association was crushed by 
American pressure on the British to seek proper membership. It seems that this 
American move shifted the core of the debate away from gradual adaptations of 
individual measures of commercial policy to a question of all or nothing1. The 
question of proper membership was very clearly defined and indeed brought to the
A treasury document clearly establishes that it was the American influence which finally 
induced the British Government to apply for full EEC membership. It speaks of a 
"considerable catalytic effect" of the American position on the formulation of views in 
Whitehall. See PRO, T267/14, April 1966: Treasury Historical Memorandum No 10. 
Negotiations with the European Economic Community 1961-1963, Section VII: Bilateral 
Talks with Member States of the E.E.C., and others.
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point by the Commission as one of complete acceptance of the treaties as such. The 
association formula on the other hand left scope for negotiations on specific 
commercial agreements. Thus the debate effectively became much more formalised 
in terms of treaty provisions and the options were narrowed down to "aye" and 
"nay". It is obvious that this would render it much easier for any one participating 
country in the negotiations that were to start on British accession to obstruct a 
positive solution.
This chapter will try to trace the influence that German industry had on the 
shift in the official German position in 1960. It will give a description of the range 
of proposals that were made in Germany and Europe at large in order to ease the 
actual and potential trade discrimination that came about between EEC and EFTA. 
Despite the massive attempts by German industry to get a direct say on some of the 
issues debated among the Governments involved in the committee of 21, the Federal 
Government still kept pursuing a pragmatic solution rather than aiming straight at a 
customs union. It is difficult but useful to assess the chances for success at the 
European level which the Muller-Armack Plan would have had, had the Americans 
not induced the UK to apply for membership of the EEC right away. The attempt 
has to be made to assess whether the Muller-Armack Plan would not have been - 
from the point of view of those wishing to see a truly Europe-wide trade 
arrangement coming into being - the much more practical way of achieving 
commercial unity between EEC and EFTA, if only in the medium term. This time 
round the Germans seemed to be on the right way to mediate between French and 
British interests. Yet the Americans dealt a destructive blow to that undertaking by 
forcing the British application.
5.1 Early German proposals for "bridge building" at the international level 
Restating the FTA formula
With the formation of EFTA coming closer, the concerns that had previously 
mainly been aired by the BMWi were increasingly shared by the Federal Chancellor 
as well. The visit to Britain in November 1959 had apparently made some
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impression on Adenauer, perhaps partly because of Macmillan’s barely disguised 
threat to withdraw British troops from the Federal Republic2. In addition to the talks 
with Macmillan a letter from Herman-Josef Abs, perhaps the most influential figure 
in German banking3, had warned him that the split between EEC and EFTA, apart 
from the commercial difficulties, was likely to have serious political repercussions 
as well. Adenauer indicates in his response to Abs that it was these two facts which 
led him to think that things were moving again for the first time since the 
breakdown of the Maudling negotiations and to formally order the working out of a 
programme for a Europe-wide trade association to overcome the gap between the 
Six and the Seven4. With his letter Abs had sent Adenauer an article which he had 
written for the journal "Europa". The article stressed that the deviation of trade 
flows caused by the existence of the two trading blocs was bound to lead to political 
tensions mainly with Great Britain and that it was important to intensity trade 
simultaneously with countries within the EEC and outside of it5. Following 
Adenauer's wish for a German programme for the close co-operation between EEC 
and EFTA, the procedure for drafting such a plan was discussed by the AA and the 
BMWi at a meeting at the Chancellor's office on 26 November 1959. The AA was 
represented by Carstens and Harkort, Meyer-Cording was there for the BMWi and 
Vialon from the Chancellor's office informed the two ministries about Adenauer's 
wishes. Both ministries were to work out the plan jointly. All of those present at the 
initial discussion agreed that no mention of these preparations should be made when 
Adenauer was to go to Paris6.
At the end of November 1959 Adenauer was also contacted on the same 
matter by the four prime ministers (Ministerprasidenten) of the north German
FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. VII, Part 1, Western European Integration and Security; Canada: 
Bonn, 11 XII 1959: Telegram from the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the 
Department of State, pp. 194-195.
On Abs' role in German politics see Czichon , Eberhard : Der Bankier und die Macht. 
Hermann Josef Abs in der deutschen Politik. Koln 1970.
BA, B136 - 2553: Bonn, 3 XII 1959, Von Adenauer an Abs; B102 - 12204,1: Bonn, 27 XI 
1959, Von: Meyer-Cording an Ludwig Erhard iiber Muller-Armack, Betr.: Uberlegungen 
hinsichtlich einer England und die anderen europaischen Staaten umfassenden grofleren 
Integration; 1 XII 1959, Meyer-Cording an Ludwig Erhard.
BA, B136 - 2553: Bonn, 14 XI 1959, Herman Josef Abs an Konrad Adenauer, Artikel: 
"Europas wirtschaftliche Integration ist ein Politikum".
BA, B136 - 2553: Bonn, 27 XI 1959, Vialon an Adenauer, Betr.: Programm fur eine 
Zusammenarbeit zwischen EWG und EFTA.
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Lander Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen and Hamburg who were 
particularly concerned about the impact of the EFTA given that a much higher 
proportion of their trade than the German average was with EFTA countries, mainly 
Britain but also Scandinavia. Their trade relations with the Seven were also by far 
more important than their commercial links within the EEC. Exports from these 
four Lander to the EEC had amounted to 1.15 billion DM in the previous year, 
while those to the EFTA amounted to 2.24 billion DM. The prime ministers 
therefore saw the vital economic interests of their states endangered and urged the 
Chancellor to promote the idea of renewed negotiations and the early conclusion of 
an FTA agreement7. Adenauer passed the request by the four prime ministers on to 
the president of the Commission of the EEC, Walter Hallstein, and to the heads of 
the BMWi and the A A, Erhard and von Brentano8.
It is fairly obvious that Adenauer saw the political need for some action on 
the question of bridge building quite early on. He was aware that inaction on his 
part might soon lead to political difficulties in Germany. The results of his talks 
with Macmillan in London, the intervention by a widely respected German banker 
and the dramatic appeal by the four prime ministers gave Adenauer a chance to act 
without having to give Ludwig Erhard the credit for Government action in this 
field. Erhard and his ministry had all along expressed the urgent need for dealing 
with this problem. Meyer-Cording's first response to Adenauer's request for a 
programme of bridge building was therefore that Erhard and the BMWi had always 
been demanding this anyway9. Adenauer thus acted mainly out of tactical
BA, B102 - 12146,3: Bremen, Kiel, Hamburg, Hannover, 7 XI 1959, Die Senatsprasidenten 
der Hansestadte Hamburg und Bremen und die Ministerprasidenten von Niedersachsen und 
Schleswig-Holstein an Konrad Adenauer. Betr.: Sorge der Kiistenlander wegen der kleinen 
Freihandelszone.
BA, B136 - 2553: Bonn, 4 I 1960, Adenauer an Hallstein, Erhard, von Brentano. Betr.: 
Schreiben der Ministerprasidenten der vier norddeutschen Kiistenlander. It is important to 
note that these concerns were apparently not present in Southern Germany. Thus, the vice- 
president of the BDI and president of the Association of Bavarian Industry, Rodenstock, 
argued in favour of acceleration. The motivation behind this was clearly to secure the 
integration of the Six and preferential access to the French and the Italian market for 
Bavarian industry. See MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 46: 
Article du Professor Rodenstock, paru dans la “Suddeutsche Zeitung” , le 20 avril 
[I960].
BA, B102 - 12204,1: Bonn, 27 XI 1959, Meyer-Cording an Ludwig Erhard iiber Muller- 
Armack, Betr.: Uberlegungen hinsichtlich einer England und die anderen europaischen 
Staaten umfassenden groileren Integration.
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considerations. His fairly rapid change of mind might also be explicable in terms of 
the political damage which he had inflicted upon himself in his temporary quest for 
the federal presidencey10. Another indication that Adenauer's initiative was probably 
mainly due to his intention to allay in advance any suspicion that he would not be 
sufficiently responsive to the interests of German business interests, can be found in 
the Chancellor's response to the four northern German prime ministers. In his letter 
to them he referred to the talks conducted and measures to be taken at the 
international level, mainly the EEC proposal for a contact group between the two 
trading blocs and the perspective of making the round of negotiations in the GATT 
an important factor easing the potential commercial tensions between the Six and the 
Seven. More importantly, the Chancellor stressed quite strongly that there had so 
far not been any indication that German foreign trade with the EFTA was shrinking 
or was likely to shrink in the near future, rather the opposite. He could point to the 
fact that German trade with the Seven had actually increased and that any immediate 
action going beyond that which was already being done and projected was not 
needed11. Thus Adenauer did not see the need for immediate action but was eager to 
demonstrate that he was alert to the problem. In this view he was reassured by 
Hallstein who furnished the Chancellor with arguments playing down the negative 
impact that was to be expected from the EFTA formation for the four northern 
German states12.
The results of the work on a programme for co-operation between EEC and 
EFTA were discussed between AA and BMWi in March 1960. Before that and even 
before Adenauer's initiative, the BMWi had been contemplating the options 
available to bring about renewed negotiations. The term for the solutions which 
were sought was that of a "multilateral European association". At the end of 1959
10 The Americans saw Adenauer’s change of mind merely as a tactical move, while the British 
Government’s hopes for a substantive change in the German attitute had increased. FRUS, 
1958-1960, Vol. VII, Part 1, Western European Integration and Security; Canada, pp. 294- 
296: 22 VIII 1960: Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France; pp. 
303-304: Circular Airgram from the Department of State to certain diplomatic missions; on 
the embarrassing candidacy for the presidency see W agner , Wolfga ng : Die 
Bundesprasidentenwahl 1959. (Adenauer-Studien II) Mainz 1972.
11 BA, B102 - 12146,4: Bonn, 4 I 1960, Adenauer an die Ministerprasidenten der Lander 
Hamburg, Bremen, Niedersachsen und Schleswig-Holstein.
12 BA, B102 - 12146,4: Bonn, 1 III 1960: Prafi an Ministerprasidenten der Lander Hamburg, 
Bremen, Niedersachsen und Schleswig-Holstein. Anlage: Ausziige des Schreibens von 
Walter Hallstein an Konrad Adenauer.
188
the BMWi was concerned that the aim of establish such an arrangement, which 
previously had been stated not only by the Federal Government but by the Council 
of the EEC and the Commission, was in danger of disappearing from the European 
agenda and that the desirability of this aim had repeatedly been questioned. In an 
assessment of the European situation Carl Hiinke from the BMWi took the view that 
provisional measures and co-operation limited to individual cases could only lead to 
an easing of tensions in the short run, if a long term solution was accepted in 
principle at the same time. Hiinke suggested that a Europe-wide customs union was 
by no means an unrealistic project in this context13. It is remarkable that such a 
scheme was considered within the BMWi at that time already. Yet Hiinke's 
suggestion of a Europe-wide customs union was not picked up in the talks about the 
programme that Adenauer had demanded. In fact the proposal of a Europe-wide 
customs union was only seriously discussed at all in the BMWi in late fall and 
winter 1960. Hiinke considered also the chances for some sort of "Atlantic" trade 
arrangement that would include the US and Canada for which only an FTA could 
serve as the basic concept.
Throughout December 1959 and the following months the BMWi and the 
AA worked on a German proposal that could eventually be put forward in the talks 
at the European level which were to begin after the Atlantic Economic Conference 
in Paris in January 1960. It was clear that the existing disagreement on any form of 
a multilateral association would make it necessary to implement pragmatic short 
term measures in order to maintain at least a minimum level of economic co­
operation. This was seen as necessary to protect vital German trade interests with 
the Seven. The early analyses by the BMWi included suggestions for closer co­
operation with the United States and Canada as well as matters referring to the 
formulation of a liberal common commercial policy by the EEC14. The 
considerations were inevitably linked with the discussions about the acceleration 
proposals which had come from the Commission of the EEC and from France. Thus 
the BMWi was initially contemplating a mild, perhaps only symbolic early
BA, B102 - 12204,1: Bonn, 3 XII 1959, EA3, Hiinke Betr.: Gedankenskizze zu einer 
grolleren Europaischen Integration.
BA, B102 - 12204,1: Bonn, 11 XII 1959, EA3, Gedankenskizze uber die Moglichkeiten 
einer wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit im europaischen und atlantischen Rahmen.
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approximation of external tariffs toward the CET in order to bring France round to 
accepting the overall lowering of the CET by 20%15. But even this small concession 
was quickly dropped in the next draft of the proposal16. The main outcome of the 
analyses and proposals debated within the BMWi and between the BMWi and the 
A A was that the basic concept for a long-term solution remained an FTA formula17. 
Hiinke's suggestion of a customs union had not found much interest. The fact that 
the FTA concept was retained was also a reflection of the strong previous 
commitments to this concept at all levels of German politics and to the expectations 
of all those who so far had commented to the BMWi and the Chancellor's office on 
the need for bridge building.
Short term and long term solutions in the German perspective
The BMWi and particularly Ludwig Erhard clearly hoped that it would be possible
to re-open multilateral talks on a Europe-wide long-term arrangement for 
commercial relations. Yet while this remained the objective of the federal ministry 
of economics, Erhard and his aides displayed an unusual degree of patience in the 
process of coming closer to achieving this aim. As far as one can tell from the 
BMWi files, they in fact abstained from putting forward the proposal for the long 
term solution in the committee of the 21 which they had worked out by March 
1960. They waited instead for some improvement of the still rather tense political 
climate between Six and Seven due to the formation of EFTA and the acceleration 
plans, hoping that such talks might have a better chance of success at a somewhat 
later stage. On the surface this seems to suggest that the BMWi had given in to the 
Commission's point of view, stated already in its second memorandum in 
September 1959, that it would be undesirable to aim at a final arrangement at one
BA, B102 - 12204,1: Bonn, 15 XII 1959, Von. EA3, Hiinke an Muller-Armack, Meyer- 
Cording, Klein, Betr.: Deutscher Vorschlag zur Senkung des gemeinsamen Auftentarifs um 
20% verbunden mit vorzeitiger Annaherung an den gemeinsamen Auflentarif.
BA, B102 - 12204,1: Bonn, 16 XII 1959, Meyer-Cording an Erhard iiber Muller-Armack, 
Betr.: Deutscher Vorschlag zur europaischen Zusammenarbeit im atlantischen Rahmen.
In a draft of the German proposal for a long term solution, the establishment of a free trade 
area with a clear schedule was seen as the essential objective. BA, B102 - 12204,2: Bonn, 19 
III 1960, EA3, Hiinke Sprechzettel fur Herm Staatssekretar Professor Dr. Miiller-Armack 
fur die Ressortbesprechung am 23 Marz 1960.
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stroke and that a pragmatic method of procedure was more advisable18. The BMWi 
suspected that the Commission wanted to put any long-term solution off the agenda 
for as long as possible, and while the ministry had to acknowledge that the 
immediate discussion of such a solution was indeed not feasible for the time being, 
it was not ready to give way to the seeming tendency of the Commission to drop 
that possibility altogether. Yet in the heated battle over acceleration it was anyway 
unlikely that much progress could be made very soon.
The plan which was contemplated in the BMWi and debated with the AA in 
spring 1960 envisaged a procedure of finally arriving at an FTA by extending all 
internal tariff reductions of the two trading blocs to one another, but with a certain 
time-lag. That would have meant that EEC and EFTA would not extend to each 
other the full internal tariff reductions but each time only the amount of reductions 
that had been made internally at the previous stage of the respective transitional 
period. In this way, the BMWi argued, the degree of discrimination between the 
two blocs would be limited while the "d6calage" ensured that the independent 
development of the EEC was not endangered. The expectation that the EEC might 
suffer in some way or other from being included in a wider framework had perhaps 
been the most important hindrance to progress on the FTA question before. By 
tackling this particular problem in the way presented, the BMWi thought that the 
inclusion of the EEC into the Europe-wide FTA could be achieved smoothly. 
Another advantage of this procedure was that it provided the projected FTA with the 
clear schedule and the final date that was required by the GATT. It was also 
considered to be an administratively simple construction. Some minor problems 
were foreseen by the BMWi as far as the interests of the United States were 
concerned. Yet it was reckoned that this problem could fairly easily be overcome 
through the tariff negotiations in the GATT in 1960 and 1961 and by the adoption 
of a liberal common commercial policy by the EEC19.
BA, B102 - 64813: Brussel, Kommission der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 
Denkschrift der Kommission fur den Sonderausschufl zur Priifimg der Fragen betreffend eine 
europaische Wirtschafitsassoziation.
BA, B102 - 12204,2: Bonn, 19 III 1960, Von. EA3, Hiinke, Sprechzettel fur Herm 
Staatssekretar Professor Dr. Muller-Armack fur die Ressortbesprechung am 23 Marz 1960.
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The trade committee of the 21 was envisaged to be the main forum for 
Europe-wide talks on trade problems. From the very beginning the Germans had 
favoured the institutional framework of the OEEC/OECD for such talks, while 
France would have preferred the contact committee of the EEC to perform this 
function. The trade committee of the 21 had been created at the occasion of the 
Atlantic economic conference in Paris on 14 January 1960 and had been charged,
among other things, with the task of finding solutions to the split between EEC and
20EFTA . The committee convened under the chairmanship of Luns and later created 
a sub-committee dealing with tariff matters. It only started substantive discussions 
after the decision on acceleration had been made by the EEC and preparatory 
analyses on the tariff situation had been undertaken. Thus by the end of May 1960 
the activities of the trade committee intensified, and the BMWi now came up with 
its suggestions, most of which concerned the preparations for the tariff negotiations 
that were to start later that year within the GATT.
In a ministerial conference in early June 1960 Ludwig Erhard talked about 
his personal assessment of how the process of arriving at a final trade arrangement 
should proceed and how much time would be needed to achieve that. He estimated 
that it would take until the end of 1961 before the practical problems would have 
been dealt with through the GATT negotiations. After that, he reckoned, the time 
for the final and lasting arrangement would have come21. It is hard to tell how 
realistic this forecast would have been, had the American pressure on Britain to seek 
full EEC-membership not altered the situation so considerably in 1961. Erhard's 
suggestion was that a list of products should be established which were primarily 
traded within Europe, and that on the basis of this list one could come closer to a 
European solution through negotiating tariff reductions for these positions. This was 
by no means a new suggestion, but it was the main line of thought followed by the 
BMWi and the object of the work that was done in the trade committee of the 21. 
Suggestions along these lines had been aired by the Dutch and the Germans already 
before at the EEC Council meeting at Luxembourg. The aim of these statements had
BA, B102 - 12204,2: Bonn, 15 I 1960, Harkort, AA an Deutsche diplomatische 
Vertretungen, Betr.: Atlantische Wirtschaftskonferenz in Paris.
BA, B102 - 12206,2: Bonn, 3 VI 1960, handwritten note on a conference in the BMWi on 
3rd June 1960.
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been to make the offers of the EEC to the EFTA more concrete and operational by 
carefully preparing with the Seven the GATT negotiations according to article 
XXIV/6 and the Dillon negotiations22.
The decision to come back to this project and to present it as a formal 
proposal to the other EEC members had been taken at the end of May by the BMWi 
and the AA23. At a meeting on 8 June 1960 the Six agreed to a proposal based 
essentially on what had been concluded in the BMWi five days earlier. The 
following day the Seven approved this proposal in the trade committee of the 21 
with only minor changes in the wording of the agreement. The changes demanded 
by the Seven were in fact quite in tune with the actual German objectives in that 
they stressed the need not to lose sight of the long term aspects of the matter24. 
According to the proposal that was discussed and approved in the trade committee 
debates on matters of principle of a long term solution should be avoided for the 
time being. It was decided that talks should begin in preparation for the mutual 
concessions to be made from September 1960 according to article XXIV/6 of the 
GATT and that the essential tariff positions of European trade should be closely 
examined between the Six and the Seven as a preparation for the GATT negotiations 
that were to begin in January 1961 and finally, that after the completion of the 
GATT negotiations, further negotiations should follow in order to achieve additional 
mutual concessions and to subsequently abolish all trade barriers that would still be 
left25. The GATT negotiations according to article XXIV/6 would be nothing more 
than a close examination of the CET by all signatory states as to whether tariff 
increases on the part of individual member countries of the EEC would be offset by 
tariff reductions of other EEC member states thus compensating the disadvantage of 
each individual third country that was harmed by the tariff increases elsewhere in
22 For an account of the overall context of the Dillon Round see Cu rzo n , Gerard :
Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its 
Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques. London 1965, pp. 99-100.
23 BA, B102 - 12206,1: Bonn, 31 V 1960, EA3, Hiinke Vermerk liber die Besprechung unter
Vorsitz von Herm Staatssekretar Muller-Armack zur Vorbereitung der Sitzung des 
Handelsausschusses der 21 am 9. und 10. Juni 1960.
24 BA, B102 - 12206,2: Brussel, 15 VI 1960: EWG-Rat an Standige Vertreter der
Mitgliedsstaaten, Betr.: Zweite Tagung des Ausschusses fur Handelsffagen am 9. und 10. 
Juni 1960, Anlage 2.
25 BA, B102 - 12206,2: Paris, 9 VI 1960, Muller-Armack, Sonnenhol an AA,
Bundeskanzleramt, BMWi et al.; BA, B102 - 12218,a: [undated] Betr.: Vorschlag der 
deutschen Delegation zur Erganzung der Absichtserklarung.
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the Community . Some of these practical proposals had been contemplated within 
the BMWi only as a result of the fact that similar analyses were being conducted by 
the EFTA countries. The head of the European department of the BMWi thus 
ordered the establishment of the list of goods traded primarily within Europe only 
less than two weeks before the trade committee was to meet on 9 June27.
5.2 German industry and the German concepts for "bridge building " in Europe
In the course of the summer of 1960, a plethora of proposals was put forward in 
Western Europe for the solution of the trade problems that were feared to arise 
between the Six and the Seven. Academics, politicians, bureaucrats and industrial 
associations showed considerable energy and creativity in producing new concepts 
to this end and in plagiarising from previous plans and proposals. Many of those 
involved in that might have hoped to earn some fame for putting forward the plan 
that would finally be adopted and lead to the solution. Thus almost every amended 
version of some previous proposal was labelled a plan of its own by the proud 
inventor. The Mimchmeyer-Plan, the Heckscher-Plan, the Bachmann-proposal and 
also the Muller-Armack-Plan are examples of suggestions made after the summer of 
1960, few of which ever became known to the wider public. All of them varied 
greatly in realism, originality and actual and potential influence. Some of them 
lacked all of these attributes and rather reflected the author's vanity and ambitions, 
others were indeed valuable contributions to the European debate. The positive 
effect of all these analyses was that there was practically no aspect to the problem 
which had not in some form been debated and for which some solution had not been 
suggested.
Within this climate of search for practical solutions, industry made 
particularly important contributions. In Germany they came mainly from the textile 
industry, the chemical industries and the engineering sector, all of which made
For a discussion of the problems posed to the GATT by the formation of the EEC (and vice 
versa) and the tariff negotiations of 1960 and 1961 see Cu rzo n , Diplomacy, pp. 98-100. 
BA, B102 - 12206,1: Bonn, 30 V 1960, Meyer-Cording an Krautwig Betr.: Vorbereitung 
der Sitzung des Handelsausschusses der 21 am 9. und 10. Juni 1960.
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themselves heard in the European debate either by pointing to the concrete impact 
which the gap between the Six and the Seven had on them or by putting forward 
concrete solutions for these issues and the more general ones. An important aspect 
of the European debate was the co-operation between European industrial 
associations from both sides, Six and Seven. There are indications that this factor 
played at least some role for the German decision making process.
The general "brain storming" during the summer of 1960 seems to have led 
to a carefully prepared proposal by the BDI for a Europe-wide customs union. 
Throughout the summer the BDI had repeatedly made statements along these lines 
and asked the BMWi to make its analyses available so that the BDI could include 
their findings in the proposals that it was working on. Thus, long before the BMWi 
and the Federal Government switched to the customs union proposal for a solution 
to Europe's trade problems, the BDI had already taken a clear position in favour of 
that. It will be seen to what extent the stance taken by the BDI influenced the BMWi 
and the Federal Government as a whole. The fact that the most important German 
industrial federation took so clear a view can almost certainly be expected to have 
exerted a great amount of pressure on the Government to revise its position.
Academic and bureaucratic expertise in the international debate
The first conceptional inputs into the debate on bridge building came mainly from
academics and individual members of national bureaucracies. Important 
contributions were made by research institutions like the PEP foundation (Political 
and Economic Planning) and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The thrust of 
the work done by these individuals and institutions had to do with the technical 
feasibility of the several overall concepts which were the FTA and the customs 
union and arrangements somewhere in between these two concepts. Most of these 
studies either dealt with one particular difficulty for the creation of a Europe-wide 
trade association or tried to offer solutions to all of them. They also tried to analyse 
whether the political and economic arguments made by the actors in the political 
arena were actually in line with the facts. The main technical problems were defined
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on the basis of the positions that had been taken by the countries involved in 
previous talks.
Table 5.1; Various concepts for "bridge building" considered in 1960
Type of arrangement main problems essential features plan by
Europe-wide CU agriculture excluded GATT conformity Muller-Armack
lower level of political 
commitment
CET or harmonised external 
tariffs
policy co-ordination?? tariff averaging
Europe-wide FTA failed once GATT conformity




association of EFTA to 
EEC (with decalage)






accession EEC to EFTA 
(with decalage)
politically unfeasible for the 
Six
GATT conformity Miinchmeyer




preferential trading area not GATT conform mutilate tariff reduction Bachmann
agriculture excluded . . - Commonwealth...................
accommodated
modified CU not GATT conform CET Heckscher
restricted to specific 
products
touchy areas excluded
agriculture excluded to include USA and Can
“progressive” FTA similar to the FTA solution restricted to a small and then 
increasing number of goods
van
Scherpenberg
Commonwealth final arrangement would be:
agriculture GATT conformity
acceptable to the USA
not harmful to the EEC
decalage
The studies thus tried to accommodate the British insistence that its relations with 
the Commonwealth should by no means suffer from the establishment of closer 
commercial links with the European continent, as they tried to deal with the existing 
tariff differentials and the fact that some low tariff countries would have profoundly 
different interests in the formation of any lasting arrangements than for example 
Italy and France with their high tariff levels. The international debate was therefore 
marked by a remarkable absence of ideological zeal on any side. The Consultative
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Assembly of the Council of Europe turned out to be an important forum for the 
analysis and discussion of many of these proposals. In two reports presented to the
assembly in July and in September H. Vos discussed the progress that was made in
28the discussion of possible solutions .
One of the first proposals made for a "Bruckenschlag" between EEC and 
EFTA came from Hans Bachmann, the director of the Swiss Institute for Foreign 
Trade and Market Research in Sankt Gallen. He suggested that a solution could be 
found by substantial mutual tariff reductions between the Six and the Seven and the 
subsequent establishment of a preferential trading area comprising the thirteen 
countries. Agriculture was to be excluded from the arrangement in order to avoid 
the main thrust of the complications that would be posed by the British relations 
with the Commonwealth. Bachmann was aware that his proposal would not be in 
line with the GATT provisions on the MFN rule, but thought that agreement by the
29other GATT partners could be bought somehow . This was clearly an illusion, and 
the GATT played an important role in preventing the Europeans from establishing
30some system of preferences with all the potential negative effects . Bachmann1 s 
proposal was considered in the BMWi and in the press, but the fact that it was not 
in conformity with the GATT made the whole exercise pointless in the eyes of any 
serious negotiator. It was impossible to imagine the US and many other GATT 
members agreeing to any preferential trade arrangement that would not strictly abide 
by the rules of the general agreement. In fact Bachmann had a formal solution to 
that problem. He argued that if one simply invited all other countries to join the 
arrangement, they could not keep up their arguments against it, while it was sure 
that neither the US nor Canada would actually be inclined to join31. This might have 
been a very smart thought, but hardly one that could have been presented in
BA, B102 - 12127,1: Strasbourg, 21 VII 1960, Assemblee consultative, Commission 
economique, Projet de rapport presente par M. H. Vos, Rapporteur; 27 IX 1960, Council of 
Europe, Consultative Assembly, Revised Draft Recommendationon European Economic 
Relations presented jointly be the Chairmen of and Rapporteurs of the Political and 
Economic Committees.
BA, B102 - 12127,1: Sankt Gallen, Juni 1960, Artikel von Professor Dr. Hans Bachmann, 
Direktor des Schweizerischen Instituts fur Aufienwirtschaft- und Marktforschung an der 
Handelshochschule: "Bruckenschlag EWG - EFTA durch eine gegenseitige Zollsenkung". 
Cu rzo n , Diplomacy, pp. 95-97.
BA, B102 - 12127,1: Bern, 7 IX 1960, Deutsche Botschaft, Mohr Betr.: Bruckenschlag 
zwischen EWG und EFTA.
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economic diplomacy without doing considerable damage to the reputation of who 
ever would present it. What Bachmann also overlooked was the fact that some 
European countries and certainly France would have regarded the risk of the USA 
accepting that deal as too high indeed, while for Switzerland and in the view of the 
BMWi this might actually have been regarded as highly desirable.
Another proposal that also lacked GATT conformity was that put forward by 
the Swedish economist Eli F. Heckscher. He had presented it to the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in September 1959 where it was debated again 
in July I96032. Just as the Bachmann proposal, Heckej^s plan would have required a ^  
two-thirds majority by all GATT members, since its provisions were not in line with 
the demands the general agreement imposed on regional trade arrangements. The 
essence of Heckscher* s plan was that a modified customs union should be created 
yet only include trade in a number of clearly specified products33. This was in 
breach of the GATT requirement according to which regional trade arrangements 
would have to abolish trade barriers concerning the main part of all trade. The 
“Scherpenberg-Plan” considered in the AA, started from a similar point and 
suggested that the rapprochement between Six and Seven should be achieved 
through progressively expanding the number of goods which would be allowed to 
circulate freely between them. Eventually, this phased rapprochement was to lead to 
an equitable solution resembling an FTA that would not endanger the cohesion of 
the EEC and would be acceptable to the USA34.
In an article for the news agency Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste (VWD) 
entitled "Europa: Nachrichten aus EWG - EFTA - Montanunion - OEEC" the 
BMWi official Edgar Horn assembled all the concepts that had been put forward 
throughout the summer 1960 in a way as to classify them according to their main
BA, B102 - 12127,1: Strasbourg, 21 VII 1960, Assemblee consultative, Commission 
economique, Projet de rapport presente par M. H. Vos, Rapporteur. See also PA - AA, Ref. 
200, Bd. 277: Bonn, 14 IX 1959: Leiter der Abteilung 4 an den Herm Staatssekretar, betr.: 
Bevorstehende Zoll- und KontingentsmaBnahmen in der EWG.
BA, B102 - 12127,1: Bonn, 12 IX 1960, DIHT an Industrie- und Handelskammem Betr.: 
Europaische Wirtschaftsintegration. Moglichkeiten einer Zollunion zwischen EWG und 
EFTA.
PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 486: Bonn, 1 X 1960: Vermerk von Emmel, betr.: Mindest 
erfordemisse fur eine Annaherung von EWG und EFTA.
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rationale35. The article shows that by September 1960 basically all possible 
arguments within the range of the political conditions that were given by the known 
positions of the countries involved had been on the table. The attempts by some to 
attach their names to one or other particular proposal still continued well into 1961 
when the president of the DIHT, Alwin Mimchmeyer, tried to present the proposal 
that the EEC should join EFTA as the "Miinchmeyer-Plan"36. All of this had been 
debated before and neatly summarised in Horn's article. Horn described four 
theoretically possible solutions, a Europe-wide customs union, a Europe-wide FT A, 
an association of EFTA to the EEC and the accession of the EEC to EFTA. He then 
went on to analyse the chances of any of these possible arrangements on the grounds 
of their technicalities rather than their political implications and concluded that the 
formation of a Europe-wide customs union and the accession of the EEC to the 
EFTA had the best chances. In the case of the accession of the EEC to the EFTA, 
Horn expected that through gradual tariff adaptations a Europe-wide customs union 
would be the eventual result.
Two studies, one by the EIU, the other by the PEP, were conducted on the 
more specific but very crucial question of the role of the Commonwealth and the 
solubility of the technical problems connected to it. The results of these studies were 
widely presented and discussed not only in the British but also the German press. 
Both studies argued that imperial preference was of a much lesser importance for 
the member countries of the Commonwealth than was widely thought and that it was 
indeed not the essential factor for Commonwealth imports into the UK37. The 
conclusion drawn from these studies by the DIHT and the BDI was that the 
Commonwealth problem could in many respects be regarded as much less dramatic
BA, B102 - 12127,1: Frankfurt, 1 IX 1960, Edgar Horn, Artikel in VWD Europa, 
Nachrichten zu EWG - EFTA - Montanunion - OEEC.
BA, B102 - 12129: Bonn, 20 IV 1961, DIHT-Hauptgeschaftsfuhrer Diiren an Muller- 
Armack Betr.: Deutsch-niederlandisch-britische Kammerbesprechungen uber den
Briickenschlag. Muller-Armack mentions Miinchmeyer in his memoirs as a great companion 
in the struggle for bridge building in 1960. See M uller-Arm ack , Alfr e d : Aufdem Wege 
nach Europa. Erinnerungen und Ausblicke. Tubingen 1971, p. 234.
HANDELSBLATT, 7 IX 1960, article by Rudolf Hahn, London; SOLINGER 
TAGEBLATT, 6 IX 1960, article by W. G. Krug, London; Economist Intelligence  
U n it : The Commonwealth and Europe. London 1960; the importance of imperial preference 
had fallen considerably by the early 1950s. MacDougall , Donald /H u tt , Rosem ary : 
"Imperial Preference: A Quantitative Analysis." In: Economic Journal 64(1954), pp. 233- 
257.
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and that the main thrust of technical and political difficulties would arise from
38agriculture as such .
Sectoral interest and the debate on bridge building
The sectors which aired their interest most clearly in the debate over bridge building 
were the engineering industry, both mechanical and electrical, the textile industry as 
well as the chemical industry. Yet of these industries with very considerable trade 
interests with the Seven, only the textile industry came forward with a detailed 
proposal for a sectoral solution for textiles in Western Europe. One of the reasons 
for this could have been that of these industries only the textile industry had real 
fears about what would happen if a permanent solution could not be found or if that 
solution was going to take a shape that would substantially damage the position of 
the German textile industry. For all the industries mentioned the fact that the 
prospects for such a solution in the near future were not clear, posed a number of 
problems. These problems varied considerably from industry to industry. The 
engineering industries only seemed likely to suffer minor damage from factors that 
could not even clearly be identified and were vaguely summarised as 
"psychological" even by the industry itself. The chemical industry had objections 
mainly against the retention of the Commonwealth preferences, while the textile 
industry was not only concerned with the treatment of the Commonwealth but also 
with that of other so-called "low-price-countries". In the context of the 
considerations of concepts of bridge building which had begun in the summer 1960 
the BMWi reviewed the results of the sectoral studies that had been conducted under 
the chairmanship of the Commission of the EEC and had ended on 23 December 
195839. In June 1960 the BMWi conducted talks with representatives of the
BA, B102 - 12127,2: Koln, 30 X 1960, BDI, Metzger, Gocksch an Mitgliedsverbande 
Betr.: EWG/EFTA Vorschlag einer Zollunion; B102 - 12127,1: Bonn, 12 IX 1960, DIHT 
an IHK's Betr.: Europaische wirtschaftliche Integration, Moglichkeiten einer Zollunion 
zwischen EWG und EFTA.
BA, B102 - 12127,1: Bonn, 23 VIII 1960, EA3, Leyser an Unterabteilungsleiter EA Betr.: 
Ihre Weisung vom 18 VIII 1960.
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chemical industry, the mechanical engineering industry and the textile industry on 
the problem of the relations between EEC and EFTA40.
At the beginning of 1960, when there was a lot of talk about something like 
an "Atlantic economic union", the largest association of mechanical engineering 
VDMA (Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten) called on BDI and Federal 
Government to push for negotiations between EEC and EFTA. Plans for the 
Atlantic union might be nice, the VDMA board said, but the only thing that really 
counted was whether a direct co-operation in Europe could be reached immediately. 
In this context the VDMA denounced the plans for acceleration and the plans for a 
common agricultural policy as they had been proposed by then41. The engineering 
industry made its concerns clear once more to the BMWi in direct talks in June 
I96042. A similar message came from the ZVEI (Zentralverband der 
Elektroindustrie) in an interview with its chairman H. Thomer for the business 
newspaper "Industriekurier". The electrical engineering industry was dissatisfied 
with the fact that the percentage of exports to the other EEC member countries had 
fallen from 1957 to 1958. Given that for the electrical engineering industry the 
export surplus to the EFTA was three times that to the EEC, the need for the 
preservation of the markets of the Seven was evident43.
The German chemical industry mainly feared competition from Britain and 
Sweden, which were the only major producers within the Seven. Yet the chemical 
industry did not expect that EFTA's tariff reductions would have a great impact on 
German exports perhaps with the exception of Britain where the average level of 
tariffs amounted to 33 %. The main concern was that the implementation of rules of 
origin in EFTA would have damaging psychological effects. As far as the 
Commonwealth was concerned, the German chemical industry objected to the 
preservation of preferences for the Canadian chemical industry44.
BA, B102 - 12206,2: Bonn, 29 VI 1960, handschriftliche Aufzeichungen iiber
Besprechungen mit Vertretem der Industrie, Chemie, VDMA, Textil.
BA, B102 - 12204,2: Frankfurt, 22 I 1960, VDMA an Ludwig Erhard Betr.: Europaische 
Integration, Anlage: Resolution des Hauptvorstandes der VDMA vom 20 1 1960.
BA, B102 - 12206,2: Bonn, 29 VI 1960, handschriftliche Aufzeichungen iiber
Besprechungen mit Vertretem der Industrie, Chemie, VDMA, Textil.
BA, B102 - B12206,l: Berlin, 21 V 1960, INDUSTRIEKURIER.
BA, B102 - 12206,2: Bonn, 29 VI 1960, handschriftliche Aufzeichungen iiber
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For the textile industry the list of potential problems concerning an 
arrangement between the Six and the Seven was longer than that for the other 
sectors mentioned. The main issue was still the question of a common approach 
toward low-price-countries and the problems arising from the position of the 
Commonwealth. Within Europe, the textile industry saw certain problems in Britain 
and Austria where the average tariff levels and therefore the likely discrimination 
through the internal tariff reductions of the EFTA were the highest. The BMWi 
suggested to the textile industry to work out a list of problematic products in co­
operation with its European counterparts45. By December 1960 the German textile 
industry came up with a very detailed analysis of the situation in the European 
textile sector and put forward possible solutions for these problems. The essential 
problem not only for the German textile industry but for the European industry was 
that, if it was not possible to ensure the maintenance of traditional trade flows, then 
the textile industry in the EEC would be faced with a severe problem of 
overproduction because of the probable reduction in exports. The second major 
problem was related to the first one in that the inflow of textile imports from low- 
price-countries would have a similar effect on the textile industry in the EEC. The 
textile industry's paper went on analysing the concrete tariff situation in Europe and 
proposed a number of solutions. In the view of the association "Gesamttextil" the 
ideal solution was the linear reduction of tariffs on the basis of article XXIV of the 
GATT46. But this solution as well as a general solution in the framework of the 
trade committee of the 21 did not seem to be possible in the near future. Thus 
Gesamttextil went on to suggest a number of pragmatic solutions which would, for a 
transitional period, ensure bearable conditions for some ranges of products. The 
association argued that the lists which had been compiled in the GATT in 
preparation for the Dillon round indicated that the interests of the countries 
concerned were such as to allow this pragmatic approach for a number of tariff 
positions. The four pragmatic proposals put forward were first, an only theoretically 
and temporarily possible GATT-wide reduction of external tariffs of both the EEC 
and EFTA for a number of individual tariff positions and secondly, a linear
45 ibid.
46 On the method of linear tariff reductions see Curzon , Diplomacy, pp. 77-80.
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reduction of tariffs for all those products that are mainly traded within Europe, that 
is, those products for which competition from overseas did not play an important 
role at all. This suggestion, which had been in the debate for a long time, seemed 
inappropriate as well because of the fact that there was not really a list of products 
which were traded mainly within Europe and that East Asian countries had a 
particular interest in practically all tariff positions concerned. The third option 
suggested that there should be tariff quotas for three years which should for example 
give a tariff reduction of 30% of the respective external tariff up to the import 
figures relating to some reference year. The fourth option foresaw the application of 
a minimum weight-related tariff or combined tariffs instead of tariffs ad valorem. 
The application of the different tariff methods should vary according to the 
character of the products concerned. On the basis of this analysis Gesamttextil 
proposed that a pragmatic solution along the lines of options three and four should 
be sought, where the GATT lists suggested that the common interest among the Six 
and the Seven was fairly strong. Gesamttextil therefore also suggested that, before 
the start of the GATT negotiations, talks between the various sectors of the 
European textile industry should be conducted47. Talks on these proposals were held 
in the BMWi department IVC1 with Gesamttextil on 21 December I96048.
The customs union plan of the BDI
The BDI and its president Fritz Berg had been among those who tried to push the 
Federal Government into doing something about the problem of bridge building 
between EEC and EFTA. Before Herman Josef Abs and Macmillan impressed their 
views on Adenauer in the late fall of 1959, Fritz Berg had already made the 
Chancellor aware of how important an issue this question was for all of German 
industry. At the end of September 1959 Berg wrote that the time for a new political 
initiative had come after France, through its courageous action in economic policy,
BA, B102 - 12127,2: Frankfurt, 12 XII 1960, Gesamttextil an BMWi Betr.: Entspannung 
des EWG/EFTA-Konfliktes fur den Textilbereich.
BA, B102 - 12127,2: Bonn, 16 XII 1960, IV Cl, Biinger an EA Betr.: ZollmaBnahmen zur 
Erhaltung und Verbesserung des Warenaustausches in dem Textilbereich zwischen den 
Landem der EWG und der EFTA.
203
had achieved a healthier economic position and for the first time was running an 
export surplus, and since the Commission's second memorandum had announced 
closer Atlantic co-operation and the establishment of a contact committee. Berg 
therefore suggested to the Chancellor that new negotiations should be started with 
the objective to keep the level of discrimination that would arise by 1st July 1960 as 
low as possible. While this immediate aim needed to be achieved, Berg insisted that 
the eventual objective was still a convention between the Six and the other eleven 
member countries of the OEEC. The president of the BDI also outlined for 
Adenauer what the essentials of that treaty would have to be. Tariff reductions and 
the abolition of quantitative restrictions were the main points. The freedom of 
movement for labour and capital as well as the freedom of establishment should also 
be guaranteed in the convention. Special rules should apply for agriculture. There 
would have to be rules of competition, a safeguard clause and a compromise 
concerning the nature of the rules of origin49. There was not much new in this 
proposal, yet it was another influence on the Chancellor inducing him to take at 
least some action in ordering work on a programme for bridge building that might 
be put forward at the international level. As has been said before, the debate over 
acceleration took up too much attention and made the climate in Western Europe 
more tense so that fruitful work on new concepts and the beginning of new talks did 
not come about. After the EEC decision for acceleration in early May 1960 and the 
beginning of serious work in the committee of the 21 this had changed.
In July 1960 the BDI contacted the Chancellor again. In his letter Fritz Berg 
again urged Adenauer to take the initiative at the highest level on the basis of 
constructive proposals for a solution that could be worked out by private business. 
Berg pointed to his positive experience in the REI (Rat der Europaischen 
Industrieverbande), the organisation of European business associations, which had 
recently convened under his chairmanship. He saw a "huge potential of very 
favourable forces and the true willingness" to achieve a good solution. Berg dared 
to suggest that new negotiations should therefore initially be conducted by 
representatives of European business. The Governments should grant them a semi­
49 BA, B136 - 2553: Bonn, 15 X 1959, Vialon an Miiller-Armack Anlage: Skizze zu Fragen 
der europaischen Wirtschaftsintegration, die Fritz Berg dem Budneskanzler hat zukommen 
lassen; Koln, 30 IX 1959, Fritz Berg Betr.: Europaische Integration - Freihandelszone.
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official status which he compared to that of a British Royal Commission. 
Governments should give these business representatives the charge to work on these 
questions and accept the results of these talks as basis for, or contribution, to the 
actual negotiations that would begin afterwards. As subjects of such negotiations 
Berg suggested all possible interim solutions to tariff problems and also the 
consideration of the form of a final arrangement of an economic association in 
Western Europe. As a possible form for that he proposed a Europe-wide customs
•  50umon .
This seems to have been the first time that the BDI mentioned the customs 
union proposal to the Federal Government. During the following months this 
proposal was repeatedly advocated by the BDI and its representatives in the public 
debate. By the fall of 1960 the BDI was working on the formulation of a precise 
plan that could be published and possibly serve as a starting point for the resumption 
of international talks on a final arrangement. In September 1960 the department for 
European economic integration of the BDI contacted the BMWi and asked for 
material that might be useful for the examination of the workability of a customs 
union51. A month later the BDI sent a letter (Rundschreiben) to its members in 
which it presented a detailed discussion of the customs union proposal, its 
drawbacks and advantages and the likely impact of such an arrangement on German 
industry. The main sectoral problems were addressed as well52. The BDI claimed 
the initiative and the authorship for the proposal for a Europe-wide customs union. 
Wilhelm Beutler had mentioned it in a speech as early as June 1960. It had then 
been restated by Fritz Berg in his letter to Adenauer in July and in a speech in 
September. In October Fritz Berg had discussions with the CBI leadership, where 
the plan was undoubtedly at the top of the agenda53. The study conducted by the 
BDI drew on previous analyses made by the PEP, the EIU and the Ford
BA, B136 - 2553: Koln, 25 VII 1960, BDI, Fritz Berg an Konrad Adenauer.
BA, B102 - 12127,1: Koln, 23 IX 1960, BDI, Arbeitskreis fur europaische wirtschaftliche 
Integration, Metzger an Regierungsrat Hunke.
For this and the following see BA, B102 - 12127,2: Koln, 30 X 1960, BDI, Metzger u. 
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Foundation. It elaborated detailed arguments concerning the difficult questions of 
the Commonwealth and imperial preference. The core of the plan was the 
establishment of a customs union that would avoid the political commitments 
required by the EEC. The advantages of a customs union of that sort lay, according 
to the BDI, in the fact that it would avoid deflections of trade which would most 
probably occur in an FTA, that the political independence of the member countries 
would not be impaired and that, as a consequence of a harmonised external tariff, a 
common commercial policy vis-a-vis the low-price-countries would evolve. The 
study went on to analyse two problems that had been pointed to often in the debate 
during the summer, the claim that tariff differentials in Europe were too large and 
that a common external tariff would be incompatible with the maintenance of 
Britain's relationship with the Commonwealth.
As for the first problem, the BDI concluded that it was only of very small 
importance as far as raw material imports from third countries were concerned, 
since each prospective member of the customs union would be interested in the 
cheapest possible provision of these materials. Exceptions to that were those tariff 
positions stated on the List G of the EEC treaty. As far as manufactured goods were 
concerned, tariff differentials in Europe were certainly greater. Yet the BDI pointed 
to the results of a British study which found that 85 % of them were primarily traded 
within Europe and that the divergence of interests within Western Europe was far 
smaller than expected and that therefore solutions to this problem could also be 
found. On the second major problem, the Commonwealth's export interests to the 
United Kingdom, the BDI also concluded that it could be solved and would not 
necessarily impede the British accession to the EEC. They founded their optimistic 
view on the study that had been done by the PEP and that had put the stress on the 
fact that imperial preference as such did not represent the vital Commonwealth 
interest, but that the essential question was that of sufficient outlets for 
Commonwealth products on the British market, be it with or without preferential 
tariff treatment. The PEP study argued that the abolition of imperial preference 
would not as such damage the Commonwealth's essential trade interests. As far as 
raw materials were concerned, the problems were again much less difficult than in 
the manufacturing sector. Only lead, zinc, aluminium and cork seemed to pose
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problems which, according to the BDI, could always be eased by the granting of 
tariff quotas. While 79% of manufactured imports from the Commonwealth enjoyed 
an average preference of 12% over imports from elsewhere and the preference 
therefore had a much greater impact here than on raw materials, these imports 
amounted to only 8% of total British imports of manufactured goods. In the case of 
imports from Canada, the BDI took the view that preferences for chemicals, engines 
and textiles would be entirely irreconcilable with the customs union, while it again 
pointed to the EIU's study to support the view that the abandonment of the 
preference would not necessarily lead to damage for the Commonwealth's essential 
trade interests. The point of the matter was that the likely expansion of the 
European market would by far compensate the Commonwealth countries for any 
possible loss on the British market. Thus the Commonwealth would in fact exchange 
the British imperial preference against an improved access to the European market 
as a whole.
The key problem for which the BDI did not see a clear-cut solution was that 
of agriculture. The BDI's study took the view that, because of large tariff 
differentials and very different systems of agricultural policies in different countries, 
the plan to include agriculture into a Europe-wide customs union was entirely 
unrealistic. The suggestion was therefore to return to the Ockrent-paper that had 
been worked out in the Maudling Committee in July 1958. The Ockrent Report had 
suggested maintaining the existing trade flows and adapting the flows of agricultural 
products according to the general rise in consumption. It was recognised that a 
balance of interest between the Commonwealth and between the more industrial and 
the more agricultural countries in Europe would have to be found. Clearly, this was 
a highly political question, which could hardly be technically solved in theory.
The BDI proposal had obviously been the fruit of a thorough study of the 
international academic and political debate on the whole issue. It had been addressed 
with the clear intention to tackle the real issues, and it had indeed taken account of 
all the serious previous work done in Germany and elsewhere. This tremendous 
effort apparently enhanced the BDI's role in the whole debate. In a BDI meeting on 
questions of foreign trade on 8 November 1960, Mr. Gocksch reported that the 
BDI's plan for a Europe-wide customs union had found a positive echo with the
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industrial associations of other European countries. He reported as well that 
European industrial circles did not believe in the FT A any more. A certain co­
ordination of commercial policies was now seen as indispensable. The BDI, 
Gocksch declared, was now seeking a solution through the establishment of a 
Europe-wide customs union or some solution very similar to it54.
5.3 Mismanagement: The Muller-Armack-Plan as the BMWVs panacea 
On the political level, bridging the gap between EEC and EFTA meant to a large
extent overcoming the silence between Britain and France over a comprehensive
solution to Europe's commercial problems. In November 1959 Adenauer had asked
for a programme to be worked out on that matter, but only a year later did the
Federal Government actually begin bilateral talks about the question of bridge
building. The reasons for this have been shown. It was in the first place the heated
atmosphere of the acceleration decision that blocked any serious possibility for the
resumption of talks. On the other hand the debate on possible concepts for bridge
building flourished during the summer of 1960 without leading to a conclusion that
the Federal Government could have picked up for a German initiative. Apart from
the substantive matters, a new initiative of any kind would have to be put forward
with the utmost diplomatic care and so as to avoid the feeling on either side that
commitments had to be made early on. As far as the French were concerned, the
prospect of multilateral talks was rejected. Hence any new start had to come about
in a very modest and very low key appearance. Thus it was only after initial talks
on expert levels that the BMWi came up with the Muller-Armack Plan hoping that it
would induce Britain and France to return to the negotiating table in the framework
of multilateral negotiations. The prospects for that happening looked right until the
British shifted their position and eventually applied for proper membership of the
EEC. The fact that the US administration had been pushing for that solution and had
constantly taken a tough stance on increased trade discrimination against American
products had also stiffened the French position. The French therefore remained
54 BA, B102 - 12127,2: Bonn, 9 XI 1960, EA3, Leyser Vermerk, Betr.: Besprechung beim 
BDI am 8 XI 1960.
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rather reserved concerning the German advances on bridge building. It was much 
more favourable for them, if Britain was to apply for full EEC membership and 
would thus have to accept the treaty of Rome as whole. It has already been said that 
this change of approach might actually have had a great influence not only on the 
further formal proceedings but also on the chances for a positive outcome of the 
whole matter. It did undoubtedly change the situation in that it limited the number 
of negotiating partners and therefore limited British bargaining power vis-a-vis the 
French as well.
Anglo-German bilateral expert talks
It seemed that by the end of 1959 Adenauer had taken a more positive and active 
attitude towards the question of the Six and the Seven by asking the BMWi and the 
AA to work out a programme to solve this question. A certain number of direct 
contacts with high ranking representatives of German business and with the British 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had preceded this change of attitude in the fall of 
1959. Already then Adenauer had suggested to begin talks with Britain and France 
which might be preceded by unofficial contacts55. A further development of 
Adenauer's position in this direction seems to have come about in the summer of 
1960 when he met again with the British head of Government. Adenauer's talks 
with Macmillan in August 1960 were seen in Britain as a turning point in British- 
German relations56. They were followed by a meeting of Erhard and Maudling at 
the occasion of an industrial trade fair in Berlin a month later. At that time 
Adenauer spoke for the first time in favour of the BMWi view that it was necessary 
to find a permanent solution quickly, while the A A favoured a short-term
BA, B102 - 12204,1: Bonn, 4 XII 1959, E3, Jentsch an Muller-Armack, Meyer-Cording et 
al. Betr.: Ergebnis des Kanzlerbesuches in London.
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approach57. At the beginning of November both Governments began talks on the 
expert level that continued until spring 1961. The BMWi hoped that these contacts 
would lead to talks between Britain, France and Germany and eventually the 
resumption of multilateral talks between the Six and the Seven. The French clearly 
did not want German mediation. They also made it understood that, what they 
would like best, was a clear decision on the part of the British for membership or 
nothing58.
The press interpreted the beginning of these contacts as a result of the 
changes in the foreign policy situation that had occurred since the end of the 
Maudling negotiations. The Berlin crisis had eased, the British summit diplomacy 
plans had failed and France also faced problems in Algeria, while de Gaulle at the 
same time pursued plans in Europe that did not please the Federal Chancellor59. The 
Economist pointed to another influence that contributed to the improvement in 
Anglo-German relations and the fact that things were moving again on the question 
of bridge building. For the Economist this was partly due to the fact that the British 
had become aware of the past failures of Ludwig Erhard and began to pay more 
attention than before to the AA and the Chancellor's office. Yet doubts remained as 
to how far Adenauer's conversion to the cause of the "big" Europe had actually 
gone at Macmillan's visit to Bonn in August60. In any case, at the beginning of 
November 1960 talks at expert level were started in Bonn on the technical questions 
of bridge building. They were continued in London later that month and once more 
in April 1961. Yet by then the situation had already changed completely. The
PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 486: London, 3 XI 1960: Deutsche Botschaft London. Herwarth an 
AA, betr.: Initiative zu den deutsch-britischen Gesprachen iiber eine Annaherung der beiden 
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meetings between the British and the German side did not have any character of 
secrecy. They were indeed reported very freely in the international forum of the 
Council of Europe and it was understood there that they were supposed to lead to 
contacts with France and only eventually to multilateral talks61. In the first meeting 
of experts at the beginning of November 1960 the two delegations exchanged their 
views and tried to come to a common viewpoint concerning the main problems that 
an association between the EEC and the EFTA would pose . The agenda was to 
present to each other the different views of Britain, the EFTA, Germany and the 
EEC as to what the essential problems were and how they could be addressed. Both 
delegations also tried to establish a common Anglo-German view concerning the 
creation of a final arrangement. Agreement was reached between the two sides that 
GATT-conformity of any arrangement was indispensable, that all trade barriers 
would have to be abolished completely between the Six and the Seven and that a 
lasting solution would have to be found within a short period of time.
For Britain the main problem was the Commonwealth. On a more general 
level the crucial point was the unlimited access of Commonwealth exports to the 
British market which, according to the British position, had to be maintained. In 
comparison with that the question of British exports to the Commonwealth and 
Commonwealth exports to the Six were of minor importance. The British found that 
the accession of the EEC to the EFTA would be the smoothest solution, while they 
made it clear that the accession of the UK to the EEC would not be possible in the 
medium term. The discussion between the two delegations continued on the basis 
that both options were in fact unrealistic and that other solutions would have to be 
found. More specific problems concerning the Commonwealth would arise in the 
field of raw materials, tropical foodstuffs, industrial products and foodstuffs from 
the moderate zones. Raw materials posed problems only for a number of products
BA, B102 - 12128,1: Strasbourg, 18 I 1961, Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, 
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like vegetable oils, aluminium, lead, zinc, cellulose and sisal63. The German 
suggestion that those could be dealt with by tariff quotas was rejected as insufficient 
by the British side. Concerning tropical foodstuffs the British saw the main problem 
arising from the fact that the overseas territories of the EEC had quite similar 
interests as the tropical Commonwealth countries concerning tea, citrus fruits, 
vegetable oils and a number of other products. The options for solutions to these 
problems presented by the British delegation were to mutually exchange the 
preferences given to the Commonwealth and to the EEC's overseas territories while 
reducing them at the same time. It seems that the German side actually favoured the 
simple disappearance of these preferences altogether64. The second possibility would 
be to grant entry of these products free of tariffs on an MFN basis. This would 
cause problems only as far as bananas were concerned.
As for industrial products, the German delegation made it clear that free 
access for such products from low-price-countries like India, Pakistan and Hong 
Kong would not be acceptable to the EEC and in particular to Germany. The British 
delegation stressed on the other hand that the access free of tariffs that these 
products now enjoyed in the UK would have to be maintained. Regarding food 
imports from New Zealand, Canada and Australia, the British delegation wanted to 
retain zero tariffs mainly in order not to affect the British price level. Another 
reason for this intention was that, for some of these countries, access to the British 
market was absolutely vital and that the maintenance of preferences had a role in 
this too. Both sides acknowledged that this was a particularly tricky problem. They 
agreed that the Ockrent-Report of the summer of 1958 should be studied again in 
order to elaborate a practical solution to these issues. Both sides also agreed to 
consider whether the long-term treaty between the Federal Republic and Denmark 
on exports of agricultural products should find a counterpart in a similar treaty 
between Britain and the Netherlands. Neither the British nor the German delegation 
thought it feasible to try to integrate the two entirely different systems of subsidising 
agriculture. The British side conceded that the preferences which Britain enjoyed in
Most of them figured on List G. See Cam pbell, Ala n : Common Market Law. Volume 2. 
London, Harlow 1969, p. 17, § 2028.
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the Commonwealth countries would pose much less of a political problem, but 
insisted on the other hand that some sectors of British industry would be hit by their 
abandonment and that Britain therefore would have to ask for corresponding 
concessions in the EEC. In order to circumvent the likely French insistence on a 
safeguard clause the British pledged that France was free to invest in Britain. The 
German delegation reminded the British of what it thought to be the main problems 
involved for the EEC. These were the question of a "decalage" to ensure the 
independent development of the EEC, a minimum of co-operation in the fields of 
services, capital transactions and freedom of movement of labour, a certain co­
ordination of "Konjunkturpolitik" and very importantly rules of competition.
In the talks in London at the end of November 1960 no progress was made 
beyond what had been said in the first meeting in Bonn65. The British delegation 
reported that the reaction by the other members of EFTA to the outcome of the first 
round of the Anglo-German expert talks had been reserved, that of France had been 
sceptical. On the level of practical questions it was agreed that a list of crucial 
products should be established according to a scheme suggested by the Germans. 
The British delegation was quite understandably not ready to make concessions at a 
point where it was not even clear whether official talks on final arrangements would 
actually come about in the very near future given the French reluctance. Britain 
remained reserved as to the adequacy of tariff quotas for the solution of individual 
trade problems with the Commonwealth. New German suggestions to harmonise 
tariffs and to regard tariffs within a certain percentage range as harmonised were 
practically not commented on by the British. The British also rejected a German 
proposal according to which global tariff reductions of up to 50% should be made in 
order to improve the climate with the US. At the end it was agreed that the 
Germans should enter into talks with the French and that talks between all three 
sides should start in January 1961. Before that there would be talks on the highest 
level66. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh from the Foreign Office urged the German
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delegation to make it clear to the Federal Chancellor that the political will had to be 
decisive, if one was to achieve the solution to the problem. With his visits to 
London and to Paris, Adenauer would have the great opportunity to help bring 
about the political will that was needed .
The Franco-German talks at expert level in January 1961 were carefully 
prepared by the BMWi and the AA. They had both worked on a questionnaire that 
was to be presented to Olivier Wormser and that was tuned in a way as to make a 
positive response a bit more likely. Despite these careful preparations, problems 
arose even before the talks began. One was the fact that the Muller-Armack Plan, 
then still labelled confidential, had been leaked to the press and thus much of the 
preparation effort had been rendereduseless. Another problem arose from the fact 
that Muller-Armack had presented his plan to Wormser without specifying whether 
or not this was to be an official German position. Wormserfs subsequent wish to 
conduct talks preferably with the AA's representative van Scherpenberg and not 
with a representative from the BMWi did not make things easier. It also reinforced 
the internal rivalry between the two ministries. In addition to this foreign 
interference in the competence struggle between BMWi and AA, both ministries 
disagreed on the question whether or not certain concessions on the political level 
could be made to France and for what price. The BMWi feared that the AA would 
concede to Paris the "secretariat politique" of de Gaulle's project for Europe 
without demanding enough in exchange. The BMWi had in fact proposed to the A A 
that there should be a package deal that would link German approval to de Gaulle's 
plan for a political secretariat to French acceptance of the Muller-Armack Plan. 
Hunke reports that the AA had previously argued that German agreement to the 
political secretariat was too much of a concession, but that it now seemed as if the
/TO
AA was ready to agree to the secretariat without asking anything in exchange . It is 
obvious that the internal struggle over power and competencies was played on 
successfully by the French at an extremely important occasion. The leaking of the 
Muller-Armack Plan three weeks before the talks were to take place was also utterly
BA, B102 - 12127,2: Bonn, 1 XII 1960, Meyer-Cording an Ludwig Erhard u. Muller- 
Armack Betr.: deutsch-englische Besprechungen vom 28. und 29. November 1960.
BA, B102 - 12128,1: Bonn, 20 I 1961, EA3, Hunke an Muller-Armack et al. Betr.: 
Vorbereitung der deutsch-franzosischen Besprechungen.
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inconvenient for the BMWi and its objectives. The talks themselves failed to 
produce a positive answer from the French. The result was that France was not 
willing to agree to a Europe-wide solution at that point. It was clear that France was 
reaching for more concessions on the political level from its EEC partners69. Talks 
between the French and the British took place at the end of February 1961. The 
French suggested that Britain should make up her mind whether or not she wanted 
to join the EEC as a full member which, in the French view, would be the simplest 
solution. Expectations had been low before the Franco-British talks and their 
outcome justified that. Wormser showed himself deeply disappointed about the 
British position which made the acceptance of a CET conditional upon the Six’ 
acceptance of the exclusion of agriculture and the accommodation of the
70Commonwealth’s interests .
The Miiller-Armack Plan: inner-bureaucratic brain-storming or blueprint for a 
workable European solution ?
When the Muller-Armack-Plan was leaked to the public in early January 1961 it 
received a very mixed press. Some suggested that it would be the basis for a new 
German initiative, others that it was just a result of the BMWi's sand-table exercises 
that had been going on for long and was clearly not intended to become an official 
German proposal71. The plan seemed to offer something for everybody. It was 
envisaged to be a GATT-compatible arrangement encompassing the Six and the 
Seven in a CU and possibly all other European members of the OECD in the form 
of an FTA. It would create a common external tariff for the Six and the Seven with 
a considerable number of exceptions and would thus be a mixture of a CU for all 
those industrial products where a CET could be agreed and an FTA for all others. It
BA, B102 - 12128,2: Bonn, 2 II 1961, Von. Meyer-Cording an Ludwig Erhard iiber 
Muller-Armack Betr.: Deutsch-franzosische Besprechungen am 27. Januar 1961 iiber die 
Beziehungen zwischen EWG und EFTA.
PA - AA, Ref. 200, Bd. 486: Paris, 3 III 1961: Deutsche Botschaft Paris, Blankenhom an 
AA; Bonn 9 III 1961: Leiter der Abteilung 4 an Herm Staatssekretar, betr.: britisch- 
franzosische Gesprache iiber das Verhaltnis Sechs/Sieben am 27. und 28. Februar 1961 in 
London; Zusammenfassung der Berichterstattung und erste Vorschhage fur eine 
Weiterbehandlung.
INDUSTRIE-KURIER, 7 I 1961, "Neue Europa-Initiative aus Bonn zu erwarten - Im 
Wirtschaftsministerium werden Zollunionsplane erortert"; DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 4 I 
1961: "Ein Europa-Plan aus der Schublade - Keine Bonner Initiative zu erwarten".
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was hoped that mutual tariff concessions could be made with the US and Canada, 
thus allaying their hesitation and perhaps achieving an Atlantic free trade area. 
Agriculture was to be excluded from the arrangement and treated in accordance with 
the Ockrent report of summer 195872. This meant that there would be an agreement 
on a standstill concerning trade restrictions in agricultural products. The adaptation 
towards the common external tariff should be made on the basis of the EEC's CET 
cut by 20%. An important feature of the arrangement was that, in the process of the 
adaptation, tariff rises would have to be agreed by a qualified majority, while tariff 
reductions could be made autonomously by the individual states73.
Once the plan was in the public, it became the object of the considerations in 
the Assembly of the Council of Europe where it was welcomed by the rapporteur 
M. H. Vos as an interesting suggestion. He pointed to the fact though that it had not 
been adopted by the Federal Government as official policy74. It is not quite clear 
what the BMWi's intentions were concerning the Muller-Armack-Plan. As a matter 
of principle the central department of the BMWi conducted an investigation into the 
leaking of the confidential document to the public75. The Federal Chancellor's office 
on the other hand was convinced that the plan had deliberately been leaked by the 
BMWi. In a briefing for Adenauer, Dr. PraB from the Chancellor's office took the 
view that the plan was valuable as a concept even though it lacked any new ideas. 
The Chancellor's office assumed though that the BMWi and Muller-Armack himself 
had been aware that the proposal, however balanced it was, would come too early 
and would hardly entice the French into resuming multilateral negotiations on a 
Europe-wide solution. In a note for Adenauer PraB suggested that in the long run a 
"progressive” customs union with some elements of an FTA would surely come 
about anyway and that the different concepts put forward by Berg, Beutler, 
Miinchmeyer and Abs would in practice gradually converge towards that sort of
Privately, Muller-Armack favoured the British system of deficiency payments over the 
system applied in Germany. See Ba, B102 - 12128, 2: Bonn, 17 II 1961: Muller-Armack an 
Robert Margulies, MdB.
VWD - Europa 2/61, 3 1 1961.
SeeBA, B102 - 12128,1: Strasbourg, 18 I 1961, Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, 
Economic Committee: Draft Report presented by M. H. Vos, Rapporteur.
BA, B102 - 12128,1: Bonn, 4 1 1961, Zentralabteilung, Walter an Regierungsrat Hunke.
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arrangement. Hence it was deemed better at the moment to continue negotiations on
7 (\pragmatic solutions to individual problems .
The Muller-Armack plan thus failed to become the official German position 
on European trade policy because of resistance from the A A and the Chancellor's 
office. The failure was also due to French reluctance to become dragged again into 
a negotiation process which they regarded as futile from the very beginning, since 
the initiative originated from the BMWi. The French were also quite dissatisfied 
with what they saw as a very unprofessional proceeding on the part of the BMWi. It 
was an unforgivable mistake that Muller-Armack had mentioned his plan “de titre 
personnel” (as he did ever so often) in a meeting with Wormser already on 20 
December 1960 and promised him a copy, but had then failed to provide the 
Director of Economic Affairs of the Quai d’Orsay with a copy of it for almost a 
month. The French did not know whether this plan was becoming official German 
policy or whether it had been dismissed in the meantime. They felt that they were 
being tested by the Germans77. Wormser made it understood to the A A that 
proceedings of that sort were unacceptable and insisted that in future talks with the 
BMWi, representatives of the AA also be present to insure that something like this
78did not happen again . In talking about the plan prematurely the BMWi and 
Muller-Armack in particular had seriously undermined their reputation and greatly 
damaged the prospects of the potentially very valuable proposal.
Despite the fact that the AA flatly rejected Muller-Armack’s intention to 
make his plan a formal proposal to the French at the end of January 1961, the 
questionnaire that the Germans presented to Wormser was essentially based on the
79Muller-Armack plan . Yet when the two delegations met for their talks, the French 
rejected any solution including all of Western Europe. German, Dutch and British
BA, B136 - 2553: Bonn, 10 I 1961, Referat 6, Dr. Prail an Adenauer, zur Vorlage Betr.: 
Schaffung einer europaischen Zollunion, hier: der sogenannte Muller-Arraack-Plan.
Le  M o n d e , 29/30 I 1961: «L’Allemagne s’efforce de savoir jusqu’ou la France peut aller 
dans la recherche d’un «modus vivendi* entre les Six et les Sept*.
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs Olivier Wormser, Vol. 46: Paris, 9 I 1961: Olivier 
Wormser a Bonn.
BA, B102 - 12128, 2: Bonn, 23 I 1961: Harkort an Meyer-Cording, Bonn, 1 II 1961: EA3, 
Ergebnisvermerk der deutsch-franzosischen Besprechungen vom 27. Januar 1961 in Paris 
iiber die Beziehungen zwischen EWG und EFTA; Bonn, 2 II 1961, Leiter der Abteilung E 
an Erhard iiber Miiller-Armack, betr.: deutsch-franzosische Besprechungen vom 27. Januar 
1961 iiber die Beziehungen zwischen EWG und EFTA
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business seems still to have embraced the plan as the way forward80. Their 
perception of the plan and the expectations which they attached to it were however 
deemed unrealistic even by the BMWi itself, especially at that late stage in April 
1961, when the British application was already on the horizon. The fact that the 
plan does not even figure in Muller-Armack’s memoirs suggests that the evolution 
of the whole story was somewhat of an embarrassment to the Secretary of State81. It 
remains however remarkable and says a lot about the intra-governmental struggle 
between AA and BMWi and the policy style of the BMWi that Muller-Armack
officially withdrew his plan, which had never been an official German proposal, at a
82meeting of the Rey committee in early 1961 .
5.4 Conclusions
In view of the industrial response to the Maudling negotiations and the theoretical 
assumptions stated earlier about industrial pressure in competing economies setting 
out to form an economic union, the eventual shift toward a CU solution in the 
German position should not be surprising. That it took almost two years for this 
change to come about is largely due to the paralysis of the international situation in 
Western Europe that persisted after the failure of the Maudling negotiations. Given 
that the formation of EFTA did not seem to cause immediate problems for German 
exports and that the acceleration proposals did not have an immediate visible impact 
either, there was no very strong reaction at the sectoral level of German industry. 
What worried the electrical and mechanical engineering industries, the chemicals 
and textile sectors was the fact that exports to the Seven had fallen in 1958. While 
they were not able to attribute this fall to any concrete measure of commercial 
policy, they might have thought that it was caused by the formation of the EEC. 
The remarkable trade expansion and output growth in 1959 must have allayed these 
fears, and only the textile industry saw the need to propose a bridge building
80 BA, B102 - 12129: Bonn, 20 IV 1961: DIHT, Dr. Diiren an Muller-Armack, betr.: 
Deutsch-niederlandisch-britische Kammerbesprechungen iiber den Briickenschlag.
81 There is just one page mentioning the efforts at bridge building. See M uller-Arm ack , Auf 
dem Weg, p. 234.
82 MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 47: Paris, 24 IV 1961, From: 
MAE, DAEF, Olivier Wormser & Bonn.
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solution in 1960. For the rest, such proposals came mainly from the umbrella 
associations, BDI and DIHT, as well as out of academia due to the expertise and 
resources available there. The evidence presented here suggests very strongly that 
the BDI’s proposal for a Europe-wide CU was crucial in preparing the change 
within the BMWi, where the FTA solution remained on the agenda for very long 
even though a CU solution had figured in some memos.
As has been shown in the previous chapter, the formation of EFTA and the 
ensuing industrial pressures caused the Federal Chancellor to adopt a more active 
position on the question of bridge building. Adenauer was thus able to portray 
himself as having taken the initiative on these issues. As was suspected by the 
British, Adenauer’s change of mind was not genuine but mostly a tactical reaction to 
the weakening of his position vis-a-vis Erhard in 1959 caused by the embarrassing
83events related to the succession of the federal president Theodor Heuss . Together 
with the pressure in favour of bridge building coming from German industry and 
business at large, the BMWi had a realistic chance in 1959 to promote its favoured 
solution at the international level. While there was clearly still reluctance on the 
French side, the main obstacle in the way of a success for Erhard and his secretary 
of state was their own clumsiness in preparing the stage for the Muller-Armack 
plan. Given that even the Chancellor’s office did not dismiss the plan as such and 
that the plan itself carefully tried to accommodate a wide range of interests, a more 
subtle presentation and a careful lobbying of the Chancellor in this direction, 
perhaps through a high representative of German industry, might have done the 
trick. Erhard’s bullying methods and Muller-Armack’s mediocre diplomacy 
precluded any success right away and opened an easy way out for the French and 
the AA. Once this opportunity was missed, the American pressure on the British 
and their subsequent change of mind concerning an application for full EEC 
membership sealed the fate of bridge building for decades.
S c h w a rz ,  Adenauer, vol. II, pp. 502-526.
6 EEC, efta and the sectoral interest of German
industry
The quantitative evidence
This chapter presents some quantitative evidence relating to a number of sectors of 
German industry, in particular to those whose trade associations made their voices 
heard in the debates over the Europe-wide free trade area, the split between EEC 
and EFTA and the British application for membership in the EEC. The sectors 
which feared the competition from the OEEC/OECD members outside the 
Community will be looked at with particular interest here, since it was they who 
were able to exert pressures on governmental actors most successfully and who 
obtained more attention than any of those who were likely to be the winners in the 
free trade area and from British accession. In order to deliver a more complete 
picture the statistical evidence concerning these potential winners from any such 
arrangement will also be looked at.
The statistical exercise undertaken in order to assess the impact which the 
trade discrimination between EEC and EFTA made on German foreign trade in 
industrial goods according to sectors is fairly simple1. What has been done to 
estimate the "EEC-effect" or the "EFTA-effect" on German foreign trade was to 
calculate the trend of German foreign trade with the other EEC partners and with 
the EFTA members (Portugal was not included) for the period of 1953 to 19582, to
The trade discrimination that began between the EEC and the other OEEC member countries 
came about mainly as a consequence of tariff preferences within the EEC. Preferences 
concerning quantitative restrictions also played a role, since internal restrictions were 
abolished by the end of 1961, while restrictions vis-a-vis third countries persisted. They 
could be lowered on condition of reciprocity. Their impact is however alleged to have been 
marginal for industrial products. See B en o it, Em ile: Europe at Sixes and Sevens. The 
Common Market, the Free Trade Association and the United States. New York 1961, pp. 
25-28; W a l t e r ,  lNGO:77ie European Common Market. Growth and Patterns of Trade and 
Production. New York [et al.] 1967, pp. 11-13.
Portugal has not been included in the present quantitative analysis given that its trade with 
Germany was of minor importance in terms of the percentage share of overall German 
foreign trade and as compared to trade with the other members of EFTA. In the pilot study 
to the present analysis, conducted on the basis of annual foreign trade data, sectoral trade 
data were often unavailable for Portugal. In view of this and in view of the minor 
importance of the Portuguese market for German export industries, Portugal has been 
ommitted from this analysis, because it was felt that the immense amount of additional data 
entry and processing would not be in any reasonable relationship to the explanatory value of 
the outcome that could be expected on the basis of the pilot study. It is also evident that, 
concerning the FTA, EFTA and British accession, German industry was mainly worried
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extrapolate this trend over the whole period up to 1964 and to take note of the 
deviation from this trend that occurred after 1959. The study is based on quarterly 
trade statistics as published in the volumes number three of "Der Aussenhandel der 
Bundesrepublik" and was done for the seven sectors of textiles, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, non-ferrous metals, non-ferrous metal products, paper and paper 
products, machinery and electrical products3.
The aims of the study were to find out about the actual import pressures that 
existed already in the absence of the free trade area and British EEC-membership. 
At the same time the study permits us to obtain a clearer picture of the importance 
of individual export markets or competing foreign industries on the home market as 
well as the common market for individual industrial sectors. On this basis it 
becomes clear that the fear of import competition from, say, the Scandinavian 
countries did not necessarily concern the German home market but rather the 
prospect of a more or less significant opportunity cost in expanding export markets 
within the EEC. Overall the study enables us to judge with a greater degree of 
differentiation what the general impact of the division EEC - EFTA was, in what 
way this situation differed for individual sectors, which export markets were of the 
greatest significance, where trade expanded the most, and whose competition had to 
be feared. An attempt will be made here to assess the evidence provided by the 
sectoral study and to match it with the material concerning tariff changes collected 
from the BMWi. The start will be made with a relatively simple descriptive account 
of the evidence which will be followed by a section relating this to the narrative 
presented so far.
6.1 Likely winners from the FTA and British accession - Machinery
Chemicals and Electrical engineering
Among the expanding sectors of German industry and hence among the likely 
winners from a Europe-wide free trade arrangement were the chemical and
about the changes in trade relations with Britain, the Scandinavian countries, Austria and 
Switzerland whereas Portugal figured only marginally if at all in any of the analyses and 
position papers coming from German industry.
Statistisches Bundesamt [ed.]: Der Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
Berlins (West). Teil 3. Der Spezialhandel nach Bezugs- und Absatzgebieten und nach 
Warengruppen und -untergruppen. 1953-1964. Stuttgart 1954-1965.
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pharmaceutical sectors, electrical and electronic products, as well as the machinery 
industry. Together with the motor car industry and a number of other expanding 
sectors, their prospects concerning the establishment of the EEC and the project of a 
Europe-wide free trade area were broadly similar, a similarity related to their rapid 
and general expansion on virtually all European markets. All of them were in favour 
of the free trade area and British accession and were also likely to gain from the 
opening of the French and the Italian markets as well as from the abolition of other 
barriers to trade vis-a-vis the Seven, while none of them had to fear serious 
competition. The examination of the trade statistics of these three sectors will help 
assess to what extent these expectations were met by the trade with the other EEC 
members and the Seven. They will also highlight to what extent sectoral interests 
were actually visible in terms of losses or opportunity costs in export markets as 
well as inroads made by foreign competitors into the home market of the respective 
sectors.
TABLE 6.1,1_________ GERMAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES -
ANNUAL PERCENTSiCE CHAN!GE OF SECTOR/3i l  OUTPUT 1953-19 63
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
NF-metals
metal production 14.04 23.85 10.56 1.12 4.44 2.66 8.29 14.83 1.67 -2.46 3.78
metal products 8.94 31.34 26.14 4.5 2.59 4.62 11.24 25.27 0 4.61 3.86
mechanical
engineering
-1.29 11.76 22.81 9.05 3.49 0.84 3.35 13.77 10.32 1.29 -3.5
vehicles 7.33 30.43 31.43 8.7 5.67 19.24 16.67 20.86 5.07 8.57 11.68
electrical
engineering
9.59 23.75 24.24 10.57 6.99 14.78 10.18 14.95 10.64 2.78 -1.87
iron and sheets, 
metal products
7.5 20.16 14.84 7.87 3.65 0 11.56 14.41 5.51 2.24 2.19
chemicals 17.65 12.86 13.29 9.5 12.24 7.27 13.98 14.5 7.14 12.12 10
glass 2.52 21.31 19.59 10.73 -2.55 3.14 9.14 7.44 -1.3 8.33 -2.43
asbestos, rubber 14.75 16.43 20.86 -0.51 3.06 3.47 15.79 13.22 2.92 2.84 6.21
timber processing -4.04 10.53 9.52 5.22 -5.79 -4.39 3.67 10.62 0 1.6 -2.36
paper production 16.04 15.45 8.45 5.84 6.13 0.58 6.32 8.11 3 1.46 2.87
paper processing 13.27 11.72 10.49 11.39 6.25 0.53 9.04 11.71 0.87 10.39 4.71
textiles 18.18 6.92 8.63 6.62 3.73 -5.99 3.82 6.13 0 2.31 2.26
finished textiles 16.13 4.17 14.67 10.47 10 -4.78 5.53 8.1 6.17 6.64 4.28
clothing 18.32 5.81 20.73 12.12 8.56 -4.98 5.68 6.61 8.53 6.43 2.68
Source: Wirtschaftskonjunktur. Berichte des ifo Instituts fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 4/1964, 2.
Beilage: “Zahlen zur Branchenkonjunktur'.
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Electrical engineering and electrical products
Exports
The value of exports of electrical products to the EEC starts from roughly DM
75,000 in 1953 and rises up to DM 550,000 at the end of 1964 while the value of 
respective exports to the EFTA ranges between DM 60,000 to DM 460,000 at the 
same points in time. The more important observation is that exports to the EFTA 
countries after 1959 continue to rise roughly along the 1953-58 trend line, whereas 
exports to the other EEC partners are clearly above that trend line after 1960. The 
rise in exports to the EEC is attributable mostly to trade with France. Starting from 
an extremely low level of less than DM 10,000 in the first quarter of 1953 the value 
of exports doubles only by 1956. Export values are rising more steeply only after 
the third quarter of 1959. For Belgium-Luxemburg and the Netherlands exports of 
electrical products follow pretty much the 1953-58 trend line. The same is true for 
exports to Italy with the exception of the period after 1961 when values are clearly 
above the trend. Hence for the electrical engineering industry France was the 
market with the greatest growth potential which was realised immediately after the 
beginning of the internal lowering of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the EEC.
Figure 6.1.1
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Whereas the growth of exports of electrical products was the greatest towards 
France, this growth occurred from a very low level. Exports to the Netherlands 
grew much less as compared to the 1953-58 trend, yet their level reached DM
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100,000 already by 1959 and reached DM 200,000 in the last quarter of 1964, and 
from 1961 exports to the Netherlands are actually markedly above the trend.
It is clear from this that the relatively open economies of Belgium- 
Luxemburg and the Netherlands were and remained much more important for 
German exports of electrical products in terms of the level than exports to France. It 
seems however that exports to France from the second quarter of 1959 onward kept 
doubling every 18 months or so and thus caught up with the levels exported to the 
smaller economies and equalling exports to Italy by 1963 which started out from a 
level similar to exports to Belgium-Luxemburg yet growing at a slightly slower rate 
than those.
As has already been stated, exports to the EFT A countries (except Portugal) 
after 1958 follow very closely the 1953-58 trend-line suggesting that the foundation 
of EEC and EFTA did not make an important impact on this part of German foreign 
trade in terms of damage to German export interests in these markets. Neither 
exports to Denmark nor to Switzerland seem to have been affected negatively by 
EEC and EFTA. For Denmark (as a relatively minor export market) exports lie 
clearly above the trend line from 1959 onward.
Figure 6.1.2
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For Switzerland the same is true at a much higher level from 1960 onward. Exports 
to Norway by and large follow the trend line, while for Sweden and Austria exports 
fall below the trend with the foundation of EFTA and EEC or slightly after that. 
Despite that, German electrical exports to Sweden remain the highest to any of the
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EFTA members followed by Switzerland and Austria with exports to Britain ranking 
only fourth and being of a similar level as those to Denmark, yet fluctuating much 
more than exports to any other country. Thus German exports of electrical products 
to the UK rise markedly above the trend line in the last quarter of 1958 and stay 
above it for one and a half years, while falling below it in 1961.
Hence German exports to the most important export market in the EFTA, 
Sweden, stagnate from 1960 onward. The same is true for exports to Austria and 
Britain. Yet only exports to Austria fall in visible conjunction with the coming into 
effect of the EEC tariff and quota adaptations, whereas exports to Sweden initially 
continue to follow the trend and those to Britain grow considerably when the EEC 
takes effect. The timing of these changes shows that the initial trade discrimination 
brought about by the EEC was not met with counter measures by the EFTA 
countries and hence did not produce a distinctive effect on German exports. On the 
Swedish and the British market the foundation of EFTA however seems to have 
made a clear difference. It is likely that trade between Sweden and Britain in 
electrical products increased at the expense of German exports due to mutual tariff 
advantages. In the smaller markets and the markets traditionally closely linked to 
Germany such as Austria this impact was hardly felt or not felt at all as in 
Denmark, Norway and Switzerland where German exporters could increase their 
sales above the 1953-58 trend.
The most important observation seems to be that the growth of German 
exports of electrical products did not fall anywhere else than to Britain and that their 
fall below the 1953-58 trend line in some EFTA markets seems to have been 
balanced by slight increases in others. When exports to the important Swedish 
market began to stagnate at the beginning of 1961 the level of exports to Italy was 
surpassing that of exports to Sweden and it was evident that exports to France would 
do the same soon. The Netherlands remained the single most important market for 
German exports of electrical products and the increases in exports to the 
Netherlands above the trend alone compensated for the "loss" incurred in exports to 
Sweden. The overall picture does not allow for the conclusion that opportunity costs 
on the EFTA markets would have been very visible at all before 1961 when exports
225
to France had picked up considerably. Thus from mid-1960 onward the combined 
exports to EEC and EFTA remain with one exception above the 1953-58 trend.
Imports o f electrical products
German imports of electrical engineering and other electrical products are 
consistently above their 1953-58 trend for both EFTA and EEC. As far as the 
imports from the other EEC member countries are concerned, they begin to rise 
above the trend already before the EEC takes effect at the beginning of 1959. These 
increases in imports occur for all EFTA and EEC members even though slightly 
later for the EFTA. The level of imports from the EEC surpasses that of imports 
from the EFTA very markedly by 1960. The only exception to this marked increase 
is Belgium-Luxemburg. Imports from there only start to rise above the trend at the 
end of 1962. There is an astonishing peak in imports in the final quarter of 1963 
which is likely to have been due to some important investment program in the 
Federal Republic. While imports for all countries rise above the trend without 
exception, there remain large fluctuations in imports from Britain. The very general 
rise in imports of electrical products might suggest that it reflected to some extent 
the general growth of the German economy and the corresponding demand in a field 
of advanced production technology as well as for consumer durables.
Figure 6.1.5
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While imports rose markedly steeper above their 1953-58 trend than exports, 
Germany still exported more than twice the value of its imports even in the last
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quarter of 1963 when imports showed a remarkable peak. On the whole German 
exports were almost three times greater than imports even toward the end of the 
period in question. It is more than obvious from this that the German electrical and 
electronic industries did not have to fear serious competition anywhere in Europe 
and that the stagnation which occurred in the Swedish market, most likely due to 
British cost advantages there, was almost compensated by growing exports to other 
EFTA members and easily outweighed by the increasing exports to the other EEC 
members, mainly to France. It is therefore hardly conceivable that the industry 
should have been aware of the opportunity costs that were undoubtedly incurred in 
the Swedish and the British markets due to the fact that German exports met with 
tariff discrimination there and that hence Swedish and British products might have 
gained cost advantages.
Figure 6.1.4














The German chemical industry was among the potential winners from a Europe- 
wide free trade area as well as from a British accession to the EEC which would 
have secured the industry tariff free access to the markets of the Seven. While the 
industry was aware of increased competition with its British counterpart, the overall 
expectations were positive and the attitudes very favourable for these projects. The 
quantitative evidence supports these views. It shows that the German chemical
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industry increased its exports to all EEC and EFTA markets (except the small 
Norwegian market) at a higher rate than the 1953-58 trend. This suggests that its 
export performance in the EFTA markets would have been even better, if the trade 
discrimination between the two blocs would not have developed or could have been 
overcome at an early stage by the Europe-wide solution or by the accession of 
Britain and the association of the other EFTA members to the EEC. The 
quantitative evidence shows further that chemical exports to the EEC were no more 
important in value than those to the EFTA and that unlike in other sectors the 
relative importance of the EEC as an export market for German industry did not 
increase. The increase of exports above the 1953-58 trend to the EFTA countries is 
mainly due to exports to Britain and Switzerland. In both cases quarterly exports 
more than double between 1958 and 1964. For the smaller export markets in EFTA 
(with the exception of Norway) exports continue pretty much to grow according to 
the trend.
Figure 6.1.5
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Given that exports to the more important export markets did not decline but 
increased substantially, the chemical industry could hardly have been induced to 
take action supporting the free trade area and British accession with more emphasis. 
Opportunity costs in terms of losses or missed increases of market shares in the 
EFTA markets were absolutely invisible for the German chemical industry. As far 
as exports to the other EEC member countries are concerned the most remarkable
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increase was in exports to France whereas exports to the other members increased at 
a slightly slower rate yet from higher levels.
Figure 6.1.6
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The value of chemical imports from EEC and EFTA ranges between half and two 
thirds of that of exports to these areas in the period from 1958 to 1964. Imports 
from the EEC are roughly twice as important in value as those from the EFTA. 
Imports from both areas are consistently above the 1953-58 trend with the exception 
of 1961 for the EFTA. When looking at imports from individual countries the 
tendency is less clear cut. Imports from the Netherlands just grow according to the 
trend, those from Belgium-Luxemburg are slightly above it after 1959, whereas 
imports from France and Italy rise very steeply from 1959 onward, though from a 
level that is only one third of that of Dutch imports at that point in time.
Imports from EFTA are generally above the 1953-58 trend after 1959, with 
the exception of Austria, which is consistently below, with Britain and Switzerland 
being the most important sources for chemical imports from the Seven. What is 
remarkable are the fluctuations in chemical imports from Britain and the fact that, 
whereas imports from Britain at the end of 1958 were still more than twice those 
from France or Italy, imports from France surpass British imports within two years 






















The machinery sector was among the most successful German industries after the 
Second World War and had nothing to fear but everything to gain from either the 
Europe-wide free trade area or the accession and association of the EFTA members 
to the EEC.
Figure 6.1.8
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When imports from EEC and EFTA together reach their highest point during the 
period that is analysed here in 1964, they still only make up a third of the value of 
German machinery exports to these markets which demonstrates the dominating
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position of German industry in this field in Western Europe. However during a 
period from the beginning of 1958 to mid-1961 German machinery exports to EEC 
and EFTA fall visibly and remain below their 1953-58 trend, while they pick up 
afterwards again and remain consistently above the trend for the rest of the period. 
The deviation from the trend for exports to the EFTA is less pronounced than for 
exports to the other EEC partners. The values of exports to EFTA remain at a level 
which is roughly 20% lower than the one for exports to the EEC in the early 1960s. 
With the exception of Austria exports to the EFTA are well above the 1953-58 trend 
for all other members of the Seven with the most pronounced increases in exports to 
Britain and Switzerland. With exports to the Netherlands and to Belgium- 
Luxemburg stagnating throughout 1958 and 1959 and rising only slightly above the 
trend afterwards, France and Italy become the most important exports markets for 
the German machinery industry from 1960 onward, with a particularly steep 
increase of exports to Italy.
Figure 6.1.9








Thus, quite similar to exports of chemical products, there is no visible difference at 
all between EEC and EFTA as far as the changes in growth rates are concerned 
suggesting that exports to the EFTA market were not only unhampered, but entirely 
unaffected by both arrangements, whereas the lowering of internal tariffs in the 
EEC made a strong impact on exports to France and Italy, with exports to the
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already relatively open markets of the Netherlands and Belgium-Luxemburg hardly 
affected by that.
Imports
Machinery imports from all important European markets except Switzerland are 
markedly above the 1953-58 trend after 1959, whereas the values for Switzerland 
closely follow the trend-line. Values of imports from both EFTA and EEC reach a 
very similar level at the end of the period. The graphs could suggest that imports 
from the other EEC partners, after starting off from a very low level and rising only 
slowly until 1959, catch up to the more "normal" level of import-values from the 
EFTA members which started off from a much higher level and with a steeper 
1953-58 trend.
The conclusion would be yet again that for trade with EFTA the foundation 
of the two competing trading blocs did not seem to matter for the German export 
performance, whereas the lowering of internal tariffs among EEC members helped 
realise a huge potential for trade mainly among the three larger economies of the 
EEC, France, Italy and Germany. As far as industrial interest and pressure is 
concerned, the statistical evidence for machinery exports shows that there were no 
tangible losses at all, nor any visible opportunity costs. The prospects for the 
German machinery, chemical and electrical engineering industries at the end of the 
1950s were clear: capturing the huge and previously protected Italian and French 
markets, while hoping to keep the strong presence on the markets of the Seven. 
Protective interests on the whole did not exist in these sectors. The fears that the 
divisions between the EEC and the Seven after the failure of the Maudling 
negotiations might negatively affect German export interests in Europe outside the 
EEC did not materialise. The stagnation in machinery exports in 1958 to 1960 
equally concerned EEC and EFTA markets and had thus nothing to do with the 
coming into effect of the EEC but more probably with a general slowdown in 
economic activity in 1958 which in turn might have negatively affected investment 
decisions for some time hitting capital goods sales harder than those in other 
sectors.
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6.2 The potential losers from the FT A and British accession - Textiles,
Non-ferrous metals and Paper industries
The textile industry and the sector of non-ferrous metals were the most vociferous 
when it came to criticising the free trade area project and the planned British 
accesion to the EEC. They predicted the most dire consequences should either of 
these arrangements come about. The same is true for the sector of non-ferrous metal 
products, the paper and paper product industries, as well as for timber and timber 
processing and a number of sectors whose fears and complaints with regard to the 
negotiations have been mentioned in the chapter on the Maudling negotiations. All 
of these sectors had specific competitors in mind when setting out to protest against 
the Europe-wide free trade area or any similar arrangement. For the non-ferrous 
metal industry, for timber, wood pulp, paper and paper product producers in the 
Federal Republic competition from Scandinavia, mainly from Norway, but also 
from Austria was seen as a serious threat which, in their view, could endanger the 
existence of whole industries. For the textile industry the main competitors were 
India, Pakistan, Hong Kong and Sri Lanka, if they were to achieve even the 
slightest reduction in trade impediments for their exports to the European market. 
For reasons of very advantageous factor endowments or very low labour costs 
competition in these sectors was seen as unfair and protection was demanded. In the 
German textile industry it was assumed that its own protective interests vis-a-vis the 
Asian countries mentioned would be shared by the other European industries and 
that hence agreement on quantitative restrictions against imports from there would 
be easily reached with the other European countries. During the accession 
negotiations these countries were in fact granted larger quotas to the European 
market. Apart from the Asian competition the associations of the textile industry 
were concerned that the divisions between EEC and EFTA might endanger the very 
important export markets for German textiles that the Seven and primarily 
Scandinavia constituted.
As before, the statistical evidence will be used on the one hand to assess 
whether the expectations of the individual sectors were met by the development of
233
trade and on the other hand to what extent opportunity costs and losses were visible 
and tangible for the industry and on which markets these costs and losses occurred.
Textiles
Exports
All European textile producers faced powerful competition from the developing 
countries whose sales in Western Europe were entirely controlled by quotas. It was 
not therefore competitiveness that determined their patterns but trade agreements. 
The problem was that the UK appeared to give the best trade deals to India, 
Pakistan and Hong Kong. For the West German textile industry combined textile 
exports to the EEC and the EFTA are consistently below the imports from these 
countries. Toward the end of the period both imports and exports begin to grow 
more steeply than before. These increases are however due only to trade with the 
other EEC member countries, while trade with the EFTA countries largely follows 
the 1953-58 trend also during the rest of the period. The value of exports to the 
EFTA markets in the years up until 1963 is persistently higher than those to the 
EEC. Until 1959 exports to the EFTA continuously more than double those to the 
rest of the Community. From 1959 onward exports to the EEC rise sharply to reach 
and surpass the value of exports to the EFTA by 1964. Thus the increased export 
potential offered to the German textile industry in the common market countries was 
not at all visible at the time when the Maudling negotiations were underway.
Figure 6.2.1
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Instead the fall in exports to both the EEC and the Seven in 1958 with figures 
remaining below the 1953-58 trend well into 1959 did not suggest that there were 
any improvements on the horizon, if trade with the Seven should be affected by 
tariff discrimination. Within the EEC the usual picture also occurred in German 
textile exports with the largest increases to France and Italy. Yet exports to the 
other EEC markets also rose markedly above the 1953-58 trend in the Dutch 
market, which remained the most important export market within the Community 
with the value of exports to the Netherlands in 1964 still almost doubling that to 
France or Italy. It is important to stress that the "take off" of exports to the EEC did 
not occur before 1961.
Figure 6.2.2














Exports to the EFTA stagnated from the beginning of 1958 onward and surpassed 
1957 levels again only at the end of 1959. At the time this might have been taken as 
an indication that the free trade area solution was needed and that German textile 
exports to the Seven would otherwise suffer. After 1960 export values were mostly 
above the 1953-58 trend. Among the EFTA markets exports to Austria and to 
Switzerland rose most markedly over the period as a whole yet without any strong 
increase above the 1953-58 trend for the latter half of the period. Both these 
markets surpassed the importance of the Swedish market at the beginning of 1959. 
German textile exports to Sweden remained practically constant over the whole of
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the period from 1935 to 1964. Exports to the UK and Denmark improved above the 
1953-58 trend after 1959 and after 1960 in the case of Austria, whereas exports to 
Norway fell in relation to the trend from 1961 onward. The most important feature 
concerning the EFTA markets is the fact that exports to the larger ones continued 
along the trend line or slightly above it with the exception of 1958 and 1959. Hence 
the exports interests of the German textile industry were not visibly hit by the
failure of the Maudling negotiations. The relative importance of the EFTA as an
export market for German textiles declined and was equalled by the EEC by mid- 
1963, but did so only after 1960.
Given the fairly high tariffs on a good 
number of textile products in all 
European countries, it had to be
expected that tariff reductions within 
the EEC would have a rather important 
impact on internal EEC trade. This is 
reflected in the German foreign trade 
statistics. All in all the tariff
discrimination that occurred between 
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important changes in the sources of imports for the Seven. This might have been 
partly due to long established trade relations, to geographic proximity and 
correspondingly low transport costs but most probably to the fact that the markets 
were so regulated by other devices. It could also have been due to the fact that 
production capacity within the EFTA would not have been sufficient to cause a 
substantial switch from Germany or indeed any other EEC country as a supplier to 
Britain as the most important textile producer among the Seven.
Imports
For imports the picture is quite similar to that of exports with a little slump in 1958 
and 1959, a rise above the trend for the EEC and a line close to the 1953-58 for the 
imports from the EFTA. It is important to note however that the balance of trade 
with the EFTA countries is persistently positive, while with the EEC it becomes
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increasingly negative particularly from mid-1959 when the first internal tariff 
measures showed their effect. The most important source of imports among the 
EEC members was Italy, closely followed by France. The value of imports from 
France almost doubles from the first to the last quarter of 1959. On a slightly lower 
level imports from the Benelux countries rise markedly above the 1953-58 trend 
too, contributing to a very strong negative balance of trade in textiles for Germany 
with its partners in the EEC.
Figure 6.2.5
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While textile imports from the EEC rose markedly, imports from the EFTA 
countries roughly followed the 1953-58 trend, and remained below it most of the 
second half of the period. Imports from the UK continue to stagnate after 1958 and 
stay well below the trend. Switzerland remains the most important source of textile 
imports among the Seven, followed by the UK and Austria. The most significant 
development is the complete stagnation of imports from Britain after 1957.
While it is hard to specify to which protective measures this stagnation was 
due, it seems that the failure to establish the free trade area and to admit Britain into 
the EEC saved the German textile industry from potentially very damaging 
competition. Had the free trade area come about in 1958/59 a "take off" of imports 
from Britain might have resembled that of imports from France and Italy and would 
undoubtedly have shed many jobs in Germany. One factor in that would certainly
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have been textile imports into the UK from the Commonwealth as well as the UK 
textiles made from Indian “grey cloth” or re-exports from Hong Kong.
Figure 6.2.4
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While the corresponding German figures were not alarming for 1956 to 1958, the 
industry feared that any loosening of quantitative restrictions vis-a-vis what they 
called "low price countries" would heighten their share of the German market and 
damage the industry. It was also likely that the Indians would ask for the expansion 
of quotas under voluntary export restraint agreements.
TABLE 6.2.2: IMPORTS OF TEXTILE PRODUCTS FROM
LOW PRICE COUNTRIES AS PERCENTAGE 
OF GERMAN PRODUCTION:
rayon spun rayon spun rayon fabrics linen fabrics
1956 0,07 - 4,5 5,4
1957 0,10 0,0 12,4 3,5
1958 0,08 0,4 14,8 4,2
cotton fabrics jute fabrics jute sacks carpets from coco fabrics
1,7 2,2 2,6 3,3
1957 4,0 1,5 7,1 4,8
1958 3,7 6,8 7,1 7,8
gloves etc. synthetic gloves mufti made from tulle
1956 4,2 5,6 20,8
1957 8,9 7,5 23,0
1958 8,6 3,7 22,0
Source: BA, B102-19568: Frankfurt, 170159, von: Bundesam t fur cew erbliche W irtschaft, An: BMWi, 
Ref. IVC1, Betr.: Das Verhaltnis der Einfuhren ausgew ahlter textiler Erzeugnisse aus den 
Ostblockstaaten und den Billigpreislandern zur inlandischen Produktion.
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An overview over the export statistics suggests that the tariff changes and other 
arrangements brought about by EEC and EFTA did not affect trade in non-ferrous 
metals to any degree as strongly and consistently as seems to have been the case in 
the other sectors which have been analysed so far. This is not at all surprising as far 
as the EFTA is concerned.
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TABLE 6.2.5: IMPORTANT NON-FERROUS METAL TARIFFS
AMONG THE SEVEN IN 1957
CET Nr. product UK SWE N DK AUT CH
ex 2601 zinc ores 0 0 0 0 0 0,5SF per 100kg
ex 2601 lead ores 0 0 0 0 0 0,1 Sfr per 100kg
ex 7801 lead, raw 7s/l or 10% 0 0 0 0 0,3Sfr per 100kg
ex 7801 scrap 0 0 0 0 0 0,0Sfr per 100kg
ex 2603 ashes and scrap 0 0 0 0 0 0,3Sfr per 100kg
ex 2805 mercury 0 0 0 0 0 5Sfr per 100kg
ex 2805 lithium 10 0 0 0 0 lOSfr per 100kg
ex 7601 aluminium, raw 0 0 0 0 20Gr per 100kg 65 Sfr per 100kg
ex 7601 scrap 0 0 0 0 20Gr per 100kg 65 Sfr per 100kg
ex 7701 magnesium, raw 10 0 0 0 0 65 Sfr per 100kg
ex 7701 scrap 10 0 0 0 0 65Sfr per 100kg
ex 7901 zinc, raw 10 0 0 0 0 0,3Sfr per 100kg
ex 7901 scrap 0 0 0 0 0 0,3Sfr per 100kg
ex 8104 tantalum 0 0 0 0 0 lOSfr per 100kg
ex 8104 titanium 10 0 0 0 0 lOSfr per 100kg
ex 8104 zirconium 10 0 0 0 0 lOSfr per 100kg
Source: BA, B102 - 18373,1: Bonn, 090857: Von: IVA1: Zahlentafel 3: Common market: zolltarife 
w ichtiger Ne-Metallpositionen.
The Scandinavian countries and Austria had no tariffs on non-ferrous metals 
whatsoever, most imports of non-ferrous metals into Britain were also tariff free and 
the other positions were hit by a 10% tariff, while Switzerland retained specific 
tariffs on all these metals. As far as exports to the EFTA are concerned, the trend 
lines for 1953 to 1958 are falling very markedly for the UK, Norway and Sweden. 
Exports to these countries do indeed reach very low levels by 1957 and remain on 
that level for the rest of the period with the exception of exports to the UK which 
pick up again in 1960.
It is obvious that in these markets German exports of non-ferrous metals were not 
competitive at all given that they did not face any high tariffs there and still fell 
continuously. The fact that the actual export figures for most of the second half of 
the period looked at here are above the 1953-58 trend does therefore not indicate 
any relative improvement of the German export performance, but is simply due to 
the fact that the trend line enters into the negative realm at some point after 1958 in 
these cases. Only exports to Austria and Switzerland have a rising trend for 1953-58 
and only the values of exports to Switzerland lie above that trend for most of the 
period after 1958. Britain and Austria remain the industry’s most important export 
markets despite the fact that exports to Austria are markedly below the trend from
240
1962 on. For the EFTA as a whole export figures are well above the negative trend 
after 1959.
Figure 6.2.7
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Given the strong fluctuation in trade in non-ferrous metals, which is perhaps largely 
due to world price changes and unstable demand, the quantitative evidence for 
exports to the EEC is fairly inconclusive in trying to assess the impact of EEC and 
EFTA4. However, exports to the Benelux countries and to Italy are above the 1953- 
58 trend for much of the period after 1958. Export levels to all these markets except 
to the Netherlands remain rather low, while exports to France stagnate after 1957 
partly due to the very high level of tariffs and to the fact that reductions of the vast 
majority of these tariffs was part of the List G and thus to be the subject of special 
negotiations and was therefore not automatic5.
In 1961 the world price for a number of non-ferrous metals plummeted, rendering tariffs 
practically ineffective. See BA, B102 - 127623: Fachvereinigung Metallhiitten und 
Umschmelzwerke, Schuller, Stellungnahme der Fachvereinigung Metallhiitten und 
Umschmelzwerke zum Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG.
List G in the annex I to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community relating 
to article 20 of the treaty comprised those products for which the arithmetical average was 
not deemed feasible for the CET and where the Six had not been able to agree on a common 
tariff intially. The member states agreed on the common tariff for the products on List G on
2 March 1960 with the exceptions of manufactured tobacco and petroleum products. See 
C am pbell, A lan : Common Market Law. Volume 2. London, Harlow 1969, p. 17, § 2028. 
For the agreement reached in 1960 see Journal Officiel des Communautes Europeennes, 20 
Decembre 1960, 3e Annee N° 80 C, pp. 1825/60-1871/60.
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TABLE 6.2.4: NON-FERROUS METALS:
TARIFF POSITIONS OF EEC MEMBERS
CET position product D F I BNLux
ex 2601 zinc ores 0 0 4 0
ex 2601 lead ores 0 0 4 0
ex 7801 lead, raw 0 8 10-20 0
ex 7801 scrap 0 0 10 0
ex 2603 ashes and scrap 0 0 4-12 0
ex 2805 mercury 0 0 7 0
ex 2805 lithium 0 20 16 0
ex 7601 aluminium, raw 10 21 25 0
ex 7601 scrap 0 25 9 0
ex 7701 magnesium, raw 0 25 25 0
ex 7701 scrap 0 12 9 0
ex 7901 zinc, raw 0 0 15 0
ex 7901 scrap 0 15-24 11 0
ex 8104 tantalum 0 20 3 0
ex 8104 titanium 4 20 2 0
ex 8104 zirconium 4 20 12 0
Source: BA, B102 - 18373,1: Bonn, 090857m Von: IVA1: zahlen- 
tafel 3: Common m arket: Zolltarife w ichtiger Ne-Metallpositionen.
Austria, the UK and the Netherlands are the most important export markets for the 
second half of the period analysed here. From mid-1959 the figures for exports to 
the EEC are mostly above the trend line. The same is obviously true for the 
combined EEC/EFTA export figures which rise sharply above the trend after mid-
1959. Thus, while the quantitative evidence on a country by country basis is rather 
inconclusive, the combined figures show that, in relation to what could have been 
expected throughout the 1950s, the industry performed rather better on its European 
export markets. One should bear in mind, however, that the value of German 
exports of non-ferrous metals to Six and Seven remained always below half the 
value of corresponding imports from these countries.
Imports
The import statistics for non-ferrous metals show that imports from the EEC as a 
whole were mostly above the 1953-58 trend from the beginning of 1959, while this 
is slightly less clear cut for imports from the EFTA as a whole. When taking into 
account that the main threat in terms of competition was thought to come from 
Norway, the UK and Austria, the statistics show that imports from these sources 
roughly followed the previous trend after the formation of EEC and EFTA with a
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slight fall in the case of Norway and Austria where the previous trend had been 
however rather steep.
Figure 6.2.8
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TABLE 6.2.5: NORWEGIAN PRODUCTION OF NON-FERROUS
METALS 1954-1965 IN 1000KC
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1965
copper 12901 15757 15454 15828 17568 19249 21614 21970 19155 18197
aluminium 641Q1 74865 99589 105755 126281 145949 164801 174909 209277 219545
nickel 17242 18498 19444 21112 25590 25998 50428 - 29202 26421
zinc 44461 45519 48772 48552 45525 48777 45962 46747 44976 46556
Source: Statistisk Arbok fo r Norge 1957-1964-
TABLE 6.2.6: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN NORWEGIAN
PRODUCTION OF NON-FERROUS METALS 1954-1965 IN 1000KC
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
copper 6.48 12.55 2.55 10.99 9.57 12.29 1.65 -12.82
aluminium 16.79 52.76 4.57 21.74 15.57 12.92 6.15 19.65
nickel 7.28 5.11 8.58 11.74 10.21 17.04 - -
zinc 2.58 7.15 -0.86 -5.85 7.15 -9.87 6.54 -5.79
Source: Statistisk Arbok for Norge 1957-1964.
However, imports from the UK and Austria show large fluctuations. Given the 
alarming information gathered in the West German industry concerning the plans 
for expansion of productive capacity mainly of aluminium in Norway, the failure of 
the free trade area and de Gaulle’s veto of British accession must have been seen as 
a godsend. It is still doubtful however, whether Norwegian production capacity
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would have increased sufficiently rapidly to constitute so serious a threat as it was 
seen in Germany.
Figure 6.2.9
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As indicated in the table below, Norwegian surplus production of non-ferrous 
metals was at roughly 100,000 tons only in 1955 compared to German import 
demand of more than three times that volume. All these questions need to be seen in 
relation to the expected development of production and demand within the EEC as 
well as in relation to the competitive struggles between metal processing industries 
across Europe. Thus high tariffs as protective measures for the German metal 
producing industries were seen as dangerous for the processing industries which had 
to compete with their counterparts in Britain who profited from the absence of 
tariffs on non-ferrous metals. The essential outcome of the import statistics is that 
imports did not increase very dramatically neither from the EEC nor from the 
EFTA above the 1953-58 trend line. The fact that decisions within the EEC on a 
good number of tariff positions in the field of non-ferrous metals were not finalised 
before the accession negotiations broke down left protective measures unchanged. 
There has to be, however, a cautionary note on the statistics. Given that the 
statistics indicate values and that important price fluctuations occurred during the 
period looked at here, low values of imports in 1961 and the following year do not 
indicate that the volume of imports actually declined and that therefore import 
pressures on the German industry diminished. Given that world prices did not only
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decline sharply in 1961, but that the DMark was also revalued at the same time, 
lower import values at that point might still have coincided with marked increases in 
volume.
TABLE 6.2.7: PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF ALUMINIUM.
LEAD. ZINC AND COPPER IN 1955 (IN 1000 TONS) IN THE EEC
mine production metal production (metal 
works)
consumption of raw 
metal
total consumption
BLux - 512,6 334,4 451,7
F 18,2 353,7 603,0 897,3
I 134,4 216,2 304,4 458,6
D 160,7 734,1 964,8 1252,8
TOM 474,0 151,1 10,0 15,0
Total 787,3 1967,7 2216,6 3075,4
Source: B102- 18373,1: Bonn, 28 VII11957, von: IVA1: Zahlentafel 1: Ubersicht uber die 
M etallproduktion und den Metallverbrauch der Europaischen W irtschaftsgem einschaft und der 
OEEC-Lander (in 10001).
TABLE 6.2.8: PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF ALUMINIUM.
LEAD. ZINC AND COPPER IN 1955 (IN 1000 TONS) IN THE OEEC- 
MEMBER STATES
mine production metal production (metal 
works)
consumption of raw 
metal
total consumption
UK 9,1 469,5 1379,2 1813,7
EEC 787,3 1967,7 2216,6 3075,4
N 16,8 150,5 41,3 48,9
SWE 90,7 67,9 151,3 195,6
DK - 7,9 34,3 47,4
CH - 31,6 86,1 109,7
AUT 12,8 81,9 81,7 86,5
GR 14,7 3,4 6,3 9,8
TURK 14,7 3,2 0,8 -
PORT 4,2 5,1 3,8 -
Total 950,3 2788,7 4001,4 5387,0
Source: B102- 18373,1: Bonn, 28 Vlll 1957, Von: IVA1: Zahlentafel 1: Ubersicht uber die 




EEC and EFTA are of very similar importance in terms of levels of exports all 
throughout the period concerned. There are no losses in the EFTA as a whole, 
while exports to the EEC as a whole are underneath the trend line between 1957 and
1960. Exports to EFTA are consistently above the trend after mid 1959. Exports to 
the main markets in the EEC, the Benelux countries are underneath the trend 
between 1957 and 1964, while those to Italy and France are consistently above the
245
trend line from mid 1959 and rising relatively sharply yet from a much lower level 
than those to the Benelux.
_________________ Figure 6,2.10
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Exports to Switzerland, the most important export market among the Seven, are 
markedly above the trend from 1960 onward. For Britain and Denmark this is true 
already from mid 1959, but from a very much lower level. In the more important 
market, Sweden, the figures are below the trend for much of the second part of the 
period, while they are above the trend line for exports to Austria. Overall no really 
important deviation from the trend line occurs except for exports to the EEC in 
1964.
Figure 6.2.11
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The fact that German exports of non-ferrous metal products to Britain and 
Switzerland increased well above the 1953-58 trend however, is an indication that 
the fears of losing out against the British were largely unfounded. Increased British 
exports to Sweden might however have been responsible for the stagnation in 
German exports to that country.
TABLE 6,2.9: NON-FERROUS METAL PRODUCTS - TARIFF
PCISITIONS OF THE SEI/EN IN 1957
CET
Nr.
product UK SWE N DK AUT CH
7602 aluminium
wire
12,5 lOKr per 
100kg






12,5 lOKr per 
100kg
























10 lOKr per 
100kg








10 lOKr per 
100kg










































63 Sfr per 
100kg




63 Sfr per 
100kg
Source: BA, B102 -18373,1: Bonn, 090857: Von: IVA1: Zahlentafel 3: Common market: zolltarife
w ichtiger Ne-Metallpositionen.
All in all the exports evidence suggests that the industry could be quite happy with 
the division between EEC and EFTA. The fact that exports to France and Italy were 
those growing the most from mid-1959 is perfectly consistent with the fact that their 
tariffs on non-ferrous metal products were on average by far the highest in Europe. 
Hence their lowering within the EEC made a relatively large impact. As far as the
247
specific tariffs of most of the EFTA countries are concerned, it is hard to assess 
their actual incidence. Yet the fact that their level did not change considerably vis-a- 
vis imports from Germany and that the volume of EFTA production was apparently 
not sufficient to replace them entirely with imports from Britain or other non-EEC 
sources left the German position in these markets essentially untouched.
TABLE 6,2,10: NON-FERROUS METAL PRODUCTS - TARIFF
POSITIGINS OF EEC MEN1BERS IN 1957
CET position product D F I BNLux possible CET*
7602 aluminium wire 14 20 25,27 6 10(M = 16%)
7603 aluminium sheets 14 20 27 6 10(M = 16%)
7606 aluminium pipes 14 20 27 8 10(M = 18,5%)
7612 aluminium cables 12 19 31 12 10(M=18,5%)
7702 magnesium wire 12 28 27 4 ,6 10(M = 17%)
7703 magnesium products 12 28 27 4 ,6 10(M = 17%)
7902 zinc wire 8 16, 18 15 4 10(M = 10,7-11%)
7903 zinc sheets 8 16-18 16 4 10(M = 11-11,5%)
7904 zinc pipes 8 16-18 16 6, 8 10(M = 11,7- 
12,2%)
8103 tantalum wire 0 24 12 0-6 10(M=9-10,5%)
8104 (ex) titanium wire 4 30 30 0 10(M = 16%)
7802 lead wire 8 15 15 4 M = 10,5%
7803 lead sheets 8 20 15 4 M = 14,0%
7805 lead pipes 8 18 15 6, 8 M = 14,4%
Source: BA, B102 ■ 18373,1: Bonn, 090857: Von: IVA1: Zahlentafel 3: Common market: Zolltarife 
w ichtiger Ne-Metallpositionen.
M =arithm etical mean
‘The column Indicates th e  lowest possible CET from  th e  point of view of th e  German position in the  
EEC as well as th e  arithm etical mean of m em ber states' existing tariffs.
The statistical evidence for imports of non-ferrous metal products from EEC and 
EFTA shows very clearly that this branch of German industry was indeed very 
happy not to have to lower its tariffs vis-a-vis the EFTA members. Given that tariff 
levels on these products were relatively high in Germany, their lowering vis-a-vis 
the other EEC members led to a shooting up of imports from there in the second 
quarter of 1959. This is not only true for imports from the EEC as a whole, but also 
for imports from all individual member countries. Imports from EFTA, which 
continued to be hit by tariffs of the same order of magnitude, kept following the 
1953-58 trend for the rest of the period.
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Imports
Imports from the UK stagnated and remained well below the rising 1953-58 trend, 
while imports from Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria and Norway exceeded 
the trend after 1959.
Figure 6.2.12
imports of non-ferrous metal products from the EEC 












The value of imports from these countries remained however relatively low with the 
combined imports of the Benelux countries exceeding total imports from the EFTA.
Figure 6.2.15
imports of non-ferrous metal products from the EFTA 




x  30000 
Q 25000 





■ t 53-58 
EFTA
quarters
Given the steep increase in imports from the other EEC member countries, the 
reduction of tariffs vis-a-vis the Seven would very likely have had a similar effect 
for imports from there, mainly from the UK. From the point of view of the German
249
industry the fact that imports from Britain stagnated and remained very far below 
the 1953-58 trend must have been seen as a major success. There was certainly 
nothing that could have induced the industry to agree to any changes in tariff 
protection vis-a-vis the Seven which might have endangered that advantageous 
situation. Given that the EFTA countries had low or zero tariffs on the primary 
products, while the CET rendered them more expensive for the industries within the 
EEC, a number of complicated issues would be in the way of any solution that 
could have been agreed to by the German non-ferrous metal processing industry. 
The creation of a Europe-wide free trade area would not only have resulted in 
stronger import-pressures on the German market, but would surely have reduced the 
gains that the German industry was making in the French and the Italian markets. 
Hence for the German non-ferrous metal processing industry the potential costs of 
having the free trade area concerning import pressures in the home market and the 
likely opportunity costs for exports to the other EEC markets were both very visible 
after 1959. Until 1958 the expectation that the UK would be the most important 
competitor and that Norway might develop its own processing industry within the 
FTA were quite reasonable assumptions made by the industrial association for non- 
ferrous metal processing in Germany. From 1959 the gains in the French and Italian 
markets began to materialise, while the failure of the Maudling negotiations did not 
produce any negative developments for German exports in the EFTA markets. 
Hence the picture for the respective industrial associations was absolutely clear. 
Having the EEC and preventing tariff reductions vis-a-vis the Seven was the best 
option available for the industry.
Paper and paper products
The statistical evidence for the paper and paper products industries is very much in 
line with the trade statistics for the sector of non-ferrous metal products. For both 
sectors the formation of the Europe-wide free trade area would have resulted in 
serious competition from the Seven, while the failure of that project left them with 
the optimum situation possible, free access to the EEC markets, while exports to the 
EFTA did not suffer. In the case of the paper and paper products sector however,
250
the growth of demand was generally much higher. This led to large increases of 
exports to all EEC member countries, in particular to France and Italy. In this 
situation the foundation of the free trade area would not only have had repercussions 
on the home market, but would certainly have produced substantial opportunity 
costs in terms of export opportunities within the EEC and to France in particular. 
While exports of paper and paper products to the EFTA were considerably higher 
than to the EEC throughout the 1950s, exports to the EEC reached and surpassed 
those to the EFTA in 1961/62.
Exports to EFTA remained however consistently above the 1953-58 from 1959 
onward. While exports to most EFTA markets followed the trend line, those to 
Britain and Switzerland rose above it, in the case of Britain very markedly so in 
mid-1959 and in the case of Switzerland less impressively at the end of 1960.
Figure 6.2.14
exports of paper and paper products to the E FTA 
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The most remarkable fact in connection with the bad expectations of the industry in 
Germany is certainly that exports to none of the Seven actually declined or fell 
much below the 1953-58 trend line. This might have been mostly due to the general 
growth of demand for paper products in the early 1960s. While the growth of 
exports to France and Italy was the most impressive, exports to France did not catch 
up with the level of exports to the Netherlands which remained Germany’s most 
important export market for paper and paper products within the EEC.
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Figure 6.2.15
exports of paper and paper products to the EEC 









More impressive than the rising export figures to France were those of imports 
coming from there. French paper exports to Germany almost quadrupled between 
the second quarter of 1959 and the first quarter of 1960. This does not so much 
reflect the overall rapid growth of demand but rather the efficiency of protective 
measures applied before. Given that these measures remained in place vis-a-vis the 
Seven, the slight increase in imports from there above the 1953-58 trend is most 
probably mainly due to the rising demand for paper and paper products throughout 
all of Europe.
Figure 6.2.16
imports of paper and paper products from France 
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Imports from Sweden, the single most important source of German paper imports 
were continuously above the 1953-58 trend from 1958. The value of paper imports 
from Sweden was persistently higher than that of imports from the entire EEC. In 
1953 paper imports from the EEC came up to one fourth of imports from the Seven, 
reached one third in 1958 and came up to half the EFTA value in 1964. It is 
obvious that the removal of tariff barriers across Europe would have led to similar 
inroads into the German market by the powerful Scandinavian industries which, at 
the same time might have taken up many of the growing export opportunities 
elsewhere in the EEC. The interest of the German paper and paper products 
industries needs hardly any further analysis. The EEC must surely have been 
perceived as the redemption from the hell which a Europe-wide free trade would 
have constituted for the German paper industry.
Figure 6.2.17
imports of paper and paper products ftom the EFTA 
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The conclusions to the quantitative evidence assembled in this chapter can be stated 
very briefly. The essence is that for the potential winners from the free trade area or 
of British accession, the opportunity costs of not having achieved these 
arrangements was hardly visible in terms of foreign trade. This was due in part to 
the overall strong growth of demand in Western Europe but as well to the fact that 
the strong position of these export-oriented sectors of German industry in the EFTA 
markets could not easily be challenged in terms of the volume of supply by the 
producers among the Seven. Thus for these industries only the UK was a serious 
competitor able to displace some of their exports in the EFTA markets. Yet given 
the continuing growth of demand in these markets this relative deterioration there 
did not show in the trade statistics as a fall relative to the pre-EFTA trend of 
exports. In fact, exports to the EFTA as a whole did not fall anywhere substantially 
below that trend. This does not only hold true for the potential winners from the 
free trade area but also for most of the potential losers.
Figure 6.5.1
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It would obviously be possible to calculate the opportunity cost for each individual 
sector concerning exports to the EFTA markets by applying the respective sectoral 
trend of export growth to the EEC to the EFTA and calculate the difference between 
these estimated values and the actual export figures. Yet given that this study is not
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so much concerned with the trade diversion caused by the EEC and EFTA but 
rather with the action of industrial pressure groups in relation to negotiations on 
preferential trading areas, it is sufficient here to look at the visibility of these 
opportunity costs at the time. Apart from the fact that this study is not mainly 
concerned with the question of trade creation and diversion, one has to bear in mind 
that the very visible increase in exports to the EEC was not only due to the same 
growth in demand that was at work with difference in degree in all of Western 
Europe, but as far as France and Italy are concerned also to their high levels of 
protection prior to the foundation of the EEC.
Figure 6.3.2
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Thus the highest rates of growth in German exports were to these two previously 
highly protected markets, while the growth of exports to the smaller European 
economies within or outside the EEC was, where it occurred, more moderate than 
that. Hence, if one were to calculate the opportunity cost of individual sectors or 
manufacturing exports as a whole, one would have to figure into the equation the 
different levels of protection before and after the coming into effect of the EEC in 
each individual EFTA market. It is hard to make a clear statement on the basis of 
the presented graphs and tables as to what the opportunity cost was. Yet in view of 
these considerations, it is safe to assume that, had there been the free trade area, 
exports from the sectors of German industry which were potential gainers to the 
EFTA countries would most probably not have grown at a rate comparable to the
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average rate of growth to the individual EEC countries and certainly not nearly as 
fast as exports to France and Italy grew in most industrial sectors analysed here.
Figure 6.5.5
exports of manufactured goods to countries other than EEC 
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The export evidence for some of those sectors which saw themselves as the potential 
losers from any enlargement of the EEC or any wider free trade area comprising the 
Seven or some of them leads to conclusions which are very different from those 
drawn in the case of the potentially winning sectors. This is mainly due to the 
expectations in these sectors with which the trade figures were seen. During the 
Maudling negotiations the assumption in these sectors was that the foundation of any 
free trade area would result in major damage or even catastrophe for the respective 
industry. The prime concern was serious competition in the home market either 
from Scandinavia and Austria (paper, non ferrous metals) or from the United 
Kingdom (non-ferrous metal products). The trends for exports of these sectors to the 
EFTA up to 1958 were anyway either only very moderately rising or indeed falling 
steeply as in non-ferrous metals. If the free trade area came into existence, huge 
losses in exports were taken for granted. Nothing could be done about that given 
that German exports in some of these sectors were already losing out against their 
competitors among the Seven in the absence of the free trade area. Thus initially, 
the prime concern of the potential losers was the protection of the home market.
Yet once the EEC had come into operation with the CET guaranteeing more 
profitable prices for the problem sectors, the concern with regard to the free trade
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area was not only the dangers of foreign competition in the domestic but also in the 
common market that was to evolve. Once the industries had become aware of the 
potential for exports to France and Italy, they were fighting not only against 










z  3000000 
a  2500000 
§ 2000000 




C * ? C V J t— ^ - C O C M i - ^ rc b K - c o c 6 c 7 i O r :- i - 1- c < j r o ’t}-'tj- 
LO I D  LO LO LO CD CO CD CO CD CD CO
quarters
Thus for the potential losers from the free trade area and from British accession, 
both their likely losses and their opportunity costs were very visible indeed. This is 
particularly clear in the case of the paper industry.
The fact that imports from the other EEC countries soared as soon as internal tariffs 
were lowered in 1959 was perhaps not very welcome in sectors that faced problems 
of competitiveness. In these cases the establishment of yet another permanent 
arrangement with the abolition of barriers to trade was certain to be strongly 
rejected. In the case of the problem sectors analysed here, the EEC, while leading 
to intensified competition within, still offered them relatively comfortable export 
opportunities and thus cushioned the effect of increased competition. None of this 
cushioning would have remained within a Europe-wide free trade area. A rapid 
shrinking and painful restructuring of these sectors would inevitably have been the 
consequence.
The rise in total imports of manufactured goods from the EEC is certainly 
also a sign of a booming economy with a relatively high level of investment. That
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this is so is corroborated by the fact that imports from countries other than EEC and 
EFTA rose very markedly above the 1955-58 trend at the beginning of the 1960s. 
The establishment of convertibility of European currencies might also have 
contributed to further growth of imports into Germany.
Figure 6.5.5
imports of manufactured goods from countries other than EEC 
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For the sectors which were fearful of the free trade area the most important 
consequence of its failure was that imports from the EFTA did not increase at all or 
did so only slightly above the 1953-58 trend. The same is true for manufactured 
products as a whole (in this case the trend only refers to the period 1955-58).
Thus, whereas these sectors retained protection against their most dangerous 
competitors, they were given unprecedented export opportunities in the other EEC 
markets, mainly France and Italy. At the same time, the division between EEC and 
EFTA did not lead to important repercussions for the exports of these sectors. On 
the whole their exports to the Seven continued to follow broadly the pre-EFTA 
trend. Thus the failure of the FTA and of the accession negotiations insured that for 
the problem sectors of German industry high risks were avoided and at the same 
time high gains were incurred. It is obvious that the structure of interests in these 
sectors was conducive to decisive action with regard to interest representation. As 
has been seen in previous chapters and as shall be shown again in the following one, 
the respective industrial associations are particularly vociferous at the political level 
when they are faced with probable losses and opportunity costs as the consequence 
of measures negotiated between states, while the prospect of some additional gains
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is unlikely to induce a large amount of action on behalf of members of any 
industrial association. One cannot therefore assume that the seemingly stronger 
sectors which expand and are more competitive than others are likely to prevail over 
the less competitive ones which might also be facing structural problems and would 
tend to ask for protection. Quite the contrary. In political terms an industrial 
sector’s weakness might be its strength vis-a-vis a government bureaucracy and 
indeed vis-a-vis competing interests within industry depending on the overall 
scenario. It means in fact that the narrower, more clearly defined and more visible 
interest will produce a high amount of activity on the part of those representing that 
interest and, in any scenario like the one addressed here would be more likely to 
carry the day than the more widely dispersed and less clearly defined interest 
represented by a larger group.
Figure 6.5.6
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The free trade area or British accession to the EEC would have been somewhere 
between a crisis and a catastrophe for the paper, timber, non-ferrous metal, the 
textile industries and a number of other sectors which have not been described here 
in detail. The EEC as such offered them unexpected relief and even a profitable 
medium term future. These options were clearly visible. Thus to them the free trade 
area issue was of crucial importance, while the potential winners did not see any 
concrete gains held out to them on the EFTA markets. They might have feared 
some losses there, though in the end these did not occur. Yet what counted more to 
them were the very visible and substantial gains in the opening common market.
7 Adenauer, German industry and de Gaulle's 
veto against British accession to the EEC
7 .1 The British application, France, Germany, and the common 
agricultural policy
Long before the negotiations on British accession began and even before the UK had 
publicly talked about applying for it, the BMWi produced initial analyses 
concerning the significance and the chances of such a move as well as the 
procedural questions that would be raised by accession negotiations. In his analysis 
of the broad procedural problems for such negotiations to begin, Karl Hiinke from 
the European section of the BMWi dismissed the assumption as impossible that the 
French demanded the full membership of the UK only because they felt sure that it 
could not be achieved due to the problems arising from the Commonwealth and 
British membership in EFTA. Hiinke could not conceive that the French demand for 
full British membership could merely be a tactical device to put the blame for an 
eventual failure on the British1. Too convincing had been the reports that had come 
from London after talks between the French and the British there in early May 1961 
that France actually favoured British accession and even was ready to accept the 
association of the other EFTA members in the form of a customs union2. The 
arguments put forward by Olivier Wormser in the Rey Committee the same month 
also seemed to support the view that, in demanding British accession rather than 
supporting some sort of bridge building, the French were following their genuine 
interests and not just seeking tactical or strategic advantages. Wormser argued on 
that occasion that the best way to help the British make up their mind quickly was to 
move ahead swiftly with progress within the EEC like the formulation of the CAP 
and a second acceleration of tariff adjustments3. While even these arguments by
BA, B102 - 44415: Bonn, 28 III 1961 EA3, Hiinke; Zum Problem eines Beitritts Englands 
zur EWG.
BA, B102 - 12130: London, 04 V 61 Deutsche Botschaft London, Herwarth; An: AA, 
BMWi; Betr.: Englisch-franzosische Gesprache iiber die Moglichkeit einer britischen 
Annaherung an die EWG.
Ba, B102 - 12130: Brussel, 15 V 61 Handschriftliche Aufzeichnung iiber eine Sitzung des 
Sonderausschusses EWG-FHZ, Rey.
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Wormser leave room for interpretation of the French intentions at this early stage, a
note presented to de Gaulle a month after the negotiations had begun, is more
precise in what sort of reasoning dominated the minds of the French negotiators at
the outset of the talks. As early as November 1961 the French contemplated the
possible consequences of a simple failure of the negotiations and argued that, for the
time being, the adoption of reserved positions on some substantive matters would
allow the French government to delay a choice that, under the circumstances of the
moment, would be rather inconvenient and might even entail the disruption or the
paralysis of the Common Market:
... une telle prise de position reserve l'avenir et permet au 
gouvemement de faire plus tard un choix qui aujourd'hui est 
malaise parce que la reussite de la negotiation est une 
solution elle-meme, avec ses avantages et ses inconvenients, 
l'echec pur et simple, sans qu'une solution de rechange ait 
6te d6finie et menagee a l'avance, veut dire crise generate et 
peut-etre meme eclatement ou paralysie du marche commun4.
The implications of this reasoning are clear. Hiding behind the absolutely 
legitimate position that the treaty establishing the EEC must not be changed in 
substance and that possible transitory measures softening the impact of British 
accession for the Commonwealth should remain exceptional and not become the 
rule, the French were able to disguise their profound unwillingness to have Britain 
become a member of the EEC and to clothe this unwillingness in more general 
concerns that were also shared by the commission of the EEC and by important 
members of the German government, mainly Adenauer and leading officials of the 
AA, like Karl Carstens5. The French were entirely aware of the important
"... adopting such a position keeps up the options for the future and allows the government 
to make a choice at a later stage, a choice that would not be a pleasant one to make today. 
The success of the negotiations is in itself a solution with advantages and disadvantages. Yet 
the simple failure without defining and accommodating any alternative solution in advance, 
will mean general crisis and perhaps even the break down or the paralysis of the common 
market." See "MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser vol. 48: Paris, 20 XI 61 
Note remise au General de Gaulle en vue de son entretien avec M. Macmillan.
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser vol. 48: Paris, 20 XI 61 Note remise 
au General de Gaulle en vue de son entretien avec M. Macmillan; on the position of the 
commission president Walter Hallstein see Groeben , Hans von  d er : Walter Hallstein als 
Prasident der Kommission. In: Lo th , W infried  [eds.] [et al.]: Walter Hallstein. Der 
vergessene Europaer? Bonn 1995, pp. 121-138; Monar , Jorg : Walter Hallstein aus 
franzdsischer Sicht. In: Lo th , Win f r e d  [eds.] [et al.]: Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene 
Europaer? Bonn 1995, pp. 265-280.
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differences concerning European integration and the fierce rivalry still existing 
between AA and BMWi6. As far as the German government went, the French 
disguise had worked even for the rather more suspicious BMWi, as is revealed in 
Hiinke's report dating from late March 1961.
A similar view of the French position was put forward by Dr. PraB of the 
Chancellor's Office who put it to Adenauer that the decisions taken by the Rey 
Committee on 16 May 1961 concerning future negotiations on British accession 
were of the highest political relevance, mainly because of the fact that for the first 
time all member states of the EEC had formally welcomed British membership, a 
decision which in fact erased the Muller-Armack Plan and all other thoughts of 
"bridge-building" from the European agenda7. In fact, as Muller-Armack mentioned 
in talks with Olivier Wormser in April 1961, Erhard himself had called for a 
meeting of the Rey Committee in order to give Muller-Armack the chance to 
formally withdraw the plan that carried his name and that, in the present 
circumstances, might have worked as an obstacle to the evolving British position in 
favour of the membership application. This was celebrated by Olivier Wormser as a 
clear victory and a reward for French steadfastness against the attempts at "bridge 
building" between EEC and EFTA8.
In its May reunion the Rey Committee had agreed on a number of principles 
that should govern negotiations with the United Kingdom. The British entry into the 
EEC was welcomed by all member states on political as well as economic grounds. 
All EFTA members should be given the same opportunity to seek membership of 
the EEC. These negotiations should be based on full accession rather than on 
association. The treaty establishing the EEC was to remain intact, except for 
provisions relating to the association of overseas territories, agriculture and 
institutional matters where modifications were seen as unavoidable. More 
specifically concerning British accession, the Rey Committee decided that firstly, 
special arrangements should apply for products coming from the Commonwealth.
MEF - Direction du Tresor, B 17745: Bonn, 12 VIII 1961, Ambassade de France, Courson 
a Direction des Finances Exterieures, Cabinet de Directeur.
B136 - 2560: Bonn, 17 V 1961, Dr. PraB, Referat 6 An: Adenauer, zur Vorlage, Betr.: 
Beitritt Groftbritanniens zur EWG, insbesondere die Haltung Frankreichs.
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 47: Paris, 24 IV 1961, MAE, 
DAEF, Olivier Wormser, & Bonn.
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Secondly, a transitional period should help British agriculture to adapt to the 
continental system. Thirdly, no retardation in the development of the EEC was to be 
allowed because of the negotiations, and finally, there should be some redefinition 
of the institutional patterns that existed among the Six9.
Despite these seeming clarifications about the nature of the negotiations and 
the conditions attached to it on the part of the Six, ample scope for ambiguity 
remained. The very problems that Hiinke had discussed in his early note on British 
entry into the EEC were rather covered than exposed and solved by the agreement 
reached in the Rey Committee. Unfortunately, article 237 of the treaty establishing 
the EEC did not clarify these issues either. It talked about "necessary adaptations" 
to be made in case of the accession of another state to the Community, but left it 
unspecified whether this applied only to institutional arrangements like voting or 
also to substantive matters like the CET10. Hiinke pointed to the fact that, if entry 
was to mean that adaptations were made simply on institutional and procedural 
matters, then Britain would have to accept the CET and all other substantive 
provisions of the EEC treaty without asking for modifications. Yet the view that 
prevailed in Britain was that the CET could be accepted only, if agriculture and the 
Commonwealth would be treated in a satisfactory manner. This would not be a 
simple entry in the formal sense of the word. It would in fact mean a partial re­
negotiation of the treaty and would tend to end the leading role of France.
Hiinke reasoned that such a shifting of the balance within the EEC could in 
fact be quite advantageous for German interest, but that it had nothing to do with 
the sort of accession that was envisaged in article 237 of the EEC treaty. Hiinke 
argued therefore that the term "accession" would have to be defined so that 
everybody would understand from the very beginning that it did not only entail a 
rise in the number of member states but also an essential change of the Community. 
This German position was restated in a note in preparation of the meeting of the 
Rey Committee in mid-May. Here the position taken by the Commission of the 
EEC was criticised. The Commission had argued that adaptations made in the
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 47: Decisions taken by the Rey- 
Committee on Six-Seven relations in Brussels on May 16.
For this and the following see BA, B102 - 44415: Bonn, 28 III 1961, EA3, Hiinke, Zum 
Problem eines Beitritts Englands zur EWG.
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process of the accession of a new member state could only refer to changes in 
institutional and procedural arrangements. The note recommended that the German 
delegation should counter this position of the Commission and insist that also 
changes of a substantive kind would have to be part of the entry of a new member 
into the Community. This was particularly important from the German point of 
view in the areas of agriculture and the Commonwealth. As far as the association of 
the neutral EFTA members was concerned, the paper argued in favour of including 
them into a simple customs union11. Behind these remarks on the meaning of the 
term "accession" was most certainly the intention of the BMWi to further 
procrastinate the final definition of the common agricultural policy and to obtain a 
chance of altering it to something more palatable to Erhard's view of a sensible 
concept for such a policy. The BMWi's assumption that there was any chance to get 
a "better deal" by its own standards was certain to meet considerable resistance from 
France, but more importantly from German agriculture as well12.
The fact that the German and the French positions on this and other 
procedural matters were rather far apart from each other was also revealed in a note 
from the Quai d'Orsay in which Wormser warned his diplomats that an overly close 
co-operation with the Germans throughout the upcoming negotiations was by no 
means desirable from the French point of view13. Wormser feared that Adenauer 
might suggest to the French that both governments should agree a common position 
on the conditions which should be imposed on Great Britain for its admission into 
the EEC. An establishment of a common position by Germany and France was, 
according to Wormser, nothing else than an indirect discussion with London with 
direct talks conducted by the Germans and with Erhard and his friends as the
BA, B102 - 12130: Bonn, 12 V 1961, EA3, Allgemeiner Vermerk iiber die Sitzung des 
Sonderausschusses Rey am 15. Mai 1961.
For an analysis of the position of the German Farmers' Federation (DBV) vis-a-vis the CAP, 
see Hendriks, G isela : Germany and European Integration. The Common Agricultural 
Policy: An Area of Conflict. New York, Oxford 1990, pp. 148-154. Both German industry 
and German agriculture regarded the CAP with great scepticism, yet both did so for opposite 
reasons. See Freisberg , Ernst: Die griine Hurde Europas. Deutsche Agrarpolitik und 
EWG. (Europaische Gegenwart. Schriften zur Europapolitik, 4), Koln, Opladen 1965, p. 
39. The French noted very carefully the negative position taken by the DBV on British 
accession. MEF - Direction du Tresor, B 17745: Bonn, 22 I 1963, Ambassade de France, 
Courson k Direction des Finances Exterieures, Cabinet de Directeur.
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 47: Paris 18 V 1961, MAE, 
Olivier Wormser, Note.
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intermediaries between the two sides. He asked his diplomats to draw the federal 
chancellor's attention rather to the fact that without a CAP the common market 
risked being immobilised and that it seemed that the German government was rather 
less concerned about defining the agricultural policy. More precisely, Wormser 
wrote, that, if the CAP was not agreed on by the end of 1961, as envisaged in the 
EEC treaty, British accession would be off, and the whole construction between the 
Six would be in danger. This message constituted an early warning shot to the 
German side against tinkering with the common agricultural policy.
The early statements in this matter from German officials in the Rey 
committee had apparently made the French wary of Germany's willingness to carry 
through the formulation of the CAP, once British accession would have changed the 
balance within the Community. Even in seemingly minor procedural matters the 
French were careful not to yield at all to arrangements which, they feared, could at 
some stage play in favour of the British position. Thus they rejected the idea put 
forward by Harkort of the AA that the British memorandum summarising Heath's 
statements at the beginning of the negotiations, should be discussed by the 
permanent representatives of the EEC. France wanted this to be done in an ad hoc 
group. The French insisted also that a common position had to be established on this 
memorandum, since otherwise the British paper would automatically become the 
basis for the discussion, a notion that Wormser flatly rejected. In his note to the 
French delegation in the Brussels negotiations he expressed the French wariness 
concerning the German position in this matter. He was not surprised, Wormser 
wrote, that the Germans should be in favour of making the British document the 
basis of the discussion. He suspected generally that the other five members of the 
EEC would be all too ready to support British wishes14. The conclusion of all of this 
for the French negotiators was obvious: in no way could they possibly yield in 
procedural and formal matters without risking a weakening of their own position 
given the perceived potential isolation among the EEC member states. The same 
caution on the part of the French in procedural questions was again displayed in 
April 1962 when the British intended to have their new proposals discussed chapter
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 48: Paris, 14 X 1961 MAE, 
DAEF, Olivier Wormser, a Delfra Bruxelles.
265
by chapter and to establish a working program on that basis. It was again Harkort 
who supported the British view and tried unsuccessfully to urge the French to yield 
in this matter15.
As mentioned before, the Germans saw the negotiations on British accession 
to the EEC among other things as an opportunity to alter the balance of interest and 
opinion within the Community concerning the main features of the common 
agricultural policy. An aide memoire of the BMWi concerning a paper to be 
submitted to the federal cabinet stressed that it was necessary to provide Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand with access to the EEC market for their agricultural 
products by means of global agreements. The nature of these agreements would to a 
large extent depend on the price policy that the EEC would eventually adopt. If 
British accession would not come about, the paper argued, Germany alone would be 
faced with the import pressure from French agricultural production, while British 
accession would ease that situation. As far as German agriculture was concerned, 
the BMWi paper held the view that the subsidies to be granted for structural 
adjustments would help avoid any lowering of agricultural incomes that might 
otherwise be the consequence of lower prices for agricultural products. A positive 
effect of that would be that lower prices for wheat would help keep overall price 
levels low as well and thus be favourable to the industrial sector of the economy16. 
These general arguments were put forward by the BMWi in order to justify German 
support of the British position on agriculture and the common agricultural policy in 
the accession negotiations. They implied an eventual shift from a policy based on set 
prices to one closer to the British deficiency payments system, a policy which stood 
no chance at all ever to be accepted by the German Farmers' Federation (DBV)17.
The British had argued that there were legitimate reasons to request some 
alterations to the CAP, while accepting its principles. These arguments had been 
that the accession of Britain and the likely accession of Denmark and Norway would
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 49: Paris, 28 IV 1962, Note a 
sujet des negotiations avec le Royaume-Uni.
BA, B102 - 61943: Bonn, 21 VIII 1962, Leiter der Abteilung V, Reinhardt an Staatssekretar 
Westrick, Betr.: Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG und zur EGKS (Kabinettsvorlage vom 
25. Juli 1962), Bezug: Ihre Anfrage vom 9. August 1962.
For the essential agricultural problems relating to the British application see Freisberg , 
Hurde, pp. 110-115.
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change the balance of supply and demand within the Community in particular for 
eggs and pork, that some vital interests of Commonwealth countries were 
concerned, and that the UK should be given some time in order to adapt more easily 
to the new system18. More specifically the British deemed unjust a financing system 
for the CAP that would determine a member state's contribution in relation to 
agricultural imports from third countries. Since such British imports came to 
roughly 50% from non-EEC member countries, this would have meant that the 
British would have to bear the main share of the burden and that further problems 
for the British balance of trade would have been created. Some of the other 
problems relating at the same time to the Commonwealth as well as the CAP have 
already been mentioned.
At the outset of the negotiations the British had asked for the acceptance of 
the general principle that comparable outlets be guaranteed for the member countries 
of the Commonwealth. As a way of achieving that, they had suggested special 
agreements for the transitional period, which, they demanded, should be of 
sufficient length. They also demanded an examination of existing regulations before 
the transition toward the final stage of the common market. Apart from that Heath 
had demanded some general assurance by the enlarged Community to the member 
countries of the Commonwealth and that, in living up to this assurance, the 
principle of comparable outlets should be applied. In the British view this concept 
meant that the Commonwealth countries should be able to export agricultural 
products to the enlarged Community in similar proportions as they existed at the 
time of British entry into the EEC. The special arrangements needed to achieve this 
should be made on a commodity by commodity basis. As far as the precise nature of 
the measures were concerned, the British were flexible. They suggested import 
quotas without duties or at reduced duties, long term import agreements or 
agreements on a division of the markets19.
For this and the following see BA, B102 - 44416: Brussel, 22 II 1962, Konferenz der
Mitgliedstateen der Europaischen Gemeinschaften mit den dritten Staaten, die ihren Beitritt 
zu diesen Gemeinschaften beantragt haben, [=RU/M/13/62] Ausz. 1, vierte Ministertagung. 
BA, B102 - 44416: Brussel, 12 IV 1962, Konferenz der Mitgliedsstaaten der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften mit den dritten Staaten, die ihren Beitritt zu diesen Gemeinschaften 
beantragt haben. Verhandlungen mit dem Vereinigten Koenigreich. RU/S/59/62. Bericht 
iiber den Stand der Verhandlungen, p. 43.
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While the precise nature of the concept of comparable outlets was thus not 
defined by the British, it was clear that any sort of guaranteed import quantities for 
the Commonwealth in the enlarged EEC would cancel out much of the positive 
effects of British accession for the German economy. Retaining existing proportions 
of agricultural imports from the Commonwealth would diminish the easing of 
import pressure from France which the Germans hoped to achieve through Britain's 
membership. As far as German agriculture was concerned, imports of hard-wheat 
from the Commonwealth (mainly Canada) were not problematic, given that German 
consumption exceeded by far domestic production levels. Cheap imports of dairy 
products (mainly butter from New Zealand) on the other hand were not welcome, 
since in this field Germany was practically self-sufficient. To give the 
Commonwealth a special deal in dairy products would thus with certainty lead to 
large losses for German agriculture in the home market.
In the process of the negotiations, as individual problems were addressed, it 
became clear to the Germans, that the position outlined in the BWMi paper 
mentioned above was at best wishful thinking. The German negotiating position 
within the EEC was not such as to support the British view without facing serious 
problems for German agriculture and open threats from the French that a retardation 
of the CAP would paralyse the whole integration process. On the very important 
matter of the price level for wheat British accession would have meant that the 
possible outcome would have been a widening of the already substantial price gap 
between the high German price and the low French price, with the British price of 
wheat being even lower.
Table 7.1,1
w heat prices (DM per t) 1958-1962
Germany France Canada USA Argentine
1958 439,64 265,10 313,30 289,80 283,30
1959 440,36 260,30 314,30 288,20 278,80
1960 440,36 263,70 309,00 289,40 281,90
1961 438,46 259,60 301,50 282,30 278,70
1962 439,03 323,90 280,60 282,30 280,60
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1963
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While all Six agreed that this had to be rejected, the German delegate made the 
grave tactical error in the negotiations in fall 1962 of refuting the British proposal in 
such a way as to make it unnecessary for his EEC-partners to expose themselves.
This put the German delegation in a situation where they certainly did not 
want to be. Hiinke commented on this incident which signalled a general 
deterioration of the German standing in the negotiations: "Auch davon abgesehen
bekommt die deutsche Delegation von Mai zu Mai deutlicher zu spiiren, daB sie auf
20der Anklagebank sitzt, iibrigens nicht nur in der EWG" . The fact that the common 
agricultural policy and the different interests of France and Germany played a major 
role in the accession negotiations was clear long before the British had handed in 
their formal membership application. In a conversation with Muller-Armack in 
April 1961 about the British attitude toward the common market, Wormser made it 
clear that any delay in the development of the CAP would stop the transition of the 
EEC into the second phase. As an explanation for the slow progress on the CAP, 
Muller-Armack pointed to the upcoming German elections21. The German 
agricultural community was indeed of significant electoral importance to the 
governing Christian Democrats22. In talks only two months later Wormser was 
appalled that Muller-Armack bluntly revealed the German intention to keep up 
traditional trade flows in agricultural products through extensive use of tariff quotas, 
unless countries like Denmark could either join the EEC or be associated with it23. 
The Germans most likely aimed at keeping cheap wheat imports from Canada, 
which went straight against the aim of French agriculture to sell its wheat to 
Germany.
Yet another area of dissent between the French and the Germans was the 
financing of the CAP. The Germans were not really happy with the results achieved
20 "Apart from this, the German delegation feels more and more that they are seen as being in 
the dock, and this is true not only within the EEC." See BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 3 I 1963, 
EA3, Hiinke, Stand der Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt Grofibritanniens zur EWG. Stichtag 
31. Dezember 1962.
21 MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 47: Paris, 24 IV 1961 MAEF, 
Wormser a Bonn.
22 The electoral importance of the farmers' lobby for the CDU/CSU and their power within 
these parties are highlighted by Freisberg and Hendriks. See F reisberg , Hiirde, p. 33; 
H endriks, Germany, pp. 48, 93-97, See also Neville-Ro lfe , Edm u n d : The Politics of 
Agriculture in the European Community. London 1984, pp. 82-87.
23 MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 47: Paris 19 VI 1961, MAE, 
Wormser a Bonn, Bruxelles, Londres.
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in January 1962. In the discussions of January they had demanded that there should 
be an upper level for their contribution of the reorientation funds. While they first 
regarded it as sufficient to have had this mentioned in the minutes of the Council 
session, they changed their mind in February and asked to make it part of the actual 
regulation. Wormser sent a clear message to the secretary of state of the AA Rolf 
Lahr, that this was not on with France. The package deal reached on January 14 
was not to be untied. France regarded the deal reached then as not subject to any 
changes24.
Again, it must have been understood that any tinkering with the CAP would 
destroy all German hopes to achieve British accession to the EEC. This was also the 
French position vis-a-vis the United Kingdom and its requests for adaptations of 
some of the rules laid down to govern the EEC's agricultural policy. Thus the 
French were concerned about the sincerity of the British in this matter from the very 
first day and remained very stubborn in pursuing their agricultural interest until the 
very end of the negotiations. This is reflected in a letter by Wormser to the French 
embassy at London where he says that, if the British are really serious about the 
EEC, then it would be necessary for them to understand the French in the question 
of agriculture25. The true understanding for the French position was not too well- 
developed on the British side given the generally large differences in agricultural 
interest.
But at least in one point did they seem to have complete agreement and to
such an extent that it turned out to be particularly painful to the Germans. This was
26in the question of the wheat price, which has already been mentioned . It seems 
that this problem for the Germans was exploited by the French to the fullest extent 
in order to undermine the cohesion of the German position and even to contribute to 
anger and discord within the German administration. In this case the secretary of
24 MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 48: Paris, 21 II 1962, MAE,
DAEF, Olivier Wormser k Bonn.
25 MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 47: Paris, 13 IV 1961, MAE,
Olivier Wormser, a Londres.
26 MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 47: Paris, 19 IV 1961, MAE,
Wormser A: Londres. For an account of the long struggle between France and Germany 
over cereal prices see H en d rik s , Germany, pp. 50-56. On the German grain market and the 
introduction of the CAP see B aad e , F r t tz /F e n d t ,  F ra n z :  Die deutsche Landwirtschaft im 
Gemeinsamen Markt. Baden-Baden 21963, pp. 133-146; M a g u ra , W ilh e lm : Chronik der 
Agrarpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1945-1967. Hamburg 1970.
270
state of the AA, Lahr, who had been defending the German agricultural interest 
against the joint Franco-British attempt to introduce a relatively low wheat price, 
had to defend himself in a cabinet meeting against harsh attacks by Adenauer. The 
chancellor was upset because of the fact that the German delegation at the 
negotiating table seemed to side with the Dutch rather than with the chancellor's 
preferred partner, the French. In his rejection of the criticism Lahr expressed his 
disappointment at the French negotiating style, which, he felt, had been exploiting 
every weak spot in the German position without regard to concessions that had been 
granted to the French by the Germans before. In short, Lahr saw himself betrayed 
by Couve de Murville and Wormser who, according to him, had broken their word 
a number of times27.
Yet while the French were quick to use a rare common interest with the 
British against the Germans, they were quite intransigent when it helped their 
interest to state that the British were not allowed to intrude into matters of the CAP 
at all. When the British presented their view on a number of agricultural regulations 
on beef, dairy products and rice, which had been worked out by the Six, the French 
simply rejected discussion of the British document on the grounds that it had been 
agreed before among the Six that no would-be member could take part in the 
formulation of policies before actual entry28. This point constituted a first rank 
procedural problem. Some of the main British concerns were related to the CAP and 
adaptations to it they deemed as absolutely crucial. Yet not only the French but also 
the Commission took the view that none of this should be decided with British 
participation before Britain actually had obtained membership. Thus the British had 
to accept the CAP as it stood at whatever time they were actually going to join.
In this very matter it becomes clear again how the different notions of what 
membership was to mean prevented progress beyond a certain point. Thus the Six 
did not agree to any extension of British deficiency payments beyond the second 
phase of the transitional period. Britain was not included in the discussions on those
BA, B136 - 2561: Unkorrigiertes Manuskript aus der Kabinettssitzung am Mittwoch, den 8. 
August 1962.
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olvier Wormser, vol. 49: Paris, 8 XII 1962, MAE, 
DAEF, Note a. s. negotiations avec le Royaume-Uni, XlVeme session, reglements agricoles 
en cours d'elaboration.
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agricultural regulations which were under consideration among the Six, nor were 
their demands for guaranteed income levels for the agricultural population supported 
by the Six. Apart from the fairly obvious clashes of interest arising from the very 
different structures of the in respective agricultures of and the systems of protection 
and support for farmers by which they were run, this very complicated area became 
an insoluble problem also because all sides had different expectations as to what 
extent the CAP could or should be a subject of discussion in the negotiations on 
British accession.
7.2  German industrial interest and the prospect o f British accession
to the EEC
The schedule, structure and the main issues of the negotiations
The main concerns of German industry in relation to the negotiations about British
accession to the EEC were related to the British wishes to associate all or most of 
the Commonwealth countries (except Canada, New Zealand and Australia) with the 
EEC and to bring about the accession or association of all other EFTA countries. 
Association was meant to be either a free trade area or, more likely, a customs 
union without any of the other obligations and rights for the member states 
enshrined in the EEC treaty. While British accession as such did not cause major 
concerns among German industrial sectors and was indeed mostly seen as opening 
further export opportunities, the direct competition in some sectors with some of the 
Commonwealth and the EFTA countries was deemed to be potentially disastrous. 
Direct competition from the Commonwealth countries would have been the 
consequence of the British wish to associate most of them or to introduce zero 
tariffs for a number of products constituting major British imports from the 
Commonwealth. The most "dangerous" countries in this respect were Canada and 
Norway and the sectors concerned were those of non-ferrous metals, primarily 
aluminium, wood and wood processing, as well as related industries like paper and 
cardboard, where the British had asked for zero tariffs for the primary materials. It 
seems that most of German industry but also the German negotiators saw the
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accession or association of the other EFTA countries as a practically certain 
corollary of British entry, once that was achieved. Yet this expectation seemed to 
ignore completely the American reticence to have any neutral country join the EEC.
The British had initially declared that they would only sign a treaty of 
accession, once an acceptable solution had been found to the relationship with the 
other EFTA countries, whose accession or association it sought. Yet it was not at all 
so clear that this was ever to happen. The problem with the association or 
membership of other EFTA members was highly complicated and heavily 
intertwined with questions of European security and American opposition to having 
neutral countries included in any way into the EEC. Apart from that there were 
huge formal and procedural problems consisting in the fact that Britain would have 
to give its fellow EFTA members one year notice before leaving the Association. 
This would mean that, if Britain was to stick to her pledge not to go ahead with 
accession before all was settled for the other members of the Seven, the negotiations 
would have been completely overburdened. Another problem concerned article 234 
of the EEC treaty which foresaw that EEC members would support any other 
member state in case it had previous legal obligations that were not compatible with 
the EEC treaty. It was not clear whether the Six would be able to accommodate 
these British problems arising from EFTA membership. In fact France was not 
inclined to ease this problem but insisted on the application of the CET by Britain
29vis-a-vis the EFTA countries as soon as Britain acceded to the EEC . Despite all of 
these rather obvious hurdles in the way of any association of the EFTA and 
Commonwealth countries, the assumption that this was a likely event, if British 
accession was achieved, remained in the heads of the German negotiators and was 
certainly the background of all analyses put forward by the BDI and individual 
industrial associations.
During the first months after the beginning of the negotiations most of the 
work was devoted to the provision of statistical material relating to trade between 
Britain, the continent and the Commonwealth. While the British wanted to begin the 
negotiations with talks about the Commonwealth, the French refused to do so before
MAE, DE-CE, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser vol. 49: Paris 01 XII 62 Note a sujet 
de la negotiation avec le Royaume-Uni, Particle 234, EFTA.
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the basic decisions among the Six on the common agricultural policy had been 
taken. Thus the talks began on manufactured products and the British requests for 
zero tariffs, while agricultural issues had to be postponed. In August the 
negotiations were interrupted. After their resumption in October practically no 
further progress was made any more until de Gaulle pronounced the French veto 
against the continuation of the negotiations.
Table 7,2.1:
imports into the  UK In 1.000 tons bv area of origin 
of products for which the  UK requested zero tariffs 
in th e  accession negotiations:__________________________
world CW cw as % of 
total
raw aluminium 228,0 123,0 53,9
paper semi-products 2225,0 217,0 9,8
newsprint 509,0 357,0 70,1
raw lead 180,0 160,0 88,9
raw zinc 177,0 91,0 51,4
acetylene soot 291,0 230,0 79,0
aluminium oxide 1033,0 700,0 67,8
artifical corundum 2478,0 1867,6 75,4
silicon carbide 9,0 2,0 22,2
calcium carbide 79,0 2,0 2,5
vegetable tanning extracts 27,0 3,5 13,0
casein 13,4 6,8 50,7
colophonium 98,4 0,2 0,2
wooden sleepers 33,6 33,1 31,5
gr&ge 0,4 0,0 0,0
woolen carpets, handmade - 76,6
mats and and weaves of coco­
fabrics
" 99,8
ferrosilicon 64,0 24,1 37,7
ferrochrom e 32,0 9,0 38,1
rods from nickel-copper-alloys 2,3 0,0 0,0
cadmium 1,2 0,5 41,7
Source: BA. B102 - 44415: Brussel, 280362, Von: Konferenz der Mitglied-staaten der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften m it den Dritten Staaten, die ihren Beitritt zu diesen Gemeinschaften bean trag t 
haben. verhandlungen m it dem  vereinigten Koenigreich. Arbeitsgruppe: w aren, fu r die die 
britische Delegation einen Zollsatz Null beantrag t hat. I= ru/GT1/int/2/62; RU/GT1/INT/1/62 rev. 2], 
Anlage 1, Einfuhr in das Vereinigte Koenigreich im Jahre 1959.
The most important British requests relating to Commonwealth industrial products 
were those for zero tariffs and special arrangements for finished products coming
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from Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The British had proposed zero tariffs for 
a number of different products some of which were raw materials, others were 
semi-products made thereof.
The main problem with that was that some of them had been the object of 
considerable disagreement among the Six, some had been put on the List G as a 
consequence of that. For the rest, the CET that had finally been agreed was the
30outcome of a compromise that could not easily be altered again . For other 
products the respective industries within the EEC simply needed the protection of 
the CET in the view of their governments. For the products made from the raw 
materials on the British list, tariffs could only be fixed, once the raw material tariffs 
had been agreed. A third group of products were those which could be dealt with 
according to article 25 of the EEC treaty31.
In the opening session of the negotiations Heath had only mentioned a few 
products for which the UK would ask for zero tariffs. Soon after, a number of other 
products was added to the list. By January 1962 the British had requested zero 
tariffs for 25 tariff positions the most important of which were aluminium, lead and 
zinc as well as some iron alloys, newsprint and wood pulp (see most of these 
products in table 7.2.1)32.
List G in the annex I to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community relating 
to article 20 of the treaty comprised those products for which the arithmetical average was 
not deemed feasible for the CET and where the Six had not been able to agree on a common 
tariff intially. The member states agreed on the common tariff for the products on List G on 
2 March 1960 with the exceptions of manufactured tobacco and petroleum products. See 
C am p b e ll, A la n :  Common Market Law. Volume II. London, Harlow 1969, p. 17, § 2028. 
For the agreement reached in 1960 see Journal Officiel des Communautes Europeennes, 20 
Decembre 1960, 3e Annee N° 80 C, pp. 1825/60-1871/60.
Article 25 of the EEC treaty specified the criteria according to which the Commission was 
entitled to allow exceptions to the common external tariff (e. g. import quotas at reduced 
tariffs) in case of difficulties faced by individual member states. See C am p b e ll, Common 
Market Law, pp. 19-21, § 2033; M e g re t, Ja c q u e s  [et al.] [ed.]: Le Droit de la 
Communaute Economique Europeenne. Commentaire du Traite et des textes pris pour son 
application. Preambule - Principes - Libre circulation des marchandises. Brussels 1970, pp. 
79-84. See BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 2 VI 1962, EA3, Losungsvorschlage zu den 
Verhandlungen fiber den Beitritt des Vereinigten Konigreichs zur EWG bisher behandelten 
Problemen.
BA, B102 - 44415: Brussel, 280362, Konferenz der Mitgliedstaaten der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften mit den Dritten Staaten, die ihren Beitritt zu diesen Gemeinschaften 
beantragt haben. Verhandlungen mit dem Vereinigten Koenigreich. Arbeitsgruppe: Waren, 
fur die die britische Delegation einen Zollsatz Null beantragt hat. [=RU/GT1/INT/2/62; 
RU/GT1/INT/1/62 rev. 2], Anlage 1, Einfuhr in das Vereinigte Koenigreich im Jahre 1959.
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German industrial interest
On 12 June 1962, the department IV of the BMWi had requested an analysis from 
the respective departments of the impact British accession to the EEC would make 
on individual industrial sectors. For most sectors the reply to this letter was the only 
occasion on which the effects of British entry were communicated from the sectoral 
departments to the higher co-ordinating level within the BMWi. The reason for this 
was simply that the sectors concerned either reported no problems whatsoever with 
British accession or just a few minor problems that might not lead to serious 
consequences and were not seen as needing attention in the negotiations. This can be 
said for all of the following sectors: Chemicals, electrical and electronic products, 
glass and ceramics, shoes, steel construction, motor vehicles, mechanical 
engineering and machine tools, ships and planes. For a few sectors like the wood 
and wood processing industries there was a considerable difference between the 
impact of a simple accession by the UK and the accession or association of the other 
EFT A countries. While British accession did not constitute any problem and 
promised even better sales opportunities, Scandinavian competition in case of the 
accession of the EFTA countries was seen as very damaging not only for the wood 
industry but also for cellulose, paper, chipboard and other related sectors33. The 
same difference of the expected impact of British accession and the possible future 
accession of the other EFTA countries to the EEC existed for a number of other 
sectors, which figured more prominently in the accession negotiations. These were 
mainly non-ferrous metals and iron alloys industries, for which competition from 
Norway would have constituted very serious problems. The situation was exactly 
the opposite for the steel construction industry which hoped for the association of 
the EFTA members34.
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 19 VI 1962, Abteilung IVB4, Aust an Abteilung IV/4, Betr.: 
Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt Groflbritanniens, Bezug: Ihr Schreiben vom 12. Juni 1962. 
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 26 VI 1962, Abteilung IVA2, Pfeiffer an Abteilung IV/4, Betr.: 




The chemical industry had always welcomed British accession to the EEC 
even though the competition with the British ICI was expected to be hard35. 
Problems were seen only for mineral oil, rubber and asbestos-processing industries. 
The electrical and electronic industry saw only advantages if Britain was to accede 
to the EEC. The electronic industry looked forward to the inclusion of the 
Commonwealth into the arrangements which would increase German export 
opportunities given the likely elimination of preferences for British exports to these 
markets. Given that tariffs in Britain were higher than in Germany it was certain for 
the industry that it stood to incur huge gains . The German car industry viewed 
British accession with similar optimism. Britain itself but also the Commonwealth 
and above all the other EFTA countries were seen as markets where German cars 
would be very competitive, while the car industry did not expect that their British 
competitors would be able to make any significant inroads into the German 
market37. In the mechanical engineering industry British accession was seen as 
leading to higher levels of foreign trade, i. e. exports but also imports. Yet it was 
clear that Germany's exports would by far exceed imports from Britain. The EFTA 
market had been the most important export market for the German engineering 
industry and the association or accession of these countries was therefore very much 
welcomed.
Table 7,2,2: Trade in motor cars:
exports imports
total to  UK % to  UK total from UK %from
UK
1959 783217 12958 1,7 115840 2648 2,3
1960 889910 18749 2,1 89460 3645 4,1
1961 920288 17166 1,9 95559 3520 3,7
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 22 VI 1962, Abteilung IVB1, Lenz an IV/4, Betr.: 
Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG, Bezug: Ihr Schreiben vom 12. 
Juni 1962.
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 25 VI 1962, Abteilung IVA4, Gronwald an Abteilung IV/4, 
Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG, Bezug: Schreiben der 
Abteilung IV vom 12. Juni 1962.
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 26 VI 1962, Abteilung IVA2, Pfeiffer an Abteilung IV/4, Betr.: 
Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens, Bezug: Schreiben der Abteilung IV vom 
12. Juni 1962.
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Table 7.2.5: Trade in lorries:
exports imports
total to  UK % from 
UK
total from UK % from 
UK
1959 102964 501 0,5 833 28 3,4
1960 117388 1904 1,6 1747 52 2,9
1961 117653 1892 1,6 3029 27 0,9
Table 7.2.4:
Trade in mechanical engineering products in million DM:
exports impo rts
total to  UK % to  UK total from
UK
% from UK
1959 7880 384,7 4,5 1506 216 14,4
1960 9285 486,6 5,2 2127 291 13,7
1961 11205 636,8 5,7 2754 357 13,0
Table 7.2.5: Office and printing machinery,
exports to  EECartd EFTA as percentage





Source fo r tables 7.2.2. ■ 7.2.5: BA, B102 ■ 44417:
Bonn, 26 V11962, Abteilung IVA2, Pfeiffer, an Abteilung IV/4,
Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens,
Bezug: Schreiben der Abteilung IV vom 12. Juni 1962.
• Textiles
The German textile industry had a whole range of problems with British accession 
to the EEC. Most of them were related to British requests for arrangements that 
would accommodate Commonwealth interests through an easing of the transition 
toward the establishment of the CET or through special agreements that would 
provide certain Commonwealth countries with guaranteed long-term access to the 
European market. For some products British competition as such was seen as a 
serious threat to German production. Apart from these problems arising from the 
changes of the situation under negotiations the German textile industry was facing 
increasing competition from within the existing EEC. Yet quite surprisingly, it was 
not before the negotiations had reached a very advanced stage that the German 
textile industry realised these potential dangers. In August 1961 the German
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economic daily newspaper Handelsblatt reported that, on the whole, the textile 
industry was calm in face of the prospect of British accession, since the relatively 
low German textile tariffs had not led to increased competition from the UK. The 
main problem was seen in the position of the Commonwealth and India, Sri Lanka 
and Pakistan in particular, but it was reckoned that a limitation of their access to the 
European market could be easily agreed among the member states of the EEC38. 
More intense competition from Britain was expected in the cotton and wool 
industries. Given that the accession or association of the EFTA countries to the EEC 
was expected to go along with British accession, the German textile industry for 
which the EFTA and mainly Scandinavia was a very important export market saw 
the development overall in a rather favourable light. The increased export chances 
to the Scandinavian countries were thought to more than offset potentially negative 
influences from granting market access to some Commonwealth countries.
A year later the German textile industry had markedly changed its view and 
looked with grave concern on British accession. The main reason for this was the 
agreement reached in summer 1962 among the Six to have a trade agreement of the 
enlarged EEC with India and Pakistan on textile imports, which was more generous 
than the Federal Republic’s previous quotas for these countries. In the fall India had 
demanded further concessions. This was seen as a potential threat to the German 
textile industry. In summer and fall of 1962 the association Gesamttextil therefore 
stepped up its pressure and left the normal channels of interest representation 
through the BMWi in order to influence the German position at the negotiation 
table. Gesamttextil had apparently expected a consensus with its counterparts within 
the EEC. Yet during the negotiations the industry had to realise that the textile 
industries of the other EEC member countries were not sharing its views to the same 
extent. This had first become clear in the forum of the GATT where an agreement 
on cotton textiles was negotiated in spring 196239.
For this and the following see: HANDELSBLATT, 22 VIII 1961, "Textilindustrie blickt 
vor allem auf das Commonwealth" - "Behandlung der Billigeinfuhren vordringlich - Aber 
alte Kunden konnten wiederkehren".
For the details on the cotton textile agreement that was negotiated in the GATT and ratified 
at the end of 1962 see Curzon, Gerard: Multilateral Commerical Diplomacy. The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its Impact on National Commerical Policies and 
Techniques. London 1965, pp. 254-258.
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Under the pressure from the USA for a liberal EEC policy and as a 
consequence of a marked shift toward a much more liberal attitude by the French, 
the Germans were forced to move along and grant much more generous concessions 
in the GATT than had been originally envisaged. De Gaulle was apparently wooing 
India and, at the same time, rendered the German position in the accession 
negotiations much more difficult. The fact that the French attitude had obviously 
been miscalculated contributed to this uncomfortable situation in the negotiations. 
There are also some indications that the French were doing this quite consciously, 
being well aware of the position of the German textile industry and their lobbying 
efforts40. The BMWi was so concerned about the matter that it made the 
chancellor's office aware of it, before protests from the textile association could 
filter through to the chancellor41. In the end Gesamttextil was not as disappointed 
with the agreement that had been produced as the BMWi's negotiators had feared42. 
Yet the matter clearly indicated that the German textile industry could not simply 
count on a very protectionist French attitude to help do the work against increasing 
competition from third countries.
Table 7,2.6: Domestic production
and imports of wool yarn in 1.0001:
production imports imports as % 
of production
1953 103 11 10.68
1954 102 12 11.76
1955 107 17 15.89
1956 115 20 17.39
1957 122 22 18.03
1958 105 21 20.00
1959 110 40 36.36
1960 114 33 28.95
1961 109 33 30.28
1962 110 37 33.64
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1958.1963
MEF - Direction du Tresor, B 17745: Bonn, 24 IX 1962, Ambassade de France, Margerie a 
Direction des Finances Exterieures, Cabinet de Directeur
BA, B136 - 7741: Bonn, 7 II 1962, Staatssekretar BMWi, Westrick an Staatssekretar 
Globke.
BA, B136 - 7741: Bonn, April 1962, Referat 6, Prafi an Adenauer, zur Vorlage, Betr.: 
Baumwolltextilienabkommen.
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Toward the end of the second phase of the accession negotiations in July and August 
1962, the BMWi department in charge of textiles formulated the precise nature of 
the problems that they saw coming up for German textiles in the process of the 
talks. In response to a letter from the department IV (gewerbliche Wirtschaft) 
asking for the positions of individual industrial sectors in mid-June, the sub­
department IVC1 (textiles) provided its assessment, which looked already much 
worse than that of a year before43. For the German cotton industry international 
competition was already very tough, leaving it with very small profit margins. The 
fear of the industry was that Britain would seek some sort of compensation for the 
disastrous developments in Lancashire's textile industry in trying to arrange for a 
sharing of the burden of textile imports from India and Pakistan with the other EEC 
member countries. It was also feared that processed textiles made from these cheap 
imports would seriously affect the corresponding German production and that 
finished cotton cloth from India might be re-exported via Lancashire to Germany44.
The second area of concern was the wool industry. Here it was genuine 
British competition that worried the German producers, while the Commonwealth 
did not play a role. The import pressure from the other EEC member countries was 
already fairly strong and a structural crisis was forcing painful adaptation measures. 
Imports of wool yam as a percentage of domestic production had more than tripled 
during the 1950s and the early 1960s. The British wool industry was seen as a very 
serious competitor for a number of reasons. It was highly specialised and had a 
highly skilled work force and thus produced yarns of superb quality often 
unmatched by yams produced anywhere else. Since some of these high quality yams 
were subject to export prohibition, German producers could not use them. The 
German jute industry which had been in a structural crisis for several years feared 
British competition. Together with the strong position of the Belgian jute industry, 
British accession would have rendered the position of the German industry hopeless
For this and the following see BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 4 VII 1962, Von. Abteilung IVC1, 
Kaulbach an Abteilung IV/4, Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens, 
Bezug: Ihr Schreiben vom 12. Juni 1962.
S h ep h e rd , G e o ff re y : Exports of Cotton Textiles from Developing Countries to the 
European Economic Community and the United Kingdom 1958-1969. (IBRD - Economics 
Department Working Paper No. 52), Brighton 1969, pp. 14, 19, 23-24.
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even with quota protectiona against imports from India. Since GATT arrangements 
would force the abolition of all remaining quantitative restrictions in a few years 
time, British membership of the EEC would expose the industry to the full British 
competitive advantages. Apart from these issues textile exports from Hongkong 
were seen as the single most important problem.
Given that every European country used relatively powerful protective 
measures for their textile industries, it is understandable that the German textile 
industry should have assumed that a consensus among these countries would be 
easy. Yet a closer look at the nature of these different protective measures reveals 
why countries like Belgium and Italy did not have to translate their protective needs 
into high tariffs or massive quantitative restrictions. In a letter by the department 
IVC1 (textiles) to Ludwig Erhard and his secretary of state Westrick on the 
problems faced by the textiles industry through British accession, these matters were 
analysed in some detail45. As far as cotton textiles were concerned, the British were 
operating a number of voluntary export restraint (VER) agreements with India, 
Pakistan and Hongkong at a preferential tariff of zero. The Benelux countries and 
Italy had liberalised their imports of textiles yet allegedly applied rather efficient 
non-tariff barriers of an administrative nature. France's textile imports were still 
quantitatively restricted at a very low level, while the same was true of German 
imports yet at a higher level. While Britain imported textiles equalling 19,7% of its 
production, for the Six together this figure was only 0,2%. Germany imported 
textiles equalling 0,3% of its domestic production. This suggests that the textile 
industries of the Six were potentially subject to large imports from the UK of these 
very cheap products imported from Asia and nationalised in Britain by some simple 
process, once trade barriers would come down. Yet the actual ratio of German 
textile imports and exports from and to Britain was indeed very favourable for the 
German industry. While Germany imported textiles from Britain at a value of 4,4 
million DM in 1960, it exported textiles at the value of 43,7 million DM to the UK. 
This tendency did not change in 1961. Thus the potential danger for the German 
cotton textiles industry had not materialised at the time. Yet the positive balance of
45 For this and the following see BA, B102 - 61943: Bonn, 15 VIII 1962, Abteilung IV, IVC1, 
Krautwig an Ludwig Erhard und Staatssekretar Westrick, Betr.: Textilproblem beim Eintritt 
GroBbritanniens in die EWG.
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trade in textiles vis-a-vis Britain by no means suggested that the German industry 
was competitive.
However, it was feared that, once Britain was member of the EEC, Her 
Majesty's Government would seek to arrive at a more even burden sharing 
concerning textile imports from India and Pakistan within the EEC. While the 
British had not yet openly addressed this issue at the time, they had asked for a 
guarantee of outlets for such products from India and Pakistan. The cotton textile 
industries of the Six, and above all the German industry, now feared that such a 
guarantee would lead to a worsening of the quota arrangements that had been agreed 
in the Geneva cotton textile agreement in the framework of the GATT46. On top of 
that it was logical to assume that British exports to the continent of textiles produced 
on the basis of cheap primary products coming from India and Pakistan would 
increase and, without establishing safety arrangements, could have ruining effects 
for the German and other continental cotton processing industries. While this 
tendency had not materialised either in terms of statistical evidence, the argument 
made by the German textile industry was supported by the fact that import 
substitution on the part of the Commonwealth countries for processed textiles had 
led to a considerable reduction in British exports of these products to the 
Commonwealth. The British cotton textile industry was indeed overtly making plans 
to that effect.
These concerns of the German textile industry became increasingly serious 
and were put forward not only to the respective department of the BMWi but to 
Erhard directly at the end of July, and a few weeks later even to Adenauer himself 
with yet increasing pressure. Yet the adaptation of Gesamttextil's assessment of the 
consequences of British accession to the EEC not only came rather late; the German 
position, which was quickly changed by Miiller-Armack to suit the demands from 
Gesamttextil, also proved to be far more protectionist than that of all other EEC
46 The decision taken by the Council of Ministers on 2 August 1962 envisaged that the long­
term trade agreements with India and Pakistan would ensure an annual increase of their 
exports to the enlarged EEC in line with the progressive increase of quotas according to the 
Geneva textile agreement within the GATT. See BA, B102 - 61943: Bonn, 15 VIII 1962, 
Abteilung IV, IVC1, Krautwig an Ludwig Erhard und Staatssekretar Westrick, Betr.: 
Textilproblem beim Eintritt Grollbritanniens in die EWG. For the specific provisions of the 
GATT agreement concerning the progressive relaxation of import restrictions see also 
Curzon, Diplomacy, p. 257-258.
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member countries. Thus the solution that was finally achieved in Brussels at the 
beginning of August did not please the German textile industry at all.
On 2 August, the Council of Ministers of the EEC had agreed to reach 
comprehensive and long-term trade agreements of the enlarged EEC with India and 
Pakistan at the latest by the end of 1962. A respective declaration of intent was 
supposed to be made even before British entry. The Council decided that there 
should be safeguards for both sides, i. e. for India and Pakistan in case their exports 
would fall markedly upon the introduction of the CET in Britain and for the 
European textile industries in case they were harmed by increased imports from 
India and Pakistan under the larger quotas which were envisaged. The German 
textile industry was particularly dissatisfied with the fact that no a priori safeguards 
would be granted and also that it was the Commission and not the national 
governments which would take the decision whether or not safeguards could be 
applied at all. Yet at that point it would have been too embarrassing for the German 
side to re-open the discussion on one of the few resolved issues and to expose itself 
again with protectionist requests which would put further difficulties in the way of 
British accession. The BMWi internally contested at a later stage that there was any 
considerable danger for German textiles in what had been agreed in August 1962 
and judged that the industry had grossly exaggerated the problem47. It is evident that 
Gesamttextil had made its voice heard at a very late stage only. In an attempt to 
compensate for that failure of interest representation the association made even more 
noise once it was too late.
As far as cotton textiles were concerned, Gesamttextil1 s demand for a 
prohibition of cotton exports from the UK to the Six unless the threefold process of 
spinning, weaving and finishing was wholly performed in the UK as well. Yet while 
Muller-Armack himself ordered the delegation to try and press through this demand 
at the negotiating table before the Council’s decision, this position was more 
restrictive than the French one and had no chance of reaching agreement by the 
other EEC members. Thus, when accused of not promoting the German textile 
industry’s interests, the BMWi remained adamant that it had done everything in its
47 BA, B102 - 61944: Bonn, 5 I 1963, Hiinke, EA3 an Muller-Armack, betr.:
Beitrittsverhandlungen zwischen der EWG und Grofibritannien; hier: Sorgen der deutschen
Textilindustrie.
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power to take note of the industry's interests, that the industry had been consulted at 
all stages of the negotiations, and that the best possible solution was achieved in 
view of Gesamttextil's interests, yet that one had to accept that the balance of 
interests between the negotiating partners had not allowed for a solution that was
48more palatable to the German textile industry .
• Non-ferrous metals
The sector of non-ferrous metals had been one of those with the most severe 
concerns regarding the Europe-wide free trade area. The aluminium producing 
industry in particular had rejected any free trade area arrangement, since it was seen 
as endangering the very existence of the industry in Germany. Problems of similar 
proportions were foreseen for the other energy-intensive industries producing iron 
alloys, phosphor and carbide49. As far as the accession of the United Kingdom itself 
was concerned, the difficulties of the respective industries were not nearly as severe 
as in the case of a free trade area which would include Norway in particular. If the 
United Kingdom was to accede to the EEC without any modifications of the existing 
tariff structure, the German aluminium producing industry could hope to expand its 
capacity and to increase its sales at some point in the future given that Britain 
imported almost 90% of domestic demand for aluminium.
What was under discussion in the accession negotiations, was the British 
proposal of a zero tariff for aluminium, iron alloys, lead and zinc. Having enjoyed 
the imports of these materials at a zero tariff from Canada or Norway before, the 
British processing industries were pressing their government for keeping this 
arrangement when joining the EEC. The Six themselves were for example not able 
to cover their consumption of aluminium from their own production and therefore 
had to cover 25% of consumption through imports from third countries. With
BA, B102 - 61942: Bonn, 26 VII 1962, Von. VC1, Bogeholz an Ministerialdirigent Daniel, 
Betr.: Heutige Besprechung der Textilindustrie bei Herm Minister, hier: Verhandlungen mit 
Grofibritannien iiber den Beitritt zur EWG, Problem Indien und Pakistan; B102 - 44418: 
Bonn, 2 XI 1962, IV/4 Bottger an EA3, Betr.: Beitritt GroJlbritanniens zur EWG, hier: 
Besorgnisse der deutschen Textilindustrie. Bezug: Schreiben von Fritz Berg vom 28. 
September 1962, Ihre Schreiben vom 3. und 24. Oktober 1962.
BA, B102 - 127623: Vortrag gehalten auf der Werksleiterbesprechung am 9. Oktober 1957 
von Herm Pickardt (VAW).
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British accession the enlarged EEC would become more dependent on imports of 
non-ferrous metals in order to meet Community demand. This fact would have 
suggested that a lowering of existing tariffs in response to an increased need was in 
the overall interest of the EEC. Yet in the meantime the productive capacities of the 
Six had been increased to a considerable extent. For aluminium output capacity had 
grown so quickly that the EEC was close to covering Community demand from its 
own production especially if Norway was to become a member as well. As a 
consequence of this, competition from within the EEC had increased and despite 
existing tariff levels for aluminium imports from third countries the same was true 
for outside competition50. For lead, zinc and copper the situation was described as 
being even worse than for aluminium.
The main problem from the perspective of the sectoral association dealing 
with non-ferrous metals ("Fachvereinigung Metallhutten und Umschmelzwerke") 
was that there were countries like the US and Japan which had an overproduction of 
lead and zinc which was brought about by a mixture of high tariffs, quantitative 
import restrictions and subsidies. These countries were thus able to obtain high 
prices for their products in their domestic market, while selling their overproduction 
at subsidised and therefore competitive prices on the world market. This had led to 
a rapid decline of world prices in 1961. Producers in more liberally inclined 
countries like Germany, where protection levels were lower and where the supply of 
raw materials was not always certain were facing grave problems as a consequence 
of this situation. This, the Fachvereinigung argued, had to be considered when 
looking at the British demands for zero tariffs on these products. Following the 
widespread liberal rhetoric the Fachvereinigung went on to stress that they were still 
of liberal convictions, but that the damaging effects of protectionist policies of 
certain countries could not be borne any longer solely by the producers in a few 
liberal-minded countries. The consequences would be that the producing industries 
in these liberal countries would simply vanish. The conclusion of all of this for the 
association's position on the accession negotiation was the following. Britain, they 
argued, should not be allowed to import these metals at zero tariffs. Tariff quotas
50 For this and the following see BA, B102 - 127623: Fachvereinigung Metallhutten und 
Umschmelzwerke, Schuller, Stellungnahme der Fachvereinigung Metallhutten und 
Umschmelzwerke zum Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG.
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could only be seen as very temporary arrangements. If Britain was to obtain the 
concession of a zero tariff or a respective tariff quota of considerable size that 
would mean for German producers of semi-material that they would no longer be 
able to compete with their British counterparts. Apart from that, tariff free imports 
of any metal into the UK would immediately hit producers in the Six. As far as the 
phasing out of existing preferential tariffs with the Commonwealth was concerned, 
the Fachvereinigung demanded rules of origin to prevent deflections of trade during 
the transitional period. Where the UK would build up the CET with a decalage 
against imports from third countries the same decalage should be applied by the Six 
vis-a-vis respective imports from Britain.
In response to the concerns aired by the metal producers, the German 
delegation planned an initiative of their own. While the British were asking for a 
zero tariff and the proposal of a lowering of the CET for aluminium had been in the 
air to be a compromise, the German draft proposal discussed within the BMWi 
discarded both options as impossible for the foreseeable future. The interests within 
the enlarged Community were too diverging. It was therefore argued that a 
transitional solution was needed to ease the problem for the British, while paying 
attention to the concerns of the continental producers.
The Germans deemed this option as a very feasible one, since at this point in 
time there were still different tariffs and commercial arrangements governing the 
aluminium production among the Six according to the protocol XII of List G51. In 
line with the industrial requests it was thus suggested that the UK should be granted 
lower tariffs on aluminium which should slowly be adapted to reach the level of the 
CET, while the internal tariff reductions of the Six vis-a-vis the UK would be 
phased in accordance with the British adaptation to the CET to avoid deflections of 
trade that otherwise would surely arise52. The same delay of internal tariff
51 For protocol XII relating to raw aluminium see JOCE, 20 Decembre 1960, 3e Annee N° 80 
C, p. 1860/60. The protocols attached to the list on this occasion provided for a number of 
measures open to individual member states of the EEC. Apart from tariff quotas these could 
be the temporary suspension and modification of tariffs. See M £ g re t, J a c q u e s  (et al.) 
(eds.): Le droit de la Communaute Economique Europeenne. Commentaire du traite et des 
textes pris pour son application. Volume 1: Preambule - principes. Libre Circulation des 
marchandises. Brussels 1970, pp. 68-70.
52 For this and the follwing see BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 2 VI 1962, EA3, Losungsvorschlage 
zu den in den Verhandlungen fiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG bisher behandelten 
Problemen.
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reductions by the Six vis-a-vis the UK would be applied to products made on the 
basis of aluminium.
Table 7.2.7: Comparison of 1961 ta riff figures (in per­
centage of values) for th e  Federal Republic of Germany, th e  
united Kingdom and th e  EEC a t 1st October 1961:_________




















free free free free free
wires 5,5 4,5 7,0 10,0 8,0 7,0 10,0
sheets 5,5 4,5 7,0 10,0 8,0 10,5 15,0
pipes 7 6,0 8,9 13,0 10,4 14,0 20,0
aluminiu
m
raw 7,0 6,0 8,5 10,0 8,0 free free
wires 9,5 8,0 11,0 15,0 12,0 8,7 12,5
sheets 9,5 8,0 11,0 15,0 12,0 8,7 12,5












5S 3d/t 7S 6d/t
wires 5,5 4,5 7,0 10,0 8,0 7,0 10,0
sheets 5,5 4,5 7,0 10,0 8,0 7,0 10,0















wires 5,5 4,5 7,0 10,0 8,0 7,0 10,0
sheets 5,5 4,5 7,0 10,0 8,0 7,0 10,0
pipes 5,5 4,5 7,8 13,0 10,4 7,0 10,0
Source: BA. B102-127625: Anlage 2 zur F.R. Nr. 52/61 vom 9. Oktober 1961, Ausgewahlte statistische 
Angaben iiber die britische NE-Metallindustrie fu r das Jahr 1960 (vorlaufige zahlen).
These arrangements, the German proposal went on, should be reconsidered, once 
the circumstances changed fundamentally, e. g. because of Norway's entry into the 
EEC or because of developments in overall tariff policy. This draft proposal 
followed entirely the line of thought laid down by the "Fachvereinigung
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Metallhutten und Umschmelzwerke". A few days later this analysis was commented 
on by another BMWi department that generally went along with the suggestions, but 
stated that it was not at all justified to apply the same delays and parallel tariff 
reduction schedules for aluminium and all those products made from it, since for a 
number of them the relationship of production and demand differed completely from 
that of aluminium53. Thus German production alone of aluminium oxide was 
sufficient to cover all of Britain's demand. The increase in German production of 
silicon- and calcium carbide would lead to the same situation for these products in 
the near future as well. Hence the need to keep the CET at a similar level for these 
products as for the scarce primary products would not correspond to the fact that 
they were produced in abundance within the EEC.
As far as lead and zinc were concerned, the problems pictured by the 
respective producers were taken very seriously. Given the very difficult situation on 
the world market, an overall lowering of the CET was regarded as impossible. Even 
the arrangements possible under the protocol XV of List G were deemed 
insufficient, since the erosion of prices had made moderate tariff increases 
ineffective54. Hence it was argued that the negotiated tariff levels should not be 
changed in the enlarged EEC, but that they should be applied immediately without 
the originally envisaged transitional period for gradual adaptation toward the CET. 
It should however be possible to suspend the CET in case a certain price level had 
been reached. While thus the foreseen CET for lead and zinc should be applied 
without exception, the Germans proposed to establish tariff-free sub-positions for 
special qualities of lead and zinc whose production within the Community could not 
cover Community demand (Feinzink und Senkblei)55.
The question of non-ferrous metals was the object of a meeting of the 
Commission of the EEC with the metal-experts of the Six in mid-July. A solution 
could not be found before the negotiations with the UK were interrupted during the 
summer. In the month before the meeting with the Commission, the BMWi was still
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 8 VI 1962, IVB1, Dr. Wulz an IV/4, Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber 
den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG, Bezug: Schreiben Iv/4 vom 5. Juni 1962.
For protocol XV relating to lead and zinc see JOCE, 20 Decembre 1960, 3e Annee N° 80 C, 
p. 1863/60.
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 2 VI 1962, EA3, Losungsvorschlage zu den in den 
Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG bisher behandelten Problemen.
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considering the situation of the German metal producing and processing industries 
under the circumstances of British accession and was trying to define the German 
position on the Commission proposals which were already known in essence. While 
aluminium imports had fallen in the first half of 1962, the BMWi noted that the 
actual battlefield with Britain-based competitors was not in production of 
aluminium, but rather in the production of semi-products. It was in this field where 
for example north American producers tried to expand their capacity in the 
European market. It was here also where the competitive struggle with the UK was 
going to be most fierce for German industry given that the UK had one of the most 
competitive industries in the world, owned more than 90% by Canadian and US 
American companies which were aiming at doubling their capacity until 1965. The 
fact that the UK was importing aluminium tariff free, made the situation for the 
German semi-product industry extremely difficult56.
Another problem arising for the German semi-product industry from within 
the EEC was that the Benelux countries imported aluminium from Eastern bloc 
countries without any quantitative limits. Thus, on a number of accounts, the 
German delegation was extremely cautious as to agree to any concessions for the 
United Kingdom on aluminium, lead and zinc. If any concessions were made for the 
UK, then there had to be arrangements preventing deflections of trade with 
potentially disastrous effects on the German semi-product industry. All of this 
would still not be enough to solve the essential problem that, with British entry, the 
capacity of the aluminium processing industry would by far exceed Community 
demand. Given that Britain, unlike Germany, could rely on a secure supply of raw 
materials British superiority was likely to persist, the respective BMWi-department 
feared57.
As the Commission proposal was debated in the EEC's own expert 
committee on metals and as this committee had become a forum of regular interest 
mediation, it was not surprising that industrial associations made their interests 
known directly to this committee in the process of the accession negotiations. Thus
BA, B102 - 127623: Bonn, 22 VI 1962, IVA1, Vath, Vermerk iiber die 
Hiittenahiminiumindustrie und den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG.
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 27 VI 1962, IVA1, Sennekamp an IV/4, Betr.: Verhandlungen 
iiber GroBbritannien, Bezug: Schreiben der Abteilung IV vom 12. Juni 1962.
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the “Vereinigte Aluminium Werke” (YAW) notified the BMWi department dealing 
with non-ferrous metals in mid-June 1962 that they would contact the EEC's metal 
committee together with their Italian and French sister associations58. At the 
meeting of the special working group established to deal with the zero tariff 
proposals of the UK for aluminium, zinc and lead, the Commission presented its 
proposal. For lead and zinc it foresaw that the UK should apply the CET, that the 
Italian market should remain isolated according to article 226 of the EEC-treaty, 
that sub-positions for special refined qualities of lead and zinc should be created 
with a zero tariff, and that the full tariff for lead and zinc should be applied 
immediately. The CET should only be suspended if the world price reached a level 
at which tariff protection was not needed any more59. The proposal ruled out further 
tariff quotas according to the protocol XV of List G, since the Commission aimed at 
abolishing those quotas altogether. The Commission stressed the fact that these 
proposals had been presented to the representatives of the Six's producing and 
processing industries at the meeting held at Florence. Given that the Commission's 
proposal was pretty much in line with what had been considered within the BMWi 
before, the German delegation agreed in principle with the Commission's view, but 
stressed that the German processing industry had not been completely happy with 
that at the Florence conference.
As for aluminium the Commission suggested to offer the British a reduction 
in the CET in order to reach a tariff level of 5 to 9%, while tariff quotas should 
again be ruled out completely. The Commission thought a CET of 1% would be 
appropriate. The German delegation was not happy with the abolition of all tariff 
quotas. It suggested that the application of quotas would be preferable over lowering 
the CET. It went so far as to suggest that, deviating from the provisions of protocol 
XII of the List G, a restricted tariff preference in favour of Commonwealth 
countries with tariff levels of less than 5% should be examined60. This, the Germans 
argued, would stand a reasonable chance of being accepted by the UK. The other
BA, B102 - 127623: Bonn 18 VI 1962, Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke (VAW) an BMWi, 
Abteilung IVA1.
For this and the following see BA, B102 - 127623: Bonn, 16 VII 1962, IVA1, Vath, Bericht 
iiber die Dienstreise nach Brussel vom 6. bis 7. Juli 1962, Besprechung der Kommission mit 
Sachverstandigen der Mitgliedstaaten der EWG iiber die Nullzolle.
For protocol XII see JOCE, 20 Decembre 1960, 3e Annee N° 80 C, p. 1860/60.
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delegations had some objections against the Commission proposal as well. The 
Italians feared a lowering of the CET, since it was likely that this lowered CET 
would again be subject to further reductions in GATT negotiations, which was 
simply unacceptable to them. The Dutch were in favour of the elaboration of a 
proposal along the lines of the protocols of List G. The Belgians were concerned 
about the size of tariff quotas and the French wanted to retain the 9% level of the 
CET in connection with tariff quotas on the basis of a revised protocol XII of List 
G. Thus the German and the French positions on non ferrous metals cam rather 
close to each other. Yet a solution was not found at that meeting and the 
Commission was to continue its work on the basis of this discussion.
* Iron alloys
The situation for iron-alloys, which also figured on the UK's list of zero tariffs, was 
very similar to that of non-ferrous metals. In its draft proposal for a German 
initiative on metals the European department EA3 suggested that a solution along 
the lines of protocol XI of the List G, which gave member states the right to apply 
tariff quotas in order to meet their domestic demand61. Again, as in the case of non- 
ferrous metals, the possible accession of Norway would change the whole situation 
completely. For Britain alone the extension of the arrangements of protocol XI 
seemed a feasible solution until the end of the second phase of the transitional 
period. The problems for some sections of the processing industry, mainly the 
manufacturers of steal pipes and some other types of pipes would still remain. In 
case that Britain was given tariff free or low-tariff quotas it would be able to even 
extend its already existing advantages. As far as foundry products were concerned, 
the effect of British cost advantages arising from cheaper raw materials, lower wage 
levels and social security costs would increase, if the British would obtain tariff 
quotas. Yet the consequences of that for German industry would not amount to
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 2 VI 1962, EA3, Losungsvorschlage zu den in den 
Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG bisher behandelten Problemen. 
For protocol XI to List G see JOCE, 20 Decembre 1960, 3e Annee N° 80 C, p. 1858/60- 
1859/60.
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much more than the fact that sales expansion of German products in the UK was 
unlikely62.
* Wood pulp and newsprint
The situation for paper semi-products and newsprint through the British accession 
was not very seriously affected, if the British demands for zero tariffs were to be 
handled within the existing EEC quota framework. While the industry did not fear 
major losses, the expansion of sales was not expected either from British entry. Yet 
given that it was widely understood that the Scandinavian countries would accede to 
the EEC along with Britain or slightly later or that these countries would at least 
obtain association in form of a customs union, difficulties of the worst kind were to 
be expected for the German wood pulp and paper industries . In the preparations 
for a German initiative on the main issues left unresolved by mid-1962 it was 
argued that, for wood pulp, a solution along the lines of the protocol VII of List G 
which had been reached among the Six would in principle be a feasible option and 
would meet all that the British were asking for64. Yet the fact that the interests 
between the Six were very diverse made an immediate adaptation of these 
arrangements difficult. Another reason for this was the fact that the EEC had taken 
commitments for tariff free quotas within the GATT65. The proposal was, to use the 
arithmetic mean as level for the CET of paper. Tariff-free imports were not 
considered possible given the large Community production, while a certain lowering 
of that tariff level was seen as possible. As with non-ferrous metals, the accession 
or association of the Scandinavian countries would change the situation in the 
enlarged EEC completely. It was therefore argued that a final solution to this 
problem should be postponed until their accession would be considered. Until then 
the procedure envisaged in article 25 of the EEC treaty should be used to help the
62 BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 27 VI 1962, Bonn, IIIC1 an IV/4, Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber den 
Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG, Bezug: Schreiben der Abteilung IV vom 12. Juni 1962.
63 BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 19 VI 1962, IVB4, Aust an Abteilung IV/4, Betr.: 
Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG, Bezug: Schreiben der Abteilung 
IV vom 12. Juni 1962.
64 For protocol VII to List G see JOCE, 20 Decembre 1960, 3e Annee N° 80 C, p. 1854/60.
65 For this and the following see BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 2 VI 1962, EA3, 
Losungsvorschlage zu den in den Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt des Vereinigten 
Konigreichs zur EWG bisher behandelten Problemen.
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British cover their import demand from third countries. Article 25 paragraph 1 of 
the EEC treaty foresaw import quota at lower rates of tariffs than the CET. The 
criterion for this was that EEC production could not meet Community demand and 
that there was dependency on imports from third countries.
* Asbestos and asbestos processing industry
The German asbestos industry aired their very grave concern about the prospect of 
British accession to the EEC. For this industry British producers were the most 
important competitors. The “Wirtschaftsverband Asbest” put forth a number of 
arguments justifying their request that the BMWi should see to it that the vital 
interests of this industrial sector were not damaged through the outcome of the 
accession negotiations. First of all, the industry stressed the wide use and thus the 
general importance of asbestos products for all other manufacturing industries in 
Germany. The fact that the structure of that industry was that of medium sized firms 
in Germany, while in Britain only two asbestos spinning concerns existed, was seen 
as a further point highlighting the vulnerability of German producers. Given that the 
British asbestos industry owned asbestos mines in South Africa and Canada and 
hence enjoyed lower raw material costs and that production costs were generally 
lower in Britain, the larger scale of production in Britain would put the German 
producers out of the market, once internal tariffs would have disappeared in the 
enlarged Community, the Wirtschaftsverband argued66. The association contended 
that asbestos producers would have to lower their prices by 10%, if Britain was to 
join the EEC, but that this was impossible despite the fact that modernisation and 
rationalisation were under way. The association also argued that the British 
competitiveness in asbestos production would have an important effect on the 
German asbestos processing industry and German consumers of asbestos products 
who would then have to depend on foreign supply capacity.
For this and the following see BA, B102 - 44416: Frankfurt, Mai 1962, Wirtschaftsverband 
Asbest e. V., K. F. Arlt, Memorandum iiber den britischen EWG-Beitritt und seine 
Auswirkungen auf die deutschen Asbestspinnereien.
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Table 7,2.8: value of German imports in dm 1.000 of
asbestos products and UK share in these imports 1956-1961:
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
total imports in 1000 DM 4090 4926 6474 7458 13607 13785
imports from UK 2550 2810 3028 3323 5617 4319
UK share in % of total turn 
over
57 57 47 45 41 31
total turnover in 1000 DM 93085 103545 111156 123708 114281 116260
share of UK asbestos yarn 
of total imports of 
asbestos products
53,6 26,6 21,2 26,2 26,9 18,6
total imports of asbestos 
yarns in 1000 DM 1759,0 1742,0 1791,0 2440,0 4960,0 3799,0
UK share of total imports 
of asbestos yarns 78,2 75,1 76,5 80,1 73,6 67,6
share of total yarn 
imports in total imports 
of asbestos products
43,0 35,4 27,7 32,7 36,5 27,6
total turnover of asbestos 
yarns in 1000 DM 6568 6843 7255 8549 9483 9366
total imports of asbestos 
yarns as percentage of 
total turnover
26,8 25,4 24,7 28,6 52,3 40,5
im port of UK asbestos 
yarns as percentage of 
total turnover
20,9 19,1 18,9 22,9 38,5 27,4
domestic turnover of 
asbestos yarns in 1000 DM 5565 5442 6000 7131 81929 8328
total imports of asbestos 
yarns as percentage of 
domestic turnover
51,6 32,0 29,8 34,2 61,1 45,6
imports of UK asbestos 
yarns as percentage of 
domestic turnover
24,7 24,1 22,8 27,4 45,0 30,8
Source: See BA. B102 • 126480: Frankfurt, 14 v 1962, W irtschaftsverband Asbest e. V., Karl F. Arlt, An: 
BMWi, Abteilung IVB1, Dr. Lenz, Betr: GB-Beitritt. For th e  table see annex v.
There are clear signs that the German asbestos industry was indeed struggling with 
British competition even despite the fact that Britain did not eventually accede at the
end of the negotiations . In the years before, the world price for asbestos had been
In 1964 the Wirtschaftsverband Asbest asked the BMWi to start an anti-dumping enquiry 
against their British competitors. The BMWi regarded this request as unfounded in legal 
terms and did not pass it on. Yet the complaint shows how desperate the industry must have 
been in view of British competition. See BA, B102 - 126480: Frankfurt, 15 V 1964, 
Wirtschaftsverband Asbest an BMWi, Abteilung IVB1, Betr.: Britischer Preiswettbewerb in
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continuously falling and diminished the profit margins of German producers to such 
an extent that they were hardly able to make competitive offers. Thus the 
Wirtschaftsverband Asbest feared complete displacement of asbestos production and 
eventually even of asbestos processing industries in Germany through unhampered 
competition from British firms, which had already started to create for themselves a 
good starting position for operation within the common market .
* Coal and Steel
For the German coal industry British entry into the ECSC was not the source of 
problems but was certain to aggravate existing ones, while the iron and steel 
industry did not face particular difficulties as a result. Britain had asked for 
accession to the ECSC only in February 1962. Negotiations with the Six began in 
Luxembourg in July 1962 with the presentation of British wishes concerning their 
entry. The formal structure of the negotiations had been the cause of considerable 
disagreement among the Six. The fact that the negotiations were finally conducted 
between all seven governments and not between Britain and the Council of Ministers 
had been due to French insistence69. One problem was seen in the fact that the 
British coal industry was state owned and larger than the German and the French 
coal industries together. Yet while it was certain that imports from Britain would 
rise after accession, the main problems were deemed as bearable for the German
70coal industry by the BMWi, if the revision of the ECSC treaty was achieved . In a 
letter to the chancellor the private German coal industry had singled out articles of 
the ECSC treaty that would work to the advantage of the state-owned British coal 
industry, if they remained unchanged when Britain acceded to the treaty71. At the
Asbestgamen; Bonn, 11 VI 1964, BMWi, Abteilung VA3, Muller-Thuns an 
Wirtschaftsverband Asbest, Betr.: Britischer Preiswettbewerb, Bezug: Ihr Schreiben vom 
15. Mai 1964.
BA, B102 - 126480: Frankfurt, 14 V 1962, Wirtschaftsverbadn Asbest e. V., Karl F. Arlt 
an BMWi, Abteilung IVB1, Dr. Lenz, Betr: GB-Beitritt. For the table see annex V.
MAE, DE-Ce, Papiers Directeurs, Olivier Wormser, vol. 49: Paris, 23 V 1962, Olivier 
Wormser a Delfra Bruxelles.
BA, B136 - 2560: Bonn, 25 VI 1962, BMWi, Abteilung IIID2, Kattenstroth an 
Staatssekretar Kanzleramt, zu Handen Dr. PraB, Betr.: Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EGKS. 
BA, B136 - 2561: Bonn, 16 VIII 1962, BMWi, Westrick an Staatssekretar Globke.
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same time these concerns were heightened by reports that the British National Coal 
Board planned to double its exports to the continent72.
While on the whole the German iron and steel industries did not have any 
fears in view of the British accession to the ECSC, st^ l imports from Britain were 
increasing. Yet the association “Eisen-, Blech- und Metallverarbeitende Industrie” 
(iron, metal sheets metal processing industries) feared tough British competition 
given the fact that British prices for primary material, mainly st|al, were 
considerably lower than in Germany73.
The German position on the main industrial issues of the negotiations
The matters of zero tariffs for some raw material imports and questions relating to
textiles from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were clearly the most difficult ones as 
far as German industry was concerned. In comparison to that the question of 
imports of finished products from Australia, Canada and New Zealand was 
relatively quickly solved and was indeed one of the few areas of the negotiations 
where a solid solution had been found at all by August 1962. Many issues for which 
German industrial sectors had made known their expectations and concerns in 
principle were never actually addressed at the negotiating table, be it that there had 
not yet been time to deal with them early on, or be it that they never were on the 
negotiating agenda in the first place.
As far as the British proposals for zero tariffs were concerned, the only 
conceivable solution in the view of the BMWi at the outset of the negotiations was 
to ask the British whether they could agree to an extension of the protocols attached 
to the agreement on the List G. These protocols enabled individual member 
countries to autonomously apply low-tariff quotas in line with domestic consumption 
that were subject to supervision afterwards74. The figures compiled showing 
production, consumption and imports of these products revealed that in the case of 
most of the products concerned the EEC was able to supply domestic demand to a
72 HANDELSBLATT, 22 VIII 1962: "England will Kohleausfuhr verdoppeln",
"Exportoffensive auf dem Kontinent".
73 BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 30 VI 1962, Abteilung IVA5, Boecker an IV/4, Betr.: 
Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG.
74 BA, B102 - 44415: Bonn, 30 X 1961, EA3, Hiinke an Zentralabteilung 3, Europa-Referate, 
Betr.: Beitritt GroBbritanniens, Hier: Fragen zur Erklarung von Lord Siegelbewahrer Heath.
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much greater extent than was Britain. In all cases apart from aluminium, paper- 
semi-products, ferrosilicon and grege, did EEC production cover 80% of common 
market consumption or more, while in a number of cases Britain had no domestic 
production at all (see tables and )75.
Table 7,2,9: Production as percentage of
consumption for a number of products for 
which the  UK had requested zero tariffs:
products EEC UK enlarged EEC
aluminium 75,7 11,8 54,9
lead 80,7 45,4 67,8




newspaper print 79,1 63,4 72,2




gr£ge 52,3 0,0 28,6
ferrosilicon 72,9 0,0 57,9
ferrochrome 106,4 0,0 75,5
cadmium 95,6 7,6 64,0
source: ba. B102-44416: Brussel, 28 ill 1962, Konferenz der 
Mitgliedstaaten der Europaischen Gemeinschaften m it den 
Dritten Staaten, die ihren Beitritt zu dlesen Gemeinschaften 
bean trag t haben. Verhandlungen mit dem  Vereinigten 
Koenigreich. Arbeitsgruppe: Waren, fur die die briti-sche 
Delegation einen Zollsatz Null beantrag t h a t  
I= RU/GT1/INT/2/62; RU/GT1/INT/1/62 rev. 2), Anlage II und III:
Industrieerzeugnisse, bei denen das Vereinigte Koenigreich 
einen zollsatz Null vorgeschlagen hat.
The stark differences of interest become immediately obvious when looking 
at these tables. Britain, having so far relied on presumably lower cost 
Commonwealth producers and enjoying imperial preference for a large share of its 
imports of raw materials was now faced with switching over to most likely higher 
cost producers from within the EEC as suppliers of these products. At the same time 
the protective interests of the continental producers of these products were likely to 
exclude or at least to considerably diminish the Commonwealth's opportunities to
BA, B102-44416: Brussel, 28 III 1962, Von. Konferenz der Mitgliedstaaten der 
Europaischen Gemeinschaften mit den Dritten Staaten, die ihren Beitritt zu diesen 
Gemeinschaften beantragt haben. Verhandlungen mit dem Vereinigten Koenigreich. 
Arbeitsgruppe: Waren, fur die die britische Delegation einen Zollsatz Null beantragt hat. 
[=RU/GTl/INT/2/62; RU/GT1/INT/1/62 rev. 2], Anlage II und III: Industrieerzeugnisse, 
bei denen das Vereinigte Koenigreich einen Zollsatz Null vorgeschlagen hat.
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export to the EEC, while exploiting their own preferential export opportunities to 
the United Kingdom.
Table 7.2,10: imports in % o f consumption:
products EEC UK
QTrrTxrweBtn rest of the 
world
total
raw aluminium 29,2 48,5 41,3 89,7
paper-,
semiproducts
41,4 9,7 90,3 100,0
news print 22,6 30,5 13,0 43,5
raw lead 26,8 51,1 6,4 57,5
raw zinc 10,3 36,4 34,4 70,8
casein 36,7 48,9 47,5 96,4
wooden rail 
sleepers
8,6 23,8 51,9 75,7
gr£ge 67,7 0,0 100,0 100,0
ferrosilicon 31,2 31,2 68,8 100,0
ferrochrome 11,5 17,2 82,8 100,0
cadmium 13,0 38,5 53,8 92,3
Source: BA. B102-44416: Brussel, 28 III 1962, Konferenz der Mitgliedstaaten der 
Europaischen Gemeinschaften m it den Drltten Staaten, die ihren Beitritt zu diesen 
Gemeinschaften beantrag t haben. Verhandlungen m it dem  vereinigten Koenigreich. 
Arbeitsgruppe: Waren, fur die die britische Delegation elnen Zollsatz Null bean trag t h a t  
I= RU/GT1/INT/2/62; RU/GT1/INT/1/62 rev. 21, Anlage II und III: Industrieerzeugnisse, bei denen 
das verein ig te Koenigreich elnen zollsatz Null vorgeschlagen hat.
The CET was needed in this context to ensure the existence of these industries, to 
keep employment at stable levels and to make further investments in these sectors 
feasible. For aluminium, iron alloys and a number of other base metals and their 
alloys the main justification of the CET was the differential in energy costs between 
Community and third country producers as well as the availability of raw materials. 
High tariff levels enable Community producers to buy raw materials at higher prices 
and thus to ensure their supplies with raw materials in competition with producers 
of those countries where high tariffs and therefore high sales prices are already in 
place. In the case of the metals mentioned here the main competitors in production 
were the Scandinavian countries and Canada. The applications for association by the 
Scandinavian countries therefore created a number of very difficult problems. Yet 
not only the situation of the producing industries had to be considered. The 
industries processing these metals were understandably concerned not to be faced
299
with exceedingly high prices for their primary products . While the lowering of the 
CET would have detrimental effects on the continental industries, the introduction 
of tariffs on lead, zinc and cadmium was likely to encourage investments in these 
fields to the detriment of the trade interest of the Commonwealth77.
The German position on the zero tariff proposals by the United Kingdom 
centred around quotas at reduced tariffs that could be granted to the UK by the 
Commission of the EEC and the protocols attached to the List G that have already 
been mentioned. Yet these handy solutions were at first rejected by Germany's other 
EEC partners. In early May 1962 the only positive sign that could be offered to the 
British jointly by the Six, was to indicate the direction where a solution might be 
found in the end. This seemed to be in a temporary suspension of the CET or a
78decalage when the second adaptation toward the CET was due . While in early 
June the BMWi contemplated putting forward German proposals for a solution that 
could be supported by all sides, this project was soon cancelled when it became 
clear that, on expert level, a different line of thought was being followed. To the 
surprise of the German negotiators the solutions envisaged by the experts were 
exactly those of extending existing protocols to the List G in the annex of the EEC 
treaty to include the UK which had previously been rejected79.
Despite this apparent movement among the Six, the discussions about zero 
tariffs remained difficult. The Six had to deal with a document jointly worked out 
by their own producers of aluminium which argued against any changes in the CET 
and rejected the idea of tariff quotas as well as the use of the respective protocol
BA, B102 - 127623: Bonn, 16 VII 1962, Vath, Abteilung IVA1, Bericht iiber die 
Dienstreise nach Brussel vom 6. bis zum 7. Juli 1962. Besprechung der Kommission mit den 
Sachverstandigen der Mitgliedstaaten der EWG iiber die Nullzollsatze.
BA, B102 - 44415: Brussel, 15 I 1962, Konferenz der Mitgliedsstaaten der EWG mit den 
dritten Staaten, die ihren Beitritt beantragt haben. Dokument RU/GT1/12/61 final, 
Arbeitsgruppe Zollsatz Null. Zusammenfassender Bericht an die Stellvertreter der Minister. 
Betr.: Untersuchung der Industrieerzeugnisse, bei denen das Vereinigte Konigreich einen 
Zollsatz Null vorschlagt.
BA, B102 - 44416: Bonn, Ergebnisbericht iiber Ressortbesprechung im Auswartigen Amt 
vom 5. Mai 1962 zur Vorbereitung der Ministertagung der Sechs mit Groflbritannien vom 7. 
bis 9. Mai 1962.
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 2 VI 1962 EA3, Losungsvorschlage zu den in den Verhandlungen 
iiber den Beitritt des Vereinigten Konigreichs zur EWG bisher behandelten Problemen; 
Bonn, 8 VI 1962: IV/4, Bottger an Referate der Abteilung IV, EA3, Betr.: Verhandlungen 
iiber den Beitritt Grofibritanniens zur EWG.
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relating to List G in the annex of the EEC treaty80. Germany took the view that 
Britain should be granted a tariff quota at a level of 5% for aluminium. As far as 
other metals were concerned, the specific situations differed from that of 
aluminium, where Community producers seemed to be united. Processing industries 
on the other hand were generally in favour of lower tariffs and hence of the British 
requests81.
The preparations by the German negotiators for the ministerial session 
planned for the 16 January 1963 shows how limited the progress was which had 
been made before de Gaulle's veto ended the negotiations. For newsprint the Six 
had rejected the British proposal for zero tariffs and had instead pointed to the fact 
that given the insufficient community supply tariff quota according to article 25 
paragraph 1 could be applied. This offer could hardly satisfy the British who were 
under pressure particularly from Canada. While the Germans had always seen tariff 
quotas as a relatively easy way out of all troubles and had held this out as a solution 
to the British, internal conflicts between the Commission and Germany about the 
German tariff quota for newsprint for 1963 showed the difficulties of that approach. 
The Commission had asked the Council of the EEC not to grant this quota again at a 
zero tariff. The German reaction to this was to suggest a further lowering of the 
CET down to 3 %. While the Germans were actually in favour of no tariff at all on
newsprint, they had to acknowledge that this was unrealistic in view of the positions
82of the other EEC members . On raw aluminium the Six offered the extension of the 
protocol attached to List G which foresaw a quota at a tariff of 5 %. A lowering of 
the CET was rejected. For lead and zinc a proposal had been worked out by the 
Commission that was supported by the Germans but still met with reluctance by the 
Dutch and the Belgians who either asked for further concessions. The proposal 
foresaw that the UK should lower its tariffs with the EEC and adjust to the CET on 
accession. The Italian market was to remain isolated. The CET was to be suspended
BA, B102 - 127623: Bonn, 11 VII 1962,IVA1, Vath, Bericht iiber die Dienstreise nach 
briissel am 3 VII 1962.
BA, B102 - 127623: Bonn, 16 VII 1962, IVA1, Vath, Bericht iiber die Dienstreise nach 
Briissel vom 6. bis zum 7. Juli 1962. BesQrechung der Kommission mit den 
Sachverstandigen der Mitgliedslander der EWG iiber die Nullzollsatze.
For this and the following see BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 14 I 1963, Abteilung IVB2, 
Sprechzettel fiir die Beratung der Minister iiber Nullzolle am 16. Januar 1963.
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in case prices exceeded a certain level. Tariff quotas were abolished. For the 
products of relatively minor importance the German delegation was in the position 
to agree to the British proposal of zero tariffs with the exception of plywood boards. 
For the final group of products, heavy jute from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka the 
Six offered a tariff suspension from 11 down to 9%. Yet before these matters could 
be discussed, de Gaulle called off the negotiations altogether on 14 January 1963.
The question of finished products from the industrialised countries of the 
Commonwealth was addressed by the respective working group soon after the 
beginning of the negotiations and had presented the reunion of ministers'
83representatives with two reports illustrating the problems of these matters . On that 
basis the representatives were able to come up with possible solutions in February84. 
These preparations lead to an early agreement by the negotiating partners in May 
1962. In preparatory talks before the ministerial meeting at the beginning of May, 
the AA and the BMWi agreed that they would not consider special arrangements for 
these countries after the end of the transitional period, but that either a lowering of 
the CET or global arrangements would be possible in line with Kennedy's 
proposals for the GATT. Concerning the transitional period the Germans intended 
to suggest in the negotiations that the British should begin with the first adaptation 
toward the CET. Once this had been done, special protocols could serve to ease 
further British adaptations toward the CET in the next phase of the transitional 
period. This could also be done according to article 26 of the EEC treaty which 
allowed for lowering the CET temporarily for member states with particular
85difficulties during the transitional period .
BA, B102 - 44415: Brussel, 15 I 1962, Konferenz der Mitgliedstateen der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften mit den dritten Staaten, die ihren Beitritt zu diesen Gemeinschaften 
beantragt haben. Arbeitsgruppe "Industrielander des Commonwealth", zusammenfassender 
Bericht an die Stellvertreter der Minister, Betr.: Untersuchung der Fertigwaren aus Canada 
(auiler Nahrungsmittel); Bonn, 22 I 1962, Bottger, IV/4 an Abteilung IVA, IVB, IVC, 
IIIC4, nachrichtlch an EA3, Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt Grofibritanniens zur 
EWG.
BA, B102 - 44416: Brussel, 24 II 1962, Von Eurogerma, Brussel, Harkort, Betr.: 
Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Grohbritannien, Tagung der Minister am 22. Und 23. Februar 
1962.
BA, B102 - 44416: Bonn, Ergebnisbericht iiber die Ressortbesprechung im Auswartigen 
Amt vom 5. Mai 1962 zur Vorbereitung der Ministertagung der Sechs mit Grofibritannien 
vom 7. bis 9. Mai 1962.
302
The solution that was finally agreed by the negotiating partners at the seventh 
ministerial meeting in May 1962 went pretty much along the lines that had been 
discussed between the A A and the BMWi weeks before. Thus the UK was to adapt 
its tariff positions 30% toward the level of the CET on accession. The second 30% 
adjustment was to be due on 1 January 1967, and the establishment of the CET in 
January 1970. Between 1966 and 1969 the Six were to hold consultations with 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand in order to arrive at measures easing their trade 
problems according to the EEC treaty. This meant however, that a postponement of 
the adjustments, toward the CET, for which the British had asked, was not possible. 
Yet this solution still offered the possibility of a temporary lowering of the CET 
during the three year period 1966 to 1969 for all those 400 products for which
o r
Britain had requested adaptation measures .
The question of finished products from the industrialised countries of the 
Commonwealth was addressed by the respective working group soon after the 
beginning of the negotiations and had presented the reunion of ministers'
87representatives with two reports illustrating the problems of these matters . On that
88basis the representatives were able to come up with possible solutions m February . 
These preparations lead to an early agreement on this matter by the negotiating 
partner in May 1962. In preparatory talks before the ministerial meeting at the 
beginning of May, the A A and the BMWi agreed that they would not consider 
special arrangements for these countries after the end of the transitional period, but 
that global arrangements would be possible in line with Kennedy's proposals for the 
GATT or to lower the CET. Concerning the transitional period the Germans 
intended to suggest in the negotiations that the British should begin with the first 
adaptation toward the CET. Once this had been done, special protocols could serve
86 BA, B102 - 61941: Brussel, 29 V 1962, Eurogerma, Brussel, Mangold und Bohmcke. Hier: 
Siebte Ministertagung.
87 BA, B102 - 44415: Brussel, 15 I 1962, Konferenz der Mitgliedstateen der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften mit den dritten Staaten, die ihren Beitritt zu diesen Gemeinschaften 
beantragt haben. Arbeitsgruppe "Industrielander des Commonwealth", zusammenfassender 
Bericht an die Stellvertreter der Minister, Betr.: Untersuchung der Fertigwaren aus Canada 
(aufler Nahrungsmittel); Bonn, 22 I 1962, Bottger, IV/4 an Abteilung IVA, IVB, IVC, 
IIIC4, nachrichtlch an EA3, Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt Groilbritanniens zur 
EWG.
88 BA, B102 - 44416: Brussel, 24 II 1962, Von Eurogerma, Brussel, Harkort, Betr.: 
Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Groflbritannien, Tagung der Minister am 22. Und 23. Februar 
1962.
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to ease further British adaptations toward the CET in the next phase of the 
transitional period. This could also be done according to article 26 of the EEC 
treaty which allowed for lowering the CET temporarily for member states with 
particular difficulties during the transitional period89. The solution that was finally 
agreed by the negotiating partners at the seventh ministerial meeting in May 1962 
went pretty much along the lines that had been discussed between the AA and the 
BMWi weeks before. Thus the UK was to adapt its tariff positions 30% toward the 
level of the CET on accession. The second 30% adjustment was to be due on 1 
January 1967, the establishment of the CET in January 1970. Between 1966 and 
1969 the Six were to hold consultations with Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 
order to arrive at measures easing their trade problems according to the EEC treaty. 
This meant however that a postponement of the adjustments, toward the CET, for 
which the British had asked, was not possible. This solution however offered the 
possibility of temporary lowering of the CET during the three year period 1966 to 
1969 for all those 400 products for which Britain had requested adaptation
90measures .
7.3 Adenauer, German industry and de Gaulle’s veto
Adenauer's position toward the British free trade area proposal had always remained
indifferent, at least in public, and the discussions about his alleged secret deals with 
de Gaulle in that matter have remained speculation for the most part. Even the 
archival material that is available now does not indicate his personal views on the 
free trade area very clearly. The reason for this might be that the free trade area 
project in Adenauer's view did not require massive action on his part, since the 
manifold problems in the discussions prevented it from becoming a very realistic 
option for European policy. With the negotiations on British accession things looked 
initially quite similarly. For the first five to six months the talks did not move ahead 
significantly. This was a consequence of the fact that the British wanted to discuss
BA, B102 - 44416: Bonn, Ergebnisbericht iiber die Ressortbesprechung im Auswartigen 
Amt vom 5. Mai 1962 zur Vorbereitung der Ministertagung der Sechs mit Grobbritannien 
vom 7. bis 9. Mai 1962.
BA, B102 - 61941: Brussel, 29 V 1962, Eurogerma, Brussel, Mangold und Bohmcke. Hier: 
Siebte Ministertagung.
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the principles of matters relating to the Commonwealth as a whole. The EEC 
members were either unwilling or indeed unable to define their position on that, 
given that a good part of questions relating to the Commonwealth would affect 
agricultural matters and that the Six were still struggling over the formulation of a 
common agricultural policy. Hence nothing could really happen unless the UK was 
willing to discuss the problems relating to individual commodities country by 
country. When this happened in May 1962, the situation changed. Even though little 
progress was made on the matters that the British had requested, the general 
assessment on the German side, like that of the Benelux countries, was that success 
of the negotiations was likely, given a number of important concessions by the 
British and assuming that the Six would match these concessions at some stage. The 
first one to subscribe to such an optimistic view was unsurprisingly Ludwig Erhard. 
Even before the negotiations had moved beyond the purely exploratory phase, he 
told the British public that accession was likely to be achieved very soon.
Erhard's reasons for assuming this, lay not so much with the state of the 
negotiations themselves but rather with the impressions gathered during his visit to 
the USA, where the Kennedy administration was founding the whole of its future 
European policy on the assumption of an early British accession to the EEC, the 
failure of which would lead to a complete reappraisal of that policy91. Erhard's 
optimism was most probably also due to the preparations of the US administration
92of what became the trade expansion act in October 1962 . This American project 
was very much in line with Erhard's predilection for a return of the German 
economy to the world market. The massive tariff reductions that would become 
possible in conjunction with British accession, Erhard might have hoped, could 
eventually still bring about the sort of world-wide economic integration that he 
favoured. With hindsight it is still difficult to understand why the majority of those
BA. B102 - 61942: Bonn, 7 II 1962, Abteilung VC1, Bogelholz an Ludwig Erhard, 
Westrick, Betr.: Besuch Ludwig Erhards in London am 25. und 26. Januar 1962. In Anlage 
femschriftlicher Bericht der deutschen Botschaft in London; Anlage: London, 27 I 1962, 
Deutsche Botschaft London, Etzdorf.
President Kennedy had announced the principles of the envisaged trade expansion act in his 
state of the Union message on 11 January and had elaborated on this in another message to 
Congress on 25 January 1962. The trade expansion act passed the House of Representatives 
in June and was enacted in October 1962. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 1961- 
62, pp., 18682-18684, 18793-18794, 18863, 19039.
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negotiating kept an optimistic view as to the overall success of the procedure93, 
given that the negotiations themselves did not quite support an assessment of the 
type made by Erhard. The early British concessions on the main questions of the 
CET and agriculture must have impressed the Germans, the Dutch and the Belgians. 
In their view the British clearly had moved a great deal. Thus the positive aspects in 
the negotiations seemed to prevail over the retarding moments until the summer 
recess in August 1962. At this point the Germans thought the negotiations to have 
reached the "point of no return"94.
It seems that, once this impression prevailed, Adenauer felt that the time was 
ripe for a more pronounced stance on British accession, i. e. a more outspoken 
attitude against it on his part. After returning from his state visit in France in July, 
Adenauer began to speak out against British membership more and more clearly at 
the cabinet table as well as with his own party leadership and finally also in public. 
He did so at about the same time when de Gaulle devoted more attention to the issue 
in France. It is therefore almost certain that both statesmen were agreed on this 
issue95. It would hardly be explicable why, at this relatively early point in time, 
Adenauer took considerable political risk to contradict the majority view in his party 
that British accession was a necessity in terms of German national interest. While 
initially retaining his very cautious approach with the general public, the federal 
chancellor also began to systematically muster potential domestic sources of support 
for his position. The divisions among industry itself were, in this respect, of the 
greatest strategic value for the federal chancellor in order to win the domestic battle 
over British accession to the EEC against a united front of all political and of the 
main social forces. One can assume that Adenauer's aim was to prepare the German 
political leadership, i. e. the government coalition, the federal parliament and the 
main parties, all of which had been and were still strongly in favour of British
Muller-Arm ack , Aufdem Weg, p. 237.
BA, B102 - 127325: Bonn, 6 IX 1962, EA3, Hiinke, Fragen der europaischen Integration, 
insbesondere Stand und Probleme der Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Groftbritannien.
Koerfer , Kampf, pp. 662-663. Adenauer told his cabinet that at the occasion of his state 
visit to France, he and de Gaulle had only said one sentence each on the accession 
negotiations. See BA, B136 - 2561: Unkorrigiertes Manuskript der Kabinettssitzung am 
Mittwoch, dem 8. August 1962, p. 49. For de Gaulle’s first statements on British 
membership see Peyrefitte , Ala in : C'etait de Gaulle. «La France redevient la France». 
Paris 1994, pp. 116-117, 150-154.
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accession, for the eventual failure of the negotiations in order to ensure that he 
would not be forced to strike back at France at the moment when de Gaulle would 
use a veto or some other measure of last resort.
Again, the collusion between Adenauer and de Gaulle in the matter is not 
established with absolute certainty. Yet it is clear, that there cannot have been the 
slightest misunderstanding between the two that the French would never yield 
anything on British accession, unless the common agricultural policy was safely 
under way and that France was ready to wreck the ship of the EEC, if its 
development was not in line with French expectations. As has been shown at the 
beginning of this chapter, the French made Adenauer well aware of this and warned 
him against any attempt by Germany and the Erhard camp to bypass previous 
commitments concerning the CAP, once the balance of power and interests within 
the EEC would have changed after enlargement. Thus Adenauer could use his 
advance in information on the position of the French, the dealings over the CAP 
and the frictions between the position of the BDI and those of individual 
associations in order to prepare the grounds for the difficult time that he would have 
to go through, once de Gaulle would call off the negotiations. That Adenauer's level 
of information as well as the quality of the information that he could tap was 
superior to that of the BMWi and Erhard's can easily be seen from the archival 
evidence used in this chapter.
The political establishment united against Adenauer
Two weeks after de Gaulle's veto of British accession to the EEC, Alfred Muller- 
Armack, one of the BMWi's two secretaries of state offered his resignation to 
Ludwig Erhard, if de Gaulle's veto was accepted without any resistance by the 
federal government. In his letter to the minister, Muller-Armack blamed Adenauer 
for much of what - in his view - had gone wrong over the last years and for the 
failure of the negotiations with Britain in particular96. Muller-Armack complained 
that Adenauer's differences with Erhard had made negotiations abroad very 
difficult, yet that he had been willing to continue working under these conditions as
ACDP, Bestand Muller-Armack, 1-236-001/1: Bonn, 1 II 1963, Muller-Armack An: Ludwig 
Erhard.
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long as there had been hope that eventually the enlargement of the EEC could be 
achieved. In the present situation however, a crisis of unpredictable political and 
economic consequences was, in Muller-Armack's view, to a large extent due to the 
weaknesses of German policy on Europe in the years since the establishment of the 
EEC. The federal government was under suspicion not to have taken a clear position 
on enlargement and of not having made every effort to convince the French. The 
position taken by Adenauer in particular and the uncertainties about the German 
position were responsible for this and even contributed to the unfavourable 
development of the view of the US administration according to Muller-Armack. In 
this situation the secretary of state deemed the ratification of the consultation 
agreement with France unbearable in view of the fact that de Gaulle had not 
consulted Germany at all on his veto and given that his veto actually violated the 
principles of the EEC-treaty, not to mention the spirit of the Franco-German treaty 
itself.
Muller-Armack's misgivings about Adenauer's position were the strongest 
where it had affected his instructions during the negotiations. Adenauer had given 
special instructions to the secretary of state of the BMWi concerning the CAP and 
the question of the association of overseas territories. In making immense sacrifices 
and in committing substantial financial means from German business, Muller- 
Armack had been able to secure a successful conclusion of these negotiations. All 
throughout it had been made very clear to Couve de Murville that the Germans 
would expect a trade-off from the French for these concessions at a later stage. 
French approval to the enlargement of the EEC in particular was explicitly 
mentioned as being of vital interest to the German economy97. In bilateral 
negotiations the French had stated their readiness to achieve this still less than half a 
year before. In vetoing British accession only three weeks after the consultation 
agreement had been initialled, France had not honoured the prior concessions made 
by the German side. If this was accepted without any resistance, Muller-Armack 
offered his resignation for 1 July 1963. In public Muller-Armack was not quite so 
blunt. A week after he had sent this letter to Erhard and copies of it to Adenauer 
and the federal president, his personal secretary had to deny press reports according
97 M u lle r -A rm a c k , Aufdem Weg, pp. 237-241.
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to which Muller-Armack had expressed the view that Adenauer's address to the 
Bundestag (Regierungserklarung) on 6 February had reinforced his intention to
98resign . Muller-Armack had his secretary declare that there was no relation 
between his resignation and the federal chancellor and that this had simply been an 
invention by the journalists". The row though was clearly in the open and nobody 
could be in doubt about the continuing rift between Adenauer and the BMWi.
Only two weeks after that, an exchange of correspondence between 
Adenauer and Erhard was leaked to the press. Adenauer, acting as ever so often as 
Erhard's supervisor, trying to bring the naughty child in line, criticised his minister 
for not having contributed to re-establishing unity among the Six at a meeting in
ioo
Brussels in February . Apart from that criticism and the reminder that political 
competencies in that matter lay entirely with the AA, Adenauer was dissatisfied 
with the fact, that Muller-Armack was still in office, while he had publicly declared 
that he could not support the position of the federal government any longer101. 
Erhard's reply was typically audacious. He bluntly told the chancellor that this was 
none of his business and that the whole matter lay entirely within his own 
competence. Apart from that, he let the chancellor know, that the foreign minister
Schroder shared his view on that matter. In order to signal his indignation, Erhard
102stayed away from the cabinet meeting the next day
Muller-Armack was only one of many within the federal government and the 
German political establishment who were embittered about de Gaulle's veto and the 
lack of response against it on the part of the federal chancellor. The whole issue had 
undermined Adenauer’s standing and increased the calls for a change of leadership 
since the summer of 1962. In August the secretary of state of the AA, Rolf Lahr, 
had made bitter complaints in a cabinet meeting about the attitude of the French 
who, he alleged, had broken their word. In response to his complaint Lahr had
98 For the text of Adenauer's declaration see Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 4. 
Wahlperiode, Stenographische Berichte, Band 52, Bonn 1963, S. 2575.
99 BA, B136 - 2561: Bonn, 8 II 1963, Kattenstroth, BMWi An: Staatssekretar Globke.
100 In the US administration this fact had raised hopes for a firm German stance against the 
French. See FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, pp. 167-170: Telegram from the mission to the 
European Commission to the Department of State, Brussels, February 2, 1963.
101 ACDP, Bestand Muller-Armack, 1-236-001/1: Bonn, 26 II 1963, Adenauer An: Erhard.
102 ACDP, Bestand Muller-Armack, 1-236-001/1: Bonn, 27 II 1963, Von. Erhard An: 
Adenauer; see also FAZ, 5 III 1963: "Februar 1963: Briefwechsel zwischen dem Kanzler 
und seinem Nachfolger."
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received nothing but anger from Adenauer who ordered him and the other German 
negotiators to make a stronger effort to side with the French in the negotiations103. 
Unsurprisingly, Erhard used every forum possible to air his discontent with the 
French veto and the insufficient German reaction to that. At a meeting with the 
economics ministers of the eleven German Lander, he talked about the economic 
consequences of the non-accession of the UK to the EEC. Without any glossing 
over he declared that Adenauer's failure to put pressure on the French despite the 
insistence of the Bundestag and all its factions to do so combined with the signature 
of the German-French consultation treaty was bringing Germany into a twilight on 
the international scene104. On the economic side Erhard stated that the European 
economy was beginning to break apart and that the distortions of German foreign 
trade had already increased since the lowering of internal tariffs had begun. On top 
of that Erhard complained about the CAP and the decisions made on aid to less 
developed countries where Germany had made concessions and sacrifices without 
receiving anything in return, while calculating that this was done in order to obtain 
the enlargement of the EEC.
Adenauer himself had begun to air his unease with British accession in mid- 
1962. In an informal conversation with two American journalists, he had expressed 
his doubts about the seriousness of the British application already in April 1962105. 
On a similar occasion at the end of July, he spoke at length about the practical 
problems for European agriculture, mainly for wheat and butter, and the wider 
political implications of British accession. The latter seemed to him very difficult 
and still a long way off106. In a letter to Hallstein he used an article published in the 
Times to demonstrate how Britain viewed membership in the EEC and argued on 
that basis that British entry would create huge institutional and organisational 
problems which, Adenauer suggested, were widely underestimated even among the
BA, BK136 - 2561: Bonn, Unkorrigiertes Manuskript aus der Kabinettssitzung am 
Mittwoch, den 8. August 1962.
BA, B102 - 44419: Biiro der Wirtschaftsministerkonferenz, Vermerk iiber die 
Wirtschaftsministerkonferenz am 13. Februar 1963 in Bonn (Haus der Vertretung des 
Landes Baden-Wiirttemberg).
M ensing , Hans Peter (Bearb.): Adenauer. Teegesprache 1961-1963. (Adenauer. 
Rhondorfer Ausgabe), Berlin 1992, p. 171.
Mensing , Adenauer, Teegesprache 1961-1963, pp. 248-258.
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members of the Commission of the EEC107.Shortly after that the chancellor asked 
for a report to be established for the federal cabinet which should focus on the 
problems created by the accession of the UK to the EEC and which should point in
particular to the difficulties faced by individual industrial sectors arising in that
108context . When this report was discussed at the cabinet meeting in August 1962 
which has already been referred to, Adenauer was at pains to stress that he had not 
yet made up his mind whether or not "we are going to take part in that thing", but 
he was equally clear about his pessimism: "Aber ich betrachte die ganze Frage sehr 
viel pessimistischer als Herr Lahr und auch sehr viel pessimistischer als sie in 
diesem Bericht geschildert ist"109.
Two weeks later Adenauer presented the same view to the board of the 
parliamentary faction of the CDU in the Bundestag which had convened for a two- 
day conference on foreign policy issues. The differences between the faction and 
Adenauer could not be bridged. While the leadership of the party-faction was all in 
favour of British accession to the EEC, Adenauer painted a gloomy picture of an 
anti-German Franco-British alliance and of the British seeking an understanding 
with the Soviet Union which, he argued, could be the consequences of British 
accession110. The party was apparently not able to follow that sort of reasoning. The 
row that broke out between the parliamentary faction and Adenauer was so fierce 
that the chancellor had to mend his words on the following day and was forced to 
state clearly that also he was in favour of British membership in principle111. In 
contradicting the chancellor practically in public, the leadership of the parliamentary 
faction had dealt a serious blow to Adenauer's reputation of being the unchallenged 
leader of his party. It also intensified the demands for a change in leadership. The 
daily newspaper "DIE WELT" reported about meetings of the factions of both 
parties forming the government coalition, CDU/CSU and Liberal Democrats (FDP)
107 BA, B136 - 2560: Bonn, 7 VI 1962, Adenauer an Hallstein.
108 BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 12 VI 1962, Abteilung IV, Neef an alle Referate der Abteilung 
IV, EA3, Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur EWG.
109 “I regard the whole issue much more pessimistically than Mr. Lahr and also much more 
pessimistically than it is portrayed in this report” BA, B136, 2561: Bonn: 8 VIII 1962, 
Unkorrigiertes Manuskript aus der Kabinettssitzung am 8. August 1962.
110 DIE WELT, 22 VIII 1962: "CDU fur Beitritt Londons zur EWG", "Der Fraktionsvorstand 
widerspricht AuBerungen des Kanzlers".
111 Die WELT, 22 VIII 1962: "Kanzler auBert Bedenken gegen den EWG-Beitritt 
GroBbritanniens".
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arriving at the conclusion that Adenauer faced complete isolation, if he tried to 
conduct a policy on Europe which was to impede British accession to the EEC and 
exclude Britain from the political union which had been envisaged (Fouchet Plan). 
The decision taken by the leadership of the CDU/CSU faction demanded almost 
unanimously that the government had to promote British membership. The article
concluded that, if Adenauer tried to circumvent this decision, he would be faced
112with further erosion of his authority .
The pressure from the political establishment did not only come from the 
governing parties and the leading figures of the government bureaucracy but also 
from individual Bundeslander (provinces) like the northern German city of 
Hamburg113. The northern German Lander in general felt that they would be more 
negatively affected by a failure of the negotiations, as is reflected for example in the 
unanimous resolution by the Schleswig-Holstein diet two weeks after de Gaulle's 
veto. Adenauer dealt with their demands by reference to wider issues and by vague 
reassurances that everything possible was being done to prevent any negative effects 
of this failure114.
The BDI and British accession to the EEC
In previous chapters it has been described how the German industrial associations 
were in regular contact with the departments of the BMWi in charge of individual 
sectors. At this level the technical dimension of industrial interest was considered. 
Whenever problems became more substantial and technical solutions could be found 
only with difficulties, even individual sectoral associations would contact higher 
levels of the BMWi, while this was normally only done on issues of general and 
fundamental concern by the leading industrial associations like the BDI and the 
DIHT. Whenever the well-being of a sector was at, stake the respective associations 
tried to reach to the highest political level possible in order to receive more attention
DIE WELT, 23 VIII 1962, "Enlgand mull beitreten", von Georg Schroder, Bonn, 
"Adenauers Niederlage", "Nicht mehr Herr im Ring?".
BA, B136 - 2561: Bonn, 11IX 1962, Adenauer An: Paul Nevermann, 1. Burgermeister der 
Hansestadt Hamburg.
BA, B136 - 2561: Kiel, 29 I 1963, Von. Ministerprasident des Landes Schleswig-Holstein 
Dr. Helmut Lemke an Konrad Adenauer; Bonn, 8 II 1963, Von. Adenauer an Helmut 
Lemke.
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for their concerns than they would be able to obtain via the way prescribed in 
normal procedures. From the associations' point of view this passing by of the 
normal administrative channels open to them can also be seen as signalling 
deficiencies in the communications between technical departments and the 
associations or in the relationship between the technical departments and the higher 
levels of decision making within the BMWi and all the way up to the German 
delegation in the international negotiations. The technical departments have to be 
seen in most cases as the allies of the industrial associations to which they are 
talking within the bureaucracy. Yet their influence is clearly limited. Hence 
whenever the associations feel that their concerns are either not transmitted with 
sufficient vigour or not being observed by higher levels of decision making, they 
will seek to muster political influence via their contacts to political figures and 
through direct appeal to the leadership of the BMWi and perhaps even to the 
chancellor himself.
For the leading industrial association, the BDI, direct contact with the 
political level of the BMWi and the chancellor's office was normality in matters of 
general concern. Thus the BDI provided his assessment of the impact that British 
accession would have on German industry to the chancellor's office and to the 
BMWi at the same time115. The BDI's analysis made a difference between the direct 
implications of British accession and the indirect effects brought about by the 
accession or association of the other member countries of EFTA as well as by the 
links that the UK had with the Commonwealth. The BDI also provided an overview 
of these effects on individual industrial sectors. The overall picture painted by the 
BDI was a very positive one. As far as the direct effects of British accession were 
concerned, the BDI stressed that Britain was Germany's fourth largest trading 
partner with machines, chemicals and textiles being the largest groups of goods 
traded. The fact that, despite the lowering of tariffs among the Six and among the 
Seven respectively, German exports to the UK had increased was seen as a clear 
indication that German exporters counted on British accession and were ready to
For this and the following see BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 13 VI 1962, Abteilung IV/4, 
Bottger an iiblicher Verteiler, Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur 
EWG, Bezug: Schreiben der Abteilung IV vom 12. Juni 1962. Anlage: Die wirtschaftlichen 
Auswirkungen eines Beitritts GroBbritanniens zur EWG. (BDI).
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make temporary price concessions in order to keep their market shares despite 
increased tariff discrimination. Given that British tariffs were on the whole higher 
than German tariffs on manufactured goods, the BDI saw a very good starting 
position for German exporters, once the trade barriers were to be gradually 
abolished. As for the indirect effects of British accession, the BDI welcomed the 
association or accession of the other member countries of EFTA which in 1960 had 
accounted for 24,3% of German total exports (compared to 29,5% to the other EEC 
member states). Another plus of British accession was seen in better access for 
German industry to Commonwealth markets that would result from the abolition of 
imperial preference by the UK. A liberal commercial policy of the USA and the 
other Western countries as well as equal conditions for German and British industry 
on the world market were also seen as a corollary of British accession116. The BDI's 
assessment of the effects of British accession on individual industrial sectors was 
equally positive. Almost all industrial sectors, the BDI reported to chancellery and 
BMWi, expected higher sales opportunities on the British market, the EFTA market 
and the market of the Commonwealth. As far as there had been concerns by some 
sectors, they had not been brought up in connection with Britain's entry into the 
EEC as such but rather in connection with the arrangements to be made for the 
Commonwealth countries and vis-a-vis the low price countries.
The view of the allegedly most powerful voice of German industry was thus 
unequivocally in favour of British accession to the EEC and of the accession or 
association of the other EFTA member countries to go a long with it. This expertise 
provided by the BDI to the chancellor's office and the BMWi constituted therefore 
firm support for Erhard and his assessment of the desirability of British accession. 
Internally, the considerations of the BDI were slightly more cautious and 
differentiated. In the files of Karl Friedrich Vialon of the chancellor's office held at 
the Archiv fur Christlich-Demokratische Politik there are copies of two letters to a 
leading figure of the BDI, Stein, which give a more detailed view of the position of
This view had been expressed by Erhard as well after his visit to the USA in January 1962. 
See BA. B102 - 61942: Bonn, 7 II 1962, Abteilung VC1, Bogelholz an Ludwig Erhard, 
Westrick, Betr.: Besuch Ludwig Erhards in London am 25. und 26. Januar 1962. In Anlage 
femschriftlicher Bericht der deutschen Botschaft in London; Anlage: London, 27 I 1962, 
Deutsche Botschaft London, Etzdorf.
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individual industrial sectors yet still uphold the overall very positive view of British
117accession as a very favourable prospect for German industry . The first of these 
letters analysed the positions expressed by individual industrial sectors in their 
annual reports of 1960 and 1961. Given that the comments collected from these 
associations only referred to British accession as such and did not include the 
association or accession of the EFTA members, the positions taken did not reflect 
the concerns by those industries that would have to deal with fierce competition 
from Scandinavian non-ferrous metals, wood, paper and related products. In view 
of that it is remarkable that the German chemical industry seemed to be extremely 
cautious with its assessment of the pros and cons of British accession, while the 
wood processing industries and the German textile industry expressed no fears at 
all. In view of the on the whole strongly positive views expressed by the former 
sector and the intensity of concerns expressed by the latter ones in the second half of 
1962 it is clear that the BDI still in July 1962 was relying on outdated information 
that did in no way reflect the actual and even less the perceived interests of its 
members.
While the chemical industry as an expanding sector and as one that exported 
a large share of its production in fact welcomed any enlargement of the EEC market 
and the association of the EFTA in principle, the textile industry and the wood and 
wood processing industries became increasingly wary of British accession and 
particularly of any further enlargement of the EEC. Hence the assessment given by 
the BDI, while still reflecting the overall positive impact that British accession 
would make on the German economy as a whole, completely misrepresented the 
situation for a number of individual industrial sectors. On the whole, many of the 
arguments put forward by the BDI in favour of British accession were of a very 
general nature and could hardly console industrial sectors that perceived British 
competition or that of the other EFTA countries as a major threat. Thus the 
constatation that British accession would overall strengthen the German economy 
was naturally not able to convince any industrial association of a sector with 
particular problems relating to Britain, EFTA, or the Commonwealth, to support it.
ACDP, Bestand Friedrich Karl Vialon, 1-475-010/1: 16 VII 1962, Professor Dr. Hermann, 
Luhring, Vermerk fur RA Stein.
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Similarly unconvincing for problematic sectors was the assertion that Germany 
needed supplies from Britain more than vice versa given that British imports were 
ranking sixth behind imports from the rest of the Six and the USA, while exports to
Britain ranked only at ninth place and that hence British accession would heighten
118Germany's standard of living
On a more theoretical note these particular arguments put forward by the 
BDI are yet more revealing. As has been said in the theoretical chapter, interests 
tend to be represented with a higher chance of success the smaller the group having 
this interest and the better defined this interest. An argument stressing the overall 
beneficial effects and the higher standard of living that would result from British 
accession appealed to everybody's interest in the German economy. Given that the 
prospective benefit according to the BDI's argument was to be spread over the 
whole of the population, producers and consumers alike even though with a very 
clear advantage for producers in expanding and competitive sectors, the instigation 
to act in support of this development was likely to be minute. This was not only the 
case because of the fact that the benefits of British accession would be spread over 
so many economic actors, but also because the alternative option of not having 
British accession was not shown as being very detrimental to these same economic 
actors. The relatively few but important industrial sectors with substantial fears 
about British accession, the potential association of the other EFTA members and 
the effects of arrangements made for the Commonwealth had very clearly specified 
interest and a very high level of motivation to represent them successfully, since for 
some of them their very existence was at stake, at least in their own perception. 
Thus the BDI might have been perfectly right in its assessment that British accession 
would have been an asset for the German economy as a whole and would have been 
desirable on a number of accounts. Yet, as will be demonstrated in the following for 
the example of the textile industry, a beleaguered sector of the German economy 
was able to muster much more political support and to demonstrate its painful 
problems much more vividly than the overall benefit of British accession could 
possibly have been demonstrated by anyone.
ACDP, Bestand Friedrich Karl Vialon 1-475-010/1: Koln, 19 VII 1962: Von. Professor Dr. 
Hermann, Dr. Baumann an Stein, Vermerk fur Herm Rechtsanwalt Stein; Koln.
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The German delegation: liberal rhetoric and protectionist positions
When looking at the interests of individual German sectors as well as the position of
the respective industrial associations, it becomes clear that, for Ludwig Erhard and 
the BMWi, it should have been rather difficult to simply promote British accession 
to the EEC at the negotiating table. Even though the German negotiators tried to 
accommodate as many of the British proposals and requests as was possible among 
the Six, they found themselves more and more frequently in the position of not 
being able to support the British position because of their natural primary task to 
represent German business interest. Thus the German delegation's support for 
British accession became more and more a rhetorical exercise and was thus in line 
with a general feature of the negotiations that consisted in covering up the lack of 
progress after August 1962. The rather uncomfortable situation of the German 
delegation was characterised by a number of problems. Firstly, the division within 
the federal government about whether to accommodate British wishes or whether to 
support the French. The fact that Adenauer did not trust Erhard nor the foreign 
minister Schroder in matters of European policy made the chancellor directly 
interfere with the negotiations by giving instructions himself to the state secretaries 
of the BMWi and the A A, instructions which often were incompatible with the 
general line adopted by the negotiators before. Secondly, the politically highly 
charged question of the common agricultural policy whose success the French had 
made the "conditio sine qua non" of all progress on British accession and even of 
the further existence of the EEC impeded whatever the BMWi might have hoped to 
achieve on this matter via British accession in the first place and placed the German 
delegation on the defensive yet again. On top of that came the problems of some 
industrial sectors which, compounded with the two general problems mentioned, 
made the position of the German delegation more and more untenable, as 
negotiations continued.
These difficulties became obvious when the state and the prospects of the 
negotiations were discussed at the federal cabinet meeting in August 1962. In May 
1962 Adenauer had first requested to be provided with a report on the negotiations
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and the whole set of problems relating to British accession. The paper provided for 
this purpose by the BMWi painted a very positive picture of the effects British 
accession was going to have on the German economy and mentioned possible 
difficulties of individual industrial sectors as something that had been known all 
along and which was of a rather minor importance. The BMWi paper was based on 
studies that had been done jointly with the BDI in previous years and stressed that 
the BDI clearly saw British entry into the EEC as something that was welcomed by 
German industry119. A few weeks later Adenauer requested a more detailed report to 
be established for the federal cabinet. It seems surprising that by that time the 
BMWi did not have any detailed analysis of German industrial interests ready at 
hand. The letter informing the sectoral departments of the BMWi about the
chancellor's request of a detailed report expressed the view that only a global
120assessment would be possible . The reason for this might lie in the diversity of 
technical matters which had been put forward by the British up to that stage of the 
negotiations and to the lack of any clear prospect of what the final arrangement for 
British entry would look like. Against initial resistance from Muller-Armack the
report to the chancellor was going to be established jointly by the BMWi, the AA,
121the ministry of finance and the ministry of agriculture . On the 25 July 1962 the
122completed report was delivered to the chancellor's office and discussed in the 
cabinet on 8 August 1962.
During this meeting many of the difficulties of the German delegation were 
highlighted in a fierce exchange between Adenauer and the secretary of state from 
the AA, Lahr. It also revealed Adenauer's negative view of British accession to the
BA, B102 - 44416: Bonn, 21 V 1962, Meyer-Cording an Ludwig Erhard iiber Muller- 
Armack, Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt Grobbritanniens zur EWG, hier: 
Unterrichtung des Bundeskanzleramtes; Anlage: Bonn, 19 V 1962, Meyer-Cording an Dr. 
Prab, Bundeskanzleramt.
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 12 Vi 1962, Abteilung IV, Dr. Neef an alle Referate der 
Abteilung IV, IIC4, EA3, Betr.: Verhandlungen iiber den Beitritt Grobbritanniens zur 
EWG.
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 9 VII 1962, EA3, Todt, Vermekr: Betr.: Unterrichtung des Herm 
Bundeskanzlers iiber die Auswirkungen des Beitritts Grobbritanniens zur EWG auf die 
deutsche Wirtschaft, Kabinettsbeschlub vom 20. Juni 1962, hier: Ressortbesprechung im 
Auswartigen Amt.
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 25 VII 1962, Schroder (AA), Erhard (BMWi), Hettlage (BMFin), 
Schwarz (BMELF) an Staatssekretar des Bundeskanzleramtes, Betr.: Verhandlunen iiber den 
Beitritt Grobbritanniens zu den Europaischen Gemeinschaften, Bezug: 33. Kabinettssitzung 
der 4. Legislaturperiode vom 20. Juni 1962.
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EEC and the fact that the AA was not any more, as under von Brentano, an 
extension of the chancellor's office. At the beginning of the cabinet meeting on 8 
August 1962 the secretary of state of the A A Lahr gave an overview over the main 
problems of the accession negotiations from the German delegation's point of
123view . Lahr explamed that the British would not accede to the EEC under all 
circumstances and that there were limits as to what they would be able to put up 
with even though the British expectations were rather modest. The main problem of 
the negotiations were the tensions among the Six themselves with France and 
Belgium being the opposing poles. In this situation the German delegation had 
successfully pursued the aim to hold the Six together despite of that.
Lahr briefly pointed to the problems for the German textile industry, but 
stressed that the most difficult matters were wheat prices and the re-negotiation of 
the association agreements for the overseas territories of the Six. Both these issues 
did not actually directly arise from the negotiations with Britain themselves, but 
were issues to be discussed firstly among the Six and strongly influenced and made 
much more crucial through the prospect of British accession. As it turned out, wheat 
prices and the re-negotiation of the association agreements with the Six’s overseas 
territories became a major point of contention between the French and the German 
delegation. The German attempt to get rid of the association of these territories, 
once they had achieved independence led to most serious tensions between the two 
delegations. The French on the other hand had been using the question of wheat 
prices in order to strike at the Germans, Lahr complained, and had generally been 
taking a stance against Germany during the last couple of weeks124. Thus Couve de 
Murville had declared that the British had no problem with accepting the French 
price level as price for the EEC and that it would be a great achievement if this
could be fixed at this stage of the negotiations. Lahr was furious at this French
provocation which would have entailed grave consequences for German agriculture: 
"Herr Bundeskanzler, das war gegen uns gerichtet! Wenn man eine solche
Forderung annahme, ich weifi nicht, was das in der Landwirtschaft gabe,
BA, B136 - 2561: Bonn, 8 VIII 1962, Unkorrigiertes Manuskript aus der Kabinettssitzung 
am Mittwoch, den 8. August 1962.
See table 7.1.1 p. 267.
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125wahrscheinlich einen Aufruhr!" . Lahr was appalled by the fact that the French
did not seem to care much about the Franco-German co-operation that was so dear 
to Adenauer.
Yet another point that caused severe friction between Germans and French
was the financial agreement of the CAP, where the French, in Lahr's view, tried to
1obtain even more than they had already been conceded . Lahr complained bitterly 
about the obstructive and completely egocentric attitude of the French toward the 
German delegation given that he saw himself making a true effort to proceed 
together with the French wherever in whatever way possible. Yet the state secretary 
made it clear that in a situation where the French were striking against Mour" 
agriculture and "our" finances in very concrete terms there was no other possibility
127for the German negotiators to defend German interests . He concluded with a 
rather stem moral of his experiences when negotiating with the French: "Ich habe 
immer die Erfahrung gemacht, wenn man den Franzosen auch die Zahne zeigt,
steigt man in ihrem Ansehen, und letzten Endes verstoBt das nicht gegen die
128deutsch-ffanzosische Freundschaft.1 The lesson that Lahr had drawn from his
experiences only helped to infuriate Adenauer all the more. The chancellor's direct 
interference with the conduct of the negotiations and his insistence to observe the 
Franco-German friendship all throughout did obviously not help the negotiators 
either.
"Mr. Chancellor, that was targeted at us! If we accepted such a demand, I am not sure what 
would happen in agriculture, there would probably be a turmoil!" BA, B136 - 2561: Bonn, 8 
VIII 1962, Unkorrigiertes Manuskript aus der Kabinettssitzung am Mittwoch, den 8. August 
1962.
The French saw the British and the Germans potentially forming a united front against 
France on the common agricultural policy and in particular concerning the financial 
agreement. MEF - Direction du Tresor, B 17744: Bruxelles, 6 VII 1962, Delegation 
ffanfaise aux Conferences entre les etats membres des communautes europeennes et les etats 
tiers ayant demande 1'adhesion k ces communautis. Note a.s. negotiations avec le Royaume 
Uni. Reunion des suppliants 03-06 Juillet 1962.
A bit more than half a year later Adenauer used almost exactly Lahr’s words and his 
argument in a conversation with the American Journalist Joseph Aslop in order to show that 
the French were by no means always protectionist and to allay the fear expressed by Aslop 
that France and Germany would create a common agricultural plan. In this conversation 
Adenauer claimed to have brought up the issue of the wheat price with de Gaulle and to have 
demanded some respect for German interests in this matter. See Mensing , Adenauer, 
Teegesprache 1961-1963, pp. 336-337.
"I have always experienced that, whenever you show the teeth to the French, they respect 
you more. And that, after all, does not breach German-French friendship."
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The French who had made clear to Adenauer that British accession would in 
no way be allowed to compromise French interests within the EEC and the CAP in 
particular used every opportunity open to them to humiliate their German 
counterparts and to make it difficult for them to portray themselves as the guardians 
of liberal trade policies of the EEC and to act as the promoters of British accession. 
In the case described by Lahr, they managed to turn one rare occasion where their 
own interests coincided with those of the British into an embarrassment for the 
German delegation which was forced to take a stance against something to which the 
British had agreed.
Apart from the substance of the matter the way in which Couve de Murville 
put it forward also demonstrated very clearly to the German side that the French 
were in a strategically superior position within the negotiating process. Not only had 
they made their point concerning their vital interest in the CAP. They also had 
EEC-law on their side and together with the Commission of the EEC they had 
worked out and defended a very coherent position on all procedural matters of the 
negotiations with the British. Given the very difficult French negotiating partner and 
given Adenauer's orders to seek a close understanding with them, the margin of 
manoeuvre for the German delegation was clearly extremely limited. This is 
probably one of the reasons why German initiatives for overall solutions of the main 
problems of the negotiations were planned but never went beyond the discussions 
within the BMWi and the AA.
Another matter which has already been addressed where the German 
negotiators ended up in an extremely uncomfortable situation was the question of 
textile imports from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The technical problems of this 
have already been described in this chapter. As in the case of the wheat price level, 
the German delegation represented the most protectionist point of view among the 
Six and was not able to obtain the solution desired by Gesamttextil. While thus the 
German delegation was yet again in the uncomfortable situation of having to defend 
protectionist interests in the way of the solution sought by the British, the more 
important consequence of its failure to achieve the protection wanted by the German 
textile industry was that the matter was picked up by the president of the BDI Fritz
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Berg himself and brought to the attention of the federal chancellor who used it as a 
weapon in his conflict with the BMWi and with Ludwig Erhard in particular129.
Adenauer endorses de Gaulle's «Non!»: German coal, textiles and agriculture, 
the failure of the accession negotiations and the ratification of the Elysee treaty
Adenauer's position on British accession to the EEC has already been analysed at 
the beginning of this chapter. There is no doubt that, from mid-1962 on, he worked 
towards reaching a situation in Germany that would allow him to let pass the failure 
of the accession negotiations without being forced to strike back against de Gaulle. 
It is almost certain that the French president had an understanding with the 
chancellor that this was going to be the evolution of events at some stage. 
Adenauer's way of preparing for that comprised the direct interference with the 
German delegation's task, his insistence that British accession was unfeasible for 
reaching political union and by stressing the serious concerns of certain industrial 
sectors. In ordering the German delegation to support the French position among the 
Six or at least to be open for compromise in a number of crucial issues (like the re­
negotiation of the association agreements with the overseas territories and the 
financial arrangements related to that) he forced the German delegation to give away 
very valuable bargaining chips. His insistence that the German negotiators should 
quite generally side with the French further limited the room for manoeuvre 
available to them. On another level Adenauer gathered valuable information in 
support of his strategy concerning German industrial sectors with reservations 
against British accession as well as other information that could be used to the same 
end. When the negotiations finally broke down, Adenauer could legitimately claim 
that there had been many concerns by German industry and a number of other 
problems which effectively stood in the way of British accession from the point of 
view of German interests and that the French veto, however hard to accept in style, 
should thus not give rise to any disruptions of relations within the EEC. Adenauer 
could even have justly claimed that the French veto brought about a situation that
BA, B102 - 44418: Bonn, 2 XI 1962, Abteilung IV/4, Bottger An: Abteilung EA3, Betr.: 
Beitritt Grobbritanniens zur EWG, hier: Besorgnisse der deutschen Texilindustrie, Bezug: 
Schreiben von Fritz Berg vom 28. September 1962, Ihre Schreiben vom 3. und 4. Oktober 
1962.
322
corresponded to German interests and in particular to those economic interests of 
which Erhard and his camp wanted to be the guardians. The political dimension of 
these questions was anyway the only one which Adenauer himself took really 
seriously. While he readily used agricultural and industrial anxieties over British 
accession in order to prove Erhard "wrong" in his own domain, he never took these 
matters very seriously in substance. Yet, as is argued here, they remained, an 
important element in explaining why there was a gap in the seemingly united front 
against the federal chancellor in the matter of the British accession and the French 
veto. The other important element in this was the struggle over Adenauer’s 
succession. The temporary competition between Erhard and foreign minister 
Schroder might in fact have allowed Adenauer to prolong his grip on German policy 
until the French veto was effectively sealed130, and the angry fantasies about 
isolating France had given way to the more sober judgement that this was neither in 
Germany’s interest nor indeed legally possible.
By the end of May 1962 Adenauer was provided with a number of reports by 
Dr. PraB from the chancellor's office on the effects that British accession was going 
to have on particular sectors of the German economy. These were agriculture, coal 
and steel, textiles and car manufacturing131. These reports together with some 
additional information showed that the very optimistic view taken by the BMWi and 
the BDI did not represent the positions of some important industrial sectors and that, 
even where the overall position of industrial associations was positive, there were 
numerous demands included in their statements that would need to be fulfilled in
It seems that, toward the end of 1962, Schroder’s star was rising, while Erhard’s star 
declined. In conjunction with the “Spiegel-Affare” and contacts with the Social Democrats 
about the establishment of a great coalition Adenauer was temporarily able to re-establish a 
firmer grip on power. See Koerfer , Kampf, pp. 690-701.
BA, B136 - 2560: Bonn, 24 V 1962, Referat 6, Dr. PraB an Adenaur, zur Vorlage, Betr.: 
Auswirkungen eines Beitritts GroBbritanniens zu den Europaischen Gemeinschaften auf die 
deutsche Wirtschaft, hier: Landwirtschaft; Bonn, 18 V 1962, Referat 6, Dr. PraB an 
Adenaur, zur Vorlage, Betr.: Auswirkungen eines Beitritts Grofibritanniens zu den 
Europaischen Gemeinschaften auf die deutsche Wirtschaft, hier: Kohlebergbau; Bonn, 18 V 
1962, Referat 6, Dr. PraB an Adenaur, zur Vorlage, Betr.: Auswirkungen eines Beitritts 
GroBbritanniens zu den Europaischen Gemeinschaften auf die deutsche Wirtschaft, hier: 
Stahlindustrie; Bonn, 21 V 1962, Referat 6, Dr. PraB an Adenaur, zur Vorlage, Betr.: 
Auswirkungen eines Beitritts Grofibritanniens zu den Europaischen Gemeinschaften auf die 
deutsche Wirtschaft, hier: Textilindustrie; Bonn, 23 V 1962, Referat 6, Dr. PraB an 
Adenaur, zur Vorlage, Betr.:Auswir-kungen eines Beitritts Grofibritanniens zu den 
Europaischen Gemeinschaften auf die deutsche Wirtschaft, hier: Autoindustrie.
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order to uphold their generally positive view on British accession. A report from the
132AA made this explicit for the position of the steel industry . The differences of 
these assessments compared to that of the BDI must have been striking to Adenauer 
and the officials at the chancellor's office where these reports arrived within a 
timespan of a few weeks. Once Adenauer had obtained the BDI's very optimistic 
analysis of the situation at the beginning of June, he requested a report to be made 
to the federal cabinet on this matter. In a letter from the department IV of the 
BMWi in charge of industry to its individual sub-sections Adenauer's request was 
specified. According to that, the chancellor was primarily interested in information
133relating to individual industrial sectors and their particular difficulties . Shortly 
before the cabinet meeting on 8 August 1962 Adenauer was briefed on the report 
that he had requested. The note summarising the report judged it to be an objective 
assessment that did not play down the problems that existed for individual 
sectors134. Adenauer's brief itself did in fact focus on the difficulties faced by 
German industry, so that Adenauer had a useful list of problematic sectors at hand 
before the cabinet meeting.
At the cabinet meeting that has been referred to already a number of times 
throughout this chapter, Adenauer not only drew on the information about the 
problems of German industry, but also on the internal political situation in the UK 
where opposition against EEC membership was rising and the prospects for the 
conservatives to stay in power and hence to push an accession treaty through 
parliament were rapidly deteriorating. The chancellor could point at a speech made 
by Labour leader Gaitskell at a conference in Brussels and his deputy George Brown 
in New York in which both had made it clear that, in their view, British entry was 
only conceivable under conditions that were unacceptable to any member country of
BA, B136 - 2560: Bonn, 15 VI 1962, Prafi an Adenauer, zur Vorlage, Betr.: Beitritt 
Groflbritanniens zu den Europaischen Gemeinschaften, hier: Brief von Minister Schroder 
vom 31. Mai 1962 sowie Times Artikel vom 6. Juni 1962.
BA, B102 - 44417: Bonn, 12 VI 1962, Abteilung IV, Neef an alle Referate der Abteilung 
IV, IIC4, EA3, Betr.: Verhandlungen fiber den Beitritt Groflbritanniens zur EWG.
BA, B136 - 2561: Bonn, 2 VIII 1962, Referat 6, Prafl, Vermerk fur die Kabinettssitzung, 
Betr.: Verhandlungen fiber en Beitritts Groflbritanniens zu den Europaischen
Gemeinschaften, gemeinsame Kabinettsvorlage der Bundesministerien des Auswartigen, fur 
Wirtschaft, Finanzen und Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten.
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the EEC135. Given that the Tories had lost all by-elections lately and that their 
prospects in general elections looked rather bleak, Adenauer deemed it unlikely that 
a treaty on British accession to the EEC would ever be put to Parliament at all, once 
a Labour government was in power. Adenauer went on to put forward a set of 
political arguments against British and in fact any accession at this stage. In his 
view, the main conflict underlying the negotiations was one over the leadership in 
Europe between Britain and France. He said that it would be a disaster, if both of 
them would unite against Germany. In view of that and in view of the Soviet threat, 
German-French relations had to be stabilised so that it would become unthinkable 
that France would sign a treaty against Germany with the Soviet Union or the other 
way round. He referred to Bismarck's Ruckversicherungsvertrag and to the treaty 
which de Gaulle signed with Stalin in 1944. This mixture of very concrete and 
tangible arguments relating to German industrial interest, political instability in 
Britain and sweeping political arguments of historic dimensions could hardly be 
proved wrong, even though one can assume that neither the AA nor the BMWi did 
see any reality in Adenauer's apprehensions about links between France and Britain 
or France and the Soviets to Germany's immediate detriment. The chancellor's 
rather lengthy political argument left no doubt about his position on British 
membership. According to the protocol, he was not interrupted any more in his 
speech, by contradicting statements as those made by Lahr earlier in the meeting. 
Yet his own party faction was less patient with the chancellor and gave him the 
"dressing down" in response two weeks later, which has already been described. 
Later in fall 1962 the accession negotiations ran into a deadlock and practically no 
progress was made after their resumption in October. Yet the technical questions 
that had been discussed before in the field of textiles and the solutions that had been 
reached in the summer, continued to stir the apprehensions of the German textile 
industry and gave Adenauer the chance to demonstrate once again to Erhard that 
important sections of German industry did not support the minister of economics in 
his plea for British membership of the EEC.
135 BA, B102 - 61941: Brussel, 20 VII 1962, Eurogerma, Oppler und Voigt an AA und BMWi, 
Konferenz prominenter sozialistischer Vertreter aus den Mitgliedslandem der EWG.
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In an effort to reverse results that had been achieved at the negotiating table
in Brussels, the textile association "Gesamttextil" had a lengthy meeting with Erhard 
1on 26 July . In response to that, Muller-Armack had ordered the German
137delegation to pursue the very demands of Gesamttextil at the negotiating table . 
The meeting with Erhard did not seem to have been sufficiently reassuring for the 
protective interests which Gesamttextil had asked the BMWi to carry through in 
Brussels. Thus the textile association contacted the chancellor's office and had a 
meeting with Adenauer himself sometime in August. Adenauer must have been 
delighted to be given the opportunity to admonish Erhard to pay more attention to 
the protective needs of German industry in the accession negotiations. Erhard was 
indignant at Adenauer's letter and pointed out in his response to the chancellor that 
he had discussed all of that with Gesamttextil himself just four weeks ago and that 
he had given them all the reassurances for which they could possibly ask. He also 
mentioned that the chancellor's office had received a summary protocol of that
138meeting with Gesamttextil, which they apparently had chosen to ignore . A month 
later another very important figure pressed Erhard yet again that he should do more 
to protect the German textile industry. This time it was Fritz Berg, the president of 
the BDI and one of the most ardent and allegedly powerful advocates for British 
accession139. He now found himself in the very uncomfortable situation to be forced 
to lobby for what was perhaps the most protectionist interest in German industry.
The example of the textile industry shows how an individual association 
representing a sector in long-term structural difficulties and faced with added 
competition of a potentially dangerous scope is able to push the government and the 
leadership of the industrial peak organisation into the desired direction given the 
government's internal divisions, the quality of the perceived threat and perceived
136 BA, B102 - 61942: Bonn, 26 VII 1962, Bogelholz, VC1 an Ministerialdirigent Daniel,
betr.: Heutige Besprechung der Textilindustrie mit Herm Minister. Hier: Verhandlungen mit 
Groflbritannien uber den Beitritt zur EWG, Problem Indien und Pakistan.
137 As a consequence of this and of an apparently well-calculated move towards a more liberal 
viewpoint on the part of the French delegation, the Germans found themselves alone in the 
protectionist comer in Brussels and failed to obtain any support. See section 7.2 on German 
industrial interest in the negotiations.
138 BA, B102 - 61943: Bonn, 13 IX 1962, Erhard an Adenauer, betr.: Besprechung mit
Vertretem der deutschen Textilindustrie, Bezug: Ihr Schreiben vom 27. August 1962.
139 BA, B102 - 44418: Bonn, 2 XI 1962, Bottger, IVA4 an Abteilung EA3, betr.: Beitritt
Groflbritanniens zur EWG, hier: Besorgnisse der Textilindustrie, Bezug: Schreiben von Fritz 
Berg vom 28. September 1962.
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certainty of the losses involved, if nothing is done against it. For the German textile 
industry the problems foreseen, if Germany would lose its capacity to control 
import quotas independently, were very concrete. On top of that there was the 
pressure within GATT to further reduce quantitative restrictions. There was also the 
move toward a common commercial policy within the EEC which were both 
perceived as dangerous scenarios which had to be fought. All of this put the 
industry into a very defensive position which, not paradoxically, enhanced its 
bargaining power. In the given situation, Adenauer could capitalise on that in order 
to demonstrate to Erhard, Muller-Armack and the Fritz Berg that there were 
important industrial sectors that feared British accession. Even though Adenauer 
himself did not think that decisions like that on British accession should be taken on 
the basis of commercial interests, he must have been delighted to show to Erhard, 
that even on the grounds of industrial interest, as it made itself felt, British 
accession was not feasible for Germany. It is even possible that Adenauer himself or 
his entourage arranged the meeting with Gesamttextil in order to give the whole 
issue a higher profile.
The battle within the federal government intensified once more, when 
Adenauer and Schroder signed the Ely see treaty just about a week after de Gaulle’s 
infamous «non!». When the negotiations were formally ended on 29 January, the 
anger among France’s EEC partners, in the UK and the US administration was 
mounting140. There were many who still believed that France would not be able to 
withstand joint pressure and might still yield in the end, if the others acted in 
unity141. The possibility for the Federal Republic to withhold the ratification of the 
Ely see treaty was seen as the perhaps most effective leverage to influence de Gaulle. 
While it is quite unlikely that de Gaulle would have yielded to anything at this
140 The delegations of the five other EEC members made rather emotional pledges to each other 
as to how to overcome the French intransigence. See Muller-Arm ack , Auf dem Weg, pp. 
239-240.
141 This was clearly the hope of the American administration. The State Department hoped that 
they could best influence the situation by encouraging and supporting Erhard and Schroder. 
Kennedy wrote directly to Adenauer, but the Americans were aware that they stood little 
chance to win him over to their views. See FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, West Europe and 
Canada, pp. 153-154, 167-169. The eventual disillusionment with Erhard’s capacity to 
deliver seems to have been so great that part of the judgement passed on the economics 
minister has not been declassified in the FRUS. The essence of the assessment was that 
Erhard would not be capable of decisive leadership. See FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, West 
Europe and Canada, pp. 208-212.
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point, the pressure on Adenauer to put the French president to the test mounted once 
more. This pressure was linked to the ongoing debate about Adenauer’s replacement 
by Erhard which was finally ended in April when the parliamentary faction of the 
CDU/CSU forced Adenauer to resign in October and elected Erhard as his 
successor. The Kennedy administration tried all it could to convince the federal 
chancellor of the need to counter de Gaulle in this matter142. It also supported 
Erhard in his continuing campaign for British membership. And indeed, Adenauer 
lost out more and more to Schroder and Erhard. The Ely see treaty was watered 
down in the end by the preamble which the Bundestag adopted with its 
ratification143. Yet all of this failed to have any impact on the French. Adenauer 
himself flatly refused to disagree with de Gaulle.
Despite all the uproar and the initial illusions about isolating and pressurising 
France, the German supporters of British accession simply had to accept the French 
veto, unless they were ready to risk the disruption of the EEC itself. It was soon 
clear that this option did not realistically exist and that threats of this sort were 
therefore without substance. Once the question of Adenauer’s succession had been 
decided and the Elys6e treaty had been ratified, all talk of retaliation against the 
French disappeared. Adenauer had not buckled under the immense pressure from 
his own party and from the Kennedy administration and had not done anything to 
influence de Gaulle. Despite all the bitterness about the undignified succession 
debate, he might have felt quite content with the fact that he played a crucial part in 
preventing British accession to the EEC, and that he had played it successfully. His 
allies in the matter were, apart from a minority within his own party, the textile,
FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, West Europe and Canada, pp. 164-165.
For the texts of the treaty and the ratification law see Auswartiges Am t  [ed.]: 
Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994. Koln 1995. 
Der Elysee-Vertrag. Wortlaut der Gemeinsamen Erklarung und des Vertrages iiber die 
deutsch-franzosische Zusammenarbeit vom 22. Januar 1963, pp. 275-278; Gesetz zum 
deutsch-franzosischen Freundschaftsvertrag/ Gesetz zu der Gemeinsamen Erklarung und zu 
dem Vertrag vom 22. Januar 1963, 15. Juni 1963, pp. 279-280; see also Schriftlicher 
Bericht des Ausschusses fur auswartige Angelegenheiten (3. AusschuB) iiber den von der 
Bundesregierung eingebrachten Entwurf eines Gesetzes zu der Gemeinsamen Erklarung und 
zu dem Vertrag vom 22. Januar 1963 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Franzosischen Republik iiber die deutsch-franzosische Zusammenarbeit. (Drucksache 
IV/1252) In: Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 4. Wahlperiode. Anlagen zu den 
stenographischen Jahresberichten. Vol. 84, Drucksachen IV/1081 bis IV/1280. Bonn 1963, 
see in particular p. 10.
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paper and metal industries, the coal industry and all other industries which saw 
British accession as a terrible threat and the EEC as a great protective blessing. To 
force France into accepting British accession was impossible. It would have meant 
putting the EEC at risk. Adenauer knew that and had accepted that early on and had 
even embraced de Gaulle’s position against it. Risking the break-up of the EEC was 
unthinkable even for the fiercest opponents of Adenauer’s policy in Germany. Even 
Erhard was not in the position to question the existence of the EEC openly. Hence 
the preservation of the common market project was and remained a firm political 
consensus in Germany. It rested on the important political achievements for the 
Federal Republic which went with the treaties of Rome. It rested no less on the 
most vital interests of the German economy and of German industry in particular.
7. 4  Conclusions
It has been shown in this chapter that de Gaulle’s veto, however independently it 
might have been spelled out in January 1963, was still in actual fact sanctioned by 
Germany through Adenauer’s signature under the Elysee treaty only ten days later. 
In doing so and in refusing to put any pressure on the French president, Adenauer 
effectively endorsed the veto. Subsequently, he also supported it explicitly. 
Adenauer was able to hold this position in the face of fierce opposition from within 
his own political party and in the face of the continuing erosion of his position as 
chancellor. The fact that he was able to do so is explicable only in terms of the 
support that he could muster outside his government, through collusion with de 
Gaulle and by utilising the protective interests of individual sectors of German 
industry and German agriculture. Adenauer prepared the grounds for this by having 
the German delegation give away all potential bargaining chips vis-a-vis the French 
at a very early stage and without obtaining formal insurances as to what they would 
receive in return.
His task was made easier by the fact that the most important supporters of 
British accession to the EEC, the Erhard camp and the BDI, were largely out of 
touch with the concrete interests of some of the groups which they had to represent. 
Both the BDI and the BMWi tended to stress the overall positive effects that British
329
accession and its corollaries would have for the German economy and paid less 
attention to the problematic industrial issues. Both were however reminded of their 
obligation to also take into account the protectionist positions of individual sectors. 
Throughout the whole negotiation process this had been done by the BMWi via the 
normal channels of interest representation that were given in the individual sectoral 
departments of the ministry. Thus the protective interests of the metal industries, the 
paper and paper board industries, the textile industry and the other problematic 
sectors mentioned in this chapter were taken into account all along and translated 
into the German position at the negotiating table. When this channel of interest 
representation failed in the case of the textile industry, the issue was brought up 
with Erhard himself and even taken all the way up to Adenauer, causing 
considerable pressure for the BMWi and the German delegation.
Even more important support for Adenauer’s position flew from the 
realisation, that only seems to have come about a while after de Gaulle’s press 
conference, that any serious challenge to the French veto would be a threat to the 
existence of the common market project. Politically, the Erhard camp and the BDI 
had come round to supporting the EEC. They had still hoped for its enlargement 
and thereby for its alteration into a more “outward-looking’’ and less protectionist 
arrangement. At the beginning of 1963 they had to realise that German industry had 
fully embraced the common market project and wanted it by all means to continue. 
The catastrophic consequences of trade discrimination between the Six and the 
Seven, which Erhard and the BDI had forecast for years, had not materialised. 
Hence the pressure from industry in favour of enlargement was not so strong as the 
Erhard camp wanted to see it. The alterations which would have been brought about 
by the enlargement of the EEC on the other hand, caused several industrial sectors 
to oppose this option or to ask for additional protection. It is easy to imagine what 
would have happened, if the German political leadership had indeed tried to put 
serious pressure on de Gaulle and to force British accession. The simple threat with 
the disruption of the common market would have caused an uproar of unprecedented 
dimensions in German industry and forced any government to refrain from 
retaliatory action against France. After all the French market was the fastest 
growing export market for German industry.
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The conclusion of all of this is that, once the veto was spelled out and the 
negotiations were formally ended, even a German government led by Erhard would 
not have been in the position to exert pressure on de Gaulle. There was simply no 
credible threat available that could have been used without causing considerable 
resistance at home against such a policy. Erhard and others were able to put forward 
strong words, only because they could be certain that, for the moment, they would 
not have the chance to make them Germany’s official policy. Erhard might not have 
been completely aware of these facts. Yet there is no doubt at all that German 
industry would have made him aware of these constraints with considerable haste, 
had he had succeeded in pushing through this policy in the cabinet. The collusion 
between the German chancellor and the French president allowed the latter to 
pronounce his long-premeditated veto at the most feasible moment, when other 
circumstances, like the question of nuclear weapons and in particular the Polaris 
issue, could be referred to in order to provide additional justification. The veto was 
thus not simply French, it was joint Franco-German policy.
8 Conclusions 
Germany's Decision against the Enlargement of the EEC
In the period after the ratification of the Treaties of Rome until the spring of 1963 
the Federal Republic of Germany went through an intense process of deciding its 
European policy. The fiercely debated alternatives were the inclusion of the EEC 
into a Europe-wide free trade area and the enlargement of the Community on the 
one hand, and keeping the EEC of the Six and the Six only on the other. This was 
also seen as a choice between continuing Germany’s successful return to the world 
market as well as a correspondingly liberal commercial policy by the EEC vis-a-vis 
third countries and the inclusion of the Federal Republic into a small, exclusive, 
protectionist and discriminatory regional trading bloc. In 1963 West Germany opted 
for the latter solution and supported the French veto against British accession to the 
EEC.
The Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had colluded with de Gaulle in the 
question of the FTA and enlargement. He accommodated and endorsed de Gaulle’s 
veto and helped counter the possibility of retaliatory measures against France from 
within the EEC. Yet given the strong political support in West Germany for the 
FTA and for the enlargement of the EEC during the previous years, one might have 
expected that the Bundestag and the main social groups, in particular the BDI, 
would have demanded to strike back at France and, if necessary, leave the French 
behind and shape the common market in the way that always seemed to have been 
preferred by German industry and the majority of political elites in general. Yet the 
fact that the veto had been pronounced and that Germany had signed the treaty of 
co-operation with France, raised the stakes of any resistance to the French move. It 
increased the gravity of the consequences which any serious threat to France would 
have produced in terms of foreign policy and for the future of the common market. 
While those in Germany who favoured British accession and who hoped for the 
realisation of something like an Atlantic free trade area within the GATT were 
dissatisfied with the evolution of events, there was no support for any move that 
might have endangered the EEC. One can therefore conclude that the decision to
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back the French veto represented the real political and economic interests of West 
Germany, despite the fact that anger and outrage lingered in the Bundestag and the 
BMWi. The BMWi’s hopes for a Europe-wide or even an Atlantic free trade area on 
the other hand did not correspond by any means to the balance of interest as 
represented by industrial pressure groups in West Germany. With time this balance 
shifted considerably in favour of the EEC of the Six, as the Community’s benefits 
to weaker sectors became more apparent and as the strong export oriented sectors 
realised that their interests outside the EEC were not seriously damaged by the 
division between the Six and the Seven. This was realised only over time, but in 
time to become politically relevant in West Germany's reaction to the French veto 
in 1963.
This study has provided archival and quantitative evidence for German 
industrial interest in the question of the FTA and British accession to the EEC. It 
has demonstrated that the negative effects of the division between EEC and EFTA 
on German foreign trade in manufactured products and for a number of individual 
sectors have been minimal and could certainly not have been perceived by the 
respective industrial associations as direct losses or clearly visible opportunity costs. 
The structure of industrial interest at the sectoral level and the ways of interest 
representation and aggregation provide a strong argument as to why the BDI’s 
support for the FTA and British accession was not translated into a more decisive 
Government policy. This offers an important additional explanation for the fact that, 
despite a grand coalition of all political parties, of the BMWi and the BDI, 
Adenauer was able to defeat this majority and carry through his own political 
objectives, which were concerned with security and with keeping West Germany’s 
firm position vis-a-vis the East in the face of American attempts to soften their line. 
The Chancellor was able not only to utilise the constitutional prerogatives of his 
office, his advance in information about the dealings on the international level and 
the domestic feuds over the issues, he could also exploit the fact that the most 
important group concerned, German industry, was by no means united and that 
there were a number of sectors with very strong reservations about a free trade area 
and British accession.
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At the outset of the debate, many in German industry and in the BMWi had 
still hoped to markedly modify the overall outlook of the common market and in 
particular of the CAP, once the FTA or enlargement were achieved. They had to 
realise however, that the support they would have needed from within the Federal 
Republic was not sufficiently strong. The balance of interest in West German 
industry had shifted in such a way as to weaken the leverage of that position in the 
domestic and the international debate. Neither could the BDI and the BMWi 
persuade or force the Federal Chancellor to go along with their view, nor were they 
able to bring about a liberal position of the German delegations at the respective 
international negotiating tables. The structural reasons for the weakness of their 
position lies in the particular way in which interest representation and aggregation 
worked through the BMWi rather than the BDI and in the fact that the sectors on the 
defensive were consistently better able to muster lobbying activity of their members 
and to obtain responses from the relevant politicians.
Far from being a simple function of the alleged "Kanzlerdemokratie", the 
policy outcome, which can be summarised as West Germany’s decision against the 
free trade area and against British accession, was the result of a complicated web of 
domestic and international forces and institutional frameworks. German industrial 
interest was a crucial element in this. The striking mismatch between the actual 
industrial interest as revealed in this study and the apparent industrial interest that 
dominated the West German debate at the time, is largely a function of the 
mechanisms of interest representation. The fact that sectoral interests did not receive 
much public attention and were consequently underestimated in strength and 
importance has certainly contributed to the somewhat undifferentiated picture of the 
decision making process that has been painted in much of the literature.
8.1 The Political Decision against the Free Trade Area and British
Accession to the EEC
The decision against the FTA and against British accession taken in West Germany
in the years 1957 to 1963 was obviously not put into the form of a bill presented to 
the Bundestag, which would then have voted yes or no on the matter. This decision 
was rather the outcome of the debates and struggles that continued during that
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period and of the increasing awareness in industry that the EEC offered a substantial 
number of benefits and on balance brought about much fewer disadvantages than 
had initially been expected. On the political side the conflict between Adenauer und 
Erhard shaped much of that debate. Yet the focus of the literature on this personal 
feud has diverted attention away from the more important questions relating to the 
actual political and economic interests.
Adenauer and Erhard both pursued very different agendas with their 
respective positions on European policy. Adenauer acted essentially in accordance 
with his perceived imperatives of West Germany’s security. In view of his 
increasing unease with the British and the US administration under Kennedy, he 
opted for a close relationship with de Gaulle’s France, which he sought to 
institutionalise through the Elysee-treaty. There is no doubt that he colluded with de 
Gaulle against the free trade area and British accession. It is very probable that the 
Chancellor gave assurances to the French president on these matters even at their 
first meeting at Colombey in September 1958.
To assume however that such a commitment by Adenauer - which was in 
complete contradiction to all respective Bundestag resolutions - could have been the 
determining factor of the German position for a number of years, ignores the fact 
that Adenauer was not in the position to speak out in that way at home during most 
of the period discussed here. The suggestion that Adenauer was able to simply 
impose his views in this matter, as implied in most of the literature and expressed 
by Hans von der Groeben, is close to absurd. This thesis has provided evidence that 
Adenauer, despite his particular policy style, was not able to consistently impose his 
views on the Cabinet, in particular not in matters of economic policy.
Adenauer’s aim was to keep France content with the development of the 
common market and to ensure that de Gaulle would support him vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union in the Berlin crises. To that end he also accommodated France’s particular 
interests in agriculture as well as in the question of the renewal of the association 
agreement with French overseas territories. The fact that Adenauer ordered the 
German delegation in the respective negotiations within the EEC to yield to 
practically all French demands and thus give away crucial bargaining chips at an 
early stage was part of a very conscious policy on the part of the Chancellor. In
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doing so he made sure relatively early on that German negotiators would not be able 
to put real pressure on France at a later stage, in case the balance of power in the 
Federal Government would shift against him.
Adenauer’s strength in the decision on Germany’s European policy after 
1957 lay therefore not so much in the constitutional prerogatives of his office, but 
rather in the fact that, as "chief executive" he had access to a larger amount of 
relevant domestic and international information than his opponents. This, in 
conjunction with his repeated personal interference in the instructions for the 
German delegations and the seeming synchronisation of certain moves with de 
Gaulle, gave him a considerable tactical advantage over his Minister of Economics 
Ludwig Erhard.
Erhard’s position on the other hand was shaped not so much by political 
considerations but rather by the imperatives of his ordo-liberal economic 
philosophy. Given his moral reservations about the representation of particular 
societal interests, Erhard’s approach to economic policy tended to ignore rather than 
to accommodate them. In any conflict with the pragmatic and sly Chancellor, he 
was therefore at a disadvantage from the very outset. More importantly, Erhard was 
largely out of touch with the perceived interests of German industry. Since he 
assumed to know already what was best for the German economy at large, he might 
not have felt the need to pay too much attention to the details of these interests 
himself. While his ministry would customarily take note of these sectoral interests 
anyway, the Minister himself did not genuinely care for them. German industry 
could therefore not regard Erhard as a representative of their interests at the 
international negotiating table. Despite the coincidence of positions of BDI and 
BMWi on the FTA and British accession, this fact contributed to the relative 
ineffectiveness of Erhard’s European policy. The fact that both, Erhard and the 
BDI, catered for what can be seen as the overall or the aggregate interests of the 
German economy or German industry and tended to ignore sectoral interests, is 
crucial in explaining the discrepancy between their seeming political power and their 
inability to translate it into a corresponding policy outcome.
On the international level Erhard’s jovial, over-optimistic and often 
completely unrealistic attitude initially raised false hopes in Whitehall for a swift
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success of the FTA and helped stain Erhard’s international reputation. While the 
main British ally on the continent was therefore not particularly useful in terms of 
the quality of information he would provide, French diplomacy was able to 
capitalise on the internal divisions of the Federal Government. This further 
undermined the political power of the Minister of Economics in the matter of the 
FTA and British accession. Given that Erhard’s political and personal style, his 
economic philosophy and his political agenda were in complete contradiction with 
any objective of French European policy, the German Minister of Economics was 
entirely unable to wield any influence with the French, since he had nothing to offer 
to them in terms of possible trade-offs. For these reasons Erhard and, quite 
similarly, his state secretary Muller-Armack were continuously in a weak position. 
The impression they gave to others was however one of extreme self-confidence 
about their political standing and economic ideas and often a striking optimism. The 
handling of the Muller-Armack plan at the end of 1960 and the beginning of 1961 is 
a very telling example of this strange mixture of the ingenuity to conceive a 
technical compromise with the inability to realistically assess its chances 
domestically and internationally and with a high degree of clumsiness in preparing 
its presentation to the relevant figures at home and abroad. The fate of the Muller- 
Armack plan was sealed however by American pressure on the British and their 
subsequent application for full membership in the EEC. It remains a purely 
hypothetical question whether the Muller-Armack plan really could have represented 
a way forward in achieving actual practical steps towards closing the gap between 
EEC and EFTA. It has been argued here that the plan could well have 
accommodated a real rapprochement between the Six and the Seven, had it not been 
for the determination by the Kennedy administration to prevent attempts at bridge 
building in Europe out of fear that they might spell further discrimination against 
the USA.
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8.2  German Industrial Interest in the FTA project and British accession
to the EEC 1957-1963
It was an essential aim of this thesis to provide a clearer picture of German 
industrial interest in the different options of European policy which were debated 
between 1957 and 1963 in the Federal Republic. The thesis has described and 
analysed German industrial interest in relation to the FTA plan, the Maudling 
negotiations, the acceleration proposals, the formation of EFTA, the attempts at 
bridge building and on the question of British accession to the EEC. The essential 
outcome of this analysis is that there was a considerable divergence among 
industrial sectors as to their perceived and actual interests in relation to these 
projects and that the balance of industrial interest shifted toward a clear preference 
for keeping the EEC of the Six and against any sort of enlargement at least for the 
time being. The evidence for the diverging views of individual industrial sectors is 
reflected in their exchanges with the respective sectoral departments of the BMWi.
It was already clear at the beginning of the Maudling negotiations that 
certain sectors of German industry would not be in the position to simply agree to 
the abolition of all barriers to trade with the member countries of the OEEC outside 
the EEC. While German industry was still assessing the impact of the establishment 
of a customs union within the EEC, many sectors were very reluctant to take an 
additional step that would expose them to increased foreign competition. Another 
problem was that the concept of a free trade area and its main features were by no 
means generally understood. As the Maudling negotiations revealed, the conflicting 
notions of such an arrangement as well as the different approaches that might still 
pass under that label and be in accordance with the requirements of the GATT were 
part of the misunderstandings and problems that led to the failure of the project.
The expanding and export oriented sectors of German industry were in 
favour of the FTA plan and hoped for increased export opportunities by extending 
free trade across all of Western Europe. In assessing the impact that the EEC and 
the FTA project would have on their fortunes, the chemical, engineering, machine 
tool and car manufacturing sectors along with others saw no serious problems but 
rather the comfortable prospect of further expansion and at least the full 
preservation of their market shares in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Austria and
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Scandinavia. The failure to establish the FTA along with the EEC and to make it 
operative at the beginning of 1959 was seen by these sectors as a potential threat to 
their shares in the other European markets. It was feared that the trade 
discrimination vis-a-vis these countries might lead to some form of retaliation on 
their part and cause substantial export losses.
The non-ferrous metal sector as well as the respective metal processing 
industries, the textile sector and the timber and timber processing industries were 
among those for which the Europe-wide FTA would have spelled disaster, at least in 
their own judgement. The same was true for a number of other industrial sectors 
like the asbestos industry. Given that these sectors were on the whole not very 
successful in export markets and were used to enjoying a great deal of protection, 
they felt that the lowering and eventual abolition of tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions within the EEC was already enough of a challenge. Any further 
challenges of that sort were most unwelcome. The expectation was that they could 
not be met and that further measures of restructuring and of achieving higher 
efficiency would be extremely painful. In the non-ferrous metal but also in the 
timber processing industries the endowment of potential competitors like Norway, 
Sweden and Austria with cheap energy or natural resources was seen as an unfair 
advantage.
For the textile industry the main problem lay in establishing sufficient 
safeguards against imports from low-price countries like India and Pakistan. Here 
and in a large number of other sectors, the precise nature of the rules of origin that 
would govern the FTA was of crucial importance. These rules would determine the 
overall nature of the FTA. As the negotiations dragged on, the Italian and French 
demands for compensatory charges introduced an element that ran counter to the 
original concept of an FTA according to which tariff adjustments should be left to 
the individual member states. Demands for compensatory charges for products of 
certain sectors were also an indication of the fact that the economies of the future 
member states were competitive rather than complementary at least in certain 
sections and would therefore in theory be better served by a customs union. The 
French also demanded studies on the particular problems of individual industrial 
sectors. As far as the chemical industry was concerned, they insisted on the
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introduction of compensatory charges. On the German side the metal and smelting 
industries were also quite favourable to that sort of arrangement. Even the German 
chemical industry came up with numerous conditions to the acceptance of a final 
arrangement for an FTA. As a consequence of the pressure exerted by the French 
and of demands coming from German industry, the initial aim of the German 
delegation to pursue a straight liberal line in the negotiations, could not be upheld, 
if the negotiations were to succeed and if German industrial interest was to be 
accommodated.
The sectoral interest of German industry did not change dramatically in 
subsequent years in relation to the FTA and to the plans for the enlargement of the 
EEC. The perception of the EEC and of the detrimental effects that the split 
between the EEC and the other OEEC members would have on German exports to 
these countries did, however, change considerably over time. The formation of 
EFTA had caused the larger industrial associations to air considerable concern about 
what might happen to their trade interests among the Seven, if they were to go 
ahead abolishing tariffs among each other. Yet time and time again, officials in the 
BMWi mentioned the fact that the commercial division of Western Europe had "not 
yet" produced the disastrous effects that they had been predicting ever since the 
beginning of 1959. As late as 1964 the expected devastating effects had "not yet" 
appeared according to the BMWi.
The quantitative evidence for German trade with the EEC and EFTA 
countries shows clearly that German exports to the Seven did not suffer in the least 
from the beginning of trade discrimination in January 1959 nor from the operation 
of EFTA in 1960. While the statistical exercise undertaken in chapter 6 to address 
this issue is a very simple one and does not set out to identify other possible 
influences on German sectoral foreign trade performance in the markets of the Six 
and the Seven, it does very much reflect the approach of much smaller BMWi 
studies in 1957 and the way in which industrial associations went about assessing the 
impact of EEC and EFTA. The archival evidence shows that positive and negative 
changes in foreign trade performance were readily attributed by individual firms and 
industrial associations to the changes in trade barriers brought about by EEC and 
EFTA. In the context of this study, the method used in chapter 6 does therefore link
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in with the perception of German industry and provides a clear picture of whether 
the commercial division between Six and Seven was seen as a blessing or a curse. 
Given that sectoral industrial interest and lobbying action is an important subject of 
the thesis, this method therefore provides essential and sufficient indications as to 
the overall structure of industrial interest in West Germany.
In connection with the archival evidence the quantitative analysis allows us 
to qualify the perception of German industrial sectors as to the potential impact of 
the possible options for German European policy. It shows that the early fears and 
predictions by the BMWi and the BDI, that the division between EEC and the most 
important European markets outside the EEC would cause major damage to German 
export interests, did not materialise. As this became more and more visible to those 
export-oriented sectors which feared heavy losses from the inclusion in the "small 
Europe" of the Six, their associations calmed down. While the predicted losses in 
the EFTA markets did not occur, exports to the EEC markets, mainly to Italy and 
France, increased considerably. The EEC, thus stripped of its main alleged 
disadvantages for the export-oriented sectors, became rather dear to them. The 
question of whether or not it would be merged with a large FTA or whether Britain 
and other EFTA members would join the Community or be associated with it, 
seemed to matter, with that development, only marginally. For the weaker sectors 
of German industry on the other hand, which faced potentially tough competition 
from their rivals in the Seven not only in the domestic market but also in the other 
EEC markets, the exclusive EEC of the Six was even more important. The trade 
discrimination vis-a-vis the EFTA helped them not only to avoid or more gently 
phase in painful restructuring measures, the opening of the French and Italian 
markets also gave them export opportunities that might have come completely 
unexpected. They therefore took increasingly strong lobbying action to prevent the 
FTA and any enlargement of the EEC, as these possibilities not only constituted a 
major threat to their viability, but also would have deprived them of growth 
opportunities within the EEC, which they had begun to cherish and for the 
preservation of which they were ready to fight hard. The potential losers are anyway 
those who tend to shout loudest when their interests are concerned.
341
8 .3  Industrial Interest Representation and the State o f the 
"Kanzlerdemokratie" in the Federal Republic o f Germany in the 
early 1960s
It has been shown how the divergence of industrial interests and in particular the 
sharp contradiction between the official line taken by the BDI and the balance of 
actual sectoral industrial interest provided Adenauer with a strong tool in his conflict 
with Erhard and his parliamentary party over European policy, when decisions were 
made in 1963. The fact that the commercial division in Europe did not damage 
German industrial interest on the one hand and greatly served it in some sectors on 
the other was the reason that the initial protest of spring 1963 abated so quickly. 
After indulging in fantasies of rebellion for a short while, Erhard and Muller- 
Armack finally had to accept that they lacked the backing for any onslaught against 
France and any paralysis of the common market. It remains however still puzzling 
why and how the actual structure of German industrial interest remained concealed 
from the political leadership in the Bundestag and also from the industrial leadership 
in the BDI. The fact that Erhard seemed relatively ill-informed at times was 
probably a reflection of his general approach toward interest groups. As the head of 
the BMWi he had by far the most detailed and precise information about perceived 
and actual industrial interest at hand. Yet, as has been stated before, Erhard did not 
attribute too much importance to these interests. Missing out on analysing the 
divergent interests and, if convenient, manipulating them in public for his own 
agenda of European policy, was yet another grave mistake by the Minister of 
Economics, which contributed to the unwelcome policy outcome for him.
It has been part of the argument here that the clearly and more narrowly 
defined interests of relatively small groups will generally have a higher chance of 
successful representation at the political level than more broadly defined interests 
that refer to much larger groups of interested individuals or firms. It has also been 
argued that the economic weakness of any such group would, in a given political 
situation, probably reinforce the political influence of the smaller interest group vis- 
a-vis that of the larger ones. Some of the findings in the archival evidence have 
corroborated these theoretical assumptions. Thus it is clear that the overwhelming
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number of requests made to the BMWi came from sectors facing more or less 
serious concrete problems and those expecting such difficulties. It is also clear that 
in a number of cases individual associations could induce the relevant political 
figures to immediate action in order to protect their interests. Thus the qualitative 
evidence validates on the whole the general theoretical assumptions about the 
influence of pressure groups. It therefore also reinforces the importance of the 
quantitative study in chapter 6 and the conclusions drawn from it.
Yet the present study allows a number of additional inferences about the role 
of industrial interest groups and in particular about their performance under the 
system of interest representation at work in the Federal Republic at the beginning of 
the 1960s. There are a number of general observations in this study that can be 
explained in terms of the particular way in which industrial positions are formed and 
the way in which industrial interest is aggregated. There is firstly the rather striking 
observation that the actual industrial interest, as revealed by this study in the 
archival and the quantitative analysis, was not reflected in the position of the BDI 
and the Bundestag. One can secondly observe that distinct levels of industrial 
associations dominated industrial lobbying activity in distinct questions of European 
policy. A third observation is that the receiving end of industrial lobbying activity 
(BMWi, Chancellor's office, parties etc.) also varied according to the particular 
issue that was addressed.
Given that this study focused mainly on industrial activity, as far as it is 
reflected in the files of the BMWi and the Chancellor's office, the explanations 
offered here, might have to be seen with some qualifications. The findings can 
however provide some signposts for future research into the relationship between 
sectoral and aggregate industrial interest, which seems to be a crucial key to 
assessing overall industrial influence on political decision making processes. The 
observation that the actual balance of industrial interest was not reflected in the 
position of the BDI and the Bundestag points to imbalances in the process of interest 
representation. The explanation for this is on the one hand the fact that there was no 
systematic process of interest aggregation within the framework of the BDI, which 
would have been able to take account of sectoral interests. As the umbrella 
organisation of all German industry, the BDI formulated positions reflecting the
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interests of the larger industrial associations, while trying to represent something 
that could be described as the common interest of German industry at large. The 
positions of the BDI were therefore by definition rather general ones. The BDI's 
position on the FTA and British accession was therefore the positive one which 
represented the views of the expanding and export-oriented larger sectors and by 
definition had to neglect positions of those sectors commanding a lesser weight 
within the BDI. Yet it seems that the BDI did not just neglect these interests in 
terms of its political position. The BDI leadership also seems to have been largely 
unaware of these interests. This unawareness of "minor" sectoral interests in the 
BDI correlates with the fact that the sectoral departments and the department IV of 
the BMWi were the places where German industrial interest was systematically 
analysed, aggregated and transmitted into the Governmental decision making 
processes. Industrial associations tended to contact the higher levels of the BMWi 
and the Federal Government in general, only when they feared that their interests 
were not sufficiently well represented by their respective BMWi sub-section. The 
attempt to push the BDI leadership into supporting a sectoral position was usually a 
waste of time.
The BDI and the larger sectoral associations were able to dominate the 
broader debates over European policy. They commanded the resources to conduct 
fairly comprehensive economic studies and were able to publicise their results in the 
most effective ways. Hence it is no wonder that the BDI drew up comprehensive 
plans for bridge building, offered a detailed position on the acceleration plans and 
would be the first to work out a proposal for a Europe-wide customs union. Since 
these issues were highly political, the BDI addressed them directly to Erhard and 
Adenauer. Smaller-scale sectoral associations lacked interest and resources to 
contribute to these debates. For them lobbying action beyond the usual contact with 
their BMWi sub-section was almost always the outcome of very concrete and 
immediate or imminent problems. Yet, once they were in alarm, they did not 
hesitate to go up to the highest level of the BMWi and at times also to appeal 
directly to the Chancellor.
The Gesamttextil association happened to be both, a resourceful and 
important industrial pressure group and a sector with very concrete and imminent
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problems vis-a-vis the FTA and British accession. This combination gave it a 
particularly strong position in terms of influence on the relevant political decisions. 
It was thus involved in the drawing up of comprehensive commercial solutions for 
European textiles and acted also in response to the very concrete problems of its 
member associations. The fact that, despite its relatively large size, the interest 
represented by Gesamttextil was very coherent and clearly defined, explains why 
this association was able to force the German delegation to alter its position despite 
the fact that it had already entered an agreement with its negotiating partners. This 
example shows very impressively the potential power of sectoral interest vis-a-vis 
the aggregate interest, if a number of conditions are fulfilled. Gesamttextil firstly 
put pressure on the BMWi leadership, then contacted the Chancellor on the same 
matter and eventually got the president of the BDI himself to represent their very 
protectionist interests vis-a-vis the Chancellor. A united political leadership might 
still have fought off such an assault. Yet given that the most important political 
figure could capitalise on such interventions and utilise them to further his own 
political agenda against BMWi and BDI as well as his party and the vast majority in 
parliament, the sectoral interest was bound to be given way. And indeed, Erhard 
and Muller-Armack were forced to give new instructions to their negotiators in 
Brussels.
It is not argued here that sectoral industrial interest in and of itself would 
carry a huge amount of lobbying power and necessarily win out over the aggregate 
interest in influencing political decision making processes. This would be a gross 
simplification. It would be as false and simplistic as it would be to allege that the 
Federal Chancellor was able to impose his views on European policy independently 
of societal interest and expressed political will for a number of years. The fact that 
sectoral interest might however attain such a crucial influence on policy making 
under specific circumstances, is an important conclusion of this thesis with 
implications for future research analysing industrial lobbying and policy outcomes. 
This study has shown that German sectoral industrial interest was an important 
element in the final struggle between Adenauer and the Erhard camp. Sectoral 
interest was able to exploit that struggle to its advantage, whereas Adenauer 
advanced his own agenda by exploiting the internal divisions of German industry.
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Given that the structure of overall industrial interest as revealed in the quantitative 
study in chapter 6 implied a clear industrial preference for the EEC of the Six, one 
can assume that real progress toward British accession and the association of other 
EFTA members would have caused stronger and more widespread expressions of 
industrial interest. An assertive policy against France along the lines initially 
suggested by the Erhard camp, which might have resulted in a paralysis or failure of 
the common market, would certainly have caused the strongest industrial response.
The role of industry in the debate over West Germany's European policy 
was quite ambivalent. On the surface, industry as represented by the BDI simply 
seemed to be yet another arrow in Erhard's apparently well-filled quiver. The 
mechanisms of interest representations outlined here favoured the general industrial 
views over the sectoral ones as far as political and public opinion was concerned. It 
was also important that the expectations in 1957 were much different in the export- 
oriented sectors than they were five or six years later. By then the disaster predicted 
by the BDI and Erhard had still not come about. Consequently, their opinions 
sounded less and less convincing. To an increasingly weak and isolated Adenauer 
the internal divisions between industry and their self-proclaimed spokespeople 
offered the chance to expose some of the actual industrial interest in the EEC which 
Erhard and the BDI were in fact concealing. He was thereby able to show that the 
whole argument on which the Minister of Economics and the industrial peak 
organisation had founded their campaign for the FTA and the enlargement of the 
EEC was out of step with important industrial interests and certainly out of step 
with the balance and direction of industrial pressure. In exploiting these sectoral 
interests to further his own objectives Adenauer, consciously or not, helped 
important societal interests to be incorporated into the high-level political decision 
making process. In a situation of almost complete isolation of the Chancellor at 
home, sectoral interests were therefore able to make an important difference to West 
Germany's European policy at a crucial point. Collusion with de Gaulle at the 
international level and a coalition with the weaker sectors of German industry 
helped Adenauer outmanoeuvre Erhard and the BDI. They had failed to realise that 
the "common good", which they claimed to represent, was not grounded in interests 
for which anybody in German industry would really fight. It took an extremely
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shrewd and skilful politician to take on the united coalition of Bundestag, BDI and 
BMWi and to assemble a countervailing coalition that would carry the day. 
Adenauer was able to perform such a masterpiece of political leadership against 
many odds. Yet the prerogatives of his office and his already diminished personal 
authority would not have allowed him to do so without such a coalition of societal 
and political interests and forces. As Erhard was to prove in his unsuccessful tenure 
as Chancellor, it was indeed the Chancellor that mattered. Yet what this meant was 
essentially the capacity to discern the societal and political forces, the mechanisms 
to use and offset them against one another and thus to uphold one's own agenda in 
the pluralistic battle of particular interests. This was the essence of Adenauer's 
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ANNEX TO CHAPTER 4
Tables A 4.2.1 - A 4.2.6: imports into th e  efta markets bv 
country o f origin in 1957 and 1958 (in currency and as 
percentage o f total and European imports) 
Table A 4.2.1: imports into the united Kingdom 1957 and 1958 (bv
origin)
1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958
million £ % of total imports % of "6+7"
Total 4071,80 3779,50 100,00 100,00 458,59 420,41
"6"+"7" 887,90 899,00 21,81 23,79 100,00 100,00
D 124,60 135,90 3,06 3,60 14,03 15,12
F 110,40 100,70 2,71 2,66 12,43 11,20
NL 131,80 159,50 3,24 4,22 14,84 17,74
BLUX 61,50 60,90 1,51 1,61 6,93 6,77
ITAL 62,70 77,10 1,54 2,04 7,06 8,58
EEC 491,00 534,10 12,06 14,13 55,30 59,41
CH 36,40 36,20 0,89 0,96 4,10 4,03
N 63,80 55,70 1,57 1,47 7,19 6,20
DK 114,10 115,70 2,80 3,06 12,85 12,87
SWE 156,80 134,80 3,85 3,57 17,66 14,99
AUT 9,30 8,20 0,23 0,22 1,05 0,91
PORT 16,50 14,30 0,41 0,38 1,86 1,59
EFTA 396,90 364,90 9,75 9,65 44,70 40,59
Source: BA. B102-12146.1: Bonn. 4 V11959: EA5. Vermerk betr.: Die Auswirkungen der 
“kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen Ausenhandel: Anlage 2.
Table P{4.2.2: imoorts into the Denmark 1957 and 1958
1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958
million Danish Kr % o f total % of "6+7"
Total 9342,9 9251,6 100,00 100,00
"6"+'7" 7084,4 6999,1 75,83 75,65 100,00 100,00
D 1801,4 1834,8 19,28 19,83 25,43 26,21
F 395,6 316,7 4,23 3,42 5,58 4,52
NL 668 679,1 7,15 7,34 9,43 9,70
BLUX 367,1 352,4 3,93 3,81 5,18 5,03
ITAL 150,6 156,5 1,61 1,69 2,13 2,24
EEC 3382,7 3339,5 36,21 36,10 47,75 47,71
GB 2286,2 2110,7 24,47 22,81 32,27 30,16
SWE 840,2 934,4 8,99 10,10 11,86 13,35
N 334,8 327,8 3,58 3,54 4,73 4,68
AUT 50,7 51,6 0,54 0,56 0,72 0,74
CH 160 204,4 1,71 2,21 2,26 2,92
PORT 29,8 30,7 0,32 0,33 0,42 0,44
EFTA 3701,7 3659,6 39,62 39,56 52,25 52,29
Source: BA. B102-12146.1: Bonn. 4 V11959: EA5 . Vermerk betr.: Die Auswirkungen der
“kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel; Anlage 5.
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Table A fl.2.5: Imports into Norway 1957 and 1958 (bv origin)
1957 1958 1957 | 1958 1957 | 1958
million N Kr % of total % of "6+7"
Total 9103,30 9352,10 100,00 100,00
"6"+ ”7
ff
6369,10 6840,40 69,96 73,14 100,00 100,00
D 1555,90 1886,10 17,09 20,17 24,43 21,SI
F 337,60 308,00 3,71 3,29 5,30 4,50
NL 525,60 645,00 5,77 6,90 8,25 9,43
BLUX 287,90 281,30 3,16 3,01 4,52 4,11
ITAL 132,70 184,70 1,46 1,97 2,08 2,70
EEC 2839,70 3305,10 31,19 35,34 44,59 48,32
GB 1587,70 1446,60 17,44 15,47 24,93 21,15
SWE 1474,10 1487,70 16,19 15,91 23,14 21,75
DK 287,60 414,40 3,16 4,43 4,52 6,06
AUT 41,90 39,50 0,46 0,42 0,66 0,58
CH 117,40 129,50 1,29 1,38 1,84 1,89
PORT 20,7 17,6 0,23 0,19 0,33 0,26
EFTA 3529,40 3535,30 38,77 37,80 55,41 51,68
Source: BA. B102-12146.1: Bonn. 4 V11959: EA5 . Vermerk betr.: Die Auswirkungen der 
“kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel; Anlage 4.
Table A q.2.a: imports into Sweden 1957 and 1958
1957 1958 1957 | 1958 1957 1958
million SKr % of total % of "6+7”
Total 12547,50 12247,70 100,00 100,00 156,78 151,03
”6’'+  "7
tv
8003,10 8109,20 63,78 66,21 100,00 100,00
D 2767,80 2854,80 22,06 23,31 34,58 35,20
F 374,90 440,80 2,99 3,60 4,68 5,44
NL 849,00 927,90 6,77 7,58 10,61 11,44
BLUX 542,20 455,50 4,32 3,72 6,77 5,62
ITAL 399,00 431,00 3,18 3,52 4,99 5,31
EEC 4932,90 5110,00 39,31 41,72 61,64 63,01
GB 1740,90 1718,10 13,87 14,03 21,75 21,19
N 463,00 405,80 3,69 3,31 5,79 5,00
DK 502,30 490,50 4,00 4,00 6,28 6,05
AUT 82,80 87,70 0,66 0,72 1,03 1,08
CH 242,80 259,60 1,94 2,12 3,03 3,20
PORT 38,4 37,5 0,31 0,31 0,48 0,46
EFTA 3070,20 2999,20 24,47 24,49 38,36 36,99
bv origin)
Source: BA. B102-12146.1: Bonn. 4 V11959: EA5 . Vermerk betr.: Die Auswirkungen der 
"kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel: Anlage 5.
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Table A q.2.5: imports Into Austria 1957 and 1958 (bv origin)
(bv origin)
1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958
million OS % of total imports % of "6+7"
Total 29339 27912 100,00 100,00 157,98 152,88
"6"+ "7
tf
18571 18257 63,30 65,41 100,00 100,00
D 10611 10865 36,17 38,93 57,14 59,51
F 974 846 3,32 3,03 5,24 4,63
NL 754 843 2,57 3,02 4,06 4,62
BLUX 475 461 1,62 1,65 2,56 2,53
ITAL 2321 2104 7,91 7,54 12,50 11,52
EEC 15135 15119 51,59 54,17 81,50 82,81
GB 1218 1213 4,15 4,35 6,56 6,64
N 195 139 0,66 0,50 1,05 0,76
DK 159 192 0,54 0,69 0,86 1,05
SWE 377 325 1,28 1,16 2,03 1,78
CH 1443 1204 4,92 4,31 7,77 6,59
PORT 44 65 0,15 0,23 0,24 0,36
EFTA 3436 3138 11,71 11,24 18,50 17,19
Source: BA. B102-12146.1: Bonn. 4 V11959: EA3 . Vermerk betr.: Die Auswirkungen der
“kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel: Anlage 6.
Table A 4.2.6: imports into Switzerland 1957 and 1958 (bv
origin) (bv origin)
1957 1958 1957 1958 1957 1958
million SFr % of total imports % of "6+7"
Total 7597 8447 100,00 100,00 152,95 149,11
"6"+ "7
IV
4967 5665 65,38 67,07 100,00 100,00
D 1853 2193 24,39 25,96 37,31 38,71
F 844 886 11,11 10,49 16,99 15,64
NL 350 380 4,61 4,50 7,05 6,71
BLUX 370 357 4,87 4,23 7,45 6,30
ITAL 726 936 9,56 11,08 14,62 16,52
EEC 4143 4752 54,53 56,26 83,41 83,88
GB 411 450 5,41 5,33 8,27 7,94
N 28 36 0,37 0,43 0,56 0,64
DK 72 69 0,95 0,82 1,45 1,22
SWE 120 133 1,58 1,57 2,42 2,35
AUT 177 208 2,33 2,46 3,56 3,67
PORT 16 17 0,21 0,20 0,32 0,30
EFTA 824 913 10,85 10,81 16,59 16,12
Source: BA. B102-12146.1: Bonn. 4 V11959: EA5 . Vermerk betr.: Die Auswirkungen der
“kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel: Anlage 7.
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Tables A 4.2.7 - A 4.2.12: Sectoral export performance o f  
German industry and its com petitors in efta
Table A 4.2.7: Exports bv th e  Federal Republic and its m ost 
serious com petitors to  th e UK in 1958 (in million £):



























Source: BA. B102 -12146.1. IEFTA1.DOC. KODie 11. Bonn. 4 V1195$). EA5 Hunke: Die
Auswirkungen der "kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel. 
Anlagen.
*except electrical engines
Table A q.2.8: Exports bv th e Federal Republic and its m ost 
serious com petitors to  Denmark in 1958 (in million Danish 
crowns):
textiles metal goods engines* motor vehicles
tariffs 3-20% 5-15% 5-7,5% 5-14%
D 153 84 210 204
GB 151 43 177 130
SWE 40 74
Source: BA. B102-12146.1.1EFTA1.DOC. Kopie 11. Bonn. 4 V11959. EA5 Hunke: Die 
Auswirkungen der "kieinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel. 
Anlagen.
♦except electrical engines
Table A 4.2.9: Exports bv the Federal Republic and its m ost 
serious com petitors to  Norway in 1958 (in million Norwegian 
crowns):
chemical raw materials textiles base metals engines* electrical engines ships
tariffs 0-30% 0-25% 0-30% 5-30% 5-25% 30%
D 51 133 166 165 102 418
GB 24 125 157 142 48 519
SWE 128 142 46 446
Source: BA. B102 -12146.1.1EFTA1.DOC. Kopie 11. Bonn. 4 V11959. EA5 Hunke: Die 




Table A 4.2.10: Exports bv th e  Federal Republic and its m ost 
serious com petitors to  Sweden in 1958 (in million Swedish 
crowns):
chemicals textiles engines motor vehicles
tariffs 0-12% up to 20% 0-17% 15%
D 188 231 642 366
GB 104 208 343 105
N 95
DK 99
Source: BA. B102 -12146.1. [EFTA1.DOC. Kopie 11. Bonn. 4 V11959. EA5 Hunke: Die
Auswirkungen der "kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel. 
Anlagen.
Table A 4.2.11: Exports bv th e  Federal Republic and its m ost 












tarif 26-30% 10-22% 10-25% 10-18% 1330-14700S per 5-15%
fs 100 kg
D 133 33 200 139 931 31
GB 14 9 92
CH 58 28 44
SW 11 16
E
source: BA. B102 • 12146.1. [EFTA1.DOC. Kopie 11. Bonn. 4 V11959. EA5 Hunke: Die 
Auswirkungen der "kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel. 
Anlagen.
Table A q.2.12: Exports bv th e  Federal Republic and its m ost 
serious com petitors to  Switzerland in 1958 (in million Swiss 
Francs):













Source: BA. B102 -12146.1.1EFTA1.DOC. Kopie 11. Bonn. 4 V11959. EA5 Hunke: Die 
Auswirkungen der "kleinen Freihandelszone" auf den deutschen AuBenhandel. 
Anlagen.
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Table A 4.5.1: Average tariff burden in percent (excluding
tariff free imports) on all imports in 1958:_________________
f in ished  products
total raw materials semi-material pre-products final products
German tariff 
1.1. 1957
11,11 3,24 7,70 13,20 11,08
German tariff 
1.12.1959
8,51 2,60 6,30 10,35 8,23
German tariff 
11.1. 1962




12,88 4,50 6,67 15,52 14,90
percentage change of averajge tariff burdens
German tariff 
1959 : 1962
30,08 33,46 33,33 24,35 34,75
German tariff 
1959 : 1970
51,35 73,08 5,87 49,95 81,04
Source: BA. B102-18555: Frankfurt, 1 ll 1960, B undesam tfur Gewerbliche 
W irtschaft: Auswirkungen der Abschaffung der Binnenzolle auf die 
zollbelastung der gew erblichen W irtschaft gem essen an der effektiven Einfuhr 
l958:Tabelle 1: zusam m enfassende Ubersicht:
Table A 4.5.2: Average tariff burden in percent (including
tariff free imports) on all imports in 1958:________________
f in ished  products
total raw materials semi-material pre-products final products
German tariff 
1.1. 1957
4,60 0,14 1,78 11,98 8,73
German tariff 
1.12.1959
3,41 0,12 1,45 9,19 6,46
German tariff 
11.1. 1962




4,30 0,18 2,29 10,14 8,64
percentage change of avera ge tariff burdens
German tariff 
1959 : 1962
30,20 33,33 33,10 24,37 34,67
German tariff 
1959 : 1970
26,10 50,00 57,93 10,34 33,75
Source: BA. B102-18555: Frankfurt, 1 ll 1960, B undesam tfur Cewerbliche 
W irtschaft: Auswirkungen der Abschaffung der Binnenzolle auf die 
zollbelastung der gew erblichen W irtschaft gem essen an der effektiven Einfuhr 
l958:Tabelle 1: zusam m enfassende Ubersicht:
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Table A 4.5.5: Average tariff burden in percent (excluding
tariff free imports) on imports from third countries in 1958:
f in ished products
total raw materials semi-material pre-products final products
German tariff 
1.1.1957
10,81 3,75 8,69 13,18 10,01
German tariff 
1.12.1959
8,24 3,27 7,45 10,18 7,39
German tariff 
1.1.1962
11,68 4,02 7,51 14,24 11,73
CET, present 
stage
12,88 4,51 6,67 15,52 14,89
percentage change of average tariff burdens
German tariff 
1959 : CET
56,31 37,94 -0,47 52,45 101,49
German tariff 
1959 : 1962
41,75 22,94 0,81 39,88 58,73
Source: BA. B102-18555: Frankfurt, 1 1 1960, Bundesam t fur Cewerbliche
W irtschaft: Auswirkungen der Abschaffung der Binnenzolle auf die 
zollbelastung der gew erblichen W irtschaft gem essen an der effektiven Einfuhr 
1958:Tabelle2.
Table A fl.5.4: Average tariff burden in percent (including
tariff free Imports) on imports from third countries in 1958
f in ished  products
total raw materials semi-material pre-products final products
German tariff 
1.1.1957
3,44 0,13 1,13 11,67 7,42
German tariff 
1.12.1959
2,59 0,11 0,96 8,74 5,45
German tariff 
1.1.1962
4,10 0,15 1,65 12,81 9,24
CET, present 
stage
5,69 0,21 2,88 15,46 13,48
percentage change of average tariff burdens
German tariff 
1959 : CET
117,38 91,82 200,00 76,89 147,34
German tariff 
1959 : 1962
58,30 36,27 71,87 46,56 69,54
Source: BA. B102-18555: Frankfurt, 1 ll 1960, B undesam tfurG ew erbl che
W irtschaft: Auswirkungen der Abschaffung der Binnenzolle auf die 
zollbelastung der gewerblichen W irtschaft gem essen an der effektiven Einfuhr 
l958:Tabelle 2.
381
Table A 4.5.5: Average tariff burden in percent (excluding
tariff free imports) on imports from th e  EEC and associated  
territories
f in ished  p roducts
total raw materials semi-material pre-products final products
German tariff 
1.1.1957
11,56 2,10 6,91 13,22 12,69
German tariff 
1.12.1959
8,91 1,31 5,37 10,63 9,50
German tariff 
1.1.1962
8,09 1,47 4,83 9,26 8,88
percentage change of average tariff burdens
German tariff 
1959 : 1962
-8,86 12,61 -9,60 -12,42 -6,25
Source: BA. B102-18555: Frankfurt, 1 1 1960, Bundesam t fur Cewerbliche
W irtschaft: Auswirkungen der Abschaffung der Binnenzolle auf die 
zollbelastung der gew erblichen W irtschaft gem essen an der effektiven Einfuhr 
l958:Tabelle 3.
Table A 4.5,6: Average tariff burden in percent (including
tariff free imports) on imports from th e EEC and associated  
territories
f in ished  p roducts
total raw materials semi-material pre-products final products
German tariff 
1.1.1957
7,92 0,24 4,32 12,57 11,06
German tariff 
1.12.1959
6,08 0,15 3,34 10,05 8,26
German tariff 
1.1.1962
5,54 0,17 3,02 8,80 7,74
percentage change of average tariff burdens
German tariff 
1959 : 1962
-8,88 13,33 -9,58 -12,44 -6,30
Source: BA. B102-18555: Frankfurt, 1 1 1960, Bundesam t fur cew erbliche
W irtschaft: Auswirkungen der Abschaffung der Binnenzolle auf die 
zollbelastung der gew erblichen W irtschaft gem essen an der effektiven Einfuhr 
l958:Tabelle 3.
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Table A 4.5.7: Average tariff burden of German imports
from third countries (GATT members) on th e  basis o f Import 
figures of 1958____________________________________
group of goods application of German tariff application of CET”
foodstuffs 13,2 12,1
raw materials
excluding mineral oil 0,1 0,2
including mineral oil 2,5 0,2
semi-products 5,6 6,2
capital goods 7,2 9,6
other finished products 12,5 13,1
overall (excl. mineral oil) 6,8 6,8
overall (incl. mineral oil) 7,4 6,8
♦Tariffs effectively applied in 1958, i. e. after the last “konjunktur-political” tariff lowering. 
♦♦Taking account of the lowering of 20% of the CET.
Source: PA - AA. Ref. 200. Bd. 277: Brussel. 24 III 1960: EWG. Kommission. Informationsdienst. 
Mitteilung an die Presse. Tabelle 1.
Table A 4.5.8: Difference betw een th e  tariffs presently
applied bv w estcerm anv and th e CET (after lowwering bv 
20%) in percent o f imports_____________________________
percentage share of 
products groups in 
total imports
cases in which 
German tariffs 
need to be raised
cases in which 
German tariffs do 
not change or need 
to be lowered
foodstuffs 27,8 44,6 55,4
raw materials 29,7 2,8 97,2
semi-products 24,5 43,9 56,1
capital goods 9,3 69,4 30,6
other finished goods 7,2 55,4 44,6
total 98,5 34,8 65,2
Source: PA - AA. Ref. 200. Bd. 277: Brussel. 24 III 1960: EWG. Kommission. Informationsdienst.
Mitteilung an die Presse. Tabelle 2.
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Table A 4,5.9: Extent of tariff changes within product
groups_______________________________________________
cases in which German tariffs need to be 
raised
cases in which German tariffs remain 
unchanged or need to be lowered
>30% >15%
<30%
>15% sum <15% >15%
<30%
>30% sum
of the present level (in % of imports) of the present level (in % of imports)
foodstuffs 16,3 13,3 15,0 44,6 18,7 6,1 30,6 55,4
raw
materials
2,8 ” 2,8 84,0 0,5 12,6 97,2
semi­
products
24,0 12,6 7,3 43,9 18,4 2,2 35,5 56,1
capital
goods




19,2 17,8 18,4 55,4 15,1 6,5 23,0 44,6
total 17,8 9,0 8,0 34,8 37,9 3,1 24,1 65,2
Source: PA - AA. Ref. 200. Bd. 277: Brussel. 24 III 1960: EWG. Kommission. Informationsdienst, 
Mitteilung an die Presse. Tabelle 3.
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ANNEX TO CHAPTER 6
The data presented in the following tables (pages 385-450) and figures (pages 451- 
506) are based on quarterly trade statistics taken from the publication S t a t is t i s c h e s  
B u n d e sa m t [ed.]: Der Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Berlins 
(West). Teil 3. Der Spezialhandel nach Bezugs- und Absatzgebieten und nach 
Warengruppen und -untergruppen. 1953-1964. Stuttgart 1954-1965. The basic data 
have been compiled for each sector by adding up the respective trade figures of 
individual products or product groups. For the list of figures see pages 507-519, for 
the list of tables see pages 520-527.
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TABLE A 6.1: OUARlrERLY TEXTILE
is
3RIGIN (IN DM1000) 1953-64:
| BlUX 1 F NL UK SWE N DK | AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 51852 26658 36707 30000 46037 2153 610 1810 15955 50333 145217 116898
53-2 51722 48173 33681 29597 47947 2159 331 954 13512 53576 163173 118479
53-3 56312 46935 37501 44095 46923 1561 313 1120 16377 47544 184843 113838
534 62197 54057 47439 42412 55727 2596 436 1999 18727 54131 206105 133616
54-1 45385 41064 35439 32789 53825 1770 857 1373 19799 53637 154677 131261
54-2 26315 42852 38127 33181 51424 2343 836 1435 20255 51106 140475 127399
54-3 62491 56229 45602 3906 54485 2636 162 1327 19831 48616 168228 127057
54-4 61660 57742 53854 57790 49229 2607 338 1758 23736 48164 231046 125832
55-1 35078 43520 51172 33401 62743 2823 216 1603 19884 49424 163171 136693
55-2 72380 44210 51965 33201 47123 2477 279 1137 20081 46948 201756 118045
55-3 63894 61592 57848 41752 61481 3013 283 2445 29655 43372 225086 140249
55-4 70568 46627 77036 43761 62875 3206 450 1372 31005 59282 237992 158190
56-1 61905 51733 64017 38474 60763 3118 321 1861 27314 57480 216129 150857
56-2 51175 51395 61835 38008 58297 3203 374 2026 26035 54541 202413 144476
56-3 78457 66405 68082 44608 66010 3273 412 2670 18166 58035 257552 148566
564 84362 77665 79501 49146 64000 3514 628 2244 45006 60614 290674 176006
57-1 78681 63551 80941 42420 76469 3594 398 2340 33334 65306 265593 181441
57-2 86091 63219 59599 42823 73949 2816 331 2468 29245 61141 251732 169950
57-3 84101 95320 110302 52720 74167 3337 524 10840 34768 60699 342443 184335
574 103095 97396 60572 59583 80216 3278 850 2579 38573 63770 320646 189266
58-1 79480 77265 82452 59510 76948 3571 461 4138 33095 67272 298707 185485
58-2 70886 71449 52063 51531 72035 2974 459 4114 28112 53717 245929 161411
58-3 73437 100294 62057 67026 49517 3403 409 4383 28590 52243 302814 138545
584 81244 84990 67502 81264 66104 3157 1064 5668 30022 55245 315000 161260
59-1 67150 80666 61824 57804 61977 3879 556 4068 29498 62344 267444 162322
59-2 80198 86652 72852 59734 63933 4025 784 4573 31401 63468 299436 168184
59-3 87828 125324 98995 68981 77601 3973 1535 5300 34753 64525 381128 187687
594 115391 138307 139552 91596 80097 5416 1535 7111 37736 75046 484846 206941
601 106813 126192 139055 75682 75890 5510 805 6153 37607 83086 447742 209051
602 107953 109336 128918 67043 66712 5274 667 6278 35626 72600 413250 187157
603 98083 142549 135292 82466 DOODD 5858 1467 5610 35418 69729 458390 184748
604 111378 147356 156964 94481 71721 7776 1887 6976 41911 79399 510179 209670
61-1 99812 140890 156453 91970 65658 7510 1033 5996 39785 77812 489125 197794
61-2 110218 155782 157219 88718 53200 7804 1265 5587 39525 67279 511937 174660
61-3 101807 193349 144927 98461 77388 8232 1834 5474 41390 70000 538544 204318
614 134585 166873 172716 107130 65246 10334 2334 8155 46179 75279 581304 207527
62-1 134815 191851 188675 112350 72541 9013 1128 6062 43648 81806 627691 214198
62-2 138638 161999 177547 99504 64675 7871 1416 6344 43849 68952 577688 193107
62-3 135527 201375 177160 117291 65351 7704 2278 5750 46745 70117 631353 197945
624 168382 186207 199662 126174 70014 8616 2606 7148 59957 78054 680425 226395
63-1 154774 180092 192700 126184 71778 7002 1285 6198 53743 82628 653750 222634
63-2 154714 178322 182875 119112 70928 6802 1532 5935 53662 73509 635023 212368
63-3 147869 215800 177761 138128 70349 6068 2458 6246 51327 70401 679558 206869
634 176490 198597 203218 149959 75364 7840 2707 7934 62462 66370 728264 222677
64-1 175254 187818 192628 141540 74057 7734 1178 6724 56923 79386 697240 226002
64-2 177628 206100 186670 144419 75049 7616 1385 6232 56122 67427 714817 213831
64-3 183691 249859 195037 160758 72408 6803 2381 6843 58206 70643 789345 217284
644 217026 234708 224208 190007 79147 8485 2673 8299 64208 76663 865949 239475
386
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 18190 3151 12604 18114 9977 5135 2044 1783 3846 14929 52059 37714
53-2 15008 3844 14683 23146 10845 4075 1412 1500 4545 17678 56681 40055
53-3 20780 4515 29013 28374 13905 3147 1217 1747 4715 16934 82682 41665
53-4 27106 3871 15379 23311 14873 8315 1432 1728 4532 20115 69667 50995
54-1 24055 6480 11222 25038 11159 6377 2008 1602 4702 21039 66795 46887
54-2 24692 7719 15926 35896 14638 7336 1639 1723 8372 19238 84233 52946
54-3 24730 10537 17656 28963 20880 6789 1822 1139 6239 17154 81886 54023
54-4 28621 10070 10061 36196 23335 6033 2108 2555 4109 24477 84948 62617
55-1 32215 4750 16439 44590 19458 7199 4897 1873 3277 23958 97994 60662
55-2 31265 17709 20109 38237 19405 7058 3777 1961 4383 27526 107320 64110
55-3 34922 13529 21664 40046 22108 6076 3708 2235 3477 28138 110161 65742
55-4 22234 10989 22885 65842 25120 9673 2988 2161 6226 24844 121950 71012
56-1 25404 21947 17446 53703 22967 7578 4602 1552 9495 25175 118500 71369
56-2 33654 9583 23015 64493 25059 10155 7293 2145 13668 26788 130745 85108
56-3 27403 12359 26643 75940 24918 11631 5097 2546 9409 26672 142345 80273
56-4 29647 15036 22678 78729 26100 7241 5393 3545 8645 28570 146090 79494
57-1 26187 11537 18547 71086 31048 7409 5727 2645 10224 30318 127357 87371
57-2 35778 16008 20478 67728 22010 6742 4368 3266 7993 30276 139992 74655
57-3 32182 26775 26833 73429 29942 7366 6576 4359 12015 31627 159219 91885
57-4 34436 22993 25466 75529 32058 7412 8510 4027 12821 29672 158424 94500
58-1 35172 20141 9199 75026 26519 5576 3757 3973 9825 32546 139538 82196
58-2 31435 21433 38353 74171 35038 11089 3814 4345 7494 32688 165392 94468
58-3 34854 23198 29396 77130 36127 8911 2969 5397 11674 32784 164578 97862
58-4 34392 23527 28518 76759 59299 8337 3099 4183 13483 33453 163196 121854
59-1 37523 25630 31170 80918 53275 7368 3197 4603 11317 36008 175241 115768
59-2 41595 31336 36413 84208 48913 9867 3022 5029 11015 43656 193552 121502
59-3 40082 36585 54653 86813 51038 11265 4520 5116 9855 43566 218133 125360
59-4 37941 39168 68518 94947 59435 12768 3034 6862 9413 50737 240574 142249
60-1 51707 46576 68565 114929 76703 8470 3532 6304 12346 54116 281777 161471
60-2 50747 48865 64167 104374 80564 10382 4403 6858 9038 54153 268153 165398
60-3 54234 45530 70311 79033 54223 10574 3915 6456 8251 52958 249108 136377
604 53444 52788 75942 106305 63547 12982 3375 7583 10325 72429 288479 170241
61-1 43634 53977 74334 111800 53038 11024 3047 6580 10003 47558 283745 131250
61-2 46944 48692 80261 79535 45229 11413 3973 6624 8027 53762 255432 129028
61-3 48395 47100 77305 86472 51108 10817 4010 6216 10921 49018 259272 132090
614 47580 48129 79355 99598 51639 12000 3893 7156 11217 63075 274662 148980
62-1 56651 70572 95411 132876 91458 13600 3462 7719 14336 57227 355510 187802
62-2 54139 49182 88228 100380 65998 13262 3130 7592 11153 57880 291929 159015
62-3 56415 64556 108087 131654 70341 12943 4288 8115 14159 55466 360712 165312
624 51468 79998 109300 119101 73989 14872 4958 9027 14848 63369 359867 181063
63-1 50264 86621 95723 134502 82006 13361 4674 9849 13985 60048 367110 183923
63-2 63541 68412 120219 136358 70917 12624 6169 9427 15107 70707 388530 184951
63-3 73829 79406 147510 182772 78137 12876 4121 8384 17818 50438 483517 171774
634 67867 82141 125086 143143 82279 13786 5407 10579 15277 80129 418237 207457
64-1 70047 79571 157233 150818 97056 13056 5271 10107 12757 58115 457669 196362
64-2 77976 101338 168062 172376 92792 14742 4964 11953 15072 67835 519752 207358
64-3 69845 106678 167822 171236 89784 13987 6605 10026 14277 65885 515581 200564
644 83864 107586 186142 180082 119719 17222 8001 10109 16321 82491 557674 253863
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TABLE A 6.3: QUARTERLY NF-ME1rALS mPORTS BY OF:igin ( N DM1000) 1953-64:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 17652 1819 1557 8929 27624 4111 6481 2787 1644 2733 29957 45380
53-2 13152 878 1490 6731 15271 1565 5955 841 4628 806 22251 29066
53-3 25890 1753 2797 13195 36923 7033 7882 2371 6487 5527 43635 66223
53-4 31734 2615 4385 14995 31226 4995 8275 793 5667 2213 53729 53169
54-1 21132 3762 3964 12071 32969 1366 7749 514 4065 446 40929 47109
54-2 29539 5770 11143 14605 49340 1603 12064 449 4452 8708 61057 76616
54-3 16455 5256 10581 14121 37988 694 11580 2343 6778 2625 46413 62008
54-4 28173 8015 7320 16443 20329 1294 16100 3326 6394 2712 59951 50155
55-1 29572 11177 8334 19099 20663 3619 17203 990 4345 2166 68182 48986
55-2 40951 10169 11808 19478 33027 10077 19846 3706 8969 2153 82406 77778
55-3 29924 5862 9146 23478 29151 5048 17786 3560 13859 4115 68410 73519
55-4 44624 7235 11357 23902 37745 7852 18314 3094 10446 3500 87118 80951
56-1 49280 4620 10244 26388 42309 8757 22840 3808 12161 2310 90532 92185
56-2 47155 10756 10204 24347 53942 11685 25362 3871 12926 421 92462 108207
56-3 41915 5414 6538 21135 56629 4356 23334 3013 8923 3131 75002 99386
5&4 32124 4952 3264 22448 43145 4833 26580 1581 7498 1672 62788 85309
57-1 35444 4095 5072 29136 36230 1890 23585 1550 5937 1441 73747 70633
57-2 22927 3792 5378 25559 27330 3300 24247 897 6174 1777 57656 63725
57-3 19283 4734 2754 25398 18473 2056 28575 1237 5578 2212 52169 58131
57-4 23739 2420 2545 27447 25797 7762 25178 1136 9731 1613 56151 71217
58-1 24602 2490 5009 20679 26277 3057 20622 842 6078 2531 52780 59407
58-2 22531 3022 3951 21693 24816 3766 21429 1141 6367 2680 51197 60199
58-3 28725 2275 3367 18723 48009 4844 29104 1138 6321 2090 53090 91506
584 30961 3642 5630 28397 36308 4448 36488 1180 13954 5360 68630 97738
59-1 31648 3389 6691 25494 27095 2334 32600 2466 7522 5136 67222 77153
59-2 50377 3831 9740 31114 37618 3778 35207 2064 6841 5761 95062 91269
59-3 46827 3582 12835 36549 59816 1619 36884 1590 7647 4257 99793 111813
594 57752 5246 17446 39882 51597 3687 37806 2729 9183 7125 120326 112127
601 61509 6343 17865 34383 40739 2456 45172 2178 7615 5890 120100 104050
602 54682 9066 12746 39754 49334 2223 25165 2103 7409 6073 116248 92307
603 44706 6136 13137 33770 52930 1215 55103 1985 7195 5629 97749 124057
604 50065 10965 12778 37394 49431 1742 36570 2017 6836 5680 111202 102276
61-1 56412 4689 12228 32212 48980 1327 37050 2002 7167 5958 105541 102484
61-2 42573 5787 20642 36065 64321 2073 40076 2108 8936 5766 105067 123280
61-3 45868 3760 12229 27249 48147 3806 40705 2246 7555 6771 89106 109230
614 66011 3187 11875 22899 37629 3436 30285 2010 13620 6623 103972 93603
62-1 44775 7017 10542 19426 31383 1354 38008 1917 7413 5162 81760 85237
62-2 52230 3010 13666 18999 36515 1394 37949 2348 10462 8315 87905 96983
62-3 35452 1684 17438 19795 53439 979 39737 2496 13908 10991 74369 121550
624 54005 2635 21996 22841 46487 2247 52972 2101 19127 8521 101477 131455
63-1 42144 4117 16248 21694 28166 2185 37523 374 6176 11362 84203 85786
63-2 55961 3504 19955 22834 27155 2572 45993 2254 9725 9516 102254 97215
63-3 55651 3629 15635 25922 32124 3138 37010 3693 16721 9946 100837 102632
634 58569 4019 22415 25532 23185 4171 47361 3504 22832 15106 110535 116159
64-1 68639 7005 23602 21335 43332 1855 51220 2300 10596 10684 120581 119987
64-2 92807 9005 36306 49242 61082 5756 52928 2816 15858 12278 187360 150718
64-3 105946 13263 26875 55918 56038 3882 57114 1679 20445 14147 202002 153305
644 122849 29231 66726 80249 80438 6247 61567 1833 21095 12241 299055 183421
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TABLE A 6.4; QUARTERLY MF-METAL PRODUCT IMPOFITS BY ORIGIN (IN DU11000)1 953-64
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 233 67 165 489 270 269 6 67 612 929 954 2153
53-2 275 88 87 572 343 185 5 115 823 1194 1022 2665
53-3 263 92 190 785 313 155 135 282 882 2553 1330 4320
53-4 295 165 176 997 827 185 87 277 1054 2778 1633 5208
54-1 206 67 228 1106 3903 1511 464 202 1089 1271 1607 8440
54-2 355 158 229 4121 5259 228 161 241 1224 1356 4863 8469
54-3 2166 196 225 4668 8465 181 204 226 1210 1409 7255 11695
54-4 4404 346 269 12067 8496 973 154 292 1541 1982 17086 13438
55-1 2892 311 333 4652 4455 427 17 227 1120 1969 8188 8215
55-2 2216 320 359 8799 3609 401 76 356 1160 1771 11694 7373
55-3 1985 220 429 6240 4524 597 104 362 1440 2043 8874 9070
55-4 2889 543 553 4017 10903 1782 103 507 2107 2889 8002 18291
56-1 3105 269 237 5061 7493 1395 28 357 1702 2247 8672 13222
56-2 2234 530 421 2400 6092 1890 36 566 1604 2288 5585 12476
56-3 2240 1189 320 2854 12014 1559 21 502 1649 2282 6603 18027
564 2020 142 643 1840 13200 1256 35 510 1757 2809 4645 19567
57-1 2000 515 533 1550 8978 1256 12 496 1720 2009 4598 14471
57-2 1775 794 799 2454 5082 2456 60 642 1207 2327 5822 11774
57-3 2121 754 672 3292 2851 1286 91 688 1636 2789 6839 9341
574 2834 1773 1717 3370 11560 1425 108 896 2281 2956 9694 19226
58-1 3078 1730 859 2833 4784 1556 82 718 1388 3549 8500 12077
58-2 3168 1790 1163 4637 6168 2144 66 837 1965 2608 10758 13788
58-3 2280 1916 722 4442 8886 1713 200 805 2126 3188 9360 16918
584 2481 4507 1048 4181 5369 2120 218 1346 2525 4070 12217 15648
59-1 2206 2531 911 3911 5099 2145 52 688 1612 3111 9559 12707
59-2 2815 2966 2769 5546 8839 2236 124 1161 2521 4138 14096 19019
59-3 3487 3984 4338 5361 5242 2206 79 1319 2429 4263 17170 15538
594 8746 7030 6114 6132 3824 3114 237 1666 3182 5781 28022 17804
601 11693 4597 6071 5939 3467 3082 496 1242 2541 4810 28300 15638
602 8872 4925 9354 6744 5629 3851 387 1939 3234 5889 29895 20929
603 12493 6720 6757 7320 5728 3413 198 1606 3653 5878 33290 20476
604 15866 13875 10256 8082 7378 4892 392 1885 5191 8110 48079 27848
61-1 15546 9463 10957 9261 8016 4500 444 1178 3944 6547 45227 24629
61-2 20883 10501 10700 10115 8169 5513 292 2657 5365 7690 52199 29686
61-3 18663 13824 8477 9349 6294 4533 346 2221 4032 7397 50313 24823
614 18235 22412 9762 9479 7620 5304 328 2661 4991 7865 59888 28769
62-1 12752 13952 8892 9970 7233 5054 333 2836 3364 6525 45566 25345
62-2 15097 14962 8831 10750 7252 4198 303 3190 3358 6479 49640 24780
62-3 19223 17461 8053 9502 7669 3562 419 2890 3479 5975 54239 23994
624 21995 26658 10615 10148 9094 5342 404 2235 4206 6852 69416 28133
63-1 22012 13463 8612 9015 9289 5801 230 1814 3314 5688 53102 26136
63-2 23173 14585 12584 11114 8346 5726 344 2937 2992 6740 61456 27085
63-3 24501 15621 10879 11745 7391 5148 418 2385 3537 7468 62746 26347
634 24295 27077 12865 12110 9818 5406 1196 2660 4125 9181 76347 32386
64-1 23826 17682 12528 12400 7943 6011 509 2763 3883 7676 66436 28785
64-2 29958 20085 14615 14913 8576 5847 619 3263 4525 8026 79571 30856
64-3 33373 28708 14616 15935 7158 6430 476 3723 4823 9813 92632 32423
644 42245 53779 23924 20225 9987 8328 738 3767 6285 12125 140173 41230
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TABLE A 6.5: QUARTERLY PAPER/PAPB? PRODUCT H/PORTS BY ORIGIN ON DMIOOO
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 1027 48 319 3232 383 7545 3277 88 5757 62 4626 17112
53-2 899 58 519 3534 256 11142 2273 34 5682 83 5010 19470
53-3 860 87 331 5659 540 9896 2745 90 7785 226 6937 21282
53-4 984 247 739 3532 609 12798 3690 39 10219 148 5502 27503
54-1 86 120 514 3887 596 11868 2505 32 9754 462 4607 25217
54-2 1701 120 514 4205 690 13246 2793 46 9709 308 6540 26792
54-3 938 54 757 4049 483 11499 2975 51 13149 837 5798 28994
54-4 2184 335 795 5037 593 16077 3505 51 16024 568 8351 36818
55-1 1496 240 1977 5513 707 15252 3006 68 17311 859 9226 37203
55-2 1230 196 2637 5079 640 15074 2649 127 16421 433 9142 35344
55-3 1109 172 2980 4626 721 15982 3268 84 13873 304 8887 34232
55-4 1499 229 2625 5419 1156 17296 3169 89 14438 682 9772 36830
56-1 396 217 2716 5777 1514 15497 3165 70 13933 576 9106 34755
56-2 2774 274 2153 6177 1211 20928 2318 150 13813 425 11378 38845
56-3 2503 246 1737 7092 1293 21236 2709 139 16718 537 11578 42632
56-4 2187 314 2148 7848 1165 22996 4362 343 20502 693 12497 50061
57-1 1957 497 1912 7643 553 25525 5801 275 20528 739 12009 53421
57-2 2773 746 1582 7620 2228 26648 4382 736 19328 665 12721 53987
57-3 2418 978 2672 7832 1603 24953 6267 305 21601 768 13900 55497
57-4 3503 693 2380 9749 2246 33559 6521 1233 20015 1063 16325 64637
58-1 3226 730 3420 10139 1486 29019 5525 911 18377 1098 17515 56416
58-2 4108 1128 3279 11556 2130 35340 6659 1149 19775 997 20071 66050
58-3 4130 586 3039 11850 1647 34056 6013 653 22741 1369 19605 66479
58-4 3615 762 2999 13198 1843 39166 8571 421 21216 1455 20574 72672
59-1 3910 557 3424 12617 1789 36174 7850 404 18180 1300 20508 65697
59-2 6130 977 4416 13277 2868 40532 8437 850 19899 1397 24800 73983
59-3 5518 895 7404 12906 2577 40182 9437 1038 20960 1814 26723 76008
59-4 6140 992 13255 16067 3175 43403 10598 1187 23282 2408 36454 84053
601 6028 1615 15642 15065 2883 49015 9625 1337 21317 1760 38350 85937
602 6867 1533 15724 15857 2862 54815 11283 1386 23581 1591 39981 95518
603 6390 1524 10848 15322 3443 49176 12184 893 25894 308 34084 91898
604 6899 1264 12066 16933 4573 60362 15780 1226 27755 3672 37162 113368
61-1 6683 1369 10792 17280 4012 46488 13849 850 21720 1674 36124 88593
61-2 7695 1654 11458 18098 4401 52901 14103 1208 22739 1551 38905 96903
61-3 6598 1589 10585 16947 5045 53432 15868 1855 24293 1700 35719 102193
61-4 7794 1626 11265 18359 4969 60836 16064 2960 23768 1936 39044 110533
62-1 8693 1381 9825 20763 4921 57124 13432 3496 22092 2016 40662 103081
62-2 9230 1770 10299 19478 5682 61343 17363 2677 22903 1644 40777 111612
62-3 7882 1691 10679 18593 5662 62336 16932 2654 26852 2076 38845 116512
62-4 7484 2297 12554 19062 5883 68664 21608 2638 25901 1722 41397 126416
63-1 7884 2265 10787 21825 5991 59200 22714 2231 25331 1870 42761 117337
63-2 7683 2610 11802 22082 5780 76259 23832 2958 25288 1433 44177 135550
63-3 8048 1893 11989 21226 4479 62641 21846 2064 24823 1871 43156 117724
63-4 9501 2082 13436 26602 5222 72564 23140 3295 24443 1412 51621 130076
64-1 9142 2157 13266 29084 5624 72477 21754 4272 24587 1918 53649 130632
64-2 12467 3664 15537 31928 5296 83827 25304 3297 28498 1870 63596 148092
64-3 10434 4536 13550 34248 5614 77086 22066 2613 28820 2265 62768 138464
64-4 12464 4677 18479 39199 4816 89248 27159 2217 29148 2166 74819 154754
1953-64:
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TABLE A 6.<5: QUARTERLY MACH NERYHi/IPORTS BY (3RICIN (IN DM1000)1 953-64:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 5396 2763 3098 2557 10802 4136 245 1074 1975 21905 13814 40137
53-2 7127 3454 4778 4058 13486 5263 272 2420 2454 25781 19417 49676
53-3 3909 3956 5086 4196 12685 4600 310 2380 2420 25171 17147 47566
53-4 2976 4122 6178 5741 15597 7484 461 2184 2472 34026 19017 62224
54-1 3990 4918 5034 5175 15855 6050 411 1941 2730 23460 19117 50447
54-2 4225 4950 5265 5935 20684 7682 175 2967 3566 31691 20375 66765
54-3 4841 5251 5331 5654 18656 6682 404 2463 4226 26827 21077 59258
54-4 4557 7253 5248 6228 29913 8932 707 3012 4619 32194 23286 79377
55-1 4791 7349 5815 6682 17658 7830 545 4140 4475 28047 24637 62695
55-2 5031 10046 6726 6563 21624 9050 402 7703 5295 38225 28366 82299
55-3 5766 9801 7335 10207 21482 11246 451 4920 6170 42930 33109 87199
55-4 7993 12207 9039 11422 21918 10950 835 7351 7713 52505 40661 101272
56-1 5754 9531 7547 7799 30335 12562 1097 9200 6638 43240 30631 103072
56-2 8946 7405 9887 10981 30744 15956 1164 8416 7493 49235 37219 113008
56-3 6314 17802 9834 13058 27303 13347 823 10558 8082 53743 47008 113856
56-4 20445 12653 10724 16331 29047 14378 1687 7187 8606 58660 60153 119565
57-1 7772 13415 10965 12472 32398 13949 1259 9666 8631 44998 44624 110901
57-2 10190 15025 11829 12411 32848 15242 1574 7620 9043 50209 49455 116536
57-3 10570 9897 13737 15021 35772 13936 701 9967 9572 55840 49225 125788
57-4 18350 20822 15684 16328 37570 20159 1676 13211 9260 62876 71184 144752
58-1 11302 17877 16519 14781 43575 15629 2066 19788 8923 53619 60479 143600
58-2 13876 20090 19139 18866 45440 17312 3025 17712 9259 56949 71971 149697
58-3 10430 19958 14525 18159 41617 15149 2167 5656 9166 61423 63072 135178
58-4 13652 23296 18578 27289 46501 21784 2281 27247 9533 68122 82815 175468
59-1 13168 21571 17150 24733 51734 19899 1911 16452 8572 59595 76622 158163
59-2 17455 27841 22856 31020 58296 20506 2145 21001 10472 65675 99172 178095
59-3 15057 31062 25342 30544 54041 17974 1139 21667 11606 68200 102005 174627
59-4 17163 36787 40746 34046 57834 30074 4063 21032 15381 79734 128742 208118
60-1 20654 39858 41846 29823 66241 27307 2303 19307 12339 68913 132181 196410
60-2 26951 48307 50344 38605 80143 27680 2401 23996 15917 74543 164207 224680
60-3 28861 50585 49375 30961 69401 28716 2909 22835 17133 82190 159782 223184
60-4 31819 71658 56682 37604 81215 40726 2653 20932 22114 102352 197763 269992
61-1 29410 63012 59672 33201 76854 39593 4229 23751 19156 74456 185295 238039
61-2 33834 63855 86537 39329 92814 40501 3395 19321 21681 93298 223555 271010
61-3 30870 48801 86060 35793 85834 37816 3827 19925 23592 82148 201524 253142
61-4 34664 62464 120465 43015 109357 53358 5149 20838 31719 107715 260608 328136
62-1 33339 55157 105583 50561 101736 47736 5027 21888 24553 89913 244640 290853
62-2 40360 62212 119343 48414 105349 51282 5128 21312 23733 95340 270329 302144
62-3 37148 55594 98486 48005 90399 50389 5268 22090 25772 94785 239233 288703
62-4 32462 66474 112024 56556 99631 50871 4479 21358 24887 100944 267516 302170
63-1 27069 61302 97426 42615 98812 45278 4280 19502 22032 92172 228412 282076
63-2 33842 57412 103285 54493 131343 51037 4867 21518 25827 94434 249032 329026
63-3 33120 55438 103828 55911 101839 44260 3371 21210 24204 93642 248297 288526
63-4 32997 61289 106789 51477 94791 52535 5041 21080 18029 99494 252552 290970
64-1 35108 65529 112693 47866 110782 46977 4764 22823 24129 88364 261196 297839
64-2 40170 75969 138179 56943 127029 54794 4405 27199 27202 103241 311261 343870
64-3 47571 69977 124737 55953 114313 46863 6670 25763 30601 95321 298238 319531
64-4 40278 93773 141319 67751 114514 56856 7811 26944 31635 121858 343121 359618
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TABUEA&7:0UARTH?LYBLEcnac/3IL/BEClreor«aIMPORTS BY0RIGIM(DM1(XX)) 1953-64;
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 261 742 1191 8261 2439 426 53 401 482 4807 10455 8608
53-2 512 567 1007 8591 2562 734 40 744 522 4862 10677 9464
53-3 569 645 889 8482 1661 669 77 807 593 4608 10585 8415
534 1006 585 1473 12208 3045 995 161 1169 746 7086 15272 13202
54-1 773 434 1015 9692 3234 1157 107 1175 596 4991 11914 11260
54-2 1378 764 1604 9590 5298 1044 116 1711 659 5486 13336 14314
54-3 1594 536 1289 12027 5653 1083 67 1932 1128 6743 15446 16606
544 1856 664 1057 16443 4343 1356 120 2257 1235 8015 20020 17326
55-1 1503 503 1310 15081 5739 1728 91 2454 1321 8011 18397 19344
55-2 1869 634 1483 11531 5381 1195 98 2770 1870 9114 15517 20428
55-3 1218 763 1336 13871 6676 1245 178 2909 1691 8574 17188 21273
554 1858 985 2355 13321 9657 2524 280 2917 2166 10825 18519 28369
56-1 1833 637 2055 11714 7407 1541 117 1979 2055 8986 16239 22085
56-2 1279 951 2498 13784 7523 1938 237 2755 3186 10144 18512 25783
56-3 1662 1036 1730 12375 9546 1144 182 2256 2191 10422 16803 25741
564 2569 1737 1347 18545 12486 1887 123 2694 2808 11032 24198 31030
57-1 2159 1399 3371 14633 9950 1773 279 2119 2670 11310 21562 28101
57-2 1475 1049 3247 12568 9789 1544 120 2314 3009 13317 18339 30093
57-3 1742 1672 2298 12700 9478 2357 217 2433 3314 12140 18412 29939
574 2377 2065 3940 17225 15550 2292 243 2286 3869 12730 25607 36970
58-1 4546 2542 11623 17631 12577 2535 456 2429 3845 10458 36342 32300
58-2 6520 4105 11358 22307 11778 2943 789 3044 3921 12125 44290 34600
58-3 5947 4344 15623 27292 11994 2533 839 2907 5017 17101 53206 40391
584 4549 4206 14527 52730 17707 2727 1199 3354 4966 15594 76012 45547
59-1 3242 4029 11675 34324 13242 2883 747 3553 3618 11867 53270 35910
59-2 3334 7450 8883 34372 25297 3327 686 3328 4868 17149 54039 54655
59-3 3051 5943 12403 32816 16562 3053 925 3278 4785 15746 54213 44349
594 3695 8259 24166 44878 27582 3648 788 4169 6220 19333 80998 61740
60-1 3366 8242 19095 52255 21123 4625 665 3483 5890 19488 82958 55274
60-2 3599 13445 20866 39847 18056 5185 690 4337 7256 19702 77757 55226
60-3 3804 15005 20731 58877 19667 3515 696 4078 8324 20698 98417 56978
604 4641 9870 30867 55344 31184 7147 594 5308 11572 26824 100722 82629
61-1 3351 21401 28102 63695 27627 5879 671 4476 10376 19324 116549 68353
61-2 4366 34218 29983 65502 26078 7376 818 4097 9876 24839 134069 73084
61-3 5283 27712 28369 85608 21690 5941 801 4712 12175 27418 146972 72737
614 7711 15732 39411 61114 31034 7783 974 6138 13179 29915 123968 89023
62-1 6362 16636 33843 59610 28006 6646 1330 5375 15409 24397 116451 81163
62-2 7733 20605 31695 53106 31025 7120 1060 6542 13379 24921 113139 84047
62-3 7528 55191 33666 52300 24648 5095 677 5444 13025 25492 148685 74381
624 10082 71656 64872 149986 39914 14669 1845 8259 19791 32052 296596 116530
63-1 9975 35689 32286 58461 34854 11203 3225 5974 15364 25640 136411 96260
63-2 10075 25419 36742 59269 30319 7962 1839 8433 15742 29831 131505 94126
63-3 17499 22124 38126 52718 28853 5331 900 5440 15047 35395 130467 90966
634 28049 45708 53833 62973 40697 9063 2088 11086 19293 33161 190563 115388
64-1 13949 32285 42487 62786 33603 7074 1122 8463 15447 25249 151507 90958
64-2 22710 36385 40982 70913 39169 7554 2003 10199 18996 33291 170990 111212
64-3 16830 31446 45532 76323 39316 5677 1862 8543 17569 34057 170131 107024
644 17565 44331 60392 99106 48620 9955 4015 12700 23126 38326 221394 136742
392
TABLE A 6.8: QUARTERLY IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS IN DM 1000  
BY ORIGIN 1955-1964:
EEC EFTA TOTAL non6 Non6 6+7
55-1 677583 603354 2054344 1376761 773407 1280937
55-2 729093 802680 2345173 1616080 813400 1531773
55-3 801339 866153 2490112 1688773 822620 1667492
55-4 876212 963271 2674693 1798481 835210 1839483
56-1 748623 722348 2320832 1572209 849861 1470971
56-2 789843 814126 2679125 1889282 1075156 1603969
56-3 787523 877893 2648705 1861182 983289 1665416
56-4 778321 1475367 2783195 2004874 529507 2253688
57-1 767203 856991 2829382 2062179 1205188 1624194
57-2 794997 847524 2866173 2071176 1223652 1642521
57-3 911894 920870 3087957 2176063 1255193 1832764
57-4 1029826 1073436 3409363 2379537 1306101 2103262
58-1 1010727 971231 3220120 2209393 1238162 1981958
58-2 1032083 942527 3149019 2116936 1174409 1974610
58-3 1073580 1124539 3546751 2473171 1348632 2198119
58-4 1175793 1225236 3836390 2660597 1435361 2401029
59-1 1142944 1104423 3377862 2234918 1130495 2247367
59-2 1425986 1223460 4070576 2644590 1421130 2649446
59-3 1648124 1289544 4218028 2569904 1280360 2937668
59-4 1938314 1430246 4928872 2990558 1560312 3368560
60-1 1916806 1352505 5525139 3608333 2255828 3269311
60-2 2347072 1506094 6587628 4240556 2734462 3853166
60-3 2331418 1438995 6441466 4110048 2671053 3770413
604 2437288 1640809 7237078 4799790 3158981 4078097
61-1 2102666 1372541 5737799 4307004 2934463 3475207
61-2 2295914 1542468 6920563 4624649 3082181 3838382
61-3 2295420 1478853 6717422 4422002 2943149 3774273
61-4 2352549 1678178 7085945 4733396 3055218 4030727
62-1 2476866 1578604 7329062 4852196 3273592 4055470
62-2 2459043 1602667 7482417 5023374 3420707 4061710
62-3 2638798 1713214 7953122 5314324 3601110 4352012
62-4 3055868 1930232 8634799 5578931 3648699 4986100
63-1 2649884 1668011 8335382 5685498 4017487 4317895
63-2 3043955 1811862 9479982 6436027 4624165 4855817
63-3 3224684 1767489 9158705 5934021 4166532 4992173
63-4 2389462 1960626 8440254 6050792 4090166 4350088
64-1 2948123 1790586 8489767 5541644 3751058 4738709
64-2 3461058 2020871 9230396 5769338 3748467 5481929
64-3 3696997 2052004 9968587 6271590 4219586 5749001
64-4 4387911 2308109 11161524 6773613 4465504 6696020
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TABLE A 6.9: QUARTERLY TEXTILE EXPORTS BY DESTINATION (IN DM1000) 1955-64:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 13276 4746 4780 21368 5119 36176 18662 30756 7297 14714 44170 112724
53-2 13385 6202 5804 20235 15115 37902 13378 24186 8758 17589 45626 116928
53-3 14563 9410 6062 19627 13278 39704 13533 30159 7811 21576 49662 126061
53-4 13647 7916 7084 24868 16810 45294 24060 33907 11722 23096 53515 154889
54-1 4880 7625 4955 25150 19169 49430 18157 30948 10845 24918 42610 153467
54-2 22859 11090 4445 30406 14876 38837 22337 27937 12205 12269 68800 128461
54-3 16379 9166 8504 30267 16780 42301 20840 36884 15764 36403 64316 168972
54-4 15915 12208 8342 31156 15843 46053 24375 37959 20562 31014 67621 175806
55-1 19138 11507 8257 30508 17378 51901 22927 31517 20382 28766 69410 172871
55-2 16533 11790 9903 29201 15024 41554 16638 27255 20865 28703 67427 150039
55-3 17560 11280 9919 31155 15955 50115 20574 30618 22623 30683 69914 170568
55-4 21922 13721 6797 27454 24715 48332 23932 29028 29045 27405 69894 182457
56-1 20375 12163 8974 39444 18908 49689 21850 24486 28943 31840 80956 175716
56-2 21915 13107 12085 19918 16097 43845 21371 23772 25509 32131 67025 162725
56-3 21152 12380 10286 58255 17712 35374 23188 28389 26421 35773 102073 166857
56-4 29018 16427 12409 44366 20085 43825 26828 35592 34087 39259 102220 199676
57-1 31954 17422 13158 52136 20672 49100 25813 32079 35373 47242 114670 210279
57-2 33219 10203 12583 43609 19097 43773 22744 25186 32220 43296 99614 186316
57-3 28274 26089 5331 44341 19665 38856 23172 27609 33725 58888 104035 201915
57-4 36163 18563 11413 39304 21199 47826 21879 26951 27901 45266 105443 191022
58-1 28698 17349 6779 38425 21833 46253 18975 22901 33319 45936 91251 189217
58-2 20636 14537 7042 35983 17871 39569 13635 18358 27359 37325 78198 154117
58-3 22251 13729 7543 37685 21408 35959 19102 23645 32909 40568 81208 173591
58-4 25255 13530 8360 42141 23413 44623 22834 27298 33472 42565 89286 194205
59-1 28203 17772 6951 50764 22432 41012 20720 27751 36645 39925 103690 188485
59-2 28271 17970 9067 47791 23160 50313 19213 25489 34854 43888 103099 196917
59-3 30721 18078 12078 48366 27791 32716 22850 30847 38565 48089 109243 200858
59-4 36742 22678 16742 53647 30679 50139 25242 35355 42662 60516 129809 244593
60-1 39955 18623 19683 57870 33380 49768 24960 32107 44589 53483 136131 238287
60-2 35022 26803 21927 52008 31735 43371 21051 26529 41883 55010 135760 219579
60-3 33968 21775 21794 58996 33422 45849 24270 31314 48131 59386 136533 242372
604 38025 11751 31371 57810 37561 49719 26886 34308 51598 61816 138957 261888
61-1 39476 28243 31310 79861 31322 48628 25041 30687 54486 61399 178890 251563
61-2 37804 30740 30330 66873 31568 42509 20117 27886 51390 52974 165747 226444
61-3 35705 24604 26650 75705 30745 43406 22448 30675 54182 59800 162664 241256
61-4 40016 30335 37023 76418 34145 48569 24372 33386 58078 58749 183792 257299
62-1 53453 38319 42346 96647 29334 46360 21526 30501 62779 63530 230765 254030
62-2 51638 36148 45144 81047 31177 38249 17583 26748 56011 56926 213977 226694
62-3 50024 38302 35043 87924 33001 41924 18873 32810 61807 66889 211293 255304
62-4 56847 43536 49641 92547 36196 50281 21342 33976 70959 64824 242571 277578
63-1 54865 52380 54953 108943 31758 49603 19607 29019 74264 70423 271141 274674
63-2 53934 57916 59797 105751 31709 45226 15879 26945 67573 64497 277398 251829
63-3 54561 52288 58479 120432 36593 46473 19215 30849 72368 78545 285760 284043
63-4 69501 61562 74167 130731 42220 53766 20344 34940 83979 74816 335961 310065
64-1 67933 68567 83967 153757 36675 53379 19835 34399 84173 83155 374224 311616
64-2 62931 62509 88128 135730 36029 44888 18027 32392 81359 74654 349298 287349
64-3 62780 56729 76191 146477 36765 46164 19486 36053 86794 86925 342177 312187
64-4 72370 67653 81896 151077 39747 55459 22639 40565 92277 85114 372996 335801
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TABILEA 6.1OrOUAIRTERLY CHBMK2AL EXPORTS BY DES11NATION (IN DM1000 11955454:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 24949 27808 32457 36532 39193 21846 7698 27216 19442 21643 121746 137038
53-2 25960 27934 27904 33379 38604 24897 9875 31070 20206 26844 115177 151496
53-3 29661 26171 22246 54215 45341 27043 9092 28395 25427 29848 132293 165146
534 33293 35329 36779 49956 58937 39575 12097 28043 25318 35474 155357 199444
544 30289 35809 37801 44706 47018 24193 12224 57587 27595 30649 148605 199266
54-2 34826 39809 35949 51753 50572 47324 12100 12330 46082 38656 162337 207064
54-3 34258 39293 30008 57643 47039 36501 13480 39351 43295 42547 161202 222213
544 42128 44541 46370 67776 51898 42797 15001 36296 14818 43696 200815 204506
55-1 38226 31715 46783 63135 48520 30370 17535 40886 34763 55120 179859 227194
55-2 44359 59420 43917 62335 42545 47328 19749 37478 53850 55838 210031 256788
55-3 38857 48363 36266 47452 47643 40877 20548 36703 41319 42568 170938 229658
554 48907 59191 48496 68190 62601 42962 23274 37769 23637 50469 224784 240712
56-1 44453 58225 48645 55914 54694 38980 26337 48915 36501 43099 207237 248526
56-2 49243 62054 61126 70629 61078 48643 19647 53856 42385 55876 243052 281485
56-3 49965 56437 52863 72495 50864 46827 20989 40763 41970 54580 231760 255993
564 62037 70674 62637 73045 55125 64282 29478 61371 46860 63089 268393 320205
574 57527 62079 68424 73700 48603 49660 28939 49905 47983 65243 261730 290333
57-2 53677 61088 68990 70320 54033 52900 30859 40625 49180 63489 254075 291086
57-3 50196 61354 43801 82895 53955 40755 22429 41480 54284 74688 238246 287591
574 53888 76612 46328 80915 64654 71843 30378 49770 56718 68432 257743 341795
58-1 57736 67456 65475 77807 66426 57298 29210 51119 49766 60449 268474 314268
58-2 53553 71281 66865 83215 62567 53867 26172 44040 53492 64298 274914 304436
58-3 56810 67683 53149 87644 61414 54014 27988 42592 64538 71899 265286 322445
584 59031 77755 57895 99319 70241 40274 30968 52410 50987 71840 294000 316720
59-1 58439 75191 60670 96556 73063 55423 28046 51238 54513 73730 290856 336013
59-2 69438 103108 63504 105602 69193 60318 28585 59970 63183 88834 341652 370083
59-3 71771 91854 64388 105600 71446 59383 22093 47454 58666 98900 333613 357942
594 80117 108897 90288 135143 88229 84715 37931 63444 66413 107464 414445 448196
60-1 79831 111784 95348 122879 87999 75046 36367 64367 67326 96411 409842 427516
60-2 77075 111686 98808 128920 81212 71074 31237 67878 75214 108901 416489 435516
693 80220 105792 95445 128184 84258 66757 27265 60054 71256 125247 409641 434837
604 87099 118189 98481 156328 92946 90873 37844 78133 77935 133767 460097 511498
614 92116 104510 110607 149576 84567 78726 36679 76842 76386 126779 456809 479979
61-2 88342 116394 114567 161269 85401 88934 36125 68647 82311 138871 480572 500289
61-3 79020 109971 101967 106893 80632 78893 30846 66620 72887 145670 397851 475548
614 87666 117906 118237 178213 79177 94345 32993 71723 76747 127115 502022 482100
624 90421 127969 131776 143970 85937 80339 34404 73327 78405 131181 494136 483593
62-2 91091 120205 127749 142225 107524 84336 37669 69133 84728 135683 481270 519073
62-3 85732 119804 121322 123948 95094 79625 25708 68571 79250 151657 450806 499905
624 94159 129050 146310 151362 97928 100890 29303 75961 83171 141046 520881 528299
634 96305 147506 154392 153997 104262 87153 28999 73349 81783 128890 552200 504436
63-2 105027 148121 170164 164324 125025 88916 33572 73369 88336 180789 587636 590007
633 98163 156995 155614 172538 125107 83368 28135 63402 76481 188716 583310 565209
634 110729 161033 172216 184419 145290 109063 32810 73599 95004 165325 628397 621091
64-1 124573 175512 187732 193091 145000 86952 31699 83876 94095 158670 680908 600292
64-2 132100 168526 200115 203661 154920 92965 37627 69417 102215 191964 704402 649108
64-3 118448 131215 167115 197384 129355 86141 33311 69054 107192 198721 614162 623774
644 135649 152009 194311 215992 149554 110882 41934 88176 110070 190074 697961 690690
395
TABLE A 6.11: OUAlRTB9.Y NFMETALS EKPORTSBYDESTIMATION 01NDM1(XX)) 19 53-64:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 342 2274 4100 10887 22668 6617 2324 1487 1713 819 17603 35628
53-2 1136 2879 2024 20333 32258 7255 1834 918 4603 524 26372 47392
53-3 1102 936 2760 7358 16481 478 864 817 2599 203 12156 21442
53-4 263 1443 2986 8709 4088 3048 76 169 4295 446 13401 12122
54-1 104 1729 3317 1741 6016 8120 901 516 4303 392 6891 20248
54-2 361 2961 5023 4034 9571 8938 1683 1176 4716 424 12379 26508
54-3 1369 2733 7098 1767 7203 8692 161 1131 4084 725 12967 21996
54-4 1961 5356 7406 3624 16368 6574 503 1774 9964 922 18347 36105
55-1 243 2949 5120 1718 14346 6198 216 1467 6327 1138 10030 29692
55-2 285 340 11965 4346 8526 7493 1238 2130 10353 577 16936 30317
55-3 725 1736 10754 4331 8281 15807 1618 2085 10002 1813 17546 39606
55-4 427 2374 16091 6141 6922 9043 334 2005 16767 993 25033 36064
56-1 1041 5475 14270 4483 5465 12175 553 1922 12319 1055 25269 33489
56-2 914 3166 18644 5203 6481 20960 332 483 11933 1434 27927 41623
56-3 640 4277 17097 4956 6870 7373 655 415 9916 1577 26970 26806
56-4 1151 7110 11358 6029 2879 5636 295 1927 11676 2939 25648 25352
57-1 1928 7560 11622 6014 2121 2601 252 1267 9825 4320 27124 20386
57-2 1551 3353 13533 7248 3791 1525 204 561 11000 1368 25685 18449
57-3 1129 2773 8801 5565 1106 1563 414 1405 10454 1730 18268 16672
57-4 1815 4044 10414 7948 2387 3871 612 872 8610 2859 24221 19211
58-1 1870 2891 7270 8010 2636 1384 318 1211 7998 1029 20041 14576
58-2 1044 1228 8257 6600 4133 1003 544 714 10394 1869 17129 18657
58-3 931 1317 6178 6123 974 1908 288 1151 11701 2871 14549 18893
58-4 1738 1750 7856 8874 1934 256 453 1895 12261 3633 20218 20432
59-1 942 2080 5593 10565 4184 876 316 2200 10651 1912 19180 20139
59-2 3552 2213 6585 14177 1467 808 356 401 11457 2538 26527 17027
59-3 1382 1766 6022 17411 979 562 518 455 11279 3110 26581 16903
59-4 3446 2585 6864 22016 4111 914 1324 337 12583 1745 34911 21014
60-1 2922 3198 7912 16361 6824 2053 1119 317 14098 2362 30393 26773
60-2 4502 2904 8854 21546 5273 563 543 636 18444 3885 37806 29344
60-3 5160 2219 7884 20040 14788 111 741 903 14294 5897 35303 37400
604 7624 3542 9046 41833 13297 818 656 992 21954 8618 62045 46335
61-1 4413 2828 7571 41439 7033 669 531 1039 17303 8345 56251 34920
61-2 6634 4351 10449 49170 7824 1291 649 345 20357 10734 70604 41200
61-3 8863 3887 8672 32557 4323 1655 497 755 15061 7479 53979 29770
614 6220 7312 6506 10584 7060 3845 947 878 13447 7993 30622 34170
62-1 5501 10917 12057 15145 5746 1165 364 1001 12178 8737 43620 29191
62-2 6031 8723 8828 14230 8474 844 630 254 14132 6748 37812 31082
62-3 7641 7658 7892 7109 49829 1235 460 831 12134 3940 30300 68429
624 7935 5993 8184 6935 9057 1457 403 634 11400 5255 29047 28206
63-1 6032 4502 9431 5146 15009 1312 588 272 13285 4932 25111 35398
63-2 7575 5915 10255 6578 7527 2554 604 928 11502 3969 30323 27084
63-3 7449 5529 7588 6675 4829 998 146 1325 7394 3392 27241 18084
634 7665 6379 8013 11736 1269 3680 152 1633 12651 6976 33793 26361
64-1 10107 6260 9285 11674 5964 4447 158 1805 10764 3964 37326 27102
64-2 8421 5727 12580 15019 4058 3136 187 824 13523 7168 41747 28896
64-3 8279 3531 9938 17306 6534 948 280 1646 12198 5200 39054 26806
644 19113 6726 12569 26245 19433 3529 570 4341 17222 9244 64653 54339
396
TABLE A 6.12: CXJARTBgLY NHVETAL PRODUCT EXPORTS BY DESTINATION (DMIOOO) 1953-64:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 7767 2884 3277 13451 6915 8555 2384 3040 1348 9120 27379 31362
53-2 8721 3440 2577 13053 3620 9628 2660 3338 1421 9574 27791 30241
53-3 8577 3988 2706 12027 3389 8659 2828 3869 1828 10904 27298 31477
53-4 10929 4724 3820 22186 5835 12032 4029 5899 2954 13831 41659 44580
54-1 9513 4006 3165 17881 3818 9362 3135 4891 2827 11115 34565 35148
54-2 11186 4042 705 18521 3907 11065 3703 6613 3334 11917 34454 40539
54-3 8336 4260 6582 20071 4081 11232 3660 6227 4564 13337 39249 43101
54-4 14983 4965 4813 24879 4966 15376 4998 7391 7036 16437 49640 56204
55-1 11955 3949 3734 20530 4269 13865 3958 5357 7127 15540 40168 50116
55-2 12223 4591 4503 25064 4728 13727 3465 5266 5399 15028 46381 47613
55-3 11912 4439 4514 25616 5438 14542 2990 4888 6491 16092 46481 50441
55-4 14727 4878 6169 31014 5774 16114 4718 5210 7595 18867 56788 58278
56-1 16423 4903 6420 29976 6088 14230 3940 4338 5911 16596 57722 51103
56-2 10698 6129 7848 34379 4494 18304 4821 5189 6257 17330 59054 56395
56-3 14374 5324 7526 34104 7732 16608 5203 5525 6383 19802 61328 61253
56-4 15291 6479 10127 35407 6846 18084 6743 8625 8330 22614 67304 71242
57-1 14890 6866 7934 36141 7782 16447 4906 6001 6627 18873 65831 60636
57-2 15026 7404 10457 32086 6315 14788 4862 5058 7323 18442 64973 56788
57-3 13166 6817 6207 27708 6170 16379 4451 5564 8568 21838 53898 62970
57-4 15149 7664 6282 26861 6634 18761 5750 6131 10107 20264 55956 67647
58-1 15045 6564 8426 22317 5963 14134 3899 5309 7934 19734 52352 56973
58-2 14950 7238 6192 24634 6290 13965 3618 5402 9200 19752 53014 58227
58-3 12515 6649 5505 24422 7263 15013 3623 5944 10952 22982 49091 65777
58-4 12711 7325 8183 26007 7424 20849 4864 8321 9937 22063 54226 73458
59-1 12172 7835 6696 27209 6715 15130 3909 6629 8635 19970 53912 60988
59-2 13452 8615 7524 27252 7115 17504 4833 7626 11103 23863 56843 72044
59-3 12433 8225 8446 28019 8647 16936 4326 7015 10746 25792 57123 73462
59-4 14696 10463 11364 32868 9714 23020 6065 9195 11951 28782 69391 88727
60-1 14610 10447 11422 34311 10192 19626 4813 7802 10987 25608 70790 79028
60-2 14237 11235 12235 31210 11196 18656 4757 11708 12661 27778 68917 86756
60-3 15714 11175 11894 34554 11414 19235 5076 10282 13777 33877 73337 93661
60-4 17972 10892 15691 36525 11225 24431 6125 11970 15875 39164 81080 108790
61-1 17399 12762 14080 38260 9771 20501 5522 10512 13490 35741 82501 95537
61-2 17467 12675 14739 38077 10687 19936 5508 10236 15584 37538 82958 99489
61-3 17631 12268 12961 36730 11529 18786 5393 9455 15799 42572 79590 103534
61-4 18220 15629 17476 39965 10465 21378 6410 12596 17446 44042 91290 112337
62-1 17383 15914 17620 40170 9848 17865 5858 11705 14066 38765 91087 98107
62-2 17430 17551 18606 38301 10320 18887 5584 10520 14835 38411 91888 98557
62-3 17248 15309 18293 39171 10409 18089 5086 12034 14768 45894 90021 106280
62-4 20354 17822 22122 43502 10944 21683 7145 15154 21166 41630 103800 117722
63-1 18602 18191 21718 41024 10309 20276 5571 12173 18664 43364 99535 110357
63-2 19054 18915 23733 39016 10792 20646 5295 12602 18623 41010 100718 108968
63-3 18785 17902 22753 41399 11561 19825 5790 11043 18447 45568 100839 112234
63-4 24568 22915 28918 50885 12817 25252 7436 13846 24323 48273 127286 131947
64-1 24735 21972 28186 58933 14123 22877 6006 12042 19043 46592 133826 120683
64-2 29958 19352 31692 59170 15266 24202 7188 16418 21164 41876 140172 126114
64-3 24464 16693 30195 58388 14716 23192 6484 15254 23046 42291 129740 124983
64-4 33118 19225 34239 67096 15923 29684 9015 18894 25835 49880 153678 149231
397
TABUE A 6.13: QUARTERLYPAPER/P-PROIDUCTEXPORrSBY DEST1IlATlONI DM1OC0)1953
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 2476 1040 773 3973 552 1324 247 910 493 2021 8262 5547
53-2 2191 1086 1074 3825 1185 1413 317 1245 537 2102 8176 6799
53-3 2683 1200 825 3603 1415 1578 394 1241 574 2046 8311 7248
53^ 4 2707 1278 1514 4320 1668 2361 597 1201 677 2567 9819 9071
54-1 2692 1363 1133 5051 1602 2620 631 2242 781 2860 10239 10736
54-2 3307 1683 1140 4570 1928 1631 439 2081 1157 2946 10700 10182
54-3 3004 1408 1004 4854 2166 3246 589 1868 1277 3231 10270 12377
54^ 4 3592 1787 1389 5285 2852 3256 812 2367 1713 3807 12053 14807
55-1 4241 1585 1566 4961 2850 2876 656 2150 1898 3157 12353 13587
55-2 3888 1420 1720 5322 3070 3033 545 2234 2030 3583 12350 14495
55-3 4658 1845 1203 5069 2673 2880 598 2553 2278 3527 12775 14509
55-4 5213 1766 1457 5506 3182 3458 830 2581 2266 3971 13942 16288
56-1 4506 1741 2092 5556 2370 2450 652 2043 2092 3889 13895 13496
56-2 5557 1938 2088 6731 2278 2936 714 2183 2296 3950 16314 14357
56-3 4292 1103 2713 5788 2232 2944 752 2350 2523 3741 13896 14542
56-4 3595 2907 2727 6311 2434 3737 1197 2938 2754 4454 15540 17514
57-1 4343 1781 3088 6845 2323 3359 887 2989 2640 4369 16057 16567
57-2 4333 2883 3301 6651 2623 3802 779 2734 2664 4146 17168 16748
57-3 5115 2399 1967 5716 2811 3416 855 2537 2910 4817 15197 17346
57-4 4997 2824 1328 6246 2531 4446 1013 3149 3334 5099 15395 19572
58-1 4631 2488 1593 6140 3409 3514 830 2605 3435 4992 14852 18785
58-2 4243 2403 1664 6126 3345 4073 677 3006 3649 4843 14436 19593
58-3 4304 2207 2656 6372 3780 3578 885 2990 4818 4208 15539 20259
584 4511 2480 1759 7093 3554 4763 1095 3346 3201 4784 15843 20743
59-1 4272 2036 1953 6934 3577 3668 877 2885 3523 3801 15195 18331
59-2 4388 2823 1891 7471 4606 3754 882 3148 4011 4544 16573 20945
59-3 5008 2806 2980 8107 6184 4120 1069 3298 4517 4807 18901 23995
594 5441 3212 5102 9157 5815 5330 1040 4082 4525 5869 22912 26661
60-1 6489 3768 5080 9690 6177 3856 1725 3218 4788 5548 25027 25312
60-2 5898 3293 4399 8561 6666 4096 687 3460 4609 5865 22151 25383
60-3 6495 3325 5090 10618 6131 4382 1232 4162 5519 6013 25528 27439
604 6920 3511 5953 12454 7350 5631 1475 4814 6266 7022 28838 32558
61-1 6807 3423 6252 10840 7384 4171 1175 4443 4944 6324 27322 28441
61-2 6869 4949 6117 10711 6558 4726 1154 4186 5884 6711 28646 29219
61-3 6984 4793 5989 11233 6002 4367 1107 4324 5980 7318 28999 29098
614 7370 4553 6478 13172 7001 5592 1564 4669 6096 7983 31573 32905
62-1 7422 5603 7790 12096 6732 4362 1212 4038 6320 8359 32911 31023
62-2 7614 5551 7923 12813 6417 4309 1116 4428 6375 8027 33901 30672
62-3 8817 5681 7853 13757 6145 5026 1025 4796 6784 8309 36108 32085
624 8155 5973 9623 12466 6970 7531 1311 5717 6666 8286 36217 36481
63-1 8086 6526 10800 12751 7252 5275 1259 4623 6438 8720 38163 33567
63-2 8305 6885 11116 12629 6827 6186 1241 4260 7090 8439 38935 34043
63-3 8180 9279 10761 15415 6760 5570 1398 4589 7202 10524 43635 36043
634 9372 8014 13868 18085 8803 7159 1653 5403 7639 10004 49339 40661
64-1 9609 9877 14046 17390 8608 6398 1238 4669 7696 10097 50922 38706
64-2 12467 8975 14812 17897 6808 6828 1551 5409 7802 10245 54151 38643
64-3 9989 8074 13435 18567 6449 6828 1356 5342 8856 10010 50065 38841
644 10941 8385 16358 20105 8151 8629 1995 6462 8708 11918 55789 45863
398
TABILEA 6.1 &OUARTERLY MACHINB3Y EXPORTS BY DESTINAjio n (iiVDM1C00) 195&04:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
534 69569 74243 59963 55697 61886 45945 18133 18353 31624 44047 250263 219988
53-2 62548 91565 73746 68700 62129 54673 24091 21869 12002 47610 296559 222374
533 60979 69384 54888 72305 47227 37937 25228 23094 43602 48375 257556 225463
534 57945 85648 62150 86183 64777 40456 29060 28865 39001 47863 291926 250022
541 55389 72578 67907 78094 52000 33572 28227 23697 29823 55015 273968 222334
542 62805 81289 63342 81959 51643 65769 33310 30922 4165C 55157 289395 278451
543 69830 80459 68458 83517 47550 48741 30616 30268 49171 55193 302264 261539
544 88070 85583 77313 93265 50819 52077 7561 29285 76097 54024 344231 269863
551 65373 80327 74543 88137 43640 50513 24240 26881 46588 42602 308380 234464
55-2 76781 95802 93603 102704 62889 56531 30340 26895 62943 79569 368890 319167
553 69766 83618 81924 103511 56503 59707 22893 15239 67256 66926 338819 288524
554 83654 55681 105128 121853 76421 62773 25741 34431 87815 40657 366316 327838
56-1 73231 85786 106395 116075 65814 47922 20718 23912 57025 54370 381487 269761
56-2 92092 95501 139440 135895 83960 61740 28UU8 29395 71025 94537 462928 368665
563 105780 90898 137778 133111 74378 54540 22791 25924 68526 78771 467567 324930
564 93169 96766 166086 154140 84823 65310 28900 30318 78255 83564 510161 371170
57-1 103936 108217 161101 151322 85316 59501 25177 27630 73179 88329 524576 359132
57-2 106164 129145 201988 148351 80790 71316 35052 31136 88858 97788 585648 404940
573 102629 121311 150013 130786 94761 69754 32176 34109 104028 90271 504739 425099
574 109087 135080 123467 125707 82995 65999 30146 37537 116143 93339 493341 426159
581 112148 122217 122601 118335 86250 64174 33249 31687 83239 95641 475301 394240
58-2 104106 125837 155396 126504 86175 82613 34550 35709 105345 96432 511843 440824
583 113829 113426 139093 112159 104207 76949 25258 46715 119721 88961 478507 461811
584 94509 119471 128577 121689 109297 89246 29831 33240 114462 86850 464246 462926
591 88093 124764 125554 122806 87075 67891 26142 36029 81732 88284 461219 387153
59-2 99623 133247 175633 138347 106244 94689 30957 49246 102805 92840 546850 476779
593 100152 140051 198458 135727 87707 74700 30179 58743 109896 92653 574388 453878
594 93663 132884 189893 134318 98027 91794 23894 56758 126991 108553 550758 506017
691 102125 140333 182142 147005 107044 75422 33503 53951 102212 94109 571605 466241
69-2 112973 153388 200976 155483 118029 90952 37632 53566 129309 111565 622820 541053
693 108955 155857 192681 156849 117505 102129 42823 54893 134672 116972 614342 568994
694 132376 177424 217318 176514 133412 111711 38611 61609 162756 135738 703632 643837
611 126438 190748 223639 186003 137077 98176 38852 bUU/b 131068 132446 726828 597695
61-2 139400 206585 266255 202153 160532 116710 43070 66623 158007 155370 814393 700312
613 179988 208915 252841 203282 155028 122205 42273 68659 156239 159247 845026 703649
614 151850 227253 277225 215442 172239 134059 45327 72076 173248 172609 871770 769558
621 158296 250611 289681 222476 142795 109883 37384 68738 148442 192891 921064 700133
62-2 155959 276896 331698 212405 155402 112959 43948 75648 147426 200700 976958 736083
623 180022 243856 302065 208938 153973 110904 46463 79072 155190 191085 934881 736687
624 176789 268418 341725 219112 158848 125900 47089 8328^ 182470 212434 1006044 810025
631 159239 307585 314982 201191 145875 106115 38478 66853 139100 193040 982997 689461
63-2 173928 342681 354008 214400 163374 122410 48018 77225 144123 196051 1085017 751201
©3 194406 268238 336590 221057 155184 122072 44304 70426 138666 206283 1020291 736935
634 230098 395251 393645 246246 170506 135590 47205 76336 191464 209159 1265240 830260
641 178237 332201 389449 241658 17797^ 121526 37632 72241 133363 196553 1141545 739293
642 40170 304042 439554 246063 210875 132993 49412 85537 157033 211537 1029829 847387
643 175904 252734 402809 244186 179816 453854 49309 86198 155921 201158 1075633 1126256
644 205371 213846 424313 264034 21575^ 150954 55204 91729 204702 205785 1107564 924127
399
TABLE A 6.15: OUAITlriRLYEiLECT7HJECTROIMCALB(PORTS BY DESTINATION (Bfi/nooon 95364;
BlUX 1 F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA
53-1 17106 16938 6361 19222 3436 20532 11447 7550 8065 11789 59627 62819
53-2 19538 33008 6815 24927 4170 23592 16168 6483 7101 14873 84288 72387
53-3 22107 22420 9163 25506 3190 24670 15576 6416 7886 15707 79196 73445
534 24340 24797 11756 37201 4369 29196 19183 6962 11324 23230 98094 94264
544 21502 22155 12364 33180 4036 28097 13676 6035 10466 17437 89201 79747
54-2 22005 29191 12453 41061 6317 32585 14636 7640 14188 19152 104710 94518
54-3 28533 25073 12073 43669 7655 33257 15045 8846 17901 21297 109348 104001
544 36299 28724 11583 49664 10210 38062 17684 11520 20774 27374 126270 125624
554 26719 25250 10102 48978 12283 39579 15522 10955 21568 21989 111349 121896
55-2 30001 29916 12760 52098 14517 40124 15588 7410 24437 22229 124775 124305
55-3 31317 29547 12677 60082 20033 39928 17813 7602 23039 28529 133623 136944
554 36491 39403 16967 72249 20102 48113 19092 8503 30926 33939 165110 160675
564 35810 39276 16706 70968 12380 43039 16283 8028 26858 28448 162760 135036
56-2 39789 41854 17041 75307 12947 52029 17752 10107 28803 32953 173991 154591
563 43860 40678 16515 77756 14550 47209 16180 11604 30941 33461 178809 153945
564 47669 47873 19795 86703 20281 57087 19364 11950 30360 45259 202040 184301
57-1 46076 46528 17939 80943 16708 54899 18925 11392 29889 41944 191486 173757
57-2 44751 44713 21149 70968 17734 57841 19203 11907 36602 38536 181581 181823
57-3 53031 44522 16821 79167 21084 64018 21930 13539 41173 43038 193541 204782
574 57147 60813 20574 79515 26099 73355 23637 14985 42348 48490 218049 228914
584 47850 47492 21382 66336 21894 70002 17729 13249 39470 40512 183060 203256
58-2 46043 41245 19215 59707 22979 75175 20042 14862 40547 42906 166210 216511
58-3 44793 44830 16458 69616 23128 70575 20602 15995 51003 48087 175697 229390
584 51526 53962 19041 77377 35776 97363 25171 19028 38814 53106 201906 269258
594 47740 50119 19902 73950 33655 80883 17152 17113 40186 46581 191711 235570
59-2 44837 44902 22449 72607 39379 78133 18531 19403 44770 51510 184795 251726
59-3 46999 51514 27994 81516 43596 82226 21821 22888 43888 54464 208023 268883
594 55930 68464 34740 100365 44354 104866 22245 25383 49796 67350 259499 313994
60-1 50334 55193 31369 96355 46860 96136 22261 24444 45484 53354 233251 288539
60-2 53423 63405 33358 103238 45231 83709 24981 24795 51178 57977 253424 287871
60-3 58840 66587 34415 108678 35550 98778 28513 29991 51348 67314 268520 311494
604 68221 72774 43871 132082 38474 108806 35876 32042 55575 84879 316948 355652
61-1 65286 64547 42363 124080 33418 83714 25258 32686 54143 71694 296276 300913
61-2 67936 69638 52135 121704 33945 86930 25580 28221 64125 74316 311413 313117
61-3 65389 72703 51826 135858 33347 84832 30809 28938 59848 77689 325776 315463
614 64812 91905 67640 162271 36857 92647 30295 35454 67414 95598 386628 358265
624 58352 80698 64589 144993 30680 85210 25540 33722 55787 83949 348632 314888
62-2 67656 83150 73857 128164 28420 86291 26110 32744 54897 83860 352827 312322
62-3 62943 92663 75325 132482 32945 86197 29389 44089 58016 86704 363413 337340
624 78646 101548 92361 142124 36569 95750 33128 44124 62486 96281 414679 368338
63-1 65033 85239 82159 130707 32409 85159 26328 32121 52513 84846 363138 313376
63-2 78503 99781 92744 138616 33036 97253 27306 30187 61571 82183 409644 331536
63-3 86828 112189 95444 146049 38195 95256 27765 31902 61361 90730 440510 345209
634 98248 130503 128902 185134 48405 104834 34810 38184 76565 103881 542787 406679
644 94715 112667 108210 175010 43301 100758 28535 33063 64949 92539 490632 363145
64-2 22710 104703 126191 187029 52259 112379 28195 37098 70605 98006 440633 398542
64-3 108593 90246 105713 179508 51748 103906 30549 40084 74091 95916 484060 396694
644 109721 100233 140832 211117 58352 123146 34504 45237 90960 115426 561903 467625
400
TABLE A 6.16: QUARTERLY EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
BYDES1n NATION ( N DM1000) 1955-64:
EEC EFTA total non6 Non 6,7
55-1 1345601 1589405 5329789 3984188 2394783
55-2 1606195 1763738 5622953 4016758 2253020
55-3 1545402 1755272 5740254 4194852 2439580
55-4 1802626 1782280 6749669 4947043 3164763
56-1 1618383 1569737 5990422 4372039 2802302
56-2 1885428 2171329 7213194 5327766 3156437
56-3 1813587 1951201 7019941 5206354 3255153
56-4 2610327 2844554 8007347 5397020 2552466
57-1 2133217 2125547 7663897 5530680 3405133
57-2 2163044 2091479 8170387 6007343 3915864
57-3 2062298 2371730 8348717 6286419 3914689
57-4 2129477 2345723 8921425 6791948 4446225
58-1 1977065 2254725 7957321 5980256 3725531
58-2 2061254 2313646 8297393 6236139 3922493
58-3 1988737 2401056 8711875 6723138 4322082
58-4 2050765 2527926 9321711 7270946 4743020
59-1 2002957 2255256 8191813 6188856 3933600
59-2 2185189 2974461 9303912 7118723 4144262
59-3 2447232 2547738 9527352 7080120 4532382
59-4 2798815 3006758 11054520 8255705 5248947
60-1 2772969 2876068 11610847 8837878 5961810
60-2 2965197 3028588 11600399 8635202 5606614
60-3 2968881 3066326 11633542 8664661 5598335
604 3454751 3569300 13608735 10153984 6584684
61-1 3406605 3182421 12238891 8832286 5649865
61-2 3617336 3453563 12880541 9263205 5809642
61-3 3499317 3394332 12666484 8251768 5772835
614 3717555 3562032 13433628 8712577 6154041
62-1 3869488 3279675 12626578 8757090 5477415
62-2 3991875 3404760 13341644 9349769 5945009
62-3 3808650 3483253 13065601 9256951 5773698
624 4237031 3666881 14275191 10038160 6371279
63-1 4268007 3349358 12934851 8666844 5317486
63-2 4268007 3696020 13576994 9308987 5612967
63-3 4800392 3659318 14745532 9945140 6285822
634 4907528 4105093 16317856 11410328 7305235
64-1 5465471 3850209 15562923 10097452 6247243
64-2 5305091 4144915 16370667 11065576 6920661
64-3 5494076 3986281 15648998 10154922 6168641
644 4910177 4621035 17880028 12969851 8348816
401
TABLE A 6 .1 7 :  1 9 5 5 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY TEXTILE IMPORTS
FROM THE EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL
IMPORTS 1 9 5 9 -1 9 6 4
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 88436 67150 89945 80666 81617 61824 62861 57804
59-2 90201 80198 92239 86652 83429 72852 64380 59734
59-3 91967 87828 94534 125324 85240 98995 65899 68981
59-4 93733 115391 96828 138307 87052 139552 67418 91596
60-1 95498 106813 99123 126192 88864 139055 68937 75682
60-2 97264 107953 101417 109336 90675 128918 70455 67043
60-3 99030 98083 103711 142549 92487 135292 71974 82466
60-4 100795 111378 106006 147356 94299 156964 73493 94481
61-1 102561 99812 108300 140890 96111 156453 75012 91970
61-2 104326 110218 110595 155782 97922 157219 76531 88718
61-3 106092 101807 112889 193349 99734 144927 78050 98461
61-4 107858 134585 115184 166873 101546 172716 79569 107130
62-1 109623 134815 117478 191851 103357 188675 81088 112350
62-2 111389 138638 119773 161999 105169 177547 82606 99504
62-3 113155 135527 122067 201375 106981 177160 84125 117291
62-4 114920 168382 124361 186207 108793 199662 85644 126174
63-1 116686 154774 126656 180092 110604 192700 87163 126184
63-2 118452 154714 128950 178322 112416 182875 88682 119112
63-3 120217 147869 131245 215800 114228 177761 90201 138128
63-4 121983 176490 133539 198597 116039 203218 91720 149959
64-1 123748 175254 135834 187818 117851 192628 93239 141540
64-2 125514 177628 138128 206100 119663 186670 94758 144419
64-3 127280 183691 140422 249859 121475 195037 96276 160758
64-4 129045 217026 142717 234708 123286 224208 97795 190007
402
TABLE A 6 .1 8 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY TEXTILE IMPORTS FROM THE
EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS
1 9 5 9 -1 9 6 4
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 74755 61977 3664 3879 566 556 4954 4068 36309 29498 61145 62344
59-2 75875 63933 3728 4025 574 784 5139 4573 37144 31401 61650 63468
59-3 76994 77601 3793 3973 581 1535 5323 5300 37978 34753 62154 64525
59-4 78114 80097 3857 5416 589 1535 5507 7111 38813 37736 62658 75046
60-1 79233 75890 3922 5510 596 805 5691 6153 39647 37607 63162 83086
60-2 80353 66712 3986 5274 604 667 5875 6278 40482 35626 63667 72600
60-3 81472 66666 4051 5858 611 1467 6059 5610 41316 35418 64171 69729
60-4 82592 71721 4115 7776 618 1887 6243 6976 42151 41911 64675 79399
61-1 83711 65658 4180 7510 626 1033 6428 5996 42985 39785 65180 77812
61-2 84831 53200 4244 7804 633 1265 6612 5587 43820 39525 65684 67279
61-3 85950 77388 4309 8232 641 1834 6796 5474 44654 41390 66188 70000
61-4 87070 65246 4373 10334 648 2334 6980 8155 45489 46179 66693 75279
62-1 88189 72541 4438 9013 656 1128 7164 6062 46323 43648 67197 81806
62-2 89308 64675 4502 7871 663 1416 7348 6344 47158 43849 67701 68952
62-3 90428 65351 4567 7704 671 2278 7532 5750 47992 46745 68205 70117
62-4 91547 70014 4631 8616 678 2606 7716 7148 48827 59957 68710 78054
63-1 92667 71778 4696 7002 686 1285 7901 6198 49661 53743 69214 82628
63-2 93786 70928 4760 6802 693 1532 8085 5935 50496 53662 69718 73509
63-3 94906 70349 4825 6088 701 2458 8269 6246 51330 51327 70223 70401
63-4 96025 75364 4889 7840 708 2707 8453 7934 52165 62462 70727 66370
64-1 97145 74057 4954 7734 716 1178 8637 6724 52999 56923 71231 79386
64-2 98264 75049 5018 7616 723 1385 8821 6232 53834 56122 71736 67427
64-3 99384 72408 5083 6803 731 2381 9005 6843 54668 58206 72240 70643
64-4 100503 79147 5147 8485 738 2673 9190 8299 55503 64208 72744 76663
403
TABLE A 6 .1 9 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY TEXTILE IMPORTS FROM THE
EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS 1 9 5 9 -
1964
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 322858 267444 181394 162322 504252 429766
59-2 330249 299436 184109 168184 514357 467620
59-3 337640 381128 186823 187687 524462 568815
59-4 345030 484846 189538 206941 534567 691787
60-1 352421 447742 192252 209051 544672 656793
60-2 359812 413250 194966 187157 554777 600407
60-3 367202 458390 197681 184748 564882 643138
60-4 374593 510179 200395 209670 574987 719849
61-1 381984 489125 203109 197794 585092 686919
61-2 389374 511937 205824 174660 595197 686597
61-3 396765 538544 208538 204318 605302 742862
61-4 404156 581304 211253 207527 615407 788831
62-1 411546 627691 213967 214198 625512 841889
62-2 418937 577688 216681 193107 635617 770795
62-3 426328 631353 219396 197945 645722 829298
62-4 433718 680425 222110 226395 655827 906820
63-1 441109 653750 224824 222634 665932 876384
63-2 448500 635023 227539 212368 676037 847391
63-3 455891 679558 230253 206869 686142 886427
63-4 463281 728264 232968 222677 696247 950941
64-1 470672 697240 235682 226002 706352 923242
64-2 478063 714817 238396 213831 716457 928648
64-3 485453 789345 241111 217284 726562 1006629
64-4 492844 865949 243825 239475 736667 1105424
404
TABLE A 6 .2 0 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  ■ TREND OF QUARTERLY CHEMICAL IMPORTS FROM THE
EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS
1 959 -1964
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 36362 37523 24743 25630 27577 31170 89425 80918
59-2 36989 41595 25650 31336 28136 36413 92341 84208
59-3 37617 40082 26557 36585 28695 54653 95256 86813
59-4 38245 37941 27464 39168 29253 68518 98172 94947
60-1 38873 51707 28371 46576 29812 68565 101088 114929
60-2 39500 50747 29278 48865 30371 64167 104004 104374
60-3 40128 54234 30185 45530 30930 70311 106919 79033
60-4 40756 53444 31092 52788 31489 75942 109835 106305
61-1 41383 43634 31999 53977 32047 74334 112751 111800
61-2 42011 46944 32907 48692 32606 80261 115667 79535
61-3 42639 48395 33814 47100 33165 77305 118582 86472
61-4 43267 47580 34721 48129 33724 79355 121498 99598
62-1 43894 56651 35628 70572 34283 95411 124414 132876
62-2 44522 54139 36535 49182 34841 88228 127330 100380
62-3 45150 56415 37442 64556 35400 108087 130245 131654
62-4 45778 51468 38349 79998 35959 109300 133161 119101
63-1 46405 50264 39256 86621 36518 95723 136077 134502
63-2 47033 63541 40163 68412 37077 120219 138993 136358
63-3 47661 73829 41070 79406 37635 147510 141908 182772
63-4 48288 67867 41977 82141 38194 125086 144824 143143
64-1 48916 70047 42884 79571 38753 157233 147740 150818
64-2 49544 77976 43792 101338 39312 168062 150656 172376
64-3 50172 69845 44699 106678 39870 167822 153571 171236
64-4 50799 83864 45606 107586 40429 186142 156487 180082
405
TABLE A 6 .2 1 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY CHEMICAL IMPORTS FROM THE
EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS
195 9 -1 9 6 4
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 40010 53275 9212 7368 5883 3197 4477 4603 12358 11317 35288 36008
59-2 41289 48913 9360 9867 6053 3022 4622 5029 12729 11015 36055 43656
59-3 42567 51038 9508 11265 6223 4520 4767 5116 13100 9855 36823 43566
59-4 43845 59435 9656 12768 6393 3034 4911 6862 13472 9413 37591 50737
60-1 45123 76703 9804 8470 6563 3532 5056 6304 13843 12346 38359 54116
60-2 46401 80564 9953 10382 6732 4403 5201 6858 14214 9038 39126 54153
60-3 47680 54223 10101 10574 6902 3915 5346 6456 14586 8251 39894 52958
60-4 48958 63547 10249 12982 7072 3375 5491 7583 14957 10325 40662 72429
61-1 50236 53038 10397 11024 7242 3047 5636 6580 15329 10003 41429 47558
61-2 51514 45229 10545 11413 7412 3973 5781 6624 15700 8027 42197 53762
61-3 52793 51108 10693 10817 7581 4010 5925 6216 16071 10921 42965 49018
61-4 54071 51639 10841 12000 7751 3893 6070 7156 16443 11217 43732 63075
62-1 55349 91458 10989 13600 7921 3462 6215 7719 16814 14336 44500 57227
62-2 56627 65998 11137 13262 8091 3130 6360 7592 17185 11153 45268 57880
62-3 57905 70341 11285 12943 8261 4288 6505 8115 17557 14159 46035 55466
62-4 59184 73989 11433 14872 8430 4958 6650 9027 17928 14848 46803 63369
63-1 60462 82006 11582 13361 8600 4674 6795 9849 18300 13985 47571 60048
63-2 61740 70917 11730 12624 8770 6169 6939 9427 18671 15107 48339 70707
63-3 63018 78137 11878 12876 8940 4121 7084 8384 19042 17818 49106 50438
63-4 64296 82279 12026 13786 9110 5407 7229 10579 19414 15277 49874 80129
64-1 65575 97056 12174 13056 9279 5271 7374 10107 19785 12757 50642 58115
64-2 66853 92792 12322 14742 9449 4964 7519 11953 20156 15072 51409 67835
64-3 68131 89784 12470 13987 9619 6605 7664 10026 20528 14277 52177 65885
64-4 69409 119719 12618 17222 9789 8001 7809 10109 20899 16321 52945 82491
406
TABLE A 6 .2 2 : 1 9 5 3 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY CHEMICAL IMPORTS FROM THE
EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS 1 9 5 9 -
1 9 6 4
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 178106 175241 107228 115768 285334 291009
59-2 183116 193552 110108 121502 293224 315054
59-3 188125 218133 112988 125360 301113 343493
59-4 193134 240574 115868 142249 309003 382823
60-1 198144 281777 118748 161471 316892 443248
60-2 203153 268153 121628 165398 324781 433551
60-3 208162 249108 124508 136377 332671 385485
60-4 213172 288479 127388 170241 340560 458720
61-1 218181 283745 130268 131250 348449 414995
61-2 223190 255432 133148 129028 356339 384460
61-3 228200 259272 136028 132090 364228 391362
61-4 233209 274662 138908 148980 372118 423642
62-1 238219 355510 141788 187802 380007 543312
62-2 243228 291929 144668 159015 387896 450944
62-3 248237 360712 147548 165312 395786 526024
62-4 253247 359867 150429 181063 403675 540930
63-1 258256 367110 153309 183923 411564 551033
63-2 263265 388530 156189 184951 419454 573481
63-3 268275 483517 159069 171774 427343 655291
63-4 273284 418237 161949 207457 435233 625694
64-1 278293 457669 164829 196362 443122 654031
64-2 283303 519752 167709 207358 451011 727110
64-3 288312 515581 170589 200564 458901 716145
64-4 293321 557674 173469 253863 466790 811537
407
TABLE A 6 .2 5 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL IMPORTS FROM THE
EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN PM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS
1 9 5 9 -1 9 6 4
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 32574 31648 4600 3389 5606 6691 28659 25494
59-2 32821 50377 4579 3831 5561 9740 29357 31114
59-3 33069 46827 4559 3582 5517 12835 30055 36549
59-4 33317 57752 4538 5246 5473 17446 30753 39882
60-1 33564 61509 4518 6343 5428 17865 31451 34383
60-2 33812 54682 4497 9066 5384 12746 32149 39754
60-3 34059 44706 4477 6136 5340 13137 32847 33770
60-4 34307 50065 4457 10965 5296 12778 33545 37394
61-1 34555 56412 4436 4689 5251 12228 34243 32212
61-2 34802 42573 4416 5787 5207 20642 34941 36065
61-3 35050 45868 4395 3760 5163 12229 35639 27249
61-4 35297 66011 4375 3187 5118 11875 36337 22899
62-1 35545 44775 4354 7017 5074 10542 37035 19426
62-2 35793 52230 4334 3010 5030 13666 37733 18999
62-3 36040 35452 4313 1684 4985 17438 38431 19795
62-4 36288 54005 4293 2635 4941 21996 39130 22841
63-1 36536 42144 4273 4117 4897 16248 39828 21694
63-2 36783 55961 4252 3504 4852 19955 40526 22834
63-3 37031 55651 4232 3629 4808 15635 41224 25922
63-4 37278 58569 4211 4019 4764 22415 41922 25532
64-1 37526 68639 4191 7005 4719 23602 42620 21335
64-2 37774 92807 4170 9005 4675 36306 43318 49242
64-3 38021 105946 4150 13263 4631 26875 44016 55918
64-4 38269 122849 4129 29231 4586 66726 44714 80249
408
TABLE A 6 .2 4 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL IMPORTS FROM THE
EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS
1 9 5 9 -1 9 6 4
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 36229 27095 5226 2334 32267 32600 1580 2466 9828 7522 2381 5136
59-2 36422 37618 5277 3778 33326 35207 1552 2064 10016 6841 2355 5761
59-3 36615 59816 5329 1619 34386 36884 1525 1590 10204 7647 2329 4257
59-4 36808 51597 5380 3687 35445 37806 1497 2729 10392 9183 2303 7125
60-1 37001 40739 5431 2456 36505 45172 1470 2178 10581 7615 2277 5890
60-2 37195 49334 5483 2223 37564 25165 1442 2103 10769 7409 2251 6073
60-3 37388 52930 5534 1215 38624 55103 1415 1985 10957 7195 2224 5629
60-4 37581 49431 5586 1742 39683 36570 1387 2017 11145 6836 2198 5680
61-1 37774 48980 5637 1327 40742 37050 1360 2002 11334 7167 2172 5958
61-2 37968 64321 5688 2073 41802 40076 1332 2108 11522 8936 2146 5766
61-3 38161 48147 5740 3806 42861 40705 1305 2246 11710 7555 2120 6771
61-4 38354 37629 5791 3436 43921 30285 1277 2010 11899 13620 2094 6623
62-1 38547 31383 5842 1354 44980 38008 1250 1917 12087 7413 2068 5162
62-2 38740 36515 5894 1394 46040 37949 1222 2348 12275 10462 2042 8315
62-3 38934 53439 5945 979 47099 39737 1195 2496 12463 13908 2016 10991
62-4 39127 46487 5997 2247 48159 52972 1167 2101 12652 19127 1990 8521
63-1 39320 28166 6048 2185 49218 37523 1140 374 12840 6176 1964 11362
63-2 39513 27155 6099 2572 50277 45993 1112 2254 13028 9725 1938 9516
63-3 39707 32124 6151 3138 51337 37010 1085 3693 13216 16721 1912 9946
63-4 39900 23185 6202 4171 52396 47361 1057 3504 13405 22832 1886 15106
64-1 40093 43332 6253 1855 53456 51220 1030 2300 13593 10596 1860 10684
64-2 40286 61082 6305 5756 54515 52928 1002 2816 13781 15858 1834 12278
64-3 40479 56038 6356 3882 55575 57114 975 1679 13970 20445 1808 14147
64-4 40673 80438 6408 6247 56634 61567 947 1833 14158 21095 1782 12241
409
TABLE A 6 .2 5 : 1 9 5 3 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL IMPORTS FROM THE
EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS 1 9 5 9 -
1 9 6 4
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 71438 67222 87510 77153 158948 144375
59-2 72319 95062 88948 91269 161267 186331
59-3 73200 99793 90387 111813 163587 211606
59-4 74081 120326 91826 112127 165907 232453
60-1 74962 120100 93265 104050 168226 224150
60-2 75842 116248 94704 92307 170546 208555
60-3 76723 97749 96142 124057 172866 221806
60-4 77604 111202 97581 102276 175185 213478
61-1 78485 105541 99020 102484 177505 208025
61-2 79366 105067 100459 123280 179825 228347
61-3 80247 89106 101897 109230 182144 198336
61-4 81128 103972 103336 93603 184464 197575
62-1 82009 81760 104775 85237 186784 166997
62-2 82890 87905 106214 96983 189103 184888
62-3 83770 74369 107652 121550 191423 195919
62-4 84651 101477 109091 131455 193743 232932
63-1 85532 84203 110530 85786 196062 169989
63-2 86413 102254 111969 97215 198382 199469
63-3 87294 100837 113408 102632 200702 203469
63-4 88175 110535 114846 116159 203021 226694
64-1 89056 120581 116285 119987 205341 240568
64-2 89937 187360 117724 150718 207661 338078
64-3 90818 202002 119163 153305 209980 355307
64-4 91699 299055 120601 183421 212300 482476
410
TABLE A 6 .2 6 :  1 9 5 5 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL PRODUCT IMPORTS
FROM THE EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL
IMPORTS 1959-1964
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 3217 2206 2100 2531 1071 911 4267 3911
59-2 3316 2815 2206 2966 1115 2769 4317 5546
59-3 3416 3487 2312 3984 1160 4338 4367 5361
59-4 3515 8746 2419 7030 1204 6114 4417 6132
60-1 3614 11693 2525 4597 1249 6071 4467 5939
60-2 3713 8872 2631 4925 1293 9354 4517 6744
60-3 3812 12493 2738 6720 1337 6757 4567 7320
60-4 3911 15866 2844 13875 1382 10256 4617 8082
61-1 4010 15546 2950 9463 1426 10957 4667 9261
61-2 4109 20883 3057 10501 1471 10700 4717 10115
61-3 4208 18663 3163 13824 1515 8477 4767 9349
61-4 4307 18235 3270 22412 1560 9762 4817 9479
62-1 4406 12752 3376 13952 1604 8892 4866 9970
62-2 4505 15097 3482 14962 1648 8831 4916 10750
62-3 4604 19223 3589 17461 1693 8053 4966 9502
62-4 4703 21995 3695 26658 1737 10615 5016 10148
63-1 4802 22012 3801 13463 1782 8612 5066 9015
63-2 4901 23173 3908 14585 1826 12584 5116 11114
63-3 5000 24501 4014 15621 1870 10879 5166 11745
63-4 5099 24295 4120 27077 1915 12865 5216 12110
64-1 5198 23826 4227 17682 1959 12528 5266 12400
64-2 5297 29958 4333 20085 2004 14615 5316 14913
64-3 5396 33373 4440 28708 2048 14616 5366 15935
64-4 5495 42245 4546 53779 2093 23924 5416 20225
411
TABLE A 6.27: 1955-58  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL PRODUCT IMPORTS
FROM THE EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1000) COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL
IMPORTS 1S 59-1 £)64
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 9420 5099 2160 2145 92 52 957 688 2196 1612 3341 3111
59-2 9694 8839 2243 2236 92 124 995 1161 2252 2521 3424 4138
59-3 9968 5242 2326 2206 91 79 1033 1319 2309 2429 3507 4263
59-4 10242 3824 2409 3114 90 237 1071 1666 2365 3182 3590 5781
60-1 10516 3467 2492 3082 89 496 1109 1242 2421 2541 3673 4810
60-2 10790 5629 2575 3851 88 387 1148 1939 2477 3234 3756 5889
60-3 11064 5728 2658 3413 87 198 1186 1606 2534 3653 3839 5878
60-4 11338 7378 2741 4892 86 392 1224 1885 2590 5191 3922 8110
61-1 11612 8016 2824 4500 86 444 1262 1178 2646 3944 4006 6547
61-2 11886 8169 2907 5513 85 292 1300 2657 2702 5365 4089 7690
61-3 12160 6294 2990 4533 84 346 1338 2221 2759 4032 4172 7397
61-4 12435 7620 3073 5304 83 328 1377 2661 2815 4991 4255 7865
62-1 12709 7233 3156 5054 82 333 1415 2836 2871 3364 4338 6525
62-2 12983 7252 3239 4198 81 303 1453 3190 2927 3358 4421 6479
62-3 13257 7669 3322 3562 80 419 1491 2890 2984 3479 4504 5975
62-4 13531 9094 3405 5342 80 404 1529 2235 3040 4206 4587 6852
63-1 13805 9289 3488 5801 79 230 1567 1814 3096 3314 4670 5688
63-2 14079 8346 3571 5726 78 344 1605 2937 3153 2992 4753 6740
63-3 14353 7391 3654 5148 77 418 1644 2385 3209 3537 4836 7468
63-4 14627 9818 3737 5406 76 1196 1682 2660 3265 4125 4919 9181
64-1 14901 7943 3820 6011 75 509 1720 2763 3321 3883 5002 7676
64-2 15175 8576 3903 5847 74 619 1758 3263 3378 4525 5085 8026
64-3 15450 7158 3986 6430 74 476 1796 3723 3434 4823 5168 9813
64-4 15724 9987 4069 8328 73 738 1834 3767 3490 6285 5251 12125
412
TABLE A 6 .2 8 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL PRODUCT IMPORTS
FROM THE EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL
IMPORTS 1S159-1964
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 10655 9559 18166 12707 28821 22266
59-2 10955 14096 18700 19019 29655 33115
59-3 11255 17170 19233 15538 30488 32708
59-4 11554 28022 19767 17804 31322 45826
60-1 11854 28300 20301 15638 32155 43938
60-2 12154 29895 20835 20929 32988 50824
60-3 12454 33290 21368 20476 33822 53766
60-4 12753 48079 21902 27848 34655 75927
61-1 13053 45227 22436 24629 35489 69856
61-2 13353 52199 22969 29686 36322 81885
61-3 13653 50313 23503 24823 37156 75136
61-4 13952 59888 24037 28769 37989 88657
62-1 14252 45566 24571 25345 38823 70911
62-2 14552 49640 25104 24780 39656 74420
62-3 14851 54239 25638 23994 40490 78233
62-4 15151 69416 26172 28133 41323 97549
63-1 15451 53102 26705 26136 42156 79238
63-2 15751 61456 27239 27085 42990 88541
63-3 16050 62746 27773 26347 43823 89093
63-4 16350 76347 28307 32386 44657 108733
64-1 16650 66436 28840 28785 45490 95221
64-2 16950 79571 29374 30856 46324 110427
64-3 17249 92632 29908 32423 47157 125055
64-4 17549 140173 30441 41230 47991 181403
413
TABLE A 6 .2 9 :  1 9 5 5 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY PAPER/PAPER PRODUCT
IMPORTS FROM THE EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE
ACTUAL IMPORTS 1959-1964
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 3728 3910 842 557 3417 3424 11337 12617
59-2 3868 6130 879 977 3541 4416 11710 13277
59-3 4007 5518 916 895 3665 7404 12083 12906
59-4 4147 6140 954 992 3789 13255 12456 16067
60-1 4286 6028 991 1615 3913 15642 12829 15065
60-2 4426 6867 1028 1533 4038 15724 13201 15857
60-3 4566 6390 1065 1524 4162 10848 13574 15322
60-4 4705 6899 1102 1264 4286 12066 13947 16933
61-1 4845 6683 1139 1369 4410 10792 14320 17280
61-2 4984 7695 1176 1654 4534 11458 14693 18098
61-3 5124 6598 1213 1589 4659 10585 15065 16947
61-4 5263 7794 1251 1626 4783 11265 15438 18359
62-1 5403 8693 1288 1381 4907 9825 15811 20763
62-2 5543 9230 1325 1770 5031 10299 16184 19478
62-3 5682 7882 1362 1691 5155 10679 16557 18593
62-4 5822 7484 1399 2297 5279 12554 16929 19062
63-1 5961 7884 1436 2265 5404 10787 17302 21825
63-2 6101 7683 1473 2610 5528 11802 17675 22082
63-3 6240 8048 1510 1893 5652 11989 18048 21226
63-4 6380 9501 1548 2082 5776 13436 18421 26602
64-1 6520 9142 1585 2157 5900 13266 18793 29084
64-2 6659 12467 1622 3664 6025 15537 19166 31928
64-3 6799 10434 1659 4536 6149 13550 19539 34248
64-4 6938 12464 1696 4677 6273 18479 19912 39199
414
TABLE A 6 .5 0 :1 9 5 5 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY PAPER/PAPER PRODUCT
IMPORTS FROM THE EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN PM 1000) COMPARED TO THE
ACTUia l  mPORTS 1959-1964
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 2028 1789 35465 36174 6559 7850 781 404 23624 18180 1206 1300
59-2 2103 2868 36680 40532 6756 8437 820 850 24286 19899 1251 1397
59-3 2178 2577 37895 40182 6954 9437 859 1038 24947 20960 1296 1814
59-4 2252 3175 39110 43403 7151 10598 897 1187 25608 23282 1341 2408
60-1 2327 2883 40326 49015 7349 9625 936 1337 26269 21317 1387 1760
60-2 2402 2862 41541 54815 7546 11283 974 1386 26930 23581 1432 1591
60-3 2476 3443 42756 49176 7744 12184 1013 893 27591 25894 1477 308
60-4 2551 4573 43971 60362 7942 15780 1051 1226 28252 27755 1522 3672
61-1 2626 4012 45186 46488 8139 13849 1090 850 28913 21720 1568 1674
61-2 2700 4401 46402 52901 8337 14103 1128 1208 29574 22739 1613 1551
61-3 2775 5045 47617 53432 8534 15868 1167 1855 30235 24293 1658 1700
61-4 2849 4969 48832 60836 8732 16064 1206 2960 30896 23768 1704 1936
62-1 2924 4921 50047 57124 8929 13432 1244 3496 31557 22092 1749 2016
62-2 2999 5682 51262 61343 9127 17363 1283 2677 32218 22903 1794 1644
62-3 3073 5662 52478 62336 9324 16932 1321 2654 32879 26852 1839 2076
62-4 3148 5883 53693 68664 9522 21608 1360 2638 33540 25901 1885 1722
63-1 3223 5991 54908 59200 9719 22714 1398 2231 34202 25331 1930 1870
63-2 3297 5780 56123 76259 9917 23832 1437 2958 34863 25288 1975 1433
63-3 3372 4479 57338 62641 10114 21846 1476 2064 35524 24823 2020 1871
63-4 3447 5222 58554 72564 10312 23140 1514 3295 36185 24443 2066 1412
64-1 3521 5624 59769 72477 10510 21754 1553 4272 36846 24587 2111 1918
64-2 3596 5296 60984 83827 10707 25304 1591 3297 37507 28498 2156 1870
64-3 3670 5614 62199 77086 10905 22066 1630 2613 38168 28820 2201 2265
64-4 3745 4816 63414 89248 11102 27159 1668 2217 38829 29148 2247 2166
415
TABLE A 6 .5 1 :  1 9 5 3 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY PAPER/PAPER PRODUCT
IMPORTS FROM THE EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE
ACTUAL IMPORTS 959-1964
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 19324 20508 69664 65697 88988 86205
59-2 19998 24800 71896 73983 91894 98783
59-3 20672 26723 74128 76008 94800 102731
59-4 21345 36454 76360 84053 97706 120507
60-1 22019 38350 78593 85937 100612 124287
60-2 22693 39981 80825 95518 103518 135499
60-3 23366 34084 83057 91898 106424 125982
60-4 24040 37162 85290 113368 109330 150530
61-1 24714 36124 87522 88593 112236 124717
61-2 25387 38905 89754 96903 115141 135808
61-3 26061 35719 91986 102193 118047 137912
61-4 26735 39044 94219 110533 120953 149577
62-1 27408 40662 96451 103081 123859 143743
62-2 28082 40777 98683 111612 126765 152389
62-3 28756 38845 100915 116512 129671 155357
62-4 29430 41397 103148 126416 132577 167813
63-1 30103 42761 105380 117337 135483 160098
63-2 30777 44177 107612 135550 138389 179727
63-3 31451 43156 109844 117724 141295 160880
63-4 32124 51621 112077 130076 144201 181697
64-1 32798 53649 114309 130632 147107 184281
64-2 33472 63596 116541 148092 150013 211688
64-3 34145 62768 118773 138464 152919 201232
64-4 34819 74819 121006 154754 155825 229573
416
TABLE A 6 .5 2 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY MACHINERY IMPORTS FROM
THE EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL
IMPORTS 1959-1964
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 14232 13168 21271 21571 17389 17150 20594 24733
59-2 14710 17455 22093 27841 18021 22856 21382 31020
59-3 15188 15057 22916 31062 18652 25342 22170 30544
59-4 15666 17163 23738 36787 19284 40746 22958 34046
60-1 16143 20654 24560 39858 19915 41846 23746 29823
60-2 16621 26951 25382 48307 20547 50344 24534 38605
60-3 17099 28861 26204 50585 21178 49375 25321 30961
60-4 17577 31819 27027 71658 21810 56682 26109 37604
61-1 18055 29410 27849 63012 22441 59672 26897 33201
61-2 18533 33834 28671 63855 23073 86537 27685 39329
61-3 19011 30870 29493 48801 23704 86060 28473 35793
61-4 19489 34664 30316 62464 24336 120465 29261 43015
62-1 19966 33339 31138 55157 24967 105583 30048 50561
62-2 20444 40360 31960 62212 25599 119343 30836 48414
62-3 20922 37148 32782 55594 26230 98486 31624 48005
62-4 21400 32462 33604 66474 26862 112024 32412 56556
63-1 21878 27069 34427 61302 27493 97426 33200 42615
63-2 22356 33842 35249 57412 28125 103285 33988 54493
63-3 22834 33120 36071 55438 28756 103828 34775 55911
63-4 23312 32997 36893 61289 29388 106789 35563 51477
64-1 23789 35108 37716 65529 30019 112693 36351 47866
64-2 24267 40170 38538 75969 30651 138179 37139 56943
64-3 24745 47571 39360 69977 31282 124737 37927 55953
64-4 25223 40278 40182 93773 31914 141319 38715 67751
417
TABLE A 6 .5 5 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY MACHINERY IMPORTS FROM
THE EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL
IMPORTS 1959-1964
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 45460 51734 19838 19899 2235 1911 17024 16452 11049 8572 66922 59595
59-2 46919 58296 20494 20506 2332 2145 17757 21001 11425 10472 68804 65675
59-3 48377 54041 21150 17974 2428 1139 18490 21667 11802 11606 70685 68200
594 49836 57834 21806 30074 2524 4063 19222 21032 12178 15381 72567 79734
60-1 51294 66241 22462 27307 2621 2303 19955 19307 12554 12339 74448 68913
602 52753 80143 23118 27680 2717 2401 20687 23996 12930 15917 76330 74543
603 54211 69401 23774 28716 2814 2909 21420 22835 13306 17133 78211 82190
604 55670 81215 24430 40726 2910 2653 22153 20932 13683 22114 80093 102352
614 57128 76854 25086 39593 3006 4229 22885 23751 14059 19156 81974 74456
61-2 58587 92814 25742 40501 3103 3395 23618 19321 14435 21681 83856 93298
61-3 60045 85834 26398 37816 3199 3827 24351 19925 14811 23592 85737 82148
614 61503 109357 27054 53358 3295 5149 25083 20838 15187 31719 87619 107715
62-1 62962 101736 27710 47736 3392 5027 25816 21888 15564 24553 89500 89913
62-2 64420 105349 28366 51282 3488 5128 26549 21312 15940 23733 91382 95340
62-3 65879 90399 29022 50389 3584 5268 27281 22090 16316 25772 93263 94785
624 67337 99631 29678 50871 3681 4479 28014 21358 16692 24887 95145 100944
63-1 68796 98812 30334 45278 3777 4280 28747 19502 17068 22032 97026 92172
63-2 70254 131343 30990 51037 3874 4867 29479 21518 17445 25827 98908 94434
63-3 71713 101839 31646 44260 3970 3371 30212 21210 17821 24204 100789 93642
634 73171 94791 32302 52535 4066 5041 30945 21080 18197 18029 102671 99494
64-1 74630 110782 32958 46977 4163 4764 31677 22823 18573 24129 104552 88364
64-2 76088 127029 33614 54794 4259 4405 32410 27199 18949 27202 106434 103241
64-3 77547 114313 34270 46863 4355 6670 33143 25763 19326 30601 108315 95321
644 79005 114514 34926 56856 4452 7811 33875 26944 19702 31635 110197 121858
418
TABLE A 6 .5 4 :  1 9 5 3 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY MACHINERY IMPORTS FROM
THE EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS
1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 4
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 73487 76622 162529 158163 236016 234785
59-2 76206 99172 167730 178095 243937 277267
59-3 78926 102005 172932 174627 251857 276632
59-4 81645 128742 178133 208118 259778 336860
60-1 84365 132181 183334 196410 267699 328591
60-2 87084 164207 188535 224680 275619 388887
60-3 89803 159782 193736 223184 283540 382966
60-4 92523 197763 198938 269992 291460 467755
61-1 95242 185295 204139 238039 299381 423334
61-2 97962 223555 209340 271010 307302 494565
61-3 100681 201524 214541 253142 315222 454666
61-4 103400 260608 219742 328136 323143 588744
62-1 106120 244640 224944 290853 331064 535493
62-2 108839 270329 230145 302144 338984 572473
62-3 111559 239233 235346 288703 346905 527936
62-4 114278 267516 240547 302170 354825 569686
63-1 116998 228412 245749 282076 362746 510488
63-2 119717 249032 250950 329026 370667 578058
63-3 122436 248297 256151 288526 378587 536823
63-4 125156 252552 261352 290970 386508 543522
64-1 127875 261196 266553 297839 394429 559035
64-2 130595 311261 271755 343870 402349 655131
64-3 133314 298238 276956 319531 410270 617769
64-4 136034 343121 282157 359618 418191 702739
419
TABLE A 6 .5 5 :  1 9 5 5 -5 8  ■ TREND OF QUARTERLY ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICAL
PRODUCT IMPORTS FROM THE EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN PM 1 0 0 0 )
COMPARED TO THE ACTIJAL IMPORTS 1959-1 964
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 4425 3242 3123 4029 9632 11675 26069 34324
59-2 4609 3334 3261 7450 10103 8883 26912 34372
59-3 4793 3051 3399 5943 10575 12403 27756 30544
59-4 4977 3695 3537 8259 11047 24166 28599 34046
60-1 5160 3366 3675 8242 11519 19095 29443 52255
60-2 5344 3599 3813 13445 11990 20866 30286 39847
60-3 5528 3804 3951 15005 12462 20731 31130 58877
60-4 5712 4641 4089 9870 12934 30867 31973 55344
61-1 5896 3351 4227 21401 13406 28102 32817 63695
61-2 6080 4366 4365 34218 13877 29983 33660 65502
61-3 6263 5283 4503 27712 14349 28369 34504 85608
61-4 6447 7711 4641 15732 14821 39411 35347 61114
62-1 6631 6362 4779 16636 15293 33843 36191 59610
62-2 6815 7733 4917 20605 15764 31695 37034 53106
62-3 6999 7528 5055 55191 16236 33666 37878 52300
62-4 7183 10082 5193 71656 16708 64872 38721 149986
63-1 7366 9975 5331 35689 17180 32286 39565 58461
63-2 7550 10075 5469 25419 17652 36742 40408 59269
63-3 7734 17499 5607 22124 18123 38126 41252 52718
63-4 7918 28049 5745 45708 18595 53833 42095 62973
64-1 8102 13949 5883 32285 19067 42487 42939 62786
64-2 8286 22710 6021 36385 19539 40982 43782 70913
64-3 8469 16830 6159 31446 20010 45532 44626 76323
64-4 8653 17565 6297 44331 20482 60392 45469 99106
420
TABLE A 6 .5 6 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICAL
PRODUCT IMPORTS FROM THE EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )
COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS 195S1-1964
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 15081 13242 2754 2883 626 747 3268 3553 4674 3618 15174 11867
59-2 15649 25297 2843 3327 655 686 3356 3328 4868 4868 15627 17149
59-3 16217 16562 2933 3053 685 925 3445 3278 5063 4785 16079 15746
59-4 16785 27582 3022 3648 714 788 3534 4169 5257 6220 16531 19333
60-1 17354 21123 3111 4625 744 665 3622 3483 5451 5890 16984 19488
60-2 17922 18056 3200 5185 773 690 3711 4337 5646 7256 17436 19702
60-3 18490 19667 3289 3515 802 696 3800 4078 5840 8324 17888 20698
60-4 19058 31184 3378 7147 832 594 3888 5308 6034 11572 18341 26824
61-1 19626 27627 3467 5879 861 671 3977 4476 6229 10376 18793 19324
61-2 20195 26078 3556 7376 891 818 4066 4097 6423 9876 19245 24839
61-3 20763 21690 3645 5941 920 801 4155 4712 6617 12175 19698 27418
61-4 21331 31034 3735 7783 950 974 4243 6138 6812 13179 20150 29915
62-1 21899 28006 3824 6646 979 1330 4332 5375 7006 15409 20602 24397
62-2 22467 31025 3913 7120 1009 1060 4421 6542 7201 13379 21055 24921
62-3 23036 24648 4002 5095 1038 677 4509 5444 7395 13025 21507 25492
62-4 23604 39914 4091 14669 1067 1845 4598 8259 7589 19791 21959 32052
63-1 24172 34854 4180 11203 1097 3225 4687 5974 7784 15364 22412 25640
63-2 24740 30319 4269 7962 1126 1839 4775 8433 7978 15742 22864 29831
63-3 25308 28853 4358 5331 1156 900 4864 5440 8172 15047 23316 35395
63-4 25877 40697 4447 9063 1185 2088 4953 11086 8367 19293 23769 33161
64-1 26445 33603 4537 7074 1215 1122 5041 8463 8561 15447 24221 25249
64-2 27013 39169 4626 7554 1244 2003 5130 10199 8755 18996 24673 33291
64-3 27581 39316 4715 5677 1273 1862 5219 8543 8950 17569 25126 34057
64-4 28150 48620 4804 9955 1303 4015 5307 12700 9144 23126 25578 38326
421
TABLE A 6 .5 7 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICAL
PRODUCT IMPORTS FROM THE EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO
THE IHCTUA IMPORTS 195S1-1964
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 43249 53270 41577 35910 84826 89180
59-2 44886 54039 42999 54655 87885 108694
59-3 46523 54213 44421 44349 90944 98562
59-4 48160 80998 45843 61740 94003 142738
60-1 49797 82958 47265 55274 97063 138232
60-2 51434 77757 48687 55226 100122 132983
60-3 53072 98417 50109 56978 103181 155395
60-4 54709 100722 51532 82629 106240 183351
61-1 56346 116549 52954 68353 109300 184902
61-2 57983 134069 54376 73084 112359 207153
61-3 59620 146972 55798 72737 115418 219709
61-4 61257 123968 57220 89023 118477 212991
62-1 62894 116451 58642 81163 121537 197614
62-2 64531 113139 60065 84047 124596 197186
62-3 66168 148685 61487 74381 127655 223066
62-4 67805 296596 62909 116530 130714 413126
63-1 69443 136411 64331 96260 133774 232671
63-2 71080 131505 65753 94126 136833 225631
63-3 72717 130467 67175 90966 139892 221433
63-4 74354 190563 68598 115388 142951 305951
64-1 75991 151507 70020 90958 146011 242465
64-2 77628 170990 71442 111212 149070 282202
64-3 79265 170131 72864 107024 152129 277155
64-4 80902 221394 74286 136742 155188 358136
422
TABLE A 6 .5 8 :  1 9 5 5 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY IMPORTS MANUFACTURED
PRODUCTS FROM THE EEC. THE EFTA. THE REST OF THE WORLD (IN DM 1QOO)
COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL IMPORTS 1959-1964
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-
non6,7
non6,7 t-total total t-non6 non6
59-1 1102668 1142911 1151797 1101423 1427749 1130195 3682214 3377862 2579516 2234918
59-2 1129566 1125986 1176364 1223160 1471682 1421130 3777612 4070576 2618016 2644590
59-3 1156163 1618124 1200932 1289511 1515615 1280360 3873010 4218028 2716517 2569901
594 1183361 1938314 1225500 1130216 1559547 1560312 3968108 4928872 2785017 2990558
60-1 1210258 1916806 1250067 1352505 1603480 2255828 1063806 5525139 2853547 3608333
60-2 1237156 2317072 1271635 1506091 1647413 2734462 4159203 6587628 2922018 4210556
603 1261053 2331418 1299203 1138995 1691345 2671053 4251601 6141466 2990518 4110018
604 1290951 2137288 1323770 1610809 1735278 3158981 1319999 7237078 3059018 4799790
61-1 1317818 2102666 1318338 1372541 1779211 2934463 1145397 5737799 3127518 4307001
61-2 1314716 2295914 1372905 1542168 1823143 3082181 1510795 6920563 3196019 1621619
61-3 1371613 2295120 1397473 1478853 1867076 2943149 1636192 6717422 3264519 1422002
614 1398541 2352549 1422011 1678178 1911009 3055218 4731590 7085945 3333019 4733396
624 1425138 2476866 1116608 1578601 1954941 3273592 1826988 7329062 3101550 4852196
62-2 1452336 2459013 1471176 1602667 1998874 3420707 1922386 7482417 3470050 5023374
62-3 1479233 2638798 1195711 1713214 2012807 3601110 5017783 7953122 3538550 5314324
624 1506131 3055868 1520311 1930232 2086739 3618699 5113181 8634799 3607051 5578931
634 1533028 2619884 1541879 1668011 2130672 1017187 5208579 8335382 3675551 5685198
63-2 1559925 3013955 1569147 1811862 2171605 1624165 5303977 9479982 3744051 6436027
653 1586823 3221681 1591014 1767189 2218537 4166532 5399375 9158705 3812552 5931021
634 1613720 2389162 1618582 1960626 2262470 4090166 5194772 8110251 3881052 6050792
641 1610618 2918123 1613150 1790586 2306103 3751058 5590170 8189767 3919552 5541641
64-2 1667515 3461058 1667717 2020871 2350335 3748467 5685568 9230396 1018053 5769338
64-3 1691413 3696997 1692285 2052004 2391268 4219586 5780966 9968587 1086553 6271590
644 1721310 1387911 1716853 2308109 2138201 4465501 5876363 11161524 4155053 6773613
423
TABLE A 6 .5 9  : 1 9 5 3 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY TEXTILE EXPORTS TO THE EEC
MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EXPORTS 1 9 5 9 -
1 9 6 4
t  53-58 BlUX t  53-58 Italy t  53-58 France t  53-58 NL
59-1 31022 28203 18441 17772 10370 6951 46732 50764
59-2 31807 28271 18909 17970 10531 9067 47748 47791
59-3 32592 30721 19377 18078 10691 12078 48763 48366
59-4 33378 36742 19845 22678 10851 16742 49778 53647
60-1 34163 39955 20313 18623 11011 19683 50793 57870
60-2 34948 35022 20781 26803 11171 21927 51809 52008
60-3 35733 33968 21249 21775 11332 21794 52824 58996
60-4 36518 38025 21717 11751 11492 31371 53839 57810
61-1 37304 39476 22186 28243 11652 31310 54854 79861
61-2 38089 37804 22654 30740 11812 30330 55870 66873
61-3 38874 35705 23122 24604 11973 26650 56885 75705
61-4 39659 40016 23590 30335 12133 37023 57900 76418
62-1 40444 53453 24058 38319 12293 42346 58915 96647
62-2 41230 51638 24526 36148 12453 45144 59931 81047
62-3 42015 50024 24994 38302 12614 35043 60946 87924
62-4 42800 56847 25462 43536 12774 49641 61961 92547
63-1 43585 54865 25930 52380 12934 54953 62976 108943
63-2 44370 53934 26398 57916 13094 59797 63991 105751
63-3 45156 54561 26866 52288 13255 58479 65007 120432
63-4 45941 69501 27334 61562 13415 74167 66022 130731
64-1 46726 67933 27802 68567 13575 83967 67037 153757
64-2 47511 62931 28271 62509 13735 88128 68052 135730
64-3 48296 62780 28739 56729 13896 76191 69068 146477
64-4 49082 72370 29207 67653 14056 81896 70083 151077
424
TABLE A 6 .4 0  : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY TEXTILE EXPORTS TO THE EFTA
MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EXPORTS 1 9 5 9 -
1 9 6 4
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 22803 22432 44042 41012 22457 20720 24627 27751 38677 36645 45056 39925
59-2 23200 23160 44078 50313 22584 19213 24305 25489 39907 34854 46187 43888
59-5 23598 27791 44113 32716 22711 22850 23984 30847 41137 38565 47318 48089
594 23995 30679 44149 50139 22839 25242 23663 35355 42368 42662 48449 60516
60-1 24393 33380 44185 49768 22966 24960 23342 32107 43598 44589 49580 53483
602 24790 31735 44220 43371 23093 21051 23020 26529 44829 41883 50711 55010
603 25188 33422 44256 45849 23220 24270 22699 31314 46059 48131 51842 59386
604 25585 37561 44292 49719 23347 26886 22378 34308 47290 51598 52973 61816
61-1 25983 31322 44328 48628 23475 25041 22056 30687 48520 54486 54104 61399
61-2 26380 31568 44363 42509 23602 20117 21735 27886 49750 51390 55235 52974
61-3 26778 30745 44399 43406 23729 22448 21414 30675 50981 54182 56366 59800
614 27175 34145 44435 48569 23856 24372 21093 33386 52211 58078 57497 58749
62-1 27573 29334 44470 46360 23984 21526 20771 30501 53442 62779 58628 63530
62-2 27970 31177 44506 38249 24111 17583 20450 26748 54672 56011 59759 56926
62-3 28368 33001 44542 41924 24238 18873 20129 32810 55902 61807 60890 66889
624 28765 36196 44577 50281 24365 21342 19808 33976 57133 70959 62021 64824
634 29163 31758 44613 49603 24492 19607 19486 29019 58363 74264 63152 70423
63-2 29560 31709 44649 45226 24620 15879 19165 26945 59594 67573 64283 64497
633 29958 36593 44685 46473 24747 19215 18844 30849 60824 72368 65414 78545
634 30355 42220 44720 53766 24874 20344 18523 34940 62054 83979 66545 74816
64-1 30753 36675 44756 53379 25001 19835 18201 34399 63285 84173 67676 83155
64-2 31150 36029 44792 44888 25128 18027 17880 32392 64515 81359 68807 74654
64-3 31548 36765 44827 46164 25256 19486 17559 36053 65746 86794 69938 86925
644 31945 39747 44863 55459 25383 22639 17237 40565 66976 92277 71069 85114
425
TABLE A 6 .4 1 :  1 9 5 5 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY TEXTILE EXPORTS TO THE EEC
AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1000] COMP4LRED TO THE ACl
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 106566 103690 202461 188485 309026 292175
59-2 108994 103099 205261 196917 314255 300016
59-3 111423 109243 208062 200858 319485 310101
59-4 113852 129809 210862 244593 324714 374402
60-1 116281 136131 213663 238287 329944 374418
60-2 118709 135760 216464 219579 335173 355339
60-3 121138 136533 219264 242372 340402 378905
60-4 123567 138957 222065 261888 345632 400845
61-1 125996 178890 224865 251563 350861 430453
61-2 128424 165747 227666 226444 356090 392191
61-3 130853 162664 230466 241256 361320 403920
61-4 133282 183792 233267 257299 366549 441091
62-1 135711 230765 236068 254030 371778 484795
62-2 138139 213977 238868 226694 377008 440671
62-3 140568 211293 241669 255304 382237 466597
62-4 142997 242571 244469 277578 387466 520149
63-1 145426 271141 247270 274674 392696 545815
63-2 147854 277398 250071 251829 397925 529227
63-3 150283 285760 252871 284043 403154 569803
63-4 152712 335961 255672 310065 408384 646026
64-1 155141 374224 258472 311616 413613 685840
64-2 157569 349298 261273 287349 418842 636647
64-3 159998 342177 264074 312187 424072 654364
64-4 162427 372996 266874 335801 429301 708797
426
TABLE A 6 .4 2 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY CHEMICAL EXPORTS TO THE EEC
MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EXPORTS 1 9 5 9 -
1 9 6 4
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 63377 58439 79871 75191 66780 60670 91981 96556
59-2 64867 69438 82034 103108 68318 63504 94122 105602
59-3 66358 71771 84197 91854 69857 64388 96264 105600
59-4 67849 80117 86360 108897 71395 90288 98406 135143
60-1 69340 79831 88522 111784 72934 95348 100548 122879
60-2 70830 77075 90685 111686 74472 98808 102690 128920
60-3 72321 80220 92848 105792 76011 95445 104832 128184
60-4 73812 87099 95011 118189 77549 98481 106974 156328
61-1 75302 92116 97174 104510 79088 110607 109116 149576
61-2 76793 88342 99336 116394 80626 114567 111257 161269
61-3 78284 79020 101499 109971 82165 101967 113399 106893
61-4 79774 87666 103662 117906 83703 118237 115541 178213
62-1 81265 90421 105825 127969 85242 131776 117683 143970
62-2 82756 91091 107987 120205 86780 127749 119825 142225
62-3 84247 85732 110150 119804 88319 121322 121967 123948
62-4 85737 94159 112313 129050 89857 146310 124109 151362
63-1 87228 96305 114476 147506 91396 154392 126251 153997
63-2 88719 105027 116639 148121 92934 170164 128392 164324
63-3 90209 98163 118801 156995 94473 155614 130534 172538
63-4 91700 110729 120964 161033 96011 172216 132676 184419
64-1 93191 124573 123127 175512 97550 187732 134818 193091
64-2 94681 132100 125290 168526 99088 200115 136960 203661
64-3 96172 118448 127452 131215 100627 167115 139102 197384
64-4 97663 135649 129615 152009 102165 194311 141244 215992
427
TABLE A 6 .4 5 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY CHEMICAL EXPORTS TO THE
EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EXPORTS
195S>-1964
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 65024 73063 59696 55423 33411 28046 52834 51238 59746 54513 76923 73730
59-2 65947 69193 60988 60318 34430 28585 53760 59970 61291 63183 78976 88834
593 66871 71446 62280 59383 35449 22093 54687 47454 62836 58666 81029 98900
594 67794 88229 63572 84715 36469 37931 55614 63444 64381 66413 83081 107464
604 68717 87999 64865 75046 37488 36367 56541 64367 65926 67326 85134 96411
60-2 69641 81212 66157 71074 38507 31237 57467 67878 67471 75214 87187 108901
60-3 70564 84258 67449 66757 39526 27265 58394 60054 69016 71256 89240 125247
604 71488 92946 68741 90873 40546 37844 59321 78133 70561 77935 91292 133767
614 72411 84567 70033 78726 41565 36679 60248 76842 72106 76386 93345 126779
61-2 73334 85401 71325 88934 42584 36125 61175 68647 73650 82311 95398 138871
61-3 74258 80632 72617 78893 43604 30846 62101 66620 75195 72887 97451 145670
614 75181 79177 73910 94345 44623 32993 63028 71723 76740 76747 99503 127115
624 76104 85937 75202 80339 45642 34404 63955 73327 78285 78405 101556 131181
62-2 77028 107524 76494 84336 46662 37669 64882 69133 79830 84728 103609 135683
62-3 77951 95094 77786 79625 47681 25708 65806 68571 81375 79250 105662 151657
624 78875 97928 79078 100890 48700 29303 66735 75961 82920 83171 107714 141046
63-1 79798 104262 80370 87153 49719 28999 67662 73349 84465 81783 109767 128890
63-2 80721 125025 81663 88916 50739 33572 68589 73369 86010 88336 111820 180789
63-3 81645 125107 82955 83368 51758 28135 69516 63402 87555 76481 113873 188716
634 82568 145290 84247 109063 52777 32810 70442 73599 89100 95004 115925 165325
64-1 83491 145000 85539 86952 53797 31699 71369 83876 90645 94095 117978 158670
64-2 84415 154920 86831 92965 54816 37627 72296 69417 92190 102215 120031 191964
643 85338 129355 88123 86141 55835 33311 73223 69054 93735 107192 122083 198721
644 86261 149554 89415 110882 56855 41934 74149 88176 95280 110070 124136 190074
428
TABLE A 6 .4 4 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY CHEMICAL EXPORTS TO THE EEC
AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1000) COMPA[RED TO THE ACTI
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 302009 290856 347633 336013 649642 626869
59-2 309342 341652 355392 370083 664735 711735
59-3 316676 333613 363152 357942 679828 691555
59-4 324010 414445 370911 448196 694921 862641
60-1 331344 409842 378670 427516 710014 837358
60-2 338678 416489 386430 435516 725107 852005
60-3 346012 409641 394189 434837 740200 844478
60-4 353345 460097 401948 511498 755293 971595
61-1 360679 456809 409707 479979 770387 936788
61-2 368013 480572 417467 500289 785480 980861
61-3 375347 397851 425226 475548 800573 873399
61-4 382681 502022 432985 482100 815666 984122
62-1 390015 494136 440745 483593 830759 977729
62-2 397348 481270 448504 519073 845852 1000343
62-3 404682 450806 456263 499905 860945 950711
62-4 412016 520881 464022 528299 876038 1049180
63-1 419350 552200 471782 504436 891131 1056636
63-2 426684 587636 479541 590007 906225 1177643
63-3 434018 583310 487300 565209 921318 1148519
63-4 441351 628397 495060 621091 936411 1249488
64-1 448685 680908 502819 600292 951504 1281200
64-2 456019 704402 510578 649108 966597 1353510
64-3 463353 614162 518337 623774 981690 1237936
64-4 470687 697961 526097 690690 996783 1388651
429
TABLE A 6 .4 5 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL EXPORTS TO THE EEC
MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN PM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EXPORTS 1 9 5 9 -
1 9 6 4
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 1550 942 3573 2080 12753 5593 5563 10565
59-2 1594 3552 3617 2213 13060 6585 5502 14177
59-3 1638 1382 3661 1766 13368 6022 5440 17411
59-4 1681 3446 3704 2585 13675 6864 5378 22016
60-1 1725 2922 3748 3198 13982 7912 5316 16361
60-2 1769 4502 3792 2904 14289 8854 5255 21546
60-3 1813 5160 3835 2219 14596 7884 5193 20040
60-4 1857 7624 3879 3542 14903 9046 5131 41833
61-1 1900 4413 3923 2828 15210 7571 5069 41439
61-2 1944 6634 3966 4351 15517 10449 5008 49170
61-3 1988 8863 4010 3887 15824 8672 4946 32557
61-4 2032 6220 4054 7312 16132 6506 4884 10584
62-1 2075 5501 4097 10917 16439 12057 4822 15145
62-2 2119 6031 4141 8723 16746 8828 4761 14230
62-3 2163 7641 4185 7658 17053 7892 4699 7109
62-4 2207 7935 4228 5993 17360 8184 4637 6935
63-1 2251 6032 4272 4502 17667 9431 4576 5146
63-2 2294 7575 4316 5915 17974 10255 4514 6578
63-3 2338 7449 4359 5529 18281 7588 4452 6675
63-4 2382 7665 4403 6379 18588 8013 4390 11736
64-1 2426 10107 4447 6260 18896 9285 4329 11674
64-2 2469 8421 4490 5727 19203 12580 4267 15019
64-3 2513 8279 4534 3531 19510 9938 4205 17306
64-4 2557 19113 4578 6726 19817 12569 4143 26245
430
TABLE A 6 .4 6 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL EXPORTS TO THE
EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EXPORTS
1 9 5 9 -1 9 6 4
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 -1822 4184 3270 876 118 316 1323 2200 13297 10651 2919 1912
59-2 -2613 1467 3036 808 72 356 1330 401 13668 11457 3034 2538
59-3 -3404 979 2803 562 26 518 1338 455 14039 11279 3149 3110
59-4 -4194 4111 2569 914 -20 1324 1345 337 14410 12583 3263 1745
60-1 -4985 6824 2336 2053 -66 1119 1353 317 14781 14098 3378 2362
60-2 -5776 5273 2102 563 -112 543 1361 636 15152 18444 3493 3885
60-3 -6567 14788 1869 777 -159 741 1368 903 15523 14294 3607 5897
60-4 -7357 13297 1635 818 -205 656 1376 992 15894 21954 3722 8618
61-1 -8148 7033 1402 669 -251 531 1383 1039 16265 17303 3837 8345
61-2 -8939 7824 1168 1291 -297 649 1391 345 16636 20357 3951 10734
61-3 -9730 4323 935 1655 -343 497 1398 755 17007 15061 4066 7479
61-4 -10521 7060 701 3845 -389 947 1406 878 17378 13447 4181 7993
62-1 -11311 5746 468 1165 -435 364 1413 1001 17749 12178 4295 8737
62-2 -12102 8474 234 844 -481 630 1421 254 18120 14132 4410 6748
62-3 -12893 49829 1 1235 -528 460 1428 831 18491 12134 4525 3940
62-4 -13684 9057 -233 1457 -574 403 1436 634 18862 11400 4639 5255
63-1 -14474 15009 -467 1312 -620 588 1443 272 19233 13285 4754 4932
63-2 -15265 7527 -700 2554 -666 604 1451 928 19604 11502 4869 3969
63-3 -16056 4829 -934 998 -712 146 1458 1325 19975 7394 4983 3392
63-4 -16847 1269 -1167 3680 -758 152 1466 1633 20346 12651 5098 6976
64-1 -17637 5964 -1401 4447 -804 158 1473 1805 20717 10764 5213 3964
64-2 -18428 4058 -1634 3136 -850 187 1481 824 21088 13523 5327 7168
64-3 -19219 6534 -1868 948 -897 280 1488 1646 21459 12198 5442 5200
64-4 -20010 19433 -2101 3529 -943 570 1496 4341 21830 17222 5557 9244
431
TABLE A 6 .4 7 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL EXPORTS TO THE EEC
AND THE EFTA (IN DM 10C>0) conIIPARED TO THE
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 23440 19180 19104 20139 42544 39319
59-2 23773 26527 18527 17027 42300 43554
59-3 24106 26581 17950 16903 42056 43484
59-4 24438 34911 17373 21014 41811 55925
60-1 24771 30393 16796 26773 41567 57166
60-2 25104 37806 16218 29344 41323 67150
60-3 25437 35303 15641 37400 41078 72703
60-4 25770 62045 15064 46335 40834 108380
61-1 26103 56251 14487 34920 40589 91171
61-2 26435 70604 13910 41200 40345 111804
61-3 26768 53979 13332 29770 40101 83749
61-4 27101 30622 12755 34170 39856 64792
62-1 27434 43620 12178 29191 39612 72811
62-2 27767 37812 11601 31082 39368 68894
62-3 28099 30300 11024 68429 39123 98729
62-4 28432 29047 10446 28206 38879 57253
63-1 28765 25111 9869 35398 38634 60509
63-2 29098 30323 9292 27084 38390 57407
63-3 29431 27241 8715 18084 38146 45325
63-4 29764 33793 8138 26361 37901 60154
64-1 30096 37326 7561 27102 37657 64428
64-2 30429 41747 6983 28896 37413 70643
64-3 30762 39054 6406 26806 37168 65860
64-4 31095 64653 5829 54339 36924 118992
E ACTUAL EXPORTS 1 9 5 9 -1 9 6 4
432
TABLE A 6 .4 8 :  1 9 5 5 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL PRODUCT EXPORTS
TO THE EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN PM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL
EXPOIRTS IS>59-19(54
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 15803 12172 7743 7835 8878 6696 35609 27209
59-2 16064 13452 7931 8615 9129 7524 36197 27252
59-3 16325 12433 8118 8225 9380 8446 36785 28019
59-4 16586 14696 8306 10463 9631 11364 37372 32868
60-1 16846 14610 8494 10447 9883 11422 37960 34311
60-2 17107 14237 8681 11235 10134 12235 38547 31210
60-3 17368 15714 8869 11175 10385 11894 39135 34554
60-4 17628 17972 9057 10892 10637 15691 39723 36525
61-1 17889 17399 9244 12762 10888 14080 40310 38260
61-2 18150 17467 9432 12675 11139 14739 40898 38077
61-3 18410 17631 9620 12268 11390 12961 41486 36730
61-4 18671 18220 9808 15629 11642 17476 42073 39965
62-1 18932 17383 9995 15914 11893 17620 42661 40170
62-2 19193 17430 10183 17551 12144 18606 43248 38301
62-3 19453 17248 10371 15309 12396 18293 43836 39171
62-4 19714 20354 10558 17822 12647 22122 44424 43502
63-1 19975 18602 10746 18191 12898 21718 45011 41024
63-2 20235 19054 10934 18915 13150 23733 45599 39016
63-3 20496 18785 11121 17902 13401 22753 46187 41399
63-4 20757 24568 11309 22915 13652 28918 46774 50885
64-1 21018 24735 11497 21972 13903 28186 47362 58933
64-2 21278 27205 11684 19352 14155 31692 47949 59170
64-3 21539 24464 11872 16693 14406 30195 48537 58388
64-4 21800 33118 12060 19225 14657 34239 49125 67096
433
TABLE A 6 .4 9 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL PRODUCT EXPORTS
TO THE EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL
EXPORTS 1959-1964
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 7273 6715 18828 15130 5135 3909 6640 6629 10778 8635 23637 19970
59-2 7403 7115 19195 17504 5215 4833 6727 7626 11142 11103 24188 23863
59-3 7532 8647 19563 16936 5296 4326 6813 7015 11506 10746 24739 25792
59-4 7662 9714 19930 23020 5376 6065 6900 9195 11870 11951 25290 28782
60-1 7791 10192 20297 19626 5456 4813 6986 7802 12234 10987 25840 25608
60-2 7920 11196 20664 18656 5536 4757 7073 11708 12598 12661 26391 27778
60-3 8050 11414 21031 19235 5616 5076 7159 10282 12962 13777 26942 33877
60-4 8179 11225 21399 24431 5696 6125 7246 11970 13326 15875 27493 39164
61-1 8309 9771 21766 20501 5776 5522 7333 10512 13690 13490 28044 35741
61-2 8438 10687 22133 19936 5857 5508 7419 10236 14054 15584 28594 37538
61-3 8567 11529 22500 18786 5937 5393 7506 9455 14418 15799 29145 42572
61-4 8697 10465 22867 21378 6017 6410 7592 12596 14782 17446 29696 44042
62-1 8826 9848 23235 17865 6097 5858 7679 11705 15146 14066 30247 38765
62-2 8956 10320 23602 18887 6177 5584 7765 10520 15510 14835 30798 38411
62-3 9085 10409 23969 18089 6257 5086 7852 12034 15874 14768 31348 45894
62-4 9214 10944 24336 21683 6337 7145 7938 15154 16238 21166 31899 41630
63-1 9344 10309 24703 20276 6417 5571 8025 12173 16602 18664 32450 43364
63-2 9473 10792 25071 20646 6498 5295 8112 12602 16966 18623 33001 41010
63-3 9603 11561 25438 19825 6578 5790 8198 11043 17330 18447 33552 45568
63-4 9732 12817 25805 25252 6658 7436 8285 13846 17694 24323 34102 48273
64-1 9861 14123 26172 22877 6738 6006 8371 12042 18058 19043 34653 46592
64-2 9991 15266 26539 24202 6818 7188 8458 16418 18423 21164 35204 41876
64-3 10120 14716 26907 23192 6898 6484 8544 15254 18787 23046 35755 42291
64-4 10250 15923 27274 29684 6978 9015 8631 18894 19151 25835 36306 49880
434
TABLE A 6 .5 0 :  1 9 5 5 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY NF-METAL PRODUCT EXPORTS
TO THE EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EXPORTS
1 9 5 9 -1 9 6 4
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6+7 6 + 7
59-1 68033 53912 72292 60988 137427 114900
59-2 69321 56843 73870 72044 140327 128887
59-3 70608 57123 75448 73462 143227 130585
59-4 71895 69391 77026 88727 146127 158118
60-1 73182 70790 78605 79028 149028 149818
60-2 74470 68917 80183 86756 151928 155673
60-3 75757 73337 81761 93661 154828 166998
60-4 77044 81080 83339 108790 157728 189870
61-1 78332 82501 84917 95537 160628 178038
61-2 79619 82958 86495 99489 163529 182447
61-3 80906 79590 88073 103534 166429 183124
61-4 82194 91290 89651 112337 169329 203627
62-1 83481 91087 91230 98107 172229 189194
62-2 84768 91888 92808 98557 175130 190445
62-3 86056 90021 94386 106280 178030 196301
62-4 87343 103800 95964 117722 180930 221522
63-1 88630 99535 97542 110357 183830 209892
63-2 89918 100718 99120 108968 186730 209686
63-3 91205 100839 100698 112234 189631 213073
63-4 92492 127286 102276 131947 192531 259233
64-1 93780 133826 103855 120683 195431 254509
64-2 95067 140172 105433 126114 198331 266286
64-3 96354 129740 107011 124983 201232 254723
64-4 97641 153678 108589 149231 204132 302909
435
TABLE A 6 .5 1 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY PAPER/PAPER PRODUCT
EXPORTS TO THE EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN PM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE
ACTUIAL EXPORTS 1959-1964
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 5225 4272 2704 2036 2522 1953 7059 6934
59-2 5326 4388 2771 2823 2585 1891 7184 7471
59-3 5427 5008 2839 2806 2647 2980 7309 8107
59-4 5528 5441 2906 3212 2710 5102 7434 9157
60-1 5629 6489 2974 3768 2772 5080 7559 9690
60-2 5730 5898 3041 3293 2835 4399 7684 8561
60-3 5832 6495 3109 3325 2897 5090 7809 10618
60-4 5933 6920 3177 3511 2960 5953 7935 12454
61-1 6034 6807 3244 3423 3022 6252 8060 10840
61-2 6135 6869 3312 4949 3085 6117 8185 10711
61-3 6236 6984 3379 4793 3147 5989 8310 11233
61-4 6337 7370 3447 4553 3210 6478 8435 13172
62-1 6438 7422 3514 5603 3272 7790 8560 12096
62-2 6539 7614 3582 5551 3335 7923 8685 12813
62-3 6640 8817 3649 5681 3397 7853 8810 13757
62-4 6741 8155 3717 5973 3460 9623 8935 12466
63-1 6842 8086 3785 6526 3522 10800 9060 12751
63-2 6943 8305 3852 6885 3585 11116 9185 12629
63-3 7044 8180 3920 9279 3647 10761 9310 15415
63-4 7145 9372 3987 8014 3710 13868 9435 18085
64-1 7247 9609 4055 9877 3773 14046 9560 17390
64-2 7348 9857 4122 8975 3835 14812 9685 17897
64-3 7449 9989 4190 8074 3898 13435 9810 18567
64-4 7550 10941 4258 8385 3960 16358 9935 20105
436
TABLE A 6 .5 2 :1 9 5 5 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY PAPER/PAPER PRODUCT
EXPORTS TO THE EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1000) COMPARED TO THE
ACTl AL EX[PORTS 1959-1964
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 3573 3577 4409 3668 1032 877 3342 2885 4072 3523 5269 3801
59-2 3663 4606 4519 3754 1058 882 3425 3148 4224 4011 5393 4544
59-3 3753 6184 4630 4120 1084 1069 3507 3298 4376 4517 5517 4807
59-4 3842 5815 4740 5330 1110 1040 3589 4082 4529 4525 5642 5869
60-1 3932 6177 4851 3856 1136 1725 3671 3218 4681 4788 5766 5548
60-2 4022 6666 4961 4096 1162 687 3754 3460 4834 4609 5891 5865
60-3 4111 6131 5072 4382 1188 1232 3836 4162 4986 5519 6015 6013
60-4 4201 7350 5182 5631 1214 1475 3918 4814 5138 6266 6140 7022
61-1 4291 7384 5292 4171 1240 1175 4000 4443 5291 4944 6264 6324
61-2 4381 6558 5403 4726 1266 1154 4083 4186 5443 5884 6389 6711
61-3 4470 6002 5513 4367 1292 1107 4165 4324 5596 5980 6513 7318
61-4 4560 7001 5624 5592 1318 1564 4247 4669 5748 6096 6637 7983
62-1 4650 6732 5734 4362 1344 1212 4329 4038 5900 6320 6762 8359
62-2 4740 6417 5844 4309 1369 1116 4412 4428 6053 6375 6886 8027
62-3 4829 6145 5955 5026 1395 1025 4494 4796 6205 6784 7011 8309
62-4 4919 6970 6065 7531 1421 1311 4576 5717 6358 6666 7135 8286
63-1 5009 7252 6176 5275 1447 1259 4658 4623 6510 6438 7260 8720
63-2 5099 6827 6286 6186 1473 1241 4741 4260 6662 7090 7384 8439
63-3 5188 6760 6396 5570 1499 1398 4823 4589 6815 7202 7509 10524
63-4 5278 8803 6507 7159 1525 1653 4905 5403 6967 7639 7633 10004
64-1 5368 8608 6617 6398 1551 1238 4988 4669 7119 7696 7757 10097
64-2 5457 6808 6728 6828 1577 1551 5070 5409 7272 7802 7882 10245
64-3 5547 6449 6838 6828 1603 1356 5152 5342 7424 8856 8006 10010
64-4 5637 8151 6949 8629 1629 1995 5234 6462 7577 8708 8131 11918
437
TABLE A 6 .5 5 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY PAPER/PAPER PRODUCT
EXPORTS TO THE EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL
EXPOIRTS 1S>59-19<54
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 17510 15195 21697 18331 24145 33526
59-2 17866 16573 22282 20945 9414 37518
59-3 18222 18901 22867 23995 8472 42896
59-4 18579 22912 23452 26661 25086 49573
60-1 18935 25027 24038 25312 10355 50339
60-2 19291 22151 24623 25383 9414 47534
60-3 19647 25528 25208 27439 26028 52967
60-4 20003 28838 25793 32558 11297 61396
61-1 20360 27322 26378 28441 10355 55763
61-2 20716 28646 26964 29219 26969 57865
61-3 21072 28999 27549 29098 12238 58097
61-4 21428 31573 28134 32905 11297 64478
62-1 21784 32911 28719 31023 27910 63934
62-2 22141 33901 29304 30672 13179 64573
62-3 22497 36108 29889 32085 12238 68193
62-4 22853 36217 30475 36481 28852 72698
63-1 23209 38163 31060 33567 14121 71730
63-2 23565 38935 31645 34043 13179 72978
63-3 23921 43635 32230 36043 29793 79678
63-4 24278 49339 32815 40661 15062 90000
64-1 24634 50922 33401 38706 14121 89628
64-2 24990 54151 33986 38643 30734 92794
64-3 25346 50065 34571 38841 16003 88906
64-4 25702 55789 35156 45863 15062 101652
438
TABLE A 6 .5 4 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY MACHINERY EXPORTS TO THE
EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EXPORTS
1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 4
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 116216 88093 125973 124764 170576 125554 148701 122808
59-2 118766 99623 128385 133247 175458 175633 151897 138347
59-3 121316 100152 130796 140051 180339 198458 155093 135727
59-4 123866 93663 133208 132884 185221 189893 158289 134318
60-1 126416 102125 135620 140333 190102 182142 161485 147005
60-2 128966 112973 138032 153388 194983 200976 164681 155483
60-3 131516 108955 140443 155857 199865 192681 167878 156849
60-4 134066 132376 142855 177424 204746 217318 171074 176514
61-1 136616 126438 145267 190748 209627 223639 174270 186003
61-2 139165 139400 147679 206585 214509 266255 177466 202153
61-3 141715 179988 150090 208915 219390 252841 180662 203282
61-4 144265 151850 152502 227253 224272 277225 183858 215442
62-1 146815 158296 154914 250611 229153 289681 187054 222476
62-2 149365 155959 157325 276896 234034 331698 190250 212405
62-3 151915 180022 159737 243856 238916 302065 193446 208938
62-4 154465 176789 162149 268418 243797 341725 196642 219112
63-1 157015 159239 164561 307585 248679 314982 199838 201191
63-2 159565 173928 166972 342681 253560 354008 203035 214400
63-3 162115 194406 169384 268238 258441 336590 206231 221057
63-4 164665 230098 171796 395251 263323 393645 209427 246246
64-1 167215 178237 174208 332201 268204 389449 212623 241658
64-2 169765 202065 176619 304042 273086 439554 215819 246063
64-3 172315 175904 179031 252734 277967 402809 219015 244186
64-4 174865 205371 181443 213846 282848 424313 222211 264034
439
TABLE A 6 .5 5 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY MACHINERY EXPORTS TO THE
EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EXPORTS
1 9 5 9 -1 9 6 4
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 98701 87075 78932 67891 31060 26102 36909 36029 117510 81732 101583 88284
59-2 100916 106200 80521 90689 31398 30957 37538 09206 121353 102803 100090 92800
59-5 103132 87707 82109 74700 31732 30179 38167 58703 125196 109896 106597 92653
594 105308 98027 83698 91790 32066 23890 38796 56758 129039 126991 109100 108553
60-1 107560 107000 85287 75022 32000 33503 39425 53951 132882 102212 111611 90109
60-2 109780 118029 86875 90952 32730 37632 00050 53566 136725 129309 114118 111565
603 111996 117505 88064 102129 33069 02823 00682 50893 100568 130672 116625 116972
604 110212 133012 90053 111711 33003 38611 01311 61609 100010 162756 119132 135738
61-1 116028 137077 91641 98176 33737 38852 01900 60076 108253 131068 121639 132006
61-2 118603 160532 93230 116710 30071 03070 02569 66623 152096 158007 124106 155370
61-3 120859 155028 90819 122203 30005 42273 03198 68659 155939 156239 126653 159247
614 123075 172239 96008 130059 30739 05327 03827 72076 159782 173208 129160 172609
624 125291 102795 97996 109883 35073 37380 00056 68738 163625 108042 131667 192891
62-2 127507 155002 99585 112959 35007 03908 05085 75608 167068 147426 134174 200700
62-3 129723 153973 101170 110900 35741 06063 05710 79072 171311 155190 136681 191085
624 131939 158808 102762 125900 36076 07089 06303 83280 175150 182070 139188 212434
634 130155 145875 100351 106115 36410 38078 06972 66853 178996 139100 141695 193000
63-2 136371 163370 105900 122010 36704 08018 07601 77225 182839 104123 104202 196051
63-3 138586 155184 107528 122072 37078 00300 08230 70026 186682 138666 106709 206283
634 100802 170506 109117 135590 37412 07205 08859 76336 190525 191060 109216 209159
604 103018 177978 110706 121526 37706 37632 09088 72241 194368 133363 151723 196553
642 105230 210875 112294 132993 38080 49412 50117 85537 198211 157033 154230 211537
643 107050 179816 113883 87005 38014 09309 50746 86198 202054 155921 156737 201158
644 109666 215753 115472 150954 38749 55200 51375 91729 205897 204702 159200 205785
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TABLE A 6 .5 6 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY MACHINERY EXPORTS TO THE
EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EXPORTS 1 9 5 9 -
1 9 6 4
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 561737 461219 464698 387153 1025669 848372
59-2 574776 546850 475815 476779 1049793 1023629
59-3 587815 574388 486933 453878 1073918 1028266
59-4 600854 550758 498050 506017 1098043 1056775
60-1 613893 571605 509168 466241 1122168 1037846
60-2 626933 622820 520286 541053 1146293 1163873
60-3 639972 614342 531403 568994 1170418 1183336
60-4 653011 703632 542521 643837 1194542 1347469
61-1 666050 726828 553638 597695 1218667 1324523
61-2 679089 814393 564756 700312 1242792 1514705
61-3 692129 845026 575873 703649 1266917 1548675
61-4 705168 871770 586991 769558 1291042 1641328
62-1 718207 921064 598108 700133 1315167 1621197
62-2 731246 976958 609226 736083 1339292 1713041
62-3 744285 934881 620344 736687 1363416 1671568
62-4 757325 1006044 631461 810025 1387541 1816069
63-1 770364 982997 642579 689461 1411666 1672458
63-2 783403 1085017 653696 751201 1435791 1836218
63-3 796442 1020291 664814 736935 1459916 1757226
63-4 809481 1265240 675931 830260 1484041 2095500
64-1 822521 1141545 687049 739293 1508165 1880838
64-2 835560 1029829 698166 847387 1532290 1877216
64-3 848599 1075633 709284 1126256 1556415 2201889
64-4 861638 1107564 720402 924127 1580540 2031691
441
TABLE A 6 .5 7 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICAL
PRODUCT EXPORTS TO THE EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED
TOT 4E ACTUAL EXPORTS 1959-1964
t-BlUX BlUX t-l I t-F F t-NL NL
59-1 56112 47740 54326 50119 21890 19902 89023 73950
59-2 57686 44837 55738 44902 22448 22449 91471 72607
59-3 59261 46999 57150 51514 23006 27994 93919 81516
59-4 60835 55930 58562 68464 23564 34740 96367 100365
60-1 62410 50334 59974 55193 24122 31369 98815 96355
60-2 63985 53423 61386 63405 24680 33358 101263 103238
60-3 65559 58840 62798 66587 25238 34415 103711 108678
60-4 67134 68221 64210 72774 25796 43871 106159 132082
61-1 68708 65286 65622 64547 26353 42363 108606 124080
61-2 70283 67936 67034 69638 26911 52135 111054 121704
61-3 71858 65389 68446 72703 27469 51826 113502 135858
61-4 73432 64812 69859 91905 28027 67640 115950 162271
62-1 75007 58352 71271 80698 28585 64589 118398 144993
62-2 76581 67656 72683 83150 29143 73857 120846 128164
62-3 78156 62943 74095 92663 29701 75325 123294 132482
62-4 79730 78646 75507 101548 30259 92361 125742 142124
63-1 81305 65033 76919 85239 30816 82159 128189 130707
63-2 82880 78503 78331 99781 31374 92744 130637 138616
63-3 84454 86828 79743 112189 31932 95444 133085 146049
63-4 86029 98248 81155 130503 32490 128902 135533 185134
64-1 87603 94715 82567 112667 33048 108210 137981 175040
64-2 89178 106111 83979 104703 33606 126191 140429 187029
64-3 90753 108593 85391 90246 34164 105713 142877 179508
64-4 92327 109721 86803 100233 34722 140832 145325 211117
442
TABLE A 6 .5 8 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICAL
PRODUCT EXPORTS TO THE EFTA MEMBER COUNTRIES (IN PM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED
TO THE ACTUAL EXPOR1rs 195S
ID0)f1
t-UK UK t-SWE SWE t-N N t-DK DK t-AUT AUT t-CH CH
59-1 28607 33655 81584 80883 22175 17152 16010 17113 47917 40186 51984 46581
59-2 29709 39379 84241 78133 22521 18531 16449 19403 49635 44770 53629 51510
59-5 30812 43596 86899 82226 22868 21821 16888 22888 51353 43888 55273 54464
594 31914 44354 89557 104866 23214 22245 17327 25383 53072 49796 56918 67350
601 33016 46860 92214 96136 23561 22261 17766 24444 54790 45484 58562 53354
602 34119 45231 94872 83709 23907 24981 18205 24795 56508 51178 60207 57977
605 35221 35550 97530 98778 24254 28513 18644 29991 58227 51348 61851 67314
604 36323 38474 100187 108806 24600 35876 19083 32042 59945 55575 63496 84879
61-1 37425 33418 102845 83714 24947 25258 19522 32686 61664 54143 65140 71694
61-2 38528 33945 105502 86930 25293 25580 19961 28221 63382 64125 66784 74316
61-3 39630 33347 108160 84832 25640 30809 20400 28938 65100 59848 68429 77689
614 40732 36857 110818 92647 25986 30295 20838 35454 66819 67414 70073 95598
624 41835 30680 113475 85210 26332 25540 21277 33722 68537 55787 71718 83949
62-2 42937 28420 116133 86291 26679 26110 21716 32744 70256 54897 73362 83860
62-3 44039 32945 118790 86197 27025 29389 22155 44089 71974 58016 75007 86704
624 45142 36569 121448 95750 27372 33128 22594 44124 73692 62486 76651 96281
63-1 46244 32409 124106 85159 27718 26328 23033 32121 75411 52513 78296 84846
63-2 47346 33036 126763 97253 28065 27306 23472 30187 77129 61571 79940 82183
63-3 48448 38195 129421 95256 28411 27765 23911 31902 78847 61361 81585 90730
634 49551 48405 132079 104834 28758 34810 24350 38184 80566 76565 83229 103881
641 50653 43301 134736 100758 29104 28535 24789 33063 82284 64949 84874 92539
64-2 51755 52259 137394 112379 29451 28195 25228 37098 84003 70605 86518 98006
64-3 52858 51748 140051 103906 29797 30549 25667 40484 85721 74091 88162 95916
644 53960 58352 142709 123146 30144 34504 26106 45237 87439 90960 89807 115426
443
TABLE A 6 .5 9 :  1 9 5 5 -5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICAL
PRODUCT EXPORTS TO THE EEC AND THE EFTA (IN DM 1 0 0 0 )  COMPARED TO
THE ACTUAL EXPORTS 1959-1964
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-6 + 7 6 + 7
59-1 221352 191711 248458 235570 469628 427281
59-2 227344 184795 256373 251726 483529 436521
59-3 233336 208023 264289 268883 497429 476906
59-4 239329 259499 272205 313994 511330 573493
60-1 245321 233251 280121 288539 525230 521790
60-2 251313 253424 288036 287871 539131 541295
60-3 257306 268520 295952 311494 553032 580014
60-4 263298 316948 303868 355652 566932 672600
61-1 269291 296276 311783 300913 580833 597189
61-2 275283 311413 319699 313117 594733 624530
61-3 281275 325776 327615 315463 608634 641239
61-4 287268 386628 335530 358265 622534 744893
62-1 293260 348632 343446 314888 636435 663520
62-2 299253 352827 351362 312322 650335 665149
62-3 305245 363413 359278 337340 664236 700753
62-4 311237 414679 367193 368338 678137 783017
63-1 317230 363138 375109 313376 692037 676514
63-2 323222 409644 383025 331536 705938 741180
63-3 329214 440510 390940 345209 719838 785719
63-4 335207 542787 398856 406679 733739 949466
64-1 341199 490632 406772 363145 747639 853777
64-2 347192 440633 414688 398542 761540 839175
64-3 353184 484060 422603 396694 775440 880754
64-4 359176 561903 430519 467625 789341 1029528
444
TABLE A 6 .6 0 : 1 9 5 5 - 5 8  - TREND OF QUARTERLY EXPORTS MANUFACTURED
PRODUCTS TO THE EEC. THE EFTA. THE REST OF THE WORLD (IN PM 1000)
COMPARED TO THE ACTUALEXPO RTS 1959-1964
t-EEC EEC t-EFTA EFTA t-
non6,7
non6(7 t-total total t-non6 non6
591 2272439 2002957 2602369 2255256 4671019 3933600 9545828 8191813 7273388 6188856
59-2 2313363 2185189 ocnorcc 2974461 4820451 4144262 9793379 9305912 7480016 7118723
593 2354286 2447232 2716760 2547738 4969883 4532382 10040030 9527352 7686643 7080120
594 239521C 2798815 2773955 3006758 5119315 5248947 10288481 1105452C 7893271 8255705
601 2436134 2772989 2831151 2876068 5268747 5961810 10536052 11610B47 8099896 8837876
602 2477057 2965197 2888346 3028588 541818C 5606614 10783583 11600599 8306525 8635202
603 2517961 2968881 2945541 3066326 5567612 5598335 11051135 11633542 8513153 8664661
604 2558905 3454751 3002736 3569300 5717044 6584684 11278686 13608735 8719780 101539&
614 2599628 3406605 3059932 3182421 5866476 5649865 11526237 12238891 8926408 8832286
61-2 2640752 3617336 3117127 3453563 6015908 5800642 11773788 12880541 9133055 9263205
61-3 2681676 3499317 3174322 3394332 6165340 5772835 12021339 12666484 9539662 8251768
614 2722590 371/5bb 3231518 3562052 6314772 6154041 12268890 13433628 9546290 8712577
621 2763523 3869488 3288713 3279675 6464204 5477415 12516441 12626578 9752917 875709C
62-2 2804447 3991875 3345908 3404760 6613636 5945009 12763992 13341644 9959545 9349769
623 284537C 3808650 3405104 3483255 6763068 5773698 13011543 13065601 10166172 9256951
624 2886294 4237051 3460299 3666881 6912501 6371279 13259094 14275191 10572799 10058160
631 2927218 4268007 3517494 3349358 7061933 5317486 13506646 12934851 10579427 86668#
63-2 2968141 4268007 3574689 3696020 7211365 5612967 13754197 13576994 10786054 9308987
633 3009065 4800592 3631885 3659318 7360797 6285822 14001748 14745532 10992682 994514C
634 3059989 4907528 3689080 4106093 7510229 7305235 14249299 16317856 11199300 11410528
641 3090912 5465471 3746275 385020G 7659661 6247243 14496850 15562923 11405936 10097452
64-2 3131836 5305091 3805471 4144915 7800093 6920661 14744401 16370667 11612564 11065576
643 3172760 5494076 3860666 3986281 7958525 6168641 14991952 15648998 11819191 10154922
644 3213683 4910177 3917861 4621055 8107957 8348816 15239505 17880028 12025819 12969851
445
TABLE A 6 .6 1 :  ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN TEXTILE IMPORTS
BY ORIGIN:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK ALTT CH EEC EFTA 6+7
1954 -11.81 12.55 11.39 -12.62 6.27 10.47 29.76 0.17 29.50 -1.98 -0.70 5.95 2.01
1955 23.52 -0.98 37.57 19.15 12.09 23.12 -44.00 11.27 20.33 -1.24 19.24 8.14 14.53
1956 14.05 26.15 14.88 11.91 6.34 13.79 41.29 34.22 15.80 15.90 16.76 12.06 14.88
1957 27.57 29.24 13.89 16.04 22.38 -0.63 21.21 107.10 16.65 8.78 22.10 16.95 20.09
1958 -13.33 4.54 -15.20 31.28 -13.19 0.61 13.79 0.42 -11.85 -8.94 -1.52 -10.80 -5.05
1959 14.92 29.03 41.33 7.24 7.18 31.96 84.29 15.02 11.32 16.15 23.26 12.13 19.28
1960 21.01 21.92 50.11 14.94 -0.92 41.20 9.43 18.83 12.88 14.86 27.69 9.03 21.42
1961 5.23 25.02 12.69 20.84 -6.94 38.75 33.98 0.78 10.84 -4.74 15.92 -0.80 10.88
1962 29.33 12.87 17.70 17.87 4.24 -2.00 14.88 0.36 16.37 2.95 18.68 6.04 15.27
1963 9.78 4.23 1.82 17.14 5.81 -16.48 7.46 3.99 13.90 -2.01 7.13 3.96 6.34
1964 18.89 13.67 5.55 19.37 4.24 10.48 -4.57 6.78 6.45 0.41 13.75 3.71 11.31
TABLE A 6.62: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN CHEMICAL IMPORTS
BY ORIGIN:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6+7
1954 25.92 126.29 -23.46 35.66 41.15 28.36 24.11 3.86 32.79 17.59 21.74 27.02 23.83
1955 18.16 34.97 47.81 49.66 22.97 13.08 102.85 17.25 -25.87 27.54 37.61 20.81 30.81
1956 -3.75 25.43 10.71 44.59 15.05 21.99 45.64 18.93 137.38 2.62 22.92 20.92 22.17
1957 10.74 31.21 1.72 5.46 16.17 -20.97 12.49 46.07 4.45 13.70 8.80 10.17 9.31
1958 5.65 14.21 15.49 5.32 36.44 17.23 -45.84 25.19 -1.34 7.86 8.16 13.77 10.25
1959 15.67 50.31 80.87 14.45 35.47 21.69 0.98 20.74 -2.06 32.32 30.79 27.37 29.47
1960 33.72 45.99 46.25 16.65 29.33 2.76 10.54 25.87 -3.94 34.31 31.42 25.47 29.17
1961 -11.22 2.14 11.57 -6.73 -26.91 6.71 '1.98 -2.30 0.52 -8.66 -1.32 -14.54 ■6.19
1962 17.22 33.56 28.84 28.25 50.13 20.82 6.13 22.11 35.67 9.62 27.48 28.05 27.67
1963 16.84 19.78 21.82 23.30 3.83 -3.71 28.62 17.83 14.11 11.70 21.15 7.92 16.70
1964 18.09 24.83 39.04 13.03 27.45 12.08 21.94 10.35 -6.05 4.98 23.73 14.71 20.92
TABLE A 6.65: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN NF-METALS IMPORTS
BY ORIGIN:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6 + 7
1954 7.77 222.76 222.69 30.54 26.64 -72.00 66.10 -256 17.71 28.48 3950 21.69 2956
1955 5223 51.05 23.14 50.17 -1425 43653 54.02 71.14 73.45 -17.65 46.92 1922 3222
1956 17.51 -2526 -2558 9.73 62.56 11.41 34.13 8.13 1054 -3687 4.79 36.93 20.18
1957 -00.52 ■41.57 47.94 14.02 44.99 4955 3.54 -60.73 -33.94 8.52 -2527 51.52 -28.68
1958 5.35 -24.01 14.02 46.78 25.58 758 5.96 40.77 1953 79.77 585 17.12 6.18
1959 74.69 4041 160.13 48.66 30.07 -29.15 3258 105.74 4.67 75.97 69.43 27.04 44.94
1960 13.05 102.58 21.01 922 926 -33.12 13.69 840 885 4.46 1645 7.73 12.03
1961 -0.05 -4641 0.79 4850 3.45 3957 8.58 1.00 2850 7.93 554 1.40 4.11
1962 •11.57 -17.66 11.70 -3155 45.70 -4386 1387 5.93 3657 3154 -14.41 1.55 8.19
1963 1387 6.43 16.67 18.41 -34.08 101.98 -046 1087 8.93 3923 15.14 -7.68 2.42
1964 83.79 283.16 106.74 115.40 117.74 47.02 32.73 -12.18 22.61 745 10355 51.18 77.14
446
TABLE A 6 .60:________ ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN NF-METAL PRODUCT
IIi/IPORTS BY 0 RIGIN:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6+7
1954 56855 86.17 5388 672.49 1390.1
9
26436 32189 29.69 5022 -1926 52383 193.06 277.77
1955 39.98 81.75 76.03 7.95 ■10.08 1085 89.48 51.09 15.07 44.10 1930 2.16 9.41
1956 ■384 5280 -3.17 -48.73 65.17 9021 80.00 3326 15.19 11.00 -30.61 4737 11.40
1957 -9.05 80.09 129.55 -1225 -26.62 530 12583 40.67 1.97 4.73 5.68 -13.40 -7.92
1958 26.08 15920 1.91 5088 -11.46 1728 10886 36.15 16.95 33.07 51.50 6.60 21.40
1959 56.75 66.06 272.68 30.18 8.74 28.78 -13.07 30.44 21.74 28.91 68.60 1136 34.91
1960 183.55 82.41 129.54 34.06 -3.49 57.08 19939 38.02 50.03 42.76 102.72 30.47 67.61
1961 4988 86.61 22.99 36.03 35.57 3027 428 30.65 25.40 19.49 48.77 27.11 40.58
1962 -581 29.95 ■8.79 5.67 382 833 3.48 27.92 -21.41 42.43 5.41 524 1.77
1963 36.07 -3.13 23.49 885 1131 21.62 49.97 -12.15 3.05 1237 15.90 9.49 1386
1964 37.69 69.98 46.16 4431 339 2054 7.04 37.97 39.72 29.45 4934 19.06 40.07
TABLE A 6.65: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN PAPER AND PAPER
PRODUCT IMPORTS BY 0 RIGIN:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6+7
1954 30.21 42.95 35.22 7.65 32.10 27.33 -1.73 -28.29 65.19 319.08 14.59 38.02 33.20
1955 8.66 33.07 296.09 20.14 36.49 20.71 2.67 104.44 27.57 4.74 46.37 21.89 26.22
1956 4736 25.57 -14.34 30.32 60.76 26.81 3.82 90.76 4.71 -2.06 20.34 15.80 16.73
1957 35.51 177.26 -2.38 22.12 27.92 37.23 82.98 263.11 25.41 45.00 23.33 36.83 33.98
1958 41.57 10.02 49.04 42.32 7.18 24.30 16.53 22.95 0.78 52.06 41.51 14.98 20.14
1959 43.90 6.71 123.75 17.38 46.48 16.51 35.69 11.01 0.26 40.66 39.50 14.57 20.29
1960 20.67 73.52 90.46 15.15 32.20 33.11 34.55 39.18 19.71 5.95 37.88 29.02 31.37
1961 9.88 5.09 -18.75 11.88 33.91 0.14 22.53 41.95 -6.12 -6.41 0.14 2.97 2.18
1962 15.71 14.44 -1.68 10.20 20.19 16.76 15.78 66.81 5.65 8.70 7.94 14.92 13.01
1963 8.52 23.97 10.74 17.77 -3.05 8.50 32.01 -8.00 2.19 -11.69 12.39 9.41 10.19
1964 34.40 69.88 26.70 46.57 8.57 19.20 5.19 17.55 11.18 24.80 40.24 14.23 21.16
TABLE A 6.66: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN MACHINERY IMPORTS BY
CIRIGIM
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6+7
1954 8.25 56.50 9.08 38.91 61.89 36.60 31.75 28.85 62.44 6.82 20.84 28.18 26.28
1955 33.88 76.13 38.50 51.68 -2.85 33.16 31.59 132.25 56.22 41.63 51.18 30.34 35.48
1956 75.82 20.27 31.39 38.12 42.02 43.93 113.66 46.64 30.30 26.70 38.05 34.80 35.69
1957 13.08 24.83 37.44 16.74 18.02 12.52 9.20 14.43 18.45 4.41 22.56 10.78 14.08
1958 5.07 37.29 31.69 40.66 27.81 10.41 83.09 73.99 1.03 12.24 29.77 21.28 23.83
1959 27.57 44.37 54.29 52.15 25.28 26.59 -2.95 13.85 24.81 13.78 46.06 19.05 27.57
1960 72.31 79.44 86.86 13.84 33.84 40.67 10.89 8.63 46.65 20.06 60.85 27.16 39.33
1961 18.93 13.18 77.93 10.47 22.85 37.64 61.70 -3.72 42.44 9.03 33.19 19.26 25.07
1962 11.28 0.55 23.45 34.49 8.84 16.94 19.89 3.36 2.91 6.53 17.31 8.58 12.45
1963 -11.36 -1.67 -5.54 0.47 7.47 -3.58 -11.77 -3.85 -8.95 ■0.33 -4.25 0.57 -1.66
1964 28.42 29.65 25.67 11.74 9.34 6.41 34.69 23.31 26.06 7.65 24.07 10.94 16.86
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TABLE A 6 .6 7 :  ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN ELECTRICAL/
ELECTRONICAL IMPORTS EY ORIGIN:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6+7
1954 138.54 -5.55 8.88 2720 90.87 64.31 23.87 126.69 54.42 18.12 29.21 49.93 38.70
1955 15.12 20.31 30.59 12.67 48.17 44.22 57.80 56.18 94.80 44.74 14.67 50.26 32.28
1956 13.88 51.16 17.67 4.86 34.64 -2.72 1.85 -12.36 45.29 11.12 8.81 17.03 13.43
1957 5.58 41.83 68.49 1.25 21.12 22.37 30.35 -5.49 25.61 21.96 10.78 19.56 15.87
1958 178.11 145.71 313.28 109.99 20.75 34.80 282.19 28.21 38.00 11.68 150.06 22.17 73.52
1959 -38.22 68.99 7.52 22.03 52.96 20.24 ■4.17 22.11 9.81 15.95 15.57 28.67 21.09
1960 15.67 81.31 60.27 40.94 8.89 58.56 -15.92 20.09 69.52 35.29 48.38 27.18 38.89
1961 34.40 112.76 37.47 33.73 18.22 31.78 23.40 12.89 38.02 17.05 44.94 21.23 35.21
1962 53.08 65.64 30.36 14.16 16.13 24.28 50.49 31.91 35.08 5.29 29.40 17.46 25.01
1963 106.90 -21.42 -1.88 -25.90 9.01 0.09 63.93 20.74 6.24 16.06 -12.73 11.41 -4.39
1964 8.32 12.03 17.64 32.43 19.29 -9.83 11.80 29.00 14.81 5.56 21.24 12.40 17.68
TABLE A 6.68: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN IMPORTS OF
MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
EEC EFTA TOTAL non6 Non6 6+7
1954 0.65 20.22 9.07 13.08 5.95 10.67
1955 -1.03 19.97 11.29 17.11 14.21 9.79
1956 -2.74 20.56 9.47 15.12 10.01 9.18
1957 1.57 21.41 12.04 16.75 12.56 11.75
1958 12.87 ■4.91 16.88 18.58 45.15 2.98
1959 20.00 -5.25 15.02 13.03 32.43 5.78
1960 2738 -3.69 15.63 11.03 26.19 934
1961 27.48 0.27 15.20 10.40 20.26 12.30
1962 22.50 15.27 12.79 8.87 4.14 18.78
1963 18.06 15.31 10.54 7.35 1.31 16.67
1964 20.93 19.69 15.27 12.74 7.27 20.31
N DM 1 0 0 0 ACCORDING TO ORIGIN:
448
TABLE A 6 .6 9 :
ANNIJALP ERCENTAGE CHANGE IN TEXTI LE EXPORTS BY DESTINJvtion:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6 + 7
1954 9.41 41.79 10.60 3587 32.48 11.03 23.09 1237 6684 3589 26.10 22.74 23.66
1955 25.19 20.48 3288 1.14 9.61 8.65 -1.91 -11.45 56.49 10.47 13.68 786 9.49
1956 23.05 11.97 25.46 36.90 ■037 -9.99 10.90 522 23.73 2029 2734 430 10.99
1957 40.18 33.66 -2.90 10.75 10.76 3.95 0.40 ■037 12.40 40.06 2029 11.99 14.76
1958 -2528 -18.17 -30.04 -14.02 483 -732 -2036 -17.55 -1.67 -1453 -19.78 -9.93 -1337
1959 27.98 2934 5085 30.04 23.11 4.67 18.08 29.54 2020 15.64 31.15 1684 21.47
1960 18.58 321 11137 13.02 30.79 834 1039 4.03 21.92 1937 22.77 1580 1824
1961 4.10 4429 3222 3184 -6.11 -2.96 -534 -131 17.15 1.40 2625 1.50 10.48
1962 38.54 3720 37.40 1984 151 -3.44 -13.76 1.14 1532 826 30.03 3.79 14.66
1965 956 43.40 43.69 30.07 9.69 1032 -5.39 -184 18.54 1432 3023 1056 1980
1964 1424 13.97 33.46 26.01 487 2.47 6.59 17.79 15.57 14.42 22.94 1127 1723
TABLE A 6.70:
ANNIJALP ERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CHEMICAL EXPOR1rs BY DEST NATICIN:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6 + 7
1954 2427 36.00 25.75 27/16 7.94 33.04 3623 2688 4580 36.67 2829 2755 2788
1955 2039 24.61 1687 8.67 2.43 7.11 53.60 5.00 1653 31.15 16.74 1456 15.53
1956 20.75 24.51 2839 1285 10.16 23.03 1882 34.07 921 620 2088 15.91 1820
1957 4.66 5.56 1.01 13.14 -023 827 16.75 -1129 24.12 25.48 6.46 9.46 8.07
1958 550 882 686 13.04 1781 ■4.51 1.54 4.61 5.10 -124 888 389 621
1959 23.17 3339 14.57 2728 1584 26.47 2.03 1680 1087 37.41 2520 2022 2255
1960 1589 18.05 39.17 21.09 14.73 1680 13.77 21.76 20.17 2586 2285 19.65 21.18
1961 7.07 030 14.76 11.12 -480 1223 2.96 4.96 5.69 15.96 832 7.10 7.69
1962 4.11 10.75 1836 5.78 1720 126 -7.00 1.11 5.59 382 5.98 480 537
1963 13.51 23.46 23.76 2026 2929 6.75 -281 -1.14 4.93 18.61 20.77 1230 16.45
1964 2451 222 1485 19.97 1584 229 17.05 9.45 21.07 11.41 14.71 12.41 13.58
TABLE A 6.71:
ANN JALP ERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NF-METALS EXPO*ITS B\r DESTINATION:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6 + 7
1954 33.49 69.66 92.45 -7639 48.13 85.79 5629 35.56 74.62 23.64 -2725 -10.06 -16.48
1955 -55.73 ■42.10 9230 48.09 -2.77 1923 486 6722 8836 83.56 37.48 2939 32.03
1956 122.98 170.69 39.70 25.01 ■43.02 19.73 46.12 5825 5.51 54.94 52.15 520 13.58
1957 71.46 -11.47 -27.70 29.53 56.65 -7928 -1924 -1352 -12.99 46.71 5.94 4129 -27.06
1958 -13.08 59.47 -3338 10.58 289 5240 8.16 21.10 6.18 551 -24.51 -289 -15.01
1959 6687 2029 -1521 116.74 11.00 5036 5683 51.74 834 -1.03 49.02 348 26.15
1960 116.78 3724 3444 5530 274.10 3326 21.68 -16.06 49.64 123.13 54.43 8626 67.54
1961 2931 54.92 -1.48 34.04 -34.70 77.16 -1422 583 581 66.41 27.73 0.15 15.10
1962 3.74 81.15 1134 5734 178.61 5688 -2923 884 -24.67 -28.57 -33.42 12.03 -1531
1963 5.95 -32.94 ■4.53 50.59 5083 81.75 -19.76 5287 -10.06 -21.92 -1727 5185 -24.96
1964 5988 -036 25.75 133.10 25.69 41.15 -1980 10722 1980 32.73 56.94 2826 4321
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TABLE A 6.72:
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN NF-METAL PRODUCT EXPORTS BY 
DESTINATION:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6 + 7
1954 2229 1468 2330 3369 ■15.12 2069 3021 5559 13521 21.59 2721 27.12 27.16
1955 15.45 3.38 2364 25.66 20.49 2364 -236 -1752 4963 24.09 2021 1768 19.03
1956 11.75 2768 68.72 30.95 24.50 15711 3665 1427 1.01 16.50 2929 1625 22.49
1957 2.54 25.91 -326 627 6.92 ■127 -3.56 -3.90 2137 4.03 -1.94 335 0.68
1958 -5.17 -339 634 -20.70 0.14 -3.64 ■1966 9.77 16.55 6.44 -1329 2.58 523
1959 A47 26.50 2022 18715 19.49 13.49 19.55 2158 11.60 16712 13.70 16.03 14.98
1960 18.54 24.51 5058 18712 36.77 1269 8.56 37.08 25.60 28.47 23.96 24.73 2439
1961 13J09 2161 15.64 12.03 -3.58 -1.64 963 2718 16.92 26717 1435 1159 1261
1962 2.40 2467 2934 530 -2.19 -5J06 3.68 15.45 4.04 3.01 12.03 238 6.72
1965 1167 17.01 26.72 6.94 9.53 1238 1.77 0.51 23.48 821 13.69 10.18 1164
1964 38.60 -067 28.00 4135 31.99 1623 19.10 26.06 1128 136 30.12 12711 20.92
TABLE A 6.75:
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCT EXPORTS
ACCCIRDING TO OF ORIlGIN:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6 + 7
1954 2524 3556 11.47 25.69 7734 61.07 58.91 86.16 116.05 4702 25.15 6761 44.49
1955 42.91 6.01 27.43 556 37.75 1369 639 1122 71.92 1065 18 66 22.40 20.72
1956 •028 1622 61.79 16.91 -2060 -1j47 26.09 0.04 14.08 12.61 16.00 1.75 839
1957 4.67 28.59 0.67 4710 10716 2450 6.61 1962 19718 14.95 669 1723 12.13
1958 565 5.13 -20.78 1.07 3664 6.02 -133 4.72 30.78 2.15 -463 13.02 4.48
1959 8.03 1356 55.45 23.08 4326 5.93 10.93 1227 9.75 1.03 2128 1329 16.75
1960 35.03 27.77 72.08 30.48 30713 6718 3234 16.71 27.79 28.53 38.00 23.08 2960
1961 8.63 2750 21.02 1121 236 4.96 -232 1257 8.13 15.90 14.77 8.10 1129
1962 14.19 28.73 33.63 1126 -253 1258 5.72 7.70 14.15 1639 1939 8 66 14.05
1963 6.05 34.62 4024 15.15 1266 1365 19.02 055 851 1427 2223 10.79 16.70
1964 26.70 15.00 26.01 25.61 126 18.57 10.61 15.93 16.54 12.16 24.02 1229 18.64
TABLE A 6.74:
ANNIJAL PERCEN1fAGE CHANGE IN MACHINERY EXPO*ITS B)f  DES1riNATION:
BlUX 1 F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6 + 7
1954 14.17 029 10.48 19.07 -14.41 1161 332 2366 5566 16.76 1036 12.46 1131
1955 7.06 -1.40 2822 23.56 18.53 14.67 3.51 -939 34.49 4.72 1426 1335 1364
1956 2324 16.97 54.76 29.56 29.03 ■0.01 -2.71 5.90 367 35.47 3161 14.06 23.67
1957 1560 3353 1560 3.14 1129 16.15 22J04 19.04 39.07 18.79 15.70 21.04 17.96
1958 0.66 -259 -1428 -1393 1223 17/11 027 1299 10.61 050 6.46 8.94 0.91
1959 -10.14 10.40 2637 10.97 -1.78 5.14 -953 3626 032 3.93 10.54 3.64 725
1960 19.63 18.09 15.02 19.70 25.57 15.54 3724 11.58 25.52 1969 17.78 21.73 19.60
1961 30.95 32.93 28.60 26.90 3128 23.92 11.11 1938 16.94 35.19 29.68 2462 27.40
1962 1228 24.75 24.04 6.95 -222 -2.44 3.16 14.70 2A2 28.63 1763 7.64 13.15
1963 12.91 2635 10.60 231 3.91 5.77 1.78 -5.18 -3.18 093 13/10 064 7.91
1964 -2065 -16.06 1836 1260 23.54 76.75 7.61 15.43 6.14 131 0.02 20.92 8.56
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TABLE A 6.75:
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICAL EXPORTS BY 
DESTINATION:
BlUX I F NL UK SWE N DK AUT CH EEC EFTA 6 + 7
1954 3039 821 42.17 5632 86.07 34.71 -2.14 24.19 8422 29.97 33.72 3333 33.54
1955 14.94 18.04 8.94 3929 13721 27.08 11.43 126 5736 25.13 24.52 34.65 29.43
1956 3421 36.71 32.67 33.13 -10.12 1835 230 20.94 17.00 3134 34.17 15.46 24.73
1957 2027 1535 9.17 -0.05 35.68 25716 2029 2431 2826 22.76 934 25.71 16.98
1958 -537 ■4.60 -0.51 1^2.09 27.14 2535 -0.18 2133 1321 733 -736 1636 4.53
1959 2.78 14.65 38.10 2029 55.12 10.40 4.54 34.30 5.19 19.12 16.12 16.52 1634
1960 18.06 1938 36.09 34.07 3.19 11.94 39.98 3124 13.96 1934 27.03 1620 20.97
1961 14.13 1533 49.61 23.52 -17.19 -10.15 028 12.61 20.60 21.16 23.13 3.55 12.62
1962 1.58 1934 43.08 0.71 -631 133 139 2345 334 936 12.08 3.50 735
1963 2230 19.45 30.42 9.63 1822 822 1.79 44.41 9.01 3.09 18.69 430 12.10
1964 2.17 •4.64 20.46 2534 3526 15.08 430 17.74 1928 11.13 12.59 16.41 1428
TABLE A 6.76: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANCE IN EXPORTS OF
MANlIFACTIJRED PRODU(CTS IN DM 1000
EEC EFTA to tal non6 Non 6, 7
1956 25.84 23.89 20.43 18.44 14.77
1957 7.07 4.66 17.26 21.24 33.28
1958 -4.83 6.30 3.58 6.48 6.58
1959 16.79 13.55 11.05 9.28 6.86
1960 28.91 16.28 27.25 26.70 32.99
1961 17.09 8.39 5.71 -3.39 -1.54
1962 11.70 1.78 4.08 6.68 0.77
1963 14.69 7.05 8.00 5.16 4.05
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chemical imports ftom the Netherlands in DM 1000 












l i l l l l l l l l
. -i . . |V.t : .|i ; ■ Vi, .4.: >■ -I .. .;.4mm
153-58 
N L
_________________ FIGURE A 6.17_________________




o  80000 o
°  60000




f i  co










14000 J  
o  12000 
o  10000
Z. 8000 










chemical imports ftom Norway in DM 1000 compared to the 
1953-58 trend
10000
“  5000 ■ t 55-58 
Na\A0 y
co csi 
cn ’=t- CD CD
quarters
FIGURE A 6.20






m - H ¥
1^- CO Csl T— a^- co
CO Kt in in in CD CD K-in in in in
• t 53-58 
DK
C \ I t7 ' * - C O C \ I t7 ’<3-COC\J 
__ ^  t D f f l O l O r ^ N N m ^n i i n i n i n i n C D C D C D C D  CD CD
quarters
FIGURE A 6.21


















■ t 53-58 
Austria
458
FIGURE A 6 .22





o  60000 -.: : ■= H v  :•• : :•1 .: •.
o  50000 H I 11 11 1 • I I I  HI
Z. 40000 -
q  30000 ___V
20000 .
10000
0 - ■ ‘ ' ‘ ‘ ---< i ) , < . i . ,
cnin CDi n
i t r r i T












T- n- r T friT r t t r
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non-ferrous metal imports ftom BLux in dm 1000 compared 
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non-ferrous metal imports ftom France in DM 1000 




g  40000 |  





t-  - d-  CO CM t—
cb cb  i n  c o
i n  i n  i n  i n  i n
CO CM 
CO IV. CD CT?
4  n  ( M  i —  4  n  c m
t n  o  r ^ -  c \ i  o j  c i  4
t n i n c o c o c o c o c o c os
quarters
460
FIGURE A 6 .28
non-ferrous metal imports from the Netherlands in DM 1000 
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non-ferrous metal imports from Sweden in DM 1000 
compared to the 1953-58 trend
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non-ferrous metal imports from Denmark in DM 1000 
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FIGURE A 6 .34
non-ferrous metal imports from Switzerland in DM 1000 
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FIGURE A 6.35
non-ferrous metal imports from the EEC in DM 1000 
compared to the 1953-58 trend
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FIGURE A 6 .37
imports of non-ferrous metal products from B Lux in DM 
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FIGURE A 6 .40
imports of non-ferrous metal products ftom the Netherlands 
in DM 1000 compared to the 1953-58 trend
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imports of non-ferrous metal products ftom the UK in DM 
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imports of non-ferrous metal products from Norvuay in DM 
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imports of non-ferrous metal products from Denmark in DM 
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imports of non-ferrous metal products from Switzerland in 




g  8000 
2  6000 
°  4000 
2000 
0
L O L O L O L D L n i n mL n L n L n c o c o c o t o c D c o
quarters
FIGURE A 6.47
imports of non-ferrous metal products from the EEC in DM 
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imports of non-ferrous metal products from the EFTA in DM 
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FIGURE A 6 .49
imports of paper and paper products ftom B Lux in DM 1000 
compared to the 1955-58 trend
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FIGURE A 6.50
imports of paper and paper products ftom Italy in DM 1000 

















imports of paper and paper producte from France in DM 
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FIGURE A 6 .52
imports of paper and paper products ftom the Netherlands in 
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______________________  FIGURE A 6.55__________________
imports of paper and paper products ftom the UK in DM 1000 
compared to the 1955-58 trend
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FIGURE A 6.54
imports of paper and paper products ftom Sweden in DM 





0  50000 
I! 40000




r ^ ^ n N r - « » n ( \ i ^ < n ( s i r - ^ n N
n r i f l i n i i u i N t i o t n a j o ^ N t s i n ^





FIGURE A 6 .55
imports of paper and paper products ftom Norway in DM 
1000 compared to the 1953-58 trend
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FIGURE A 6.56
imports of paper and paper products ftom Denmark in DM 
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imports of paper and paper products ftom Austria DM 1000 
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imports of paper and paper products ftom Switzerland in 
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FIGURE A 6.59
imports of paper and paper products ftom the EEC in DM 
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imports of paper and paper products ftom the EFTA in DM 
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FIGURE A 6 .6 4
machinery imports ftom the Netherlands in dm 1000 
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FIGURE A 6 .70
machinery imports ftom Switzerland in DM 1000 compared 
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FIGURE A 6.72
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imports of electrical and electronical products ftom B Lux in 
DM 1000 compared to the 1953-58 trend
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FIGURE A 6.75
imports of electrical and electronical products ftom France 
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FIGURE A 6 .76
imports of electrical and electronic product from the 
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FIGURE A 6.77
imports of electrical and electronic products from the UK in 
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FIGURE A 6.78
imports of electrical and electronic products from Sweden 
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FIGURE A 6 .79
imports of electrical and electronic products ftom Norway 
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FIGURE A 6.80
imports of electrical and electronic products ftom Denmark 
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FIGURE A 6 .82
imports of electrical and electronic products Rom 
Switzerland in DM 1000 compared to the 1955-58 trend
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_________________ FIGURE A 6.85_________________
imports of electrical and electronic products from the EEC 
in DM 1000 compared to the 1955-58 trend
3 0 0 0 0 0
2 5 0 0 0 0
o  200000 o
°  1 5 0 0 0 0
o  100000 
5 0 0 0 0
r -  ^  n  cm cn cb A
quarters
FIGURE A 6.84
imports of electrical and electronic products ftom the EFTA 
in DM 1000 compared to the 1955-58 trend
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FIGURE A 6 .85
textile exports to blux in DM 1000 compared to the 1953-
58 trend
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FIGURE A 6.86
textile exports to Italy in DM 1000 compared to the 1953-58
trend
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FIGURE A 6.87
textile exports to France in DM 1000 compared to the 1953-
58 trend
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FIGURE A 6 .1 0 0
chemical exports to the Netherlands in DM 1000 compared 
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FIGURE A 6.107
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FIGURE A 6 .1 0 9
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non-ferrous metal exports to France in DM 1000 compared 
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FIGURE A 6 .112
non-ferrous metal exports to the Netherlands in DM 1000 
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non-ferrous metal exports to Sweden in DM 1000 compared 




“  10000 ..
5000 |




FIGURE A 6 .115
non-ferrous metal exports to Norway in DM 1000 compared 
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FIGURE A 6.116
non-ferrous metal exports to Denmark in DM 1000 compared 
to the 1953-58 trend
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FIGURE A 6.117
non-ferrous metal exports to Austria in DM 1000 compared 
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FIGURE A 6 .118
non-ferrous metal exports to Switzerland in DM 1000 












non-ferrous metal exports to the EEC in DM 1000 compared 
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non-ferrous metal exports to the EFTA in DM 1000 compared 
to the 1953-58 trend
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exports of non-ferrous metal products to blux in DM 1000 
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FIGURE A 6.122
exports of non-ferrous metal products to Italy in DM 1000 
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exports of non-ferrous metal products to Fiance in DM 1000 
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FIGURE A 6 .124
exports of non-ferrous metals Id the Netherlands in DM 
1000 compared to the 1953-58 trend
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exports of non-ferrous metal products to the UK in DM 1000 
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exports non-ferrous metal products to Norway in DM 1000 
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exports of non-fleirous metal products to Denmark in DM 
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FIGURE A 6.129
exports of non-ferrous metal products to Austria in DM 1000 
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exports of non-ferrous metal products to Switzerland in DM 1000 
compared to the 1955-58 trend
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FIGURE A 6.131
exports of non-ferrous metal products to the EEC in DM 1000 
compared to the 1953-58 trend
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FIGURE A 6.132
exports of non-ferrous metal products to the EFTA in DM1000 
compared to the 1953-58 trend
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__________________ FIGURE A 6 .135___________________
exports of paper and paper products to BLux in DM 1000 
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FIGURE A 6.134
exports of paper and paper products to Italy in DM 1000 
compared to the 1953-58 trend
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FIGURE A 6.135
exporb of paper and paper products to France in DM 1000 
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FIGURE A 6.137
exports of paper and paper products to the UK in DM 1000 
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FIGURE A 6 .1 3 9
exports of paper and paper products to Norway in DM 1000 
compared Id the 1953-58 trend
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exports of paper and paper products to Denmark in DM 1000 
compared to the 1953-58 trend
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exports of paper and paper products to Austria in DM 1000 
compared to the 1953-58 trend
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exports of paper and paper products to Switzerland in DM 
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exports of paper and paper products to the EEC in DM 1000 
compared to the 1955-58 trend
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